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I

THE DONELSON CAMPAIGN

BY

GEORGE A. BRUCE

CAPTAIN AND BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, 13TH NEW HAMPSHIRE VOLUNTEERS

Read before the Society December 30, 1907

THE DONELSON CAMPAIGN

On the first of January, 1862, there were 208,604 men in arms on the line of the Potomac; 83,060 under Buell, most of them grouped about and near Louisville; and 92,227 in the Department of the Missouri commanded by General Halleck. General McClellan was the commander-in-chief and in direct control of the Army of the Potomac.

The last six months of the previous year had been principally given up to the organization of forces by the Union and Confederate governments, with the result that their respective numbers were very nearly in the ratio of five to three. At this date the line had been definitely drawn between the loyal and disloyal states and sections of states, so that each government knew from what population it could draw to carry on the war. Missouri was still the most disturbed of the territory under Federal control, but the insurgents there, so far as organized forces were concerned, had been pretty nearly driven from the state.

In the East the Confederate troops held a line close up to the Potomac, touching it at several points so as to command its navigation; and west of the Alleghanies a line running from Columbus on the Mississippi through Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Clarksville, Bowling Green, and Mill Springs to Knoxville in East Tennessee.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, whom Mr. Davis considered the ablest soldier in the Confederate service, was in command of Department No. 2, which embraced nearly the whole of the Mississippi Valley on either side of the river of that name. At Bowling Green, a bold salient thrust out a hundred miles to the north of the general line, were stationed the divisions of Hardee and Buckner, later reënforced by Floyd, Pil-

low, and Bowen, so as to make the number of men of all arms just 24,000. At Columbus and other points on or near the river, 22,000 could be counted under General Polk. Fort Henry and Fort Donelson were garrisoned by 5000 men commanded by General Tilghman. During the period covered by the Donelson campaign, General Johnston could never have brought together within the field of operations over 50,000 men. The forces in East Tennessee, and the small division of Crittenden, demoralized and scattered by the defeat at Mill Springs, are excluded from this enumeration for the reason that they were not available.

The strategical campaign against Forts Henry and Donelson was the first in point of time, and first or second in importance and brilliancy, as it may be viewed by different students, of all the great campaigns of the Civil War. In my opinion it ranks first in importance and value. To what circumstances, at whose suggestion and impulsion it owes its origin, the relation which Generals McClellan, Halleck, and Buell bore to it, and its importance as a factor in the war, are the objects I have in view to present in this paper.

The impatience of the Administration and the public generally had nearly reached its limit at the inactivity of our armies during the fall of 1861. The bulk of this feeling, swelling at times into wrath and breaking out into words of distrust, no doubt was concentrated on the person of General McClellan. Halleck was in fact pretty free from it, for, during the short time he had been in command of the Department of the Missouri, the task of straightening out the tangle which Frémont had created or permitted had been pretty nearly accomplished, and much progress had been made in solving the military problem in that state. Elsewhere, save in sending off the expeditions of Sherman, Butler, and Burnside, inaction was the rule. General McClellan had been for nearly six months in Washington, for two months commander-in-chief of half a million men in arms, and no general plan for the

use of this large force had been made by him, nor any suggestion of value given to either of his two principal subordinate commanders. He had urged upon Buell the necessity of occupying East Tennessee, but he only made a feint at such a movement, and really never intended to enter seriously into it. It would, at the time, have been a false military move, though supported by the President with all the earnestness of a heart touched by the sufferings of a loyal people.

So disheartening was the situation at the beginning of the year that the President, McClellan being sick, took the reins into his own hands, feeling, according to his quaint expression, "if something were not soon done the bottom would be out of the whole affair," and wrote to Halleck and Buell advising them to get together and put their forces into the real work of the war. There had thus far been no communication between them, but the letters of the President resulted in an interchange of messages and nothing more.

On the 29th of December Buell wrote to McClellan a long letter of a familiar type, informing him, among other things, that Bowling Green had been reënforced. He then went on to tell him that "unless checked by strong demonstrations and attacks on Columbus and the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, the number can easily be increased to 50,000 or even 60,000 before I can get there. These facts make the coöperation I have in former letters mentioned as important quite essential now to any great success. It is quite essential, too, that the success should be *speedy*, or otherwise the enemy will be so strong in West Tennessee and Kentucky from Bowling Green to Columbus as to increase our work vastly."[1]

At this time General Buell had no intention of making any forward movement for months, and his use of the word "speedy" must be interpreted in accordance with his now well-known habits when in command of an army. But McClellan, on receipt of this letter, not intending to move him-

[1] 7 W. R. 520, 521.

self, knowing well the complaints everywhere uttered and muttered at his apparently interminable delays, — delighted, perhaps, at the prospect of something that would draw off the public attention from his own inactivity, — interpreted the word "speedy" as it is commonly understood, and without making any inquiry of Buell as to the time when his columns would be on the road, ordered Halleck without a moment's delay to make the required demonstrations. "As our success in Kentucky," he says, "depends in a great measure on our preventing reënforcements from joining Buckner and Johnston, not a moment's time should be lost in preparing these expeditions." This would indicate that McClellan had no thought of any movement in that field except one by Buell by land against Bowling Green.

Except a considerable aggregation under General Curtis near the Arkansas border, Halleck's army was divided up into small detachments and widely scattered. The nearest force was that of General Grant within what was called the District of Cairo, consisting of about 14,000 men doing garrison duty at some five posts along the Ohio River. They were mostly new troops and were without even brigade organization. Halleck turned over McClellan's orders to Grant and requested him to carry them out. Grant immediately formed his infantry into two divisions: one under Smith was sent to demonstrate against Fort Henry, and the other under McClernand moved toward Columbus. With great propriety Grant accompanied McClernand's column.

There is one sentence in General Grant's letter to Halleck just before leaving Cairo, which shines out in such marked contrast with the disheartening complaints and excuses of so many of our officers during this period, that it is worth quoting: "The continued rains of the last week and more have rendered the roads extremely bad, and will necessarily make our movement slow. This, however, will operate worse upon the enemy, if he should come out to meet us, than upon us."

There was one general always ready to move on receipt of orders, his troops always equipped and supplied with food, and plenty of ammunition. The two columns were out for a week or ten days, during which time a severe storm, with rain and sleet and snow, came on and made the roads, already "extremely bad," the worst ever known, causing extreme discomfort and much suffering. The number of men who died and were disabled from these useless and inexcusable demonstrations was equal to the casualties of a sharp battle. Neither accomplished anything directly, but the indirect results were of the highest import. So far as accomplishing what McClellan indicated as the object of these demonstrations, they might as well have been made to the northward toward Springfield, Illinois, as in the direction they took.

There was no intention of sending reënforcements from Columbus to Bowling Green, for the Confederate officers rightly held that all other positions and places were of secondary importance to the Mississippi River. General Buell, in the letter referred to, showed the belief and feeling, common to many in the early days, that the enemy were focusing their eyes on him alone, and that, whenever he began to move, every post would be stripped or abandoned, and all their forces would be at once concentrated against his own army.

It has been said more than once that General Grant had not the gift of imagination. It is true that he had not that kind of imagination that sees an enemy where none exists; that multiplies by five the number of those who happened to be in his front; that discovers obstacles impossible to overcome whenever there is a necessity to act; that sees the road open and the way clear to victory when the foe is far away and not threatening; that conjures up, on his near approach, a multitude of impossible movements being made on the flanks and to the rear; that sets the brain of a commander into a whirl of doubt and uncertainty which generally ends

in a hasty retreat or ignominious defeat; but of that higher type he was more richly endowed than any of his contemporaries save Lincoln alone.

It was not through knowledge gained from books but through the gift of an historic imagination in part that he was enabled to see the true character of the great conflict in which he was engaged, its relation to the past and its bearing on the future; that enabled him to take in at a glance the whole field of the war, to form a correct opinion of every suggested and possible strategic campaign, their logical order and sequence, their relative value and the interdependence of one upon another; and finally at Appomattox, the moment Lee let drop his flag, to see that the end had come and the whole Southland was once more a part of a common country and her conquered soldiers were again his countrymen.

It has already been said that the indirect effect of the movements against Columbus and Fort Henry was of the highest import; this I will now endeavor to explain.

Very soon after General Grant was assigned to the command of the District of Cairo he formed the opinion that the weak point in the Confederate line was at the Tennessee River, and that to break it there would result in disaster to the enemy. With a settled plan in his own mind he sent a request to Halleck to visit St. Louis for the purpose of laying it before him. To this letter no reply was ever sent. Halleck, without doubt, at this time put a low estimate on his abilities and treated him with disrespect, if not with contempt. During his demonstration against Fort Henry General Smith, whom Halleck considered as a soldier very highly, went within two miles of the fort, and having gained a good deal of information in regard to it and the means of approaching it, had formed the opinion that it could be taken.

Grant having his own opinion confirmed, if not strengthened, by the judgment of so good a soldier as Smith, and knowing the value of the use of his name in favor of his own

designs, again asked permission to visit St. Louis, which was finally granted. During an interview with Halleck he laid before him his plans, but, being rudely rebuffed, he returned to Cairo.

Halleck, however, the next day wrote to Smith requesting him to give all the information he had gained in regard to Fort Henry during his demonstration, and, though there is no record of his reply, there can be no doubt but one was sent.

This project had taken so strong a hold upon the mind of Grant that he could not drop it; and in several dispatches pressed it upon the attention of his commander, and finally drew on Commodore Foote, who, at his request, wrote Halleck that the fort could and should be taken. On the first of February Grant received authority to prepare the expedition. It is not likely that Grant would have pressed the subject so persistently upon Halleck but for the concurrence of Smith in his plan, nor is it likely that Halleck would have given his consent but for the opinion and information contained in Smith's reply to him. So it happened that a crowning victory and the auspicious beginning of a great military career can be traced back to the use of the word "speedy" in a letter from Buell to McClellan under date of the 29th of December, 1861.

The next day after receiving his instructions Grant was steaming up the Tennessee River with his army in transports behind him. This promptness was the occasion of a curious protest on the part of one whose slow and methodical mind had been formed in a bureau where time was not considered, and details were regarded as the real essence of military life.

Fort Henry was taken on the 6th, and in making his report to Halleck Grant informed him that Fort Donelson would be taken on the 8th, a promise not fulfilled as to the date, but accomplished eight days later with an enlarged measure of success that more than compensated for a slight postponement in time. It is quite certain that the taking and holding of

Fort Henry was all that was originally contemplated. It was a sudden inspiration, after the landing and the first victory was gained, that led Grant to extend the campaign and make conquest of the Cumberland River.

The cause of the delay was the coming on of a storm of great severity which caused the river to overflow its banks for a mile on either side; rendered the roads impassable for the artillery, and imposed upon the men much labor to save the ammunition from being spoiled and the supplies from being injured. It was not until the morning of the 12th that the army was able to move, but, before night came down, the enemy had been driven within his works, and our lines were drawn about them from Hickman's Creek to a point near the Cumberland.

Information of the fall of Fort Henry was received by General Johnston with surprise and consternation on the afternoon of the 6th of February at Bowling Green. He at once called Generals Beauregard and Hardee into a conference. These officers indulged in no illusions, for each realized the gravity of the situation. General Beauregard wrote out a report of this conference, sending one copy to Richmond and leaving another with General Johnston.

They recognized that the armies of Generals Johnston and Polk must thereafter act independently, as communication between the two had been severed, save by a circuit of several hundred miles, which also might soon be closed. It was unanimously agreed that Bowling Green should be evacuated and the army brought back to Nashville; that Columbus should temporarily be defended by a force of about 3000 men, and other positions on the Mississippi held for the purpose of retarding as long as possible our progress down the river. Though not expressed in the report it is to be inferred that the intention was that Fort Donelson should be abandoned, for it states the opinion to be that it was no longer tenable, and provided for the erection of new batteries on

the river a few miles from Nashville. The conference went so far as to provide for the possible retreat of Johnston to Stevenson and Polk into Mississippi. These retrograde movements were thought likely to be necessary by reason of the occupation of Fort Henry alone. That these officers formed a correct opinion of the military situation and agreed upon a rational plan of future operations is too clear for discussion.

After the conference was dissolved it would seem that the responsibility of giving up so much without a contest, of quitting Kentucky and yielding up the greater part of Tennessee, preyed upon the mind of General Johnston, deprived him of the moral courage to carry out its decisions, and led to the adoption of a compromising middle course that resulted in disaster.

Commencing at once the withdrawal of his troops from Bowling Green he sent enough of them to Fort Donelson to make the garrison number 18,500 effectives, and resolved, as he expresses it, to make a fight there for the defence of Nashville. His selection of General Floyd for a position of such importance was bad enough, but his instructions to him, to save the army if he was not able to hold the fort, were well calculated to produce irresolution and vacillation at a time when decision and resolute courage were most demanded.

As General Johnston had concurred with Beauregard and Hardee in the opinion that earthworks were not able to contend successfully with ironclads, the placing of 18,500 men in a position where they were sure to be surrounded on the land, and liable to be cut off from their base by the passing of the water-batteries by a single gunboat, which was Grant's plan, and which Commodore Foote ought to have done, instead of holding his fleet for hours within two hundred yards of the muzzles of the enemy's guns, it would seem that he was acting not in the line of a prudent and able commander. Besides, since the loss of Fort Henry, Donelson had ceased to be of much value, for the two forts had been built prin-

cipally to protect the railroad to Columbus, and that had been put out of use by the destruction of the great bridge over the Tennessee.

In the meantime, Grant, in ignorance of the consternation which his first success had caused in the Confederate camps, and the proposed movements of the enemy, was alone preparing to bring his campaign to a close. There were but two educated officers in the army under him, General Charles F. Smith and Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, who was temporarily serving on his staff. On the 13th of February his lines were drawn more closely around the beleaguered garrison and eligible positions secured for his batteries. General McClernand, without the knowledge of his chief, attempted the capture of a battery, but the assault made by three regiments was not successful.

On the 14th General Wallace was brought over from Fort Henry and a division of two brigades formed for him, consisting of one commanded by General Thayer, and a second composed of reënforcements sent up the Cumberland. He took a position in the centre, enabling McClernand to move further to the right. During the afternoon Commodore Foote engaged the water-batteries, but was unable to silence them. His fleet was badly damaged; one boat after another drifted out of range, and all hope of much further assistance from the navy was gone. Grant at once concluded that he would be compelled to resort to a siege; but this was not to be.

General Floyd, remembering the injunction of his chief, — "if he could not hold the fort, to at least save the army," — evidently had his mind firmly fixed on the last part of his instructions, and after consulting with his officers, decided upon an attempt to break through the right of our lines and get back to Nashville.

In the early morning of the 15th, most of his army, burdened with knapsacks and haversacks filled with cooked rations, was brought to the left near Dover, and, at about

daylight, a vigorous attack was commenced on McClernand's division with the expectation or hope of driving back our right to a distance sufficient to uncover the roads leading to Nashville.

Though successful in shattering McClernand's division, or a considerable part of it, the Confederate forces were so broken up and scattered during the prolonged contest that it was impossible to continue the battle or withdraw the army.

It was at the moment when the battle had ceased and the opposing forces were at a standstill fronting each other, with a wide interval between the lines, if lines there were, that Grant arrived from an interview with Commodore Foote on board the flagship. Seldom, if ever, has so sudden and complete a transformation taken place on a battle-field as his presence produced. Learning from the men that the Confederate army had come out with knapsacks and rations in their haversacks, he instantly divined the object of the enemy and the character of the hostile assault. To every one else it appeared that the Confederate officers had imposed an unnecessary hardship upon their men in ordering them into a battle burdened in this way. To him it revealed a plan to escape. With that intuitive knowledge that men of genius possess, he saw that the whole of the Donelson army had been massed upon his right with the object of retreating to Nashville, if a way could first be opened for them. In this they had failed. The conclusion was necessary that nothing more than a skirmish line had been left behind, and the conclusion was in accordance with the fact. Giving an order to McClernand and Wallace to regain their former position, Grant rode instantly — and he always had a fine horse — to the left, and ordered General Smith to assault the lines on his front. Smith was an accomplished soldier, and had been a professor at West Point when Grant was a cadet. He had already discovered that there was something beyond the ordinary in his former student and was loyal and devoted to him. In a very

short time Smith had formed his division and was leading it forward. As Grant had divined, there was but a single regiment there to oppose him. Without serious loss, and, with none of the desperate fighting that has been often described, the lines were carried and a position gained that completely commanded the water-batteries and enfiladed the works on the right. The success gained came none too soon, for the Confederate commanders, when the attempt to break through had been defeated, at once ordered the troops to take up again their positions in their defensive lines, and a delay of five minutes would have enabled Johnson's division to have filled them and doubtless held them against Smith's assault. The greater part of the casualties in Smith's division occurred in an attempt by Johnson to regain what had been lost. The fort being no longer tenable, General Buckner, who had succeeded to the command, made an unconditional surrender of his army the following morning.

We often speak of this or that battle as "the soldiers' battle," but Donelson can with every propriety be designated as Grant's battle. Many soldiers were engaged in it, but his genius brought the victory. His quick comprehension of the whole situation on his return to the field; his divination of the enemy's plan and object; his clear sight of the empty lines on the left; his speedy ride to Smith's division and infusion into its commander of that energy and promptness which the emergency demanded make up a rounded whole of the comprehensive vision of a battle-field and perfect conduct of a battle that has never been surpassed. While preparing this paper I have re-read the accounts of the famous battles where the credit for victory has been specially awarded to eminent commanders, and I can find none where the evidence is so clear in the favor of any as that in favor of Grant at Donelson.

Though the Donelson campaign was Grant's in conception and execution, yet Halleck, McClellan, and Buell had some

relations with it, and it is not without interest to see how they viewed it and what each did to make it successful. From the 5th to the 17th of February more than a hundred dispatches passed between these three officers, most of which have been preserved.

During this period, both in his action and correspondence, Halleck appears to better advantage than the other two, though commendation must be so often qualified that the sum of praise is not very large. From the first he commenced gathering up and sending forward reënforcements with a zeal and energy the most commendable. He sent his chief-of-staff, General Cullum, a capable officer, to Cairo and kept him there with authority to issue any order in his name that might be helpful. He stripped his own department, begged troops of Hunter from Kansas, and kept the wires trembling with messages to Buell and McClellan for aid. It can be said that during ten days, from the 6th to the 16th of February, Halleck rendered the greatest service to the country that can be credited to him during the war by remaining in his office in St. Louis and extending a helping hand to Grant. It in no way detracts from this that possibly the victory might have been won with less aid.

The strategical field into which Grant had boldly entered with 15,000 raw troops, with only one educated soldier under him with a command, could as well be studied and understood in Washington from a map as on the ground itself. It was the first important movement on a large scale of the new year and the duty of every one in a position to aid, to do all possible to make it successful, is too plain even to mention. In this connection it should be remembered that the President had written a private letter to both Buell and Halleck urging them to coöperate and put their forces into activity. In a dispatch dated the 5th of February, Halleck informed McClellan that it was reported that 10,000 men had left Bowling Green to reënforce Fort Henry, and in

another on the 6th that the fort had been heavily reënforced from both Columbus and Bowling Green, asking him in the former for troops from Ohio, and, in the second, telling him that unless he got some assistance Grant might not be successful. Remembering the order the Commander of the Army sent to Halleck, not to lose a moment in preparing demonstrations against Columbus and Fort Henry, on the receipt of a letter from Buell of the 29th of December, it is surprising to learn, now that a campaign was really commenced and our army in the very presence of the enemy, where success was of vital importance in a military sense as well as for its moral effect on the country, that McClellan, after the receipt of the first dispatch, sent 8000 men from Ohio and Indiana to report to Buell,[1] and replied to the second that he could not spare troops from Buell, who was then at Louisville with 60,000 well-trained men, and unable to move, as McClellan well knew. Instead of ordering reënforcements he sent a telegram to Buell asking him "If report true"— that 10,000 men had been sent from Bowling Green to Fort Henry — "can you not assist by a demonstration in direction of Bowling Green?"[2] This would seem to put the burden upon Buell of ascertaining the truth of the report, before beginning the demonstration, and as his troops were nearly two hundred miles from Fort Henry and more than fifty from Bowling Green, the value of this suggestion can very readily be estimated.

Buell understood fully the importance of Grant's strategic campaign and foresaw the effect it would have, if successful, upon the Confederate position.[3] His attitude towards it can be explained by inference, but on no rational principle. On the 5th of February he wrote to Halleck: "I think it quite plain that the centre of the enemy's line — that part you are now moving against — is the decisive point of his whole front, as it is also the most vulnerable. If it is held, or

[1] 7 W. R. 584. [2] 7 W. R. 584. [3] 7 W. R. 936.

even the bridges on the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers destroyed and your force maintains itself at those points, Bowling Green will speedily fall and Columbus will soon follow. . . . There is not in the whole field of operations a point at which every man you can raise can be employed with more effect or with the prospect of as important results."

It will be noticed how closely these views, expressed before the taking of Fort Henry, correspond with those of the Confederate officers put in writing by Beauregard after the conference had at Bowling Green on the 7th of February.

There was a close and confidential relationship between Buell and McClellan, much like that existing between Fitz John Porter and the Commander of the Army. It is revealed in the correspondence between them, the tone of which differs widely from that with Halleck.

On the 1st of February he wrote to McClellan: "Night before last I received a dispatch from him [Halleck] saying, 'I have ordered an advance on Fort Henry, and Dover. It will be made immediately.' I protest against such prompt proceedings,— as though I had nothing to do but command 'Commence firing' when he starts off. However he telegraphs to-night that coöperation is not essential now." [1] "I hope Halleck has weighed his work well." [2] Again on the 6th to the same: "This whole move, right in its strategical bearing, but commenced by Halleck without appreciation, preparation, or concert, has now become of vast magnitude. I was myself thinking of a change of the line to support it when I received your dispatch. It will have to be done in the face of 50,000 if not 60,000 men and is hazardous. I will answer definitely in the morning." [3]

The dispatch referred to contained the inquiry, "If road so bad in your front, had we not better throw all available force on Forts Henry and Donelson? Answer quick." [3] After a night's reflection upon the subject he forwarded a negative

[1] 7 W. R. 933. [2] 7 W. R. 586. [3] 7 W. R. 936.

answer, and a request to be furnished with eighteen rifled siege-guns and four companies of experienced gunners to man them.

Buell had estimated the number of men in his front under Johnston at 30,000, 8000 in excess of the real number, as is now known, but he was aware that 10,000 had been sent away from Bowling Green to oppose Grant, for he had so informed Halleck. When requested to move to Grant's assistance, he declines so to do for the reason, as he claims, that it will have to be done "in the face of 50,000 or 60,000 men and is hazardous." This is one of many instances in the early days of the war of unreasoning exaggeration of the enemy's forces that kept our armies in a state of inaction for months. No intelligent officer could have been ignorant of the fact that there were less than 6,000,000 of white population in the Confederate and more than 20,000,000 in the Northern States; that with unlimited wealth and abundant supplies of arms and all the materials necessary to equip armies, with the whole nation, as it were, throwing its vast energies and business talent into the work of organizing her citizen soldiery, who were volunteering faster than they could be armed and equipped, the North had been able to furnish an army of only 500,000 men at the beginning of 1862. That the South, with her limited and scattered population, could have accomplished results comparable to this was an impossibility. Her record of having about 300,000 armed men in the field at a corresponding date was, on the whole, an achievement more remarkable than our own. Her situation, however, with a coast-line more than 3000 miles in extent, her cities and towns scattered along it, open to attack by our powerful navy, with a land frontier not less extensive, demanded and compelled the division of her forces into so many units that the generals commanding her principal armies found them too small to successfully hold the positions to which they had been assigned. To accept the reports of untrained secret service men

and spies without experience that there were 250,000 men under Johnston at Manassas, or 50,000 to 60,000 about Bowling Green, was an instance of unwarranted confidence in agents and a failure to exercise a trained reason to correct them.

The correspondence reveals the fact that with reference to this campaign McClellan abdicated his functions as commander-in-chief and became a receiver of dispatches from Halleck which he transmitted to Buell for an answer, and invariably accepted his decisions as final, which were uniformly adverse to Halleck.

Notwithstanding all his rebuffs from Washington and Louisville, on the 13th of February Halleck again pleads with Buell to come down to the Cumberland, promising to give him the command, and send away the man who had conceived the campaign, when he had the enemy surrounded and was about to make what he believed would be a successful assault upon their lines!

Buell announced to McClellan his decision to go to Fort Donelson with a part of his army, leaving the balance, probably under Thomas, to move against Bowling Green. "The movement to the Tennessee," he says, "is difficult, but promises great results. It should be thoroughly supported. It will probably require transports fitted up with some view to defence against sudden attack, and the rivers must be made absolutely secure by gunboats against any attempt to occupy them in force. There ought to be five gunboats to each river. The present gunboats cannot run in low water either there or in the Ohio. Broader ones, drawing not more than three feet, ought to be got up at once. Paducah should be held by not less than 10,000 men as long as the enemy occupies Columbus in force. Let me suggest to you to be prepared any day to throw strong reënforcements into these movements." [1]

This is not war. As the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers had been traversed every day since the 1st of February by

[1] 7 W. R. 938.

our transports, and were as safe then as they are to-day, it will be seen by this letter or dispatch that Buell was requiring conditions for his safety and that of his army as numerous and great as the Russian Government would take in these times of anarchy and misrule for a movement of the Czar from one of his capitals to another.

However, a compliance with these conditions requiring months of time — the sheathing of transports with iron; the building of new gunboats drawing three feet of water, and sending 10,000 men to Paducah — was dispensed with; for, on the following day, learning that Bowling Green had been evacuated, he again changed his mind, and later commenced a slow and tedious march of his army towards the abandoned Confederate stronghold, which brought its leading division to the Cumberland opposite Nashville on the evening of the 24th of February.

When General Floyd reached Nashville and made known to Johnston the extent of the disaster, the latter at once ordered his army into a full retreat. He says that when he crossed the Cumberland it had dwindled to less than 10,000 men.[1] To save this remnant was his first and chief thought. He left Floyd with a small brigade to send away the military supplies, and curiously enough the one injunction which he imposed upon the man who had run away from Donelson was that he should not under any circumstances fight a battle in the city of Nashville. Destroying bridges and breaking up the railroad he hastened to Murfreesboro, where he was compelled to halt. He did not dare to move further. His troops were in a state of utter demoralization and the Kentucky contingent on the border of a mutiny. The terms of most of the Tennessee regiments were about to expire and hundreds of them anticipated the date of their discharge and went home. The long delay at Murfreesboro was an enforced and not a voluntary one. Having called in Crittenden's division

[1] 7 W. R. 259.

and having received some reënforcements, Johnston had under him seventeen thousand men, and this was the whole number north of the Gulf States between the Tennessee River and the Cumberland Mountains. That this army should have been allowed to remain unmolested for nearly a month and then permitted to cross the Tennessee River unopposed to join with the forces of Beauregard collected together at Corinth will remain as a most serious reflection upon the generalship of those who are responsible for it.

Having sent his prisoners, the captured war material, and his own wounded to Cairo, in two days following the battle, Grant informed Halleck that he should at once occupy Nashville, but was compelled to halt at Clarksville by orders of his department commander. His clear judgment told him that if the occupation of Fort Henry caused Johnston to immediately draw back from Bowling Green, the loss of Donelson and the larger part of his army would compel him at once to retreat. When, a few days later, Nelson's division reported to him, he at once ordered it, without consulting any one, to occupy the Tennessee capital, which was accomplished without opposition on the morning of the 25th.

Buell arrived at the north bank of the Cumberland on the previous evening and was thrown into a state of alarm at the rashness and imprudence of Grant in ordering Nelson to take possession of an abandoned city.[1] In his opinion Johnston, having given him possession of all the fortifications about Nashville, was on the point of turning back to regain them. He sent steamers in all haste to Clarksville with a request to Smith, that had, as he expressed it, "all the force of orders," "to come forward with all the available force." It was not until the 1st of March, when he had his five divisions about him or within supporting distance, that he felt safe.[2]

With the occupation of Nashville the campaign of Donelson may be said to have ended. But there is an aftermath to

[1] 7 W. R. 668, 944. [2] 7 W. R. 675.

campaigns and battles sometimes as fruitful in results as that which preceded them. Here the harvest was only partially gathered. On the 1st of March there were about 80,000 men on the Cumberland, with transportation sufficient to take them, or the necessary part of them, in a few days to a point on the Tennessee that could have prevented the junction of the armies of Johnston and Polk. But celerity of movement was necessary and the importance of time was not considered. When McClellan learned of the abandonment of Nashville he telegraphed Buell that it would "be necessary to make our next movement with great caution."[1] Having secured Nashville, his plan was that Buell should move forward, occupy and hold in force the railroad junctions in the vicinity of Chattanooga, meaning doubtless Stevenson, Cleveland, and Dalton, and reëstablish the railroads from Nashville to Stevenson and Decatur. This much was clear, definite, but at the time wholly impracticable and bad strategy. To divide his forces and send the larger army away two or three hundred miles into the enemy's country, where its line of communications could readily be destroyed, rather than bring them together and operate along the line of the Mississippi, where every mile gained could be held by the navy, leaving absolute freedom of action to his land forces, was a part of the last advice given by McClellan to the Western commanders.

Having defined the work that the Army of the Ohio was to undertake, he adds: "The next move," and this must have applied to Grant's army, "should be either a direct march in force upon the rear of Memphis, or else first upon the communications and rear of Columbus, depending entirely on the strength and movements of the rebels. In the meantime it would be well to *amuse* the garrison of Columbus with our mortar-boats as soon as a sufficient number of them can be spared, with gunboats from the Tennessee and Cumberland

[1] 7 W. R. 664.

Rivers. The early possession of Humboldt in force is of importance, but should not be undertaken until Nashville is securely ours. The possession of Grand Junction will complete the isolation of the Confederates. It may be better to occupy Corinth instead of Decatur after Chattanooga is firmly in our possession." [1]

When and how to act under these instructions is a puzzle that might have baffled the acutest military mind. They were never followed. On the 11th of March McClellan was removed as Commander of the Army and the Department of the Ohio was given to General Halleck, making him supreme in the northern zone of the Mississippi Valley. The almost hysterical impatience for action manifested by him in his correspondence before and after the taking of Fort Donelson at once disappears, and the cautious and uncertain action of his former chief was again manifest. Nothing more is heard of sending Buell's divisions with all the speed of steam up the Tennessee to capture Johnston's army, and Grant was ordered not to advance beyond a set limit until his final preparations were made for the concentration of 125,000 men for the well-known campaign against Corinth under his personal command.

So far as campaigns in the Mississippi Valley were considered and planned by McClellan, Halleck, and Buell, no higher conception was reached than making the war a campaign of posts. It was the taking of Nashville, Chattanooga, Corinth, and innumerable other places, but no thought seems to have been entertained by them of capturing and destroying armies.

There is nothing in all the correspondence referred to to indicate that it ever occurred to McClellan, Halleck, or Buell that the capture of the garrison at Fort Donelson was either contemplated or possible. The demonstrations against Bowling Green were suggested for the purpose of relieving "the press-

[1] 7 W. R. 661.

ure" on Grant, and the forward movement of Buell toward Nashville, it was thought, would compel Floyd to withdraw his army. The capture of the capital of Tennessee was "the great object," and the safety of Johnston's army was made sure by the method followed in securing it.[1]

In estimating the value of the Donelson campaign it is to be remembered that the war in which we were engaged differed from wars between nations, where one or more battles were sufficient to determine the balance of power, and to lead the weaker nation to propose terms which have generally resulted in a treaty of peace. Here no terms of peace could be accepted by the North except, in the laconic words of Grant, "an unconditional surrender." Before the end could be reached it was necessary to destroy the Southern armies and occupy every foot of Southern territory. In such a contest moral effects are only less potent than those purely physical. Grant's great victory was so sudden and unexpected that the effect was almost electrical. From gloom the nation passed to the other extreme and looked forward to a rather sudden collapse of the insurrection. But for it, and the capture of New Orleans a little later, it is impossible to say whether the unfortunate Peninsula campaign, followed by Manassas, might not have broken down the warlike resolution of the North and induced a conviction that separation was better than a state of war with an enemy always victorious.

Throughout the Mississippi Valley the belief began to grow that the Confederacy would fail in securing independence. Mr. Davis, whose inauguration as president under the permanent government was to take place on the 22d of February, was so alarmed at the effect likely to be produced on public sentiment that all information of the great calamity was suppressed in Richmond until after the inauguration ceremonies were concluded.

[1] 7 W. R. 620.

General Halleck wrote on the 21st: "Our success on the Tennessee and Cumberland and in the Southwest, together with the stringent measures taken here, have completely crushed out the rebellion in this city and state; no more insurrection, bridge-burning, and hoisting of rebel flags."

As these statements are corroborated by other Union officers they can be accepted as substantially true, though somewhat exaggerated. As our armies passed on below the southern boundary of Missouri, secessionists there realized that whatever might be the final result of the war, their own state was, at least, destined to remain an integral part of the Union. With this conviction they no longer gave aid and support to the rebellion, and soon consented to join the home guards under Federal control to preserve the internal peace and repel further Confederate invasions.

Northern Arkansas was to a less extent in a like manner affected, and prominent citizens, including a former United States Senator and members of Congress, were looking forward to the time when they could coöperate with the Government to bring this state again into the Union.

These results, though not very striking and impressive, and hardly considered at the time amid the tumult of the war, were of much importance and value, and enabled many men to be withdrawn from the trans-Mississippi to swell our forces elsewhere.

The direct and immediate results were the loss to the Confederacy of not less than 17,000 men killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the state of Tennessee, with the exception of the eastern section, which required a considerable force to keep down the preponderating Union sentiment, the retention of which was of small value except as a connecting link between Virginia and the cotton states by means of its railroads.

If General Grant had captured at Donelson 75,000 men, his campaign there would have passed unchallenged as the

greatest event of the war. As a matter of fact he did more than that. Tennessee was the most populous state in the South and was capable of furnishing more men to her armies and more supplies to sustain them than any other. According to the tables of Colonel Livermore she could have furnished 175,000 soldiers between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, and that number would have been added to the Confederate forces if the conscription laws could have been enforced within her territory. At the time there were in the ranks only 50,000 Tennesseeans, all of whom had enlisted for a single year, save one regiment of about 1000 men. It is not possible to arrive at an absolutely accurate computation, but, after a careful examination of all the records, I feel sure that not more than 25,000 men from Tennessee entered the Confederate service after the 16th of February, 1862. There is no evidence to justify the belief that the number was as large. If this opinion is correct, then it follows necessarily that the campaign of Donelson deprived the Confederacy of 100,000 men. This was better than to have captured an equal number. Leaving out of view all sentiments of humanity, and looking at war merely as a means to an end, it is better to kill any number of thousands than to capture or disable them by wounds. The prisoner has to be fed and clothed, and the wounded, as soon as restored to health and strength, again takes his place in the ranks. In this view the men kept from entering the Confederate service would count as so many killed in battle.

When General Johnston began his retreat from Nashville Governor Harris fled in haste to Chattanooga, where, for a little over a year, he vainly endeavored to perform his executive functions. He issued several high-sounding proclamations, calling upon his fellow citizens to rise *en masse* to repel the invader, which gave more the impression of despair than of hopefulness that his frantic appeals would be listened to. Volunteering had ceased in the South at the end of 1861, and

her armies could thereafter be increased to any appreciable extent only by compulsory laws. After spending the winter of 1861–62 in an unsuccessful attempt to induce the old soldiers, two thirds of whose terms of service were about to expire, by means of bounties and promises of long furloughs, to reënlist, the Confederate Government passed its first conscription act. In the graphic language of the Secretary of War "it was demanded by the imperious necessity of the crisis"; for, as he confesses, "the spirit of volunteering had died out."[1] The bureau, established under this act, and continued under others more extended and stringent, was in operation during the war. It appointed its agents with a supporting military force in every Congressional District, but none ever entered into Middle or West Tennessee. In 1865 General John S. Preston, the accomplished superintendent of conscription, sent to Congress his report giving the results of the operations of the bureau during the war, and his estimate of the men who joined the army after April, 1862, without passing through camps of instruction. The total given for Tennessee is 5720. General Pillow claimed that he enlisted five regiments of cavalry from this state. Forrest and other leaders doubtless gained recruits from the same territory, but it does not seem likely the number could have been large. In response to calls from the President upon the state for its quota Governor Harris replied that he could not comply within the time, for the reason that he could exercise authority only in East Tennessee. In fact he did not meet the calls at all. Lieutenant-Colonel Larkin Smith, assistant quartermaster-general, whose duty it was to collect the tax-in-kind,[2] reported that he was able to operate in only a few counties, for the reason that Middle and West Tennessee were in control of the enemy. Upon such data and such evidence I base the conclusion that the Donelson campaign resulted in depriving the Confederacy of the use of 100,000 soldiers and the abundant

[1] W. R. Serial 128, p. 280. [2] W. R. Serial 128, p. 576.

supplies to support her armies that her rich soil was capable of furnishing.

In the public mind, and, perhaps, in the view of most military men, Vicksburg is still considered the most brilliant and the crowning achievement of the war. The forces engaged were larger than at Donelson, the time consumed much longer, the difficulties to be overcome were more varied and more numerous; it called into long-continued exercise higher and larger intellectual faculties, more daring, and an inflexible will. But the qualities of mind in each instance were the same, — instant decision and prompt action. If it was an inspiration of genius that led Grant, the moment he reached high land east of the Mississippi, to abandon his base of supplies and move north to place his army between Pemberton and Johnston, none the less was this true, when, having taken Fort Henry, he resolved at once to advance to the Cumberland and take Fort Donelson. Each campaign was faultless, both in conception and execution, and the brilliancy of one was not excelled by that of the other.

There was much in the Vicksburg campaign to kindle the imagination and excite the public interest — a great army almost lost to view for months among the swamps and bayous of the trans-Mississippi, living an amphibious life, enduring untold hardships, performing incredible labors, suddenly appearing on dry land to the east of the great river, again lost to sight for weeks to reappear out of the smoke of five victorious battles with its right arm grasping the Mississippi above and the left below the mighty fortress, and its final surrender on the 4th of July. There was nothing lacking to the picture, but Lincoln gave to it a bit of coloring, when with his pen he added, "At length the Father of Waters flows unvexed to the Sea."

Great and glorious as was the victory, is not its value pretty nearly measured by the destruction of Pemberton's army of about 40,000 men? Was the loss of what control the

Confederacy had of the river any serious detriment to it, or was the possession of it by our forces of any substantial advantage to the Union cause?

The Confederacy was practically severed when New Orleans was captured, and Farragut had proved his ability to patrol the river between Port Hudson and Vicksburg. With great reluctance the corps of Van Dorn obeyed the order of President Davis to leave Arkansas and join General Johnston at Corinth. Sterling Price exhausted his personal influence to induce his Missourians to follow him. General Richard Taylor some months later, in obedience to orders, endeavored to cross the Mississippi with his division, but his men deserted so fast that he found it impossible to obey. Before the fall of Vicksburg each section was for all military purposes nearly independent and relied upon its own resources for support.

General Halleck, in a letter of congratulations to General Grant, said that campaigns should thereafter be made to the east and west, using the Mississippi as a base for supplies. To this no answer was returned. He set his seal of disapproval upon his proposition a few days later by stating that his troops could best be employed in an expedition against Mobile, and asked permission to take possession of that city, which was unfortunately refused. The war soon shifted from the Mississippi Valley to other zones and the river played no important part in it further, though it furnished a convenient and economical channel of communication between the Government and our forces in Louisiana. And here I leave my contention that the Donelson campaign was unsurpassed in brilliancy and was second in value to none that preceded the great campaign of 1864–65 which ended at Appomattox.

II

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH

BY

HENRY STONE [1]

LIEUT.-COLONEL AND BREVET COLONEL, 100TH U. S. COLORED TROOPS

Read before the Society February 9, 1885

[1] During the Shiloh campaign the writer was a lieutenant of the 1st Wisconsin Volunteers and served as Acting Assistant Adjutant-General on the staff of General Buell. — ED.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH

PERHAPS it is proper to say that this paper was wholly written before the appearance of General Grant's article in the February "Century." That article is, indeed, less remarkable for what is said than for what is omitted. However valuable as a statement of General Grant's opinions, it is comparatively valueless for all historical purposes. The personal details are in inverse ratio, in importance, to the things left untold. Clearly, in writing it, he either had not read, or had read too carefully, the tenth volume of the "Rebellion Records." In some important particulars he is certainly in error. He declares he made no report of the battle and gives his reasons for omitting to do so. But this declaration is correct only in a most narrow and technical sense. He made the same kind of report about Shiloh that he made about Belmont and Fort Donelson — the two leading engagements in which he had previously had command. His report on Shiloh bears the same relation, in length and detail, to the magnitude and importance of the battle as does that on Donelson; or, if we strip it of incidental matter, as that on Belmont. The report on Donelson covers a page and a half; that on Shiloh two pages and a half. Both were written immediately after the battles without waiting for subordinate reports. Both were accepted, and considered, at the headquarters of General Halleck, his immediate superior, and at the War Department, as official reports. The opening lines of that on Shiloh show what he thought at the time: "It becomes my duty again to report another battle fought between two great armies," etc., and, toward the close, he says: "Of the part taken by each separate command, I cannot take special notice in this report, but will do so more fully when reports of division commanders are

handed in." Clearly, the plea that it is a letter, not a report, is an afterthought. The reason assigned (in the "Century" article) for the omission is equally invalid: "Although I was in command of all the troops engaged at Shiloh, I was not permitted to see one of the reports of General Buell or his subordinates until they were published by the War Department, long after the event." But General Buell was not properly under Grant's command; nor did Grant at the time so claim. He says, specifically, in his report: "General Buell, coming upon the field with a distinct army long under his command . . . commanded by himself on the field," etc. There was, therefore, no reason why the reports of "General Buell or his subordinates" should pass through his hands. They were forwarded, properly, to General Halleck, the common commander of both. Grant's letter to Buell, on the night of April 7, after his return from the field, shows that he did not consider the latter under his command. "Instructions have been sent to the different division commanders, *not included in your command*, to be ready in the morning." The ordering of Buell's troops is expressly left to that commander.

This, however, is matter of slight consequence, and would not be referred to except for the conspicuous position of General Grant, and the weight which attaches to every word he utters. It shows that, even in the case of so illustrious a man, it is hardly safe to accept the impressions of twenty years afterward as the facts of the time. It seems quite clear, also, that, had he been free from some powerful influences which surrounded him for a year after the battle, we should have been spared much of the subsequent controversy and all its bitterness.

The unconditional surrender to General Grant, on the 16th of February, 1862, of Fort Donelson, with the greater part of its garrison, following almost immediately upon the capture of Fort Henry, gave the National forces entire control of all the region watered by the lower Cumberland and Tennessee

Rivers. It also weakened the Confederate strength in the Southwest, by the loss of at least fifteen thousand (15,000) acclimated soldiers, fifty (50) guns, and vast quantities of other valuable stores; and, what was of equal, if not greater, importance, a loss of prestige and position. An immediate and necessary consequence was the abandonment of Bowling Green and Nashville, followed soon after by that of Columbus, Kentucky. The exultation throughout the Northwest — especially in Illinois and Indiana, which states furnished more than one half the soldiers in the Union army at Fort Donelson — and the consternation in the insurgent regions in the Southwest, were not surpassed, if they were equalled, by those of three years later, when Petersburg was captured and Richmond abandoned. The hilarity at Chicago, and the panic at Nashville, cannot be described.

Albert Sidney Johnston, who, on the 10th of September, 1861, had been assigned by the Richmond Government to the command of the Western Department, after visiting all parts of his command, established his headquarters at Bowling Green, Kentucky, on the 10th of October. This place was the centre of his line of operations, which extended from Cumberland Gap, in the east, to Columbus in the west,— and was the salient of that line,— threatening Louisville and the Ohio River. Immediately on the surrender of Fort Donelson, he took the most vigorous steps to counteract the evil effects of that misfortune. The garrison of Bowling Green, with the unsurrendered remnants from Donelson and Henry, and the scattered regiments saved from dissolution after the demoralizing defeat of Zollicoffer at Mill Spring, on the 19th of January, were gathered together at Murfreesboro by the 23d of February. Thence they marched, by way of Shelbyville, Fayetteville, Decatur, and Tuscumbia, to Corinth. The head of this column reached the latter place on the 18th of March — the rear coming up a week later. Generals Beauregard and Polk, who had been at Columbus, abandoned that post on the

2d of March, bringing away in safety all the guns and military stores. Van Dorn's corps, in Missouri and Arkansas, was summoned to the east side of the Mississippi, and a small part of it reached the field of Shiloh in time to take part in the battle. A division under Cheatham had been stationed at Jackson and Union City. Bragg was hurried up from Pensacola with a considerable body of well-disciplined troops who had been under his training during the winter. Mansfield Lovell sent a division from Mobile and New Orleans; and Kirby Smith, in command in East Tennessee, detached all whom he could spare from that quarter.

Thus, by the end of March, there were concentrated at and about Corinth an effective force of at least fifty thousand (50,000) fighting men, as well trained as any in the Confederacy. Among the generals in command were those of the highest repute, many of whom gained afterward still greater renown. First of all, at the head of all the forces in the Southwest was Albert Sidney Johnston. He had, perhaps, more military experience than any officer then in active service on either side. His friends, with Jefferson Davis at the head, claim him as the ablest of all the rebel generals, Lee not excepted. Next came Beauregard, at that time certainly the most famous; then Polk, Bragg, Hardee, Van Dorn, Breckinridge, Forrest, Cheatham, Cleburne, and a host of others — all zealous, eager, and confident.

The only generals present on the Union side, whose reputation has, in any respect, exceeded that of the rebel generals named, are Grant and Sherman. Halleck's fame is bookish; and Buell — rather from peculiarities of temperament than lack of ability — has far less renown than his services or his merits deserve. The rest of the prominent Union generals at Shiloh either lacked great military ability or died too early to display it. General Thomas, though belonging to Buell's army, was in command of the rear division, which did not come up until the battle was over.

While this concentration of the rebel forces was going on, Halleck, who commanded all the region west of the Cumberland River, was tied fast to his headquarters at St. Louis, and from there undertook to manage the affairs of three or four separate armies — one, under Curtis, in Arkansas and Southwestern Missouri; another, under Pope, about Madrid Bend and Island Number 10; still another, under Grant, at Fort Donelson. Besides this he had pretty much the entire civil affairs of Missouri to look after. The result was what might have been expected. In the shifting condition of affairs from day to day, the several commanders had to wait for orders or approval from headquarters before undertaking any important movement. In consequence, Grant's operations, after the surrender of Fort Donelson, were wanting in vigor, and show no clear comprehension of the task before him. To add to his embarrassments, Halleck was greatly exasperated by his going to Nashville soon after the capture of Donelson. He went there in the strict line of duty, and returned in a few days; but during his absence there was some confusion in his command, and Halleck, who could not get immediate replies to his urgent telegrams, reported to the War Department a rumor "that since the taking of Fort Donelson, General Grant has resumed his former bad habits. If so," he adds, "it will account for his neglect of my often-repeated orders. I do not deem it advisable to arrest him at present, but have placed General Smith (C. F.) in command of the expedition up the Tennessee."

It was this expedition which resulted in the battle of Shiloh. It was ordered by General Halleck on the 1st of March, and the order announced that "the main object was to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear Creek, near Eastport, and also the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt." It also explicitly directed: "Avoid any general engagement with strong forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle." As soon as the specified results were accom-

plished, the troops were to return to Danville and move on Paris. Under these orders, Grant began to prepare for the new work assigned him; and when, on the 4th of March, in a characteristically petulant telegram, General Halleck said: "You will place Gen. C. F. Smith in command of the expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry" [then under water six feet deep!], he continued his efforts, saying to General Smith: "Information that seems to be reliable places the rebel force at Eastport and Corinth at 20,000 men. . . . Allow me to congratulate you on your richly deserved promotion and to assure you that no one feels more pleasure than myself."

While these preparations were going on, Halleck was under serious apprehensions that the rebels were concentrating at Columbus and planning a move by gunboats and transports against Cairo. Meantime Buell, whose department lay to the east of the Tennessee River, had marched with great rapidity to Nashville, entering that city on the 25th of February, as the rebel rear guard, under Forrest, evacuated it. Here, by the 1st of March, he had concentrated about 30,000 troops, organized into four divisions, and ready to advance as soon as sufficient supplies were accumulated. He tried repeatedly to bring about a meeting with Halleck, so that they could talk over matters and decide on a general plan of campaign in which all the forces should take part; but Halleck could not be brought to such agreement.

The force at Fort Donelson began to embark on the 10th of March. It numbered in all about 40,000 men and fifty-four guns, and consisted of the divisions of McClernand, C. F. Smith, Hurlbut, and Lew Wallace. General Sherman, who had been all winter in command of a camp of instruction at Paducah, was also ordered to join the expedition, and he brought with him twelve regiments of infantry and a small cavalry force. Before the expedition had fairly started, Halleck directed that, on its return after accomplishing the object

for which it was undertaken, it should encamp at Savannah instead of moving on to Paris. It was hoped by this expedition to prevent the junction of Johnston's and Beauregard's forces, and so enable Halleck, as soon as he had captured Island Number 10, to concentrate a sufficient force to destroy the two armies in detail. It was supposed that Beauregard had 20,000 men at Corinth; and that there were 10,000 to 12,000 at Henderson Station, twenty-five miles north of Corinth, and 8000 to 10,000 at Bear Creek Bridge. It was also reported that there were heavy batteries at Chickasaw.

On the 11th of March, Halleck's jurisdiction was enlarged so as to embrace Buell's department, and henceforth he is responsible for the operations of all the Union troops in the Southwest.

Sherman's division was the only one which made the attempt to cut the railroad near Bear Creek. The rest remained at or near Savannah. It landed at the mouth of Yellow Creek, and undertook the destruction of a long trestlework on the railroad, ten miles east of Corinth. A terrible storm came on and completely prevented the success of this movement. The troops reëmbarked with great difficulty and the next morning the landing was five feet under water. An effort was made to find a landing still further up the river, but without success, and the force turned back. Instead, however, of keeping on to Savannah as ordered, Sherman stopped on the 15th at Pittsburg Landing, nine miles above, and on the west side of the river. This disposition is said to have been ordered by C. F. Smith, but there is no record evidence of it. General Sherman's dispatch to Smith, on the 15th, says: "Finding the whole shore under water, from Chickasaw to Pittsburg, I had no alternative but to run down to the latter place and report to you." Evidently Sherman's idea was to find some place where he could reach and break the railroad. That propensity to "smash things," afterward so fully developed, had here its earliest manifestation. In

his dispatch to Grant, on the 17th, he stated that his object was to "cut the Memphis and Charleston Railroad without a general or serious engagement." In a letter to General Smith, the same date, he says: "I will be governed by yours of yesterday, to occupy Pittsburg strongly, extend the pickets so as to include a semicircle of three miles, and push strong reconnoissances as far as Lick Creek and Pea Ridge."

While Smith was disembarking at Savannah, and Buell advancing to Columbia, Halleck, on the 14th of March, advised the latter to move by water up the Tennessee, but subsequently, on Buell's recommendation, directed him to join Smith by an overland march. In his dispatch of the 16th to General Buell, Halleck says: "Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah. You must direct your march to that point, so that the enemy cannot get between us" — evidently fearing a movement by the way of Florence on the east side of the river.

It was thus an accident of an accident that Pittsburg Landing was occupied by the Union troops. Neither Halleck, nor Buell, nor Grant had any idea of concentrating an army there when the movement up the river was ordered. On the contrary, the purpose, so far as there was a definite one, was to reach as high a point as possible on the river, and thence, by expeditions, interpose between Corinth and Sidney Johnston's army, destroying the railroad and compelling either the evacuation of Corinth or submission to a pitched battle there by Beauregard's troops only, as soon as Halleck's forces could be concentrated. With this in view, Savannah was selected as the place of concentration.

While Sherman was landing at Pittsburg, Hurlbut's division arrived and reported to him. It was placed in camp about a mile from the landing. Sherman's own division went into camp about three miles out, near the crossing of Owl Creek by the Purdy Road. Three brigades took position near Shiloh Church, the fourth, on Lick Creek, near the Hamburg and Corinth Road. Between these two portions of his division was

an unoccupied space of fully two miles, and, as the force about Shiloh faced west and southwest, it exposed his left flank to an enemy moving from the direction of Corinth. Before he went into camp, he sent out a skirmishing party, on the 16th of March, which encountered the rebel videttes at Pea Ridge, and was thus prevented from going on to the railroad as ordered. On the 17th he wrote to Grant: "I have just returned from a reconnoissance toward Corinth and Purdy, and am strongly impressed with the importance of this position, both for its land advantages and its strategic position. The ground itself admits of easy defence by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for 100,000 men."

The same day Grant reached Savannah. He at once reported to Halleck that his scouts brought word that Johnston was at Corinth with 150,000 men. "Of course," said Grant, "the number is very much exaggerated, and Johnston being there is very much against my expectation." Halleck was evidently profoundly impressed with this report, and all his subsequent orders show that he believed the enemy was in great force at Corinth. Grant immediately notified Sherman that all the troops except McClernand's division had been ordered to report to him at Pittsburg. He closed his letter by saying: "Although sick for the last two weeks, I already feel better at the thought of being along with the troops." The nature of his illness is not stated; but Halleck's letters and dispatches for the two weeks are sufficient cause, without seeking further.

On Grant's arrival at Savannah, he found the forces disposed thus: Sherman and Hurlbut at Pittsburg; McClernand at Savannah; Lew Wallace at Crump's Landing; and Smith's division, with a considerable number of unattached regiments, still on board transports. These latter were immediately ordered to land at Pittsburg. The rebel forces, at the same time, were stationed as follows: Polk at Jackson; a brigade of Bragg's at Purdy, and another at Bethel; a division under Beauregard at Corinth, and another at Iuka. Beaure-

gard declares that, while Grant was disembarking at Pittsburg, his entire force — with headquarters at Corinth — consisted of a regiment of cavalry at Pea Ridge; two regiments of infantry and a battery halfway between Pea Ridge and Corinth; a cavalry picket at Hamburg, and 15,000 infantry and artillery at Corinth, in a state of disorganization. But it was almost impossible for Sherman to learn anything about things at Corinth, and he said in despair on the 17th: "I am trying my best to find out the strength of the enemy, but thus far am unsuccessful."

The day after General Grant's arrival at Savannah, but before General Halleck had learned of it, the latter telegraphed (on the 18th) to General Grant or the commanding officer *at Fort Henry*, a report that the enemy had moved from Corinth to cut off the transports below Savannah, and added: "If so, General Smith should immediately destroy the railroad communication at Corinth." This dispatch was forwarded to General Grant at Savannah, and reached him at 11 o'clock on the night of the 19th. The hint it contained was enough. Chafing under the enforced inaction to which he had, for a month, been subjected, he determined to carry out, in person, the service for which Halleck had designated General Smith. Accordingly, he at once dispatched to Halleck: "Immediate preparations will be made to execute your perfectly feasible order. I will go in person leaving General McClernand in command here" [*i.e.* Savannah]. This promptness surprised Halleck, who, the next day, replied: "I do not fully understand you. By all means keep your forces together until you connect with General Buell, who is now at Columbia, and will move on Murfreesboro with three divisions. Do not let the enemy draw you into a general engagement now. Wait until you are properly fortified and receive orders."

It is very evident, from this dispatch, that Halleck had no idea that there were then any troops on the west bank of the Tennessee. General Grant had written him from Savannah,

on the 18th, saying, among other things: "I arrived here last evening, and found that General Sherman and Hurlbut's divisions were at Pittsburg, partially debarked; General Wallace at Crump's Landing, six miles below, same side of the river; General McClernand's division at this place, encamped; and General Smith's, with unattached regiments, on board transports, also here. . . . I have not been here long enough to form much idea of the actual strength of the rebels, but feel satisfied that they do not number 40,000 armed effective men at this time. . . . I shall go to-morrow to Crump's Landing and Pittsburg, and if I think any change of position for any of the troops needed, I will make the change." But this letter did not reach General Halleck until some time after the date of his dispatch to Grant, quoted above. At that time, he supposed all the troops under General Grant were at Savannah.

In a letter to General Halleck, on the 20th, General Grant elaborated his plan of cutting the railroad at Corinth as suggested on the 18th. He wrote: "I will go with the expedition to Corinth in person, should no orders received hereafter prevent it. Owing to the limited space where a landing can be effected, it will take some days yet to debark the troops now there. I was in hopes of starting on the 22d, but now think the 23d or 24th will be as early as I can get off. There is no enemy on this [Savannah] side of the river much before reaching Florence. . . . I will take no risks at Corinth under the instructions I now have. If a battle on anything like equal terms seems to be inevitable, I shall find it out in time to make a movement on some other point of the railroad, or at least shall seem to fill the object of my expedition without a battle, and thus save the demoralizing effect of a retreat upon the troops."

Full of this scheme, Grant, on the 20th, issued orders to McClernand to prepare to send two brigades to Pittsburg; to C. F. Smith to hold all the command at Pittsburg subject to marching orders, and to prepare rations and forage for ten

days; and to Lew Wallace at Crump's Landing also to be ready to march at a moment's notice. The next day, however, after having again been over the ground at Pittsburg, he writes to Halleck: "It will be impossible to move with any celerity taking artillery. Corinth cannot be taken without meeting a large force, — say thirty thousand (30,000). A general engagement will be inevitable. Therefore I will wait a few days for further instructions." In a letter of considerable length written the same day (21st), he says: "Corinth cannot be taken without a general engagement, which, from your instructions, is to be avoided. This, taken in connection with the impassable state of the roads, has determined me not to move for the present without further orders. The temper of the rebel troops is such that there is little doubt but that Corinth will fall much more easily than Donelson did when we do move. All accounts agree that the great mass of the rank and file are heartily tired."

So, — owing chiefly to the distance of the commanding general at St. Louis from his army at Pittsburg Landing, — the contemplated movement against Corinth was reluctantly abandoned by General Grant. It is doubtful if it would have succeeded, at the time, in doing more than to cut the railroad; there is as little doubt that, if Halleck had been with the army or Grant had been in chief command, it would have been undertaken. In that case, the pending battle, if fought at all, would have been at or near Corinth, instead of Shiloh, and before Johnston could come up, unless Beauregard should abandon the place on Grant's approach. On the 23d of March, Grant wrote to Smith: "I am clearly of the opinion that the enemy are gathering strength at Corinth quite as rapidly as we are, and the sooner we attack, the easier the task of taking the place."

The ground occupied by General Grant's army at Pittsburg Landing is, in many respects, a most admirable one for encamping a large force, as well as for fighting a defensive

battle. The ground is high, well-watered, well-wooded, with good drainage, and roads leading into the interior in various directions. On the north it is protected by Snake Creek, a deep stream with high banks and bordered by swampy bottom-lands, and flowing easterly, nearly at right angles to the Tennessee. About two miles from the river, it receives the waters of Owl Creek, which, rising in a cluster of ridges about four miles away, flows northeast, past Shiloh Church, and guards the approaches from the west. South of the landing, with its mouth about four miles from that of Snake Creek, is Lick Creek, which rises among the same ridges as Owl Creek, and flows, for some distance, nearly parallel with it. The banks of Lick Creek are higher and steeper than those of Owl Creek. Pittsburg Landing is midway between the mouths of Snake and Lick Creeks. It is about twenty-three miles from Corinth, with which it is connected by three roads; one near the riverbank, crossing Lick Creek a few miles above the landing; another, called the Bark Road, running southwesterly, through Monterey; the third, the Ridge Road, so called, running at first nearly westerly, till, passing near Shiloh Church, it turns towards the south and joins the Bark Road, in the vicinity of Monterey. The riverbank at the landing is a steep bluff a hundred feet high. From this the ground gradually falls off a little toward the west. The watershed between the Tennessee and Mississippi Rivers is only a few miles west of the landing. The plateau on which the troops were encamped is cut up into ridges and ravines by numerous small watercourses which drain into Snake, Owl, and Lick Creeks. The general shape of the ground thus enclosed is an irregular parallelogram. A large slough, or bayou, near the mouth of Lick Creek, prevents the possibility of an approach to the landing from the south side of the creek. Over the whole of this parallelogram there were but few open spaces, made by the half-cultivated fields scattered irregularly about. The undergrowth is very thick and abundant.

The positions taken up by the troops, as they landed from time to time, were without any regard to a general line, either of advance or defence. They were stationed merely for convenience, and they maintained their original camping-grounds till the morning of the battle. The only general instructions on this point were those given by Sherman to his brigade commanders — to be convenient to water, and, when in brigade line, to have twenty-two paces between the regiments. Not a man in his division had ever been in action, and only two of his regiments were commanded by officers who had had any military training. Most of his men had scarcely ever heard a gun fired, and their only instruction in war was such as he had given them during the few months that they had been in camp at Paducah. Yet he disposed them at the extreme front, where, if any attack were made by the enemy, they must be the first to receive it.

When C. F. Smith's division — which had distinguished itself under his leadership at Fort Donelson — disembarked on the 20th, it was directed to select a line parallel to and about a mile from the river, encamping by brigades facing west, and no regiment within fifty yards of the road. Hurlbut's division — which had also been in the action at Fort Donelson — was already on the ground when Smith landed, and was about in a line with him, and on his left, or south. On the 26th of March General Prentiss reported for duty, and a division was newly organized for him out of the unattached troops. This was also stationed at the extreme front, on the prolongation of the line of Sherman's detached brigade, under Stuart, extending westerly. There were not enough of them to reach to Sherman's left, near Shiloh Church, and so a considerable gap was left. None of Prentiss' regiments had ever been in action; most of them had had but little instruction; and some of them received, for the first time, their muskets as they disembarked, from day to day, up to the very eve of the battle. Thus the front line was occupied entirely by perfectly raw troops. The

only soldiers who had ever been in battle were near the landing. The gap between Prentiss' right and Sherman's left was from a half to three fourths of a mile wide. It would probably have been filled in a few days by some of the constantly arriving regiments, all equally inexperienced with the rest. McClernand's division was encamped by itself, about halfway between the ground occupied by Smith's and Hurlbut's divisions and the open space between Prentiss and Sherman. It faced southwesterly and was, perhaps, a mile to the rear of the front line.

By the time the troops had been in camp a week, the ground about the landing was cut up into a thousand cross-roads leading in every direction. Owing to the frequent rains, these soon became miry and boggy, and were speedily transformed into quagmires by the countless wagons that swarmed about the place. It was in the days when twenty-seven wagons and two ambulances were deemed a part of the necessary regimental outfit. Most of the troops were undisciplined, and the steamers at the landing were overrun from morning to night with curious, idle, ill, or homesick loungers, constantly coming and going. As late as the 28th of March — a week before the battle — General Grant wrote to General Halleck: "I have caused the boats leaving here to be visited and all persons leaving on them to be required to show their passes. This led to the discovery that a number of persons were going North without my authority on leaves and passes given, in one instance by a brigadier-general, in one by a captain, in all others by regimental commanders." How many had already gone, by similar authority, there is no means of knowing. More than twelve thousand (12,000) out of sixty-eight thousand (68,000) of Grant's army were absent in March, 1862, and twelve thousand (12,000) more were unfit for duty; leaving but forty-four thousand (44,000) for duty, out of sixty-eight thousand (68,000) in all.

The condition of things in the rebel army was not much if

any better. Bragg, a much stricter disciplinarian than Grant, wrote on the 18th of March: "The disorganized and demoralized condition of our forces gives me great concern. . . . The whole country seems paralyzed. . . . Nothing is brought to us for sale, and it is most difficult to procure supplies. The unrestrained habits of pillage and plunder have done much to produce this state of affairs and reconcile the people of the country to the approach of the enemy, who certainly do them less harm than our own troops. In the present condition of the army, without transportation, supplies, discipline, or organization, no move toward the enemy can be made."

Meantime, General Buell was pushing on the movements of his coöperative column as rapidly as possible. Three of his divisions had reached Columbia, forty miles south of Nashville and ninety miles from Savannah, by the 18th of March. Here he was delayed ten days by the destruction of the bridges over Duck River, which had been done by Johnston's orders. In that time two other divisions joined him. He came to Columbia in person on the 25th, having been detained at Nashville by the duties of his military department, expecting to find the bridges rebuilt, as he had ordered. But the task was more difficult than he had calculated. He at once directed the construction of a boat-bridge, to insure a speedier crossing. Both bridges were finished on the 28th, on which day also the water had fallen so as to render the river fordable. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 29th, Nelson, who had been promised the advance if he should first cross the river, and who was in camp about three miles from its bank, roused his men, and, as soon as breakfast was over, started. It was scarcely daylight when they reached the stream. Here the men stripped off shoes, stockings, trousers, and drawers, — fastening them in a bundle to their bayonets, — and, tucking up shirts and blouses, waded the cold and swift river, the water running waist-deep. A line of cavalrymen was stationed in

the river along the lower edge of the ford to show the way and to render aid if needed. The passage was safely and quickly made, and the men reclothed themselves after their morning bath. The supplies were then hauled over — a much more tedious job. As the water was deep enough to cover the wagon-bottoms, they were kept dry by turning one wagon-body upside down on the axles, and placing another, loaded, on the top of that. By means of the ford and the bridges, it took all that day and the next for the five divisions and their trains to cross. On Monday, March 31, the whole column was fairly under way, Nelson leading. General Buell's orders, under advices from both Halleck and Grant, were to move to Savannah. On the 26th of March, Halleck had designated "the vicinity of Savannah or Eastport" as the point of concentration; but on the 29th, he directed Buell to concentrate "at Savannah, or Pittsburg twelve miles above." While on the march, General Buell learned that from Waynesboro a road led to the river opposite Hamburg, and he suggested to Halleck the concentration of his divisions at Waynesboro, with the view of taking that road. Meantime, telegraphic communication with Savannah was opened. On the 5th of April, Halleck replied: "You are right about concentrating at Waynesboro. Future movements must depend on those of the enemy." This dispatch reached Buell too late; Nelson had passed Waynesboro and was nearly at Savannah when it arrived. On the 1st of April, Buell had telegraphed Halleck: "I expect to arrive at Savannah Sunday or Monday" (6th or 7th), and requested that pontoons be sent to meet him there. On the 4th, from his camp three miles west of Waynesboro, and twenty-seven from Savannah, he telegraphed General Grant: "I shall be in Savannah myself to-morrow with one, perhaps two, divisions. . . . Have you any information for me that should affect my movements?" To this Grant replied on the 5th: "I will be here [Savannah] to meet you to-morrow. The enemy at and near Corinth

are probably from 60,000 to 80,000"; but with no word of urgency or hint that he should hasten.

Nelson's division reached Savannah before noon of the 5th. As General Grant was not present when he arrived, and as there were no boats at hand to take the troops across the river, they were ordered to go at once into camp. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon, General Grant rode up to the headquarters of Colonel Ammen, commanding the leading brigade, and directed that the men be made as comfortable as possible, saying, — in answer to Colonel Ammen's remark that the men were not fatigued and could march on to Pittsburg Landing, — "You cannot march through the swamps. I will send boats for you Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week. There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth, where the rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us we can whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson." He then rode off, and the troops immediately began to make ready for inspection and review, which were ordered for Sunday morning at 9 o'clock. The other divisions of Buell's army were coming up, with the intervals customary where there was haste, and all were expected to reach Savannah by Tuesday.

In his letter of April 5, Grant reported to Halleck the arrival of Nelson's division, and said: "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us. . . . The other two divisions of Buell's column will arrive to-morrow and next day. It is my present intention to send them to Hamburg, some four miles above Pittsburg. . . . Colonel McPherson has gone to-day to examine the defensibility of the ground about Hamburg, and to lay out the position of the camps if advisable to occupy that place."

Throughout the march of General Buell's army from Columbia to Savannah, he and General Grant had been in frequent communication, and the latter had never said a word to indi-

cate that he needed any addition to his forces, or that he was not abundantly able to take care of himself and the enemy in case he were attacked. On the 19th of March, while beginning his preparations for the proposed expedition to destroy the railroad at Corinth, General Grant sent out two scouts to find Buell's whereabouts. They reached him on the 23d, with a communication dated at Savannah but containing nothing important. Buell's reply, by the same scouts, reached Grant on the 26th, and fully explained the situation at Columbia and the cause of detention. On the 29th Buell forwarded by some scouts, who reached Savannah on the evening of the 31st, a copy of a dispatch from Halleck, directing that a battle should be avoided for the present until a larger force could be concentrated. Grant replied, by the same messengers, that he had been looking for Buell's column that he might report it to headquarters, thinking some move might depend on its arrival. All communications between the two generals were dated at or addressed to Savannah; and Halleck's dispatches to Buell always spoke of Savannah as Grant's position. It was not until he had left Columbia that Buell learned, incidentally, that all Grant's forces were at Pittsburg Landing, on the west side of the river.

The only officer who had kept up much activity in the direction of the enemy was Sherman, — as restless, ardent, and enterprising then as ever afterward. From his advanced position he daily sent out scouting or reconnoitring parties, — sometimes an entire brigade, — which seldom returned without having had an affair with the enemy's outposts. On the afternoon of the 4th such a reconnoissance was made, resulting in a loss of nineteen and the capture of ten prisoners, and the discovery that the enemy were in considerable force at Pea Ridge. On the 5th everything was reported quiet on his front. His letter that day to General Grant says: "I have no doubt nothing will occur to-day more than the usual picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday,

and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with the certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position." At the moment he was writing these words Hardee's corps was deployed in line of battle, not two miles from his camp, and the other three corps of the rebel army were within supporting distance! No wonder they were "saucy."

Yet, in spite of all these warnings, nothing whatever was done to guard against a general attack, and the activities of the week closed — so far as the plans and expectations of all the generals in Grant's army were concerned — with a Saturday night full of promise of quiet and rest for the coming Sunday.

The greater part of the rebel force was concentrated at Corinth by the 1st of April. General Johnston had reached there on the 24th of March, and had spent the week "in the reorganization, armament, and array of the forces collected there from so many quarters." Beauregard was appointed second in command, Bragg was made chief of staff, and the army organized into four corps. The first, commanded by General (Bishop) Polk, consisted of two divisions of two brigades each and was made up mainly of the troops that had been at Columbus and Island Number 10. The second, commanded by General Bragg, in addition to his duties as chief of staff, consisted of two divisions of three brigades each, made up chiefly of the troops with whom he had spent the autumn and winter in Florida, and who were under better, or rather severer, discipline than any of the rest of the army. The third, a single division of three large brigades, was commanded by General Hardee, and consisted of the Bowling Green garrison, and others who had been under Johnston's own supervision. The fourth, or reserve corps, was commanded by General Breckinridge, and consisted of three brigades, chiefly Kentucky and Tennessee troops. There were in Johnston's army 72 regiments and 7 battalions of infantry, 8 regiments of cavalry, and 19 batteries, making, according to William Preston

Johnston, an effective force of 40,335. According to Bragg's field return of April 3, 1862, the army that marched from Corinth numbered, including those reported sick, on extra duty, and in arrest, 49,444. The first corps had 10,999 infantry and 452 artillery; second corps, 19,564 infantry, 779 artillery; third corps, 5750 infantry and 457 artillery; reserves, 7846 infantry and 665 artillery. There was also a cavalry force of 2932, afterward increased to 4382. In the return of effective force in the Confederate army, commissioned officers are not included.

There were in General Grant's army, on the field of Shiloh April 6, 63 regiments of infantry, portions of 4 regiments of cavalry, and 21 batteries of artillery. The number present for duty, according to the morning reports of April 5, for five divisions, and April 4 for one, including commissioned officers, was 44,895, of all arms of the service, with 62 pieces of artillery. From this number is to be deducted the division of General Lew Wallace, numbering 7564. This would leave a total present for duty of 37,331, of whom 32,287 were infantry, 2028 artillery, and 3016 cavalry. The cavalry, however, can hardly be said to have been engaged; and the number here given includes extra-duty men of all kinds — cooks, teamsters, musicians, etc. Making deduction for these in the same percentage as is claimed for Johnston's army, there would remain for Grant an effective force of 35,376 on the 6th of April, organized into five divisions. The first (McClernand's) numbered 7028; second (Smith's — now commanded by W. H. L. Wallace), 8708; third (Hurlbut's), 7302; fourth (Sherman's), 8830; fifth (Prentiss'), 5463. Deducting the cavalry not engaged, there remains a total of 32,860 under General Grant, as against 40,335 under Johnston. But few of Johnston's troops had ever been in action. Of Grant's 63 regiments, 25 had been at Fort Donelson, and a few others at Belmont and other minor engagements.

During the night of the 6th and morning of the 7th,

General Grant's army was reënforced by the arrival on the field of eight regiments of Lew Wallace's division — say 5500 men; and by three divisions — Nelson's, Crittenden's, and McCook's — from Buell's Army of the Ohio. These latter comprised thirty regiments of infantry and three batteries of artillery, numbering in all 15,437 men. None of them had ever been under fire except a single regiment. The total reënforcement was thus 20,937, making the aggregate strength of the Union army, in both days' engagements, 53,797, against the Confederate force of 40,335. William Preston Johnston, in the "Life" of his father, very erroneously states that Grant's effective force on the 6th was 49,314, and that the reënforcement on the 7th was 21,579; making an aggregate of 70,893, or more than 17,000 in excess of the actual number.

It was Johnston's determined purpose to force Grant to battle before Buell could reach Pittsburg. With this fixed intention, as soon as he heard that Buell had left Columbia, he issued, on the 3d of April, an elaborate order directing the army to move at once. He knew the exact position of Grant's army, with its right on Owl Creek near Shiloh Church, and its left on Lick Creek. Hardee, with the troops who had been under Johnston's own eye at Bowling Green since October, was to take the advance, and, moving by the Bark Road, to reach and bivouac at Mickey's house that night. Bragg was to take the Monterey and Savannah Road, and reach the vicinity of Mickey's by sunset. Polk was to move by the Ridge Road, half an hour after Hardee's column had passed, and to bivouac in his rear. Breckinridge was to concentrate at Monterey as soon as Bragg was out of the way. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, Hardee was to resume the advance, and moving out on the Bark Road, left in front, until he struck Grant's outposts, was to deploy and open the battle.

Johnston accompanied this order with a high-sounding proclamation which he ordered to be read at the head of each

regiment: "I have put you in motion to offer battle to the invaders of your country. With the resolution and disciplined valor becoming men fighting, as you are, for all worth living or dying for, you can but march to a decisive victory over the agrarian mercenaries sent to subjugate and despoil you of your liberties, property, and honor" — and so on.

The Confederate advance began, as directed, on the afternoon of the 3d. Hardee moved by the Ridge Road; but instead of reaching Mickey's that night, so as to start at 3 o'clock the next morning, he did not gain that point until some time the next afternoon. Bragg, who came next, reached Monterey at 11 o'clock on the morning of the 4th, and Mickey's in Hardee's rear that night. One division of Polk's corps followed Bragg; the other, which had been at Bethel, moved down on the morning of the 5th and joined the left of that which came from Corinth. Breckinridge, who had been stationed at Burnsville, left there at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 4th; but his movements were greatly delayed by rain, mud, and bad roads. It would seem, from the words of Johnston's order, that he intended to make the attack on the 4th; if so, there is, somehow, a loss of twenty-four hours.[1] At any rate, it was not until the night of the 4th that the troops reached their assigned position. Then the order was given to

[1] As already stated, this was written before the appearance of the papers on Shiloh, in the February *Century*. In General Gordon's "notes," this loss of twenty-four hours is explained. He says: "As it would take some time to formulate the order and issue all the requisite copies, General Beauregard explained orally to the three generals their routes of march for the first day, so that they might not wait for the receipt of the written orders. . . . The troops were brought under arms before noon, and all the roads leading from Corinth were densely packed with troops, wagons, and field batteries, ready for the march. But no movement was made; General Polk's corps in some way blocked the line of march. This having been reported to General Beauregard at a late hour in the afternoon, an aide was sent to General Polk, when, to the surprise of all, he explained that he had kept his corps at a stand, awaiting the written order. Thus it was so late before the movement actually began that it really lost the Confederate army a whole day, and their arrival in the near presence of their adversary twenty-four hours later than was intended."

advance at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 5th, so as to attack at daylight. It had showered a good deal during the 4th. At 2 o'clock on the morning of the 5th a drenching rain began to pour down upon the unsheltered troops. Notwithstanding, they were under arms as ordered at 3 o'clock, but it was too dark to see the road, or to move a step through the wooded country. They therefore stood in the cold, driving storm until full daylight. It was 7 o'clock before Hardee was under way, so that Bragg could start. Before 10 o'clock his advance came in collision with Sherman's outposts, and were "saucy" to them as Sherman reported. But neither Sherman, nor any one else in authority, dreamed that it was Johnston's skirmishers who were in his front, much less that the whole Confederate army was within gunshot. At 7 o'clock on the 5th, Bragg moved up his leading division — Withers' — and placed one brigade of it — Gladden's — on Hardee's right, filling the space to Lick Creek. The other brigade was placed in the second line. Bragg's rear division, however, under General Ruggles, failed to move promptly, and in consequence all Polk's and Breckinridge's troops were held motionless. Johnston himself was early astir — indeed, he had slept but little — and he came upon the field soon after 6 o'clock, taking post in rear of Hardee, and waited for the battle to open. Bragg's right wing was soon deployed, but Ruggles' division still remained behind. Eight o'clock came — nine o'clock — and at half-past nine, Johnston sent an aide to Bragg to learn the cause of the delay. Answer came back that he had sent to the rear to find out, and as soon as he knew he would report. Eleven o'clock came — twelve o'clock — but still no report. The whole morning had now been wasted. At half-past twelve, Johnston, unable any longer to restrain his impatience, and exclaiming, "This is puerile — this is not war," mounted his horse and rode to the rear, to see for himself what the trouble was. He soon found the delinquent division, its head in an open field, with Polk's reserves in the road

across its path, and wagons and artillery blocking the way. He speedily cleared the road, and ordered the column forward. But it was too late — the day was gone. It was four o'clock before line of battle could be formed, and it was useless at that hour to bring on a general engagement.

Soon after the troops had been put in position, a kind of council of war was held to decide whether to fight or to return to Corinth. It was not a regularly called council, but rather a chance meeting of all the corps commanders, together with Generals Johnston and Beauregard, just before dark, around an open camp-fire in the woods. Beauregard was very urgent to fall back to Corinth for fresh supplies, — the five days' rations with which the army started having been already consumed, — and because he did not believe it possible to surprise Grant and defeat him before Buell's arrival. His view was not seconded, and, at the close of the discussion, Johnston, who had taken but little part in it, said — "Gentlemen, we shall attack at daylight to-morrow." With this decisive announcement the meeting was dissolved. Johnston's whole bearing was that of a man not only bent upon but confident of victory. He believed he had as many troops as could be properly handled on such a field, and it made no difference how many Grant had. "I would fight him if he had a million," he exclaimed to one of his staff. "I intend to hammer 'em. I think we will hammer them beyond doubt." At dark his army went into bivouac just as they were, the front corps in line of battle, and so close to Grant's outposts that camp-fires and all noises were forbidden. Hardee's pickets were so near Sherman's and Prentiss' camps that the drums were heard beating retreat and tattoo; and a band serenading some newly arrived general made music for the enemy as well as for the recipient of the compliment.

In the Confederate order of battle, Hardee's corps with a brigade from Bragg's formed the first line, from Owl to Lick Creek, something over three miles. Preston Johnston states

that the force on this line was 9024 men, less than 3000 to a mile; certainly a very feeble one with which to make such an assault as was intended. Sherman's and Prentiss' divisions, which occupied the same length of line with wide gaps between, numbered over 13,000. Bragg's corps, less the brigade in Hardee's line, formed the second line of battle. Withers' division was on the right, resting on Lick Creek, with cavalry to its right and front, and Ruggles' division of three brigades, two on Withers' left reaching to Owl Creek and the third in reserve, opposite the interval between Withers' and the rest of Ruggles'. Polk's corps and Breckinridge's reserves were massed in column of brigades near Mickey's house ready for deployment — the former on the left and the latter on the right — as the needs of the attacking army might require. Artillery was stationed wherever it could be made available.

While all these movements were going on in the rebel army General Grant's troops remained in the same positions in which convenience or accident had disposed them on their arrival at Pittsburg Landing. No instructions had been given them as to their conduct in case of an attack by the enemy; and there was no continuous picket-line along the front toward Corinth, twenty miles away, where the Confederate forces were known to be massing in great strength. The newest and rawest troops occupied the most exposed part of such line as there was between Shiloh Church and Lick Creek. A large part of the troops on this broken and interrupted line had never had a day's brigade drill, and the regiments were unknown to each other. No line of battle had been marked out for them to occupy in case of need; nor had they the training to take such line promptly if called upon.

With the earliest dawn of Sunday, April 6, 1862, the rebel army was in motion. The morning was bright and clear, and the air exhilarating. As Johnston mounted his horse, he said gayly: "To-night we will water our horses in the

Tennessee River." He had scarcely reached the front when skirmishing began. It was quarter-past five o'clock when the first cannon sounded in the Confederate ranks. From that moment until after dark the next night, there was an almost uninterrupted crash of musketry or booming of cannon. The opening musketry came from a reconnoitring party under command of Colonel Moore, of the 21st Missouri, of Prentiss' division, which had gone out the night before a short distance on the Corinth Road, and began their movement at three o'clock in the morning. Obliquing to the right till they reached almost to Sherman's left, they came suddenly upon Hardee's skirmishers.

Hearing the noise of this encounter, Colonel Everett Peabody, of the 25th Missouri, commanding the brigade to which the reconnoitring party belonged, called out the rest of his regiments and started for the front, to assist his endangered comrades. He was speedily repulsed. General Prentiss, roused by the sound of firing, ordered his whole division under arms. But there was a wide gap between his right and Sherman's left, which there were no troops at hand to fill, and, if there were, no officer of rank to order up reënforcements so sorely needed. Surmising from the sound what was coming, Prentiss at once sent notice to Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace, as well as McClernand, of the pending attack, and was just mounting his horse as Colonel Peabody, with the remnant of his command, fell back toward the camp closely followed by the eager enemy. Excited by the unexpected results of Moore's reconnoissance, General Prentiss called out to Colonel Peabody, "What do you mean by bringing on an engagement, when you know we are not ready?" Stung by the tone of rebuke in Prentiss' manner and words, Colonel Peabody answered as quickly and sharply, "I did not bring it on. It is coming without my assistance," —and turned his face toward the enemy. General Prentiss ordered him to check as much as possible the rebel advance,

so that he could have time to form the division to meet the attack. Without looking back, Colonel Peabody dashed bravely to the head of his brigade, and was gallantly urging them to hold their ground when he fell dead with a bullet through his heart.

This assault was made under the immediate lead of Hindman, Johnston being directly in his rear. The line quickly followed Peabody's retreating regiments till it struck Prentiss' other brigades, while farther to the rebel left Cleburne's brigade fell, with equal suddenness and fury, on the exposed flank of Hildebrand's brigade on Sherman's left. "Like an Alpine avalanche," says Beauregard, "our troops moved forward." The hapless brigade had hardly time to form before it was overwhelmed. General Sherman was among the first at the front, and put forth all his energies to hold that part of his line, but in vain. His orderly was killed and himself wounded as he rode toward the right, and Hildebrand's brigade was swept away. Hindman's centre was opposite the gap between Sherman and Prentiss, while his right came down on Prentiss' front and reached also to Stuart on Prentiss' left.

As the rebel troops pressed on after Hildebrand's broken brigade and into the gap, Sherman's other two brigades were quickly formed and made ready to receive Cleburne, whose left was overlapped by Sherman's right. In Cleburne's front was a swamp, or morass, which broke his line, — a part moving toward the right, and the rest around the left of the swamp. The charge was made with the desperate energy which ever afterward distinguished Cleburne; but his right wing was repulsed, with severe loss, by Sherman's infantry and batteries near Shiloh Church, and fell back in great disorder. The left wing, after a severe struggle, succeeded in reaching Sherman's encampment, but made no further advance till afternoon. A brigade from Bragg's corps was quickly sent forward to Cleburne's assistance; but this, too,

after a short conflict, was driven back in disorder, and did not venture again to attack. The 6th Mississippi lost 300 in killed and wounded out of an aggregate of 425. So that point, one of the strongest on Grant's whole line, was held a while longer. Those of Hindman's troops who had found their way into the gap were encountered by one of McClernand's brigades, which, having received timely warning from Prentiss, had formed some distance in front of its encampment. McClernand's third brigade, which was somewhat in advance of the rest, on the left of the division, was driven back with great loss some three hundred yards to a junction with the other two. Before night the whole division, after a series of severe struggles, was driven nearly to the riverbank, badly shattered. McClernand reports his doings in great detail, claiming that he was the means of "probably saving our army, transports and all, from capture." General Grant's endorsement on his report declares that he reported "too much of other divisions remote from his own, and from which reports are received conflicting somewhat with his statements." He also claims to have lost 37⅜ per cent of his force, whereas the figures he gives make but 26 per cent. Soon after the battle, he sent a long and boastful dispatch to President Lincoln, recounting his exploits somewhat in the style of Major Goliah O'Grady Gahagan, immortalized by Thackeray, saying: "My division, as usual, has borne, or shared in bearing, the brunt. I have lost, in killed and wounded, about every third man of my command" [though the figures show less than every fourth man]. "Within a radius of two hundred yards of my headquarters some 150 dead bodies were left on the field. Among the killed is General A. S. Johnston (said to be), who fell within thirty yards of my tent," and so on. Doubtless these exaggerated claims of General McClernand laid the foundation of that disagreement between himself and General Grant which culminated more than a year later in McClernand's retirement.

Before eight o'clock in the morning Hindman's division was in possession of a considerable part of Prentiss' camp — though not without terrible loss from the stubborn resistance made by Prentiss' inexperienced troops. He was soon obliged to call on Bragg for help, and Chalmers' division was sent forward. In the advance Hindman and Gladden had become somewhat separated, and Chalmers was placed in the interval thus caused. He struck Prentiss' left, where were several regiments which had only the day before reached the ground, and had not been brigaded. Indeed, some of them had received their muskets only on Saturday night, and their first exercise in the manual of arms was loading and firing at the enemy, advancing in line of battle. What with Hindman on his right and Chalmers on his left front, Prentiss could do nothing else but retire, which he did in much better order than might have been expected, and took a position along a sunken road, which afforded some shelter, and where he held his ground till late in the afternoon.

Stuart's detached brigade was early threatened by Gladden; but, warned by Prentiss, he had succeeded in forming line before Gladden could attack. He had also sent word to Hurlbut of the condition of affairs, and Hurlbut at once sent forward a battery to his aid. While Stuart, after having placed his men in line, was reconnoitring, his right regiment, stationed to support the battery, and the battery itself, disappeared at the very first shot from Gladden's guns without offering a particle of resistance. On his return, intending to place the battery in a commanding position which he had selected, he found a gap of at least a quarter of a mile on his right, where not a soldier could be seen, except fugitives making their way to the rear, while a large force of the enemy was advancing, in line of battle, straight for the abandoned ground. Before he could change front, or make any new disposition, his remaining regiments were involved in a most unequal contest. He succeeded, however, in gradually withdrawing them to

a new and advantageous line, where — not more than 800 in all — they maintained their ground several hours against Chalmers and his artillery. This successful resistance prevented Johnston from carrying out his plan of turning Grant's left, and so forcing him back to Owl Creek and a surrender.

C. F. Smith's division, then under command of W. H. L. Wallace, was in camp on Hurlbut's right. Probably Wallace learned of the attack on Prentiss at about the same time with Hurlbut, as Prentiss reports sending him that information. His division was promptly moved to the front, and before nine o'clock had formed on Prentiss' right in the space between the latter and McClernand. Here he remained, bravely holding his ground and repelling the enemy's assaults all through the early part of the day.

When Sherman realized that an attack in force had been made upon him, — which he says was not until about eight o'clock when he "saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry in the woods," though the action began at quarter-past five, — he sent to McClernand for assistance. The latter at once ordered his third brigade to the threatened point. Before it reached there, the firing showed him that Prentiss was also attacked, and the brigade was formed between Sherman's left and Prentiss' right, nearly at right angles to Sherman's line. As soon as it had formed, a charge was ordered, and the advancing enemy were assaulted, with terrible loss to the brigade, and without seriously checking the rebel advance. Ten officers, including Colonel Raith the brigade commander, and 86 men, were killed and nearly 400 wounded in this single assault, in less than half an hour. This is more than one fourth of McClernand's total loss in the two days' fight. The brigade was soon withdrawn, and the ground it occupied — a part of which had been abandoned by Hildebrand — was again left open. Sherman now appealed to Hurlbut; and the latter sent his second brigade within ten minutes after receiving the request for help. The moment it came up it was placed in

line on Sherman's left, where it met so severe a fire that it had to fall back to McClernand's line.

Hurlbut's other two brigades and his batteries went to the aid of Prentiss. As they approached the ground where the battle was raging, multitudes of men — the bulk of many broken and disorganized regiments — from all parts of the field forced their way through his ranks and drifted rapidly to the rear, in spite of all efforts to hold them by himself and Prentiss and all the brave men who remained steadfast with their colors. "A single shot," says Hurlbut, "from the enemy's batteries struck in the 13th Ohio Battery, when officers and men, with a common impulse of disgraceful cowardice, abandoned the entire battery, horses, caissons, and guns, and I saw them no more till Tuesday." The commander of the battery was summarily dismissed for cowardice, without the formality of a court-martial. The colonel of the 71st Ohio, who abandoned his post on Stuart's right, was not, at the time, dismissed. During the next summer he surrendered eight companies of his regiment, and the fort he was ordered to hold, to an inferior force, while the other two companies, commanded by a captain, repulsed and drove off from an inferior earthwork the same force to which the colonel had already surrendered.

Inspired by these successes all along the line, and with the help of the reserves from Polk's and Breckinridge's corps as fast as needed, the rebel troops pushed on with great ardor. General Johnston himself accompanied the advance, and his presence roused the wildest enthusiasm. By ten o'clock all the camps of Sherman's, Prentiss', and McClernand's divisions, with all their supplies, were in the enemy's hands. The direct attack of Cleburne on Sherman's right had, at first, been unsuccessful; but after Raith's bloody repulse and the withdrawal of Veatch, Hardee succeeded in getting some artillery in rear of Sherman's left, and the whole line was compelled to fall back, with the loss of three guns of Water-

house's and five of Behr's battery, the latter of which had not fired a shot. Hundreds of wounded, skulkers, and demoralized soldiers and teamsters were streaming to the rear and the riverbank, repeating the same story of death and disaster with which Bull Run had made the country familiar.

Yet the skulking was not wholly on the part of Grant's troops. The rebel reports are full of similar stories. The movements thus far made had very seriously disorganized Johnston's ranks. Many of the repulsed regiments lost their brigades, and did not find their proper places till the next day. Many more were demoralized by the abundant supplies of food and drink found in the camps they had captured. Bragg speaks with great bitterness of some of his troops, especially Gibson's brigade, which was twice repulsed with great loss for want of proper handling. Cleburne denounces the cowardice of some of his officers and men, and threatened to shoot them. Several Louisiana and Tennessee regiments are singled out by their brigade commanders as lacking in courage. The roads to Corinth were as crowded with stragglers and skulkers as those to the riverbank and the landing.

From about ten o'clock in the morning until two in the afternoon there is little variation in the story, or course, of the battle. During those four hours there was not so much skulking as earlier — the cowards and panic-stricken having already run away. Although there was serious disorganization in Grant's army, those who remained with their colors at the fighting-line stood up to their work with wonderful courage and tenacity. On Sherman's front, the resistance, during this time, to the rebel assaults was, perhaps, the most effective; partly because of the activity and skill of the immediate commander; partly because the right flank was protected by the swampy bottom of Owl Creek, and a succession of ridges, running parallel to the line of battle, which gave opportunities for making a stand; but chiefly because Johnston's plan was to turn Grant's left, and so the assaults along Sherman's

position were less persistent and fierce, after the early morning, than elsewhere.

Prentiss, too, held his ground — after the first repulse and as soon as his men had recovered from their surprise — with a resolution born, almost, of despair. A little after ten o'clock, just after he had repelled a fierce onslaught, General Grant came up to his position and ordered him to hold it at all hazards; an order which he obeyed with rigorous exactness. He had found a sunken road along a part of his line, which afforded partial protection to his men, and here he stayed until entirely surrounded. Late in the afternoon, with the remnant of his own and W. H. L. Wallace's division, which had come to his assistance, — in all about 2100 officers and men, — finding every avenue of escape closed, and further resistance merely bringing slaughter, he surrendered. He had fought a most gallant and determined fight, against overwhelming odds, with a loss of 17 officers killed, 64 wounded, and 46 captured; and of enlisted men 219 killed, 864 wounded, and 962 captured; a total of 2172.

The early movement of Hurlbut's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions has already been briefly mentioned. Owing to Wallace's death on the battle-field, no report of the operation of his command has ever been made. But the brigade reports throw some light upon its movements. The first brigade, under Colonel Tuttle, formed the left of the line as it advanced to reënforce Prentiss, with whose right it joined about nine o'clock. Throughout the day the whole division shared the fortunes of Prentiss, fighting valiantly in every position it occupied. Toward four o'clock, after Hurlbut's left had been turned, and his command forced back to the landing, Prentiss and Wallace held a hasty consultation and agreed to maintain their ground at all hazards, in the hope of thus saving the rest of the army from destruction. As the enemy, in overwhelming numbers, was closing about what was left of these two devoted divisions, Wallace fell dead with a bullet in his

brain. All but four of his regiments had cut their way through and were rallied at the rear, more or less disorganized. These four, completely surrounded, surrendered, with General Prentiss, at about half-past five in the afternoon, but not until, having repeatedly repelled assaults in front and on each flank, they saw the force which had driven back Sherman and McClernand closing in upon their right, and that before which Hurlbut and Stuart retired, enveloping their left. They then realized that nothing remained but death or surrender. Some of the battalions already stood back to back against the foe when the surrender was made. What was left of four of the fifteen regiments in Wallace's division, and four of the thirteen in Prentiss', — in all 2091 officers and men, — were made prisoners of war. At the surrender, one of the regiments was commanded by a lieutenant. The aggregate loss in these two divisions was 4921, being 45 per cent of the loss in Grant's whole army of five divisions, during the two days. This disaster, coming after the disorganization of the twenty-four regiments of Sherman's and McClernand's divisions before referred to, made a practical loss to General Grant of thirty-two out of the sixty-three regiments composing his army, in addition to the killed and severely wounded. When night came, less than one half of the able-bodied survivors of his morning army could be mustered for duty, and these mostly in squad and company. Not a single brigade organization was preserved; in a majority of cases, scarcely a regimental one.

Hurlbut's division was as actively engaged as any other during the day. At half-past seven in the morning, he received notice that Sherman's left was heavily attacked, and at once sent Veatch's brigade of four regiments to the threatened point. It came immediately into action. After a variety of adventures, successful and otherwise, this brigade presently found itself on McClernand's left, and there fought with good effect until Prentiss and Wallace succumbed. It then fell back, under orders, to the line of batteries on the high ridge

near the landing. The operations of the other two brigades have been briefly stated, but are deserving of a more detailed account. As they took position between Stuart and Prentiss they came under a heavy fire from the enemy's guns, and at the same time a formidable infantry force, formed in columns doubled on the centre, advanced against their left across an open field. As soon as these had come within four hundred yards of Hurlbut's line they were received with so hot a fire of musketry and artillery that they were broken in pieces while attempting to deploy, and fell back in confusion under cover, leaving 150 dead and mortally wounded on the field. This position was afterward repeatedly assaulted by the enemy, but without success. Prentiss rallied a considerable part of his command on Hurlbut's right, and for five hours they maintained their ground, twice exhausting their ammunition, and having to send one of the batteries to the rear on account of its losses in men and horses. About three o'clock Stuart notified Hurlbut, who was on his right, that his left had been driven in, and that the attack would reach his own left in a few minutes. It was now a question whether he should still endeavor to maintain his right where he connected with Prentiss. His left was in momentary danger of being turned. He speedily determined that his only hope for safety was in withdrawing his whole line, especially as he believed that Prentiss, with what remained of Wallace's division, and McClernand could hold their ground till night or help should come. He therefore sent word to Prentiss of his intention. He had scarcely done so when a Texas brigade made a fierce assault on his left, trying to get between him and the river. Dealing these a stunning blow with both artillery and musketry, before which they fell back in confusion, he withdrew in good order to the line of batteries near the riverbank, and, by General Grant's direction, assumed command of all the troops there collected. Gathering together all the men that he could he soon established a connection between his right and Sher-

man's left. The divisions of Prentiss, Wallace, and McClernand, which in the morning lay between them, had practically disappeared. Together, he and Sherman repulsed a vigorous attack led by Pond's brigade of Bragg's corps. This was the last effort of the rebel forces in that quarter to gain the river-bank. The concentrated fire of the batteries, the gunboats, and the infantry was too much. The assault failed, and was not renewed. It was now about dark; and soon after, Hurlbut advanced one of his brigades a hundred and fifty yards to the front, where he threw out pickets, and the men went into bivouac in line of battle and in the midst of a heavy rainstorm. It is only fair to say that this brigade, commanded that day by General Lauman, was one which General Buell had sent to General Grant to aid in the attack on Fort Donelson; and that, according to all the reports, it was the only one which was held steadily in hand from morning till night. When the final order for withdrawal was given by General Hurlbut, after the effort to turn his left had failed, the regiments of this brigade retired by right of companies to the rear to their assigned positions. Out of an aggregate of 1727 the brigade lost 454 in killed and wounded, and only 4 were reported missing.

At about midnight General Nelson came up to Hurlbut's position leading his freshly arrived division, and, advancing still further to the front, relieved the tired and valiant brigades, which retired nearer to the river, where they were joined by Hurlbut's third brigade, which had been fighting with Sherman during the day, and the remnants of the division were once more united.

The operations of the rebel army during the afternoon were almost as disastrous to them as to the Union forces. Not long after noon, when nearly the whole line was engaged, when the last reserves of Breckinridge had been ordered into action, and the issue of the battle was still doubtful, a charge upon the positions held by Wallace and Prentiss was ordered.

All the troops that could be concentrated were made ready for the assault, which the rebel leaders hoped would end the contest in their favor. It was Johnston's determined purpose in this attack to gain Grant's left flank, and force him away from the landing toward Owl and Snake Creeks. The first assault was repulsed with great loss. As soon as possible it was renewed. A second time the assailants were driven back by the brave survivors of those two divisions, who, steadfast to their colors, held their ground with tireless tenacity. So hot and fierce did they make it for their enemy that the rebels called the place the Hornet's Nest. Their resistance was more than had been counted on. The slaughter inflicted on Polk's and Breckinridge's ranks, by these brave men, was terrible. The commander of the 9th Arkansas says: "Prentiss poured on us a most destructive fire"; and Colonel Martin, of the 2d Confederate Infantry, commanding a brigade, says: "The 2d Confederate Regiment lost in a few minutes one hundred men, and would have been annihilated if Prentiss' troops had not overshot."

At this juncture, General Ruggles, commanding a division in Bragg's corps, after having been repeatedly repulsed, succeeded in concentrating eleven batteries on a commanding knoll, whence they could enfilade the right of Prentiss' line. Some Tennessee and Louisiana regiments had just given way under a heavy fire, and Breckinridge, in disgust and despair, had reported to General Johnston that he had a Tennessee regiment which would not fight. Gibson's Louisiana brigade also fell under Bragg's displeasure for the same alleged reason. General Johnston, on hearing Breckinridge's statement about the Tennessee troops, turned to Mr. Harris, the fugitive governor of that state, — then a volunteer aide on his staff, — and said, "Let the Governor go to them." Mr. Harris went, as suggested, and after much eloquent persuasion succeeded in bringing them into line. But they were still too unsteady for Breckinridge to venture a charge, and he again reported its

condition to General Johnston. "Then I will help you," said Johnston, and all together — Johnston and all his staff, Breckinridge and his staff, Harris, and others — rode along the line encouraging and cheering on the men. On reaching the centre Johnston turned his horse toward the front, and calling out, "I will lead you," dashed forward in the charge which finally overwhelmed Prentiss' left, but not until the rebel chief had received his death-wound and every one of his staff present was brought to the ground by wounds more or less serious or by the killing of their horses. Thus Prentiss' left was driven in, while his right, enfiladed by the cruel guns of Ruggles, also gave way. It was about three o'clock when Johnston was killed. Bragg, who was on the ground, continued the movement which had been begun. From all directions the enemy swept down upon this division and the remnants of Wallace's, completely surrounding them. Yet it took nearly two hours after this to accomplish its destruction. Cleburne, who had in the morning gone into action against Sherman's right near Owl Creek, and Chalmers, who had attacked the extreme left along Lick Creek, met in the rear of Prentiss' position, and there was no alternative but surrender.

It was now after five o'clock. Beauregard, who had succeeded to the command after Johnston's death, was greatly prostrated by the prolonged sickness with which he had been afflicted since early in February. He was scarcely able to leave his ambulance. He was at the extreme left of the rebel line, near Shiloh Church, when Governor Harris brought him the news of Johnston's death. Learning from Harris that all seemed to be going on well at the rebel right and that Bragg was there, he merely said — "Then the battle may as well go on" — and gave new orders. Inviting Harris to join his staff, he remained where he then was till the close of the day.

Meantime, Bragg, who had been close at hand during the charges just mentioned and who saw Johnston's fall, had issued strenuous orders that everything should go forward.

Under his and Breckinridge's leadership the attack and pursuit were pressed with vigor. Cheatham had come up on the right with his division comparatively fresh, and, charging with great energy, carried all before him, capturing many prisoners and a six-gun battery before it had fired a shot. At this time it looked as though Grant's entire army were fated to become prisoners of war. The victorious brigades which had surrounded and captured Prentiss were re-formed, and were nowhere more than half a mile from the river, and some of them were as near as four hundred yards. Several of the approaches to the landing were under the rebel control. Indeed, young Willie Forrest, son of the famous cavalry general, a lad of some fifteen years, with two or three companions armed with old shot-guns, actually made their way to the river and captured and led away as many as fifteen demoralized skulkers who were cowering under the bank, and turned them over to the Provost Marshal. Nothing could more fully illustrate the terrible panic which that day had complete possession of so large a portion of that army which afterward made for itself so noble a record of courage and invincibility.

Just before reaching the last ridge which separated the battle-ground from the river, the rebel troops were halted to rectify their disordered lines, concentrate their artillery, and to prepare for the final charge which was to sweep away every vestige of opposition. Nearly an hour of daylight still remained. The only organized resistance now came from the two gunboats on the river, some batteries collected on a ridge overlooking the slough just above the landing, a few companies of Buell's advance guard, which had first succeeded in crossing, and such remnants of Hurlbut's, McClernand's, and Sherman's divisions as could be held in line by the combined efforts of General Grant and all his officers. At this moment of seeming victory the rebel corps commanders were surprised to learn that orders had come from General Beauregard, and had been communicated directly to brigade commanders, that

the lines should fall back beyond the reach of fire from batteries and gunboats. This unexpected order was at once obeyed. Soon after dark the entire rebel army went into camp, the greater part in the captured tents of their enemy, which had been left standing as they were abandoned in the morning. The fire of the batteries collected near the riverbank by Colonel Webster, General Grant's chief of artillery, doubtless had some effect in causing Beauregard to issue the order recalling his troops; still more, the noisy and vigorous demonstrations of the two gunboats, which, from Beauregard's far-off station, must have sounded formidably enough. He gives no reason for such an order in his report; indeed, he does not mention it — merely saying that he directed the troops "to sleep on their arms in such positions in advance and rear as corps commanders should determine." "It was after six o'clock," he says, "when the enemy's last position was carried, and his forces finally broke and sought refuge behind a commanding eminence covering Pittsburg Landing, not more than half a mile distant, and under the guns of the gunboats, which opened on our eager columns a fierce and annoying fire of shot and shell of the heaviest description." So it seemed to Beauregard; but to the men who had approached the riverbank, and had driven the broken lines into such narrow quarters, the gunboats had few terrors. Bragg, in his report, says: "The two gunboats poured a heavy fire on our supposed position. This fire, though terrific in sound, and producing some consternation at first, did us no damage, as the shells all passed over and exploded far beyond our positions." Polk also says: "The height of the plain on which we were was about one hundred feet, so that it was necessary to give great elevation to the guns to enable them to fire over the bank. The consequence was that the shot would take effect only at points remote from the river's edge. They were comparatively harmless to our troops nearest the bank." It is to be borne in mind, however, in reading these reports, that Bragg's was not made

until the 25th of the ensuing July, and Polk's the 4th of February, 1863, so that these representations may be an afterthought. Hardee, whose report was also made in February, 1863, does not mention the gunboats. Most of the reports of division, brigade, and regimental commanders were made within a few weeks after the battle, and they generally agree that the gunboat fire had very little effect. Colonel Massey, a brigade commander, says: "The fire from the gunboats was more noisy than destructive." Strahl, Venable, Gibson, Anderson, and others mention the fire of the gunboats, but without special comment. Stewart, who commanded a brigade in Polk's corps, says the pursuit "was checked by the fire of the gunboats." Evidently their moral was greater than their physical effect.

During this vital struggle of more than twelve hours, the information concerning General Grant's doings is singularly meagre. Never was battle of such magnitude fought, in which there is so little evidence of one directing will. Several times during the contest — notably after Breckinridge had been repulsed, and when he could not bring up his regiments — it would appear that the presence and leadership of an energetic commander might have prevented disaster, or turned it to victory. But at such times there is no evidence that General Grant knew or appreciated the condition of things at the front. Not a single order issued by him that day to the troops on the field is of record. A few verbal orders are mentioned by Prentiss, Sherman, and Hurlbut. Indeed, no order of his for the week preceding, that relates in any way to the disposition of his forces for battle, is to be found. In all the reports of his subordinates giving accounts of the battle, some eighty-seven in number, only six make any mention of him during the long and trying day. Of these six, only one speaks of seeing him between ten o'clock in the morning and three o'clock in the afternoon. General Prentiss says it was soon after ten o'clock when General Grant came upon the field where he was

fighting and ordered him to maintain his ground at all hazards. About three o'clock, also, Grant visited Sherman, on the right. Not far from the same time a regimental commander in W. H. L. Wallace's, and another in Hurlbut's division, which were near together, received orders from him in person. A regimental commander in McClernand's division, while at the rear during the afternoon getting ammunition, was ordered by Grant to advance his command; and later, Colonel Stuart of Sherman's detached brigade reports Grant's passing near his position at the extreme left of the Union lines, and ordering him to re-form on the batteries near the riverbank. These are all the glimpses we get of him during the day, except that General Buell found him, on his arrival at the landing, on board a steamer, and they went ashore together, and several orders were issued to officers of Buell's army, marching to reënforce him, to hurry their movements.

General Grant's own report, dated April 9, covering about two and a half printed pages, is very meagre. His entire account of Sunday's battle is compressed into twenty-two lines, of which fourteen are occupied with an account of what was done by the gunboats and Nelson's division during the last half-hour before dark. Considering the vigorous contentions which have been made by some of Grant's volunteer champions, denying the value of Buell's assistance, the comparative space allotted to it in his report, and the urgency of his orders concerning it, may be taken as a fair indication of his own judgment at the time when the memory of such services was fresh in his mind; whatever may have been afterward said or done, this evidence of what he said and thought at the time is significant.

This reference to General Grant's conduct during the battle of Shiloh is not intended, I presume I need not say, in any way to impugn it. As commander he had the undoubted right to be where he chose and to do what he pleased. Unquestionably he was — unless his whole career before and after-

ward belies him — active and alert. It is certain that he was cool and self-contained, and that he did not despair of final success. But it is none the less singular that there is so little record of his doings during those stirring and eventful hours. At Belmont and Fort Henry and Fort Donelson he appears as the central and commanding figure. At Shiloh, so far as appearances or results go, he might as well have been absent from the field.

General Buell and his staff, who had spent the night of the 5th with General Nelson at Savannah, were roused from their tents by the booming of the first gun, at quarter-past five in the morning. Very soon after, General Buell rode up to General Grant's headquarters to get information as to the best means of reaching the battle-field, and learned that he had just started for Pittsburg, leaving an order for General Nelson, dated Savannah, April 6 — hour not stated — as follows: "An attack having been made on our forces, you will move your entire command to the river opposite Pittsburg. You can obtain a guide easily in the village. By order of Major-General U. S. Grant. J. A. Rawlins, A. A. G."

General Nelson was an officer of very uncommon energy and vigor both of mind and body. He never needed the spur. With this ominous order in his hand, and with the sounds of battle drawing nearer and nearer every minute, — showing that Grant's forces were meeting with reverses, — he entered upon its fulfilment with his customary zeal. Yet it was half-past one in the afternoon before he left Savannah. All the morning had been consumed, not in getting his troops ready, —they were under arms as early as seven o'clock in the morning and in the streets of Savannah, — but in vain efforts to find a way of reaching the battle-field, or the river opposite it, as Grant had directed. The story is best told in the diary of Colonel Jacob Ammen, who commanded Nelson's advance brigade, himself an old soldier: "General Nelson comes dashing

into camp (it was not yet 7 o'clock) and gives me orders to be ready to proceed to the assistance of the Army of the Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing, if a practicable route could be found through the swamp. He went to the landing to watch for the boats and said he would send me orders. The brigade was soon under arms and cartridge-boxes filled, arms examined, men ready to march, no orders from General Nelson. Rode to brick house on the riverbank and there met Generals Buell and Nelson, both very impatient, as there was no appearance of boats coming down the river from the battle-field. Those sent out to find a road through the swamp returned and reported unfavorably. Roar of artillery continued, and reports of defeat were numerous. My friend, C. F. Smith, was upstairs, a cripple, and I obtained permission to see him. He was in fine spirits, laughed at me for thinking a battle was raging. Presently an orderly came and said General Nelson wanted to see me. A small steamer was approaching and would soon go up the river. It is about noon. General Buell and staff take passage on the steamer, and start up the river for Pittsburg Landing. At one o'clock an officer came with orders to march through the swamp, as no boats were in sight."

While on the way from Savannah to Pittsburg Landing, General Buell was met by a boat bringing him a communication from General Grant, apologizing for not meeting him according to agreement, and adding: "I have been looking for this [attack] but did not believe it would be made before Monday or Tuesday." General Buell, on his arrival at the landing, joined General Grant whom he found on a boat. Even at that hour "the banks at the landing swarmed with a confused mass of men of various regiments," — not less than 4000 or 5000 in number, — and later, a great many more. General Buell immediately requested that steamers be sent to Savannah to bring up Crittenden's division which was next in rear of Nelson's. As soon as orders had been given for the steamers, as requested by Buell, both the generals, in accord-

ance with the latter's suggestion, went ashore and on to the battle-field.

Nelson's division had to make its way through the deep black mud of a pathless and wooded swamp, five miles wide, before it reached the landing opposite to Pittsburg. The men hurried on — if the word hurry can be properly used to describe such progress — as fast as they could drag themselves through the mire. The sounds of battle grew every moment more and more distinct. Presently a courier splashed up to the head of Ammen's column, which was in the lead, and shouted: "The General sends his compliments, and says to hurry up or all will be lost. The enemy are driving our men." It was still two miles to the landing. Before reaching there two more couriers came with the same encouraging message. Presently the head of the column emerges from the dense forest and black swamp, and the men stand on the river-bank opposite Pittsburg. They see the whole space between the top of the bluff and the water, for half a mile, crowded with men, and the whole fleet of boats full — all utterly demoralized, a confused and ungoverned mass of 10,000 to 15,000. Signals are made to some of the steamers to hurry over, and a road is cut from the high bank to the waterside. Presently a boat starts across, yet it is so crowded with skulkers that only three or four companies can get on board, and every straggler of them has his tale to tell of how his regiment was cut to pieces, and foretelling the same fate for them. Indeed, during the crossing some of Colonel Ammen's men called his attention to persons with shoulder-straps on, paddling on logs toward the east side of the river, and begged permission to shoot the cowards. General Nelson, who was on the first boat, as soon as he landed besought General Buell to allow him to open fire on the "knaves," as he called them, "insensible," he says, "to shame or sarcasm, for I tried both." Those who know of Nelson's capacity in either of these directions need no greater proof of the utter panic into which these men had fallen.

The three or four companies which first crossed, belonging to the 36th Indiana, were at once formed in line on the hill, and held their places until the rest of their regiment and the 6th Ohio arrived. While thus waiting, a solid shot from one of the enemy's guns cut off the head of one of Nelson's escort and wounded one of his staff officers, and many shot and shell whizzed over the men's heads into the river behind them. Nelson rode slowly up and down the bank in front of this short line; so complete was his mastery over his troops that not one of them thought of turning back while he was there, and his wounded staff officer rode up and saluted, as he asked permission to go to the rear to have his wound dressed. Even while the line was forming, persons were running through it from the front and breaking it. Within the short space occupied by these two regiments were Generals Grant, Buell, and Nelson, "all of them," says Ammen, "cool and calm." General Grant directed Ammen to support a battery stationed sixty to one hundred yards to the left of the road, and Generals Buell and Nelson helped to form the line. The companies were put in position behind the crest of a hill, the left of which was protected by a deep, watered ravine parallel to the river and about three hundred yards from the landing. As the line was forming, the rebel assaulting column reached the crest, received the fire of the troops, — the first they had ever discharged against an enemy, — and fell back in some confusion. The enemy were soon rallied and again marched to the crest, but only to repeat their former experience. After half an hour of fruitless effort, in which Ammen lost only one man killed, the attempt was abandoned and the enemy retired. While this was going on, the gunboats Tyler and Lexington had taken position opposite the mouth of the ravine which separated the two armies, and were firing their great guns directly along the open space which the rebels must cross to reach the Union position. At the time when General Ammen was placed in line by Buell there was not a soldier

between the riverbank and Hurlbut's left, some eighth to a quarter of a mile back. The occupation of this point by the enemy would have secured them the possession of the riverbank and the landing, and have completely turned Grant's left.

The other two brigades of Nelson's division did not arrive until after dark. Ammunition was then distributed, cartridge-boxes filled, and twenty additional rounds per man were put in pockets. The whole line was then cautiously advanced — making their way by feeling, not by sight — to the bayou several hundred yards in front, relieving the tired regiments of Hurlbut's division. A strong picket-line was established beyond the bayou, and by midnight everything was ready for the morning's work. Meantime a heavy rain began to fall, and the men slept as best they could in the miry mud.

While Nelson's division was making its way through the swamp above Savannah, and the tide of battle was turning most fiercely against Grant's army, at an hour not noted the following order was sent:

To the Commanding Officer, Advance Forces, Buell's Army, near Pittsburg:

The attack on my forces has been very spirited from early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops in the field now would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be more to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us. The rebel forces are estimated at over 100,000 men. My headquarters will be in the log building on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide you to your place on the field.

U. S. GRANT, Major-General Commanding.

Such a dispatch written in the midst of battle from such a general is its own best commentary.

This dispatch was received by General Crittenden, whose division was next in order to Nelson's. He made all possible haste, but did not succeed in making a crossing before dark. During the night the whole division was brought over and formed as well as they could on Nelson's right. At daylight they advanced, under Buell's leadership, to their position in line. McCook's division was twelve miles from Savannah, when, about noon of Sunday, he received orders to hurry up, bringing three days' rations and plenty of ammunition. He reached Savannah at seven o'clock, and after resting two hours, moved to the riverbank, where were numerous boats but no preparation for taking him over. He had to wake up the captains and compel them to get their boats ready. He succeeded in placing Rousseau's brigade across by 5 o'clock in the morning, followed as rapidly as possible by his other two brigades, one of which reached the field at between seven and eight o'clock, and the other not until eleven o'clock in the forenoon. There was lack of fuel on some of the boats, and sides of bacon were flung into the furnaces to keep up the fires. Rousseau on landing was marched to Crittenden's right, and the other two brigades as they came up formed on his right and right rear.

While the desperate battle was raging all day Sunday an entire division of Grant's army, which had already distinguished itself at Fort Donelson under the leadership of General Lew Wallace, was within six miles of Pittsburg Landing, from which it was separated by the water of Snake Creek, with its low swampy bottoms. This division, though hearing the sounds of the strife, took no part in it. It numbered, all told, about 7000 men, with twelve pieces of artillery. The first brigade lay at Crump's Landing, the second about two miles to the west, at a cross-roads appropriately called Stony Lonesome, and the third at Adamsville, two and a half miles still further west. General Grant, when the first intimations of a rebel advance on the 4th reached him, thought an attack

would be made on this force, and accordingly sent him some artillery, and ordered W. H. L. Wallace to be ready to march to his namesake's assistance if necessary. When Lew Wallace heard the guns on Sunday morning he put his troops in order, and by nine o'clock was ready to move wherever required. About that time General Grant met him on the wharf-boat at Crump's and directed him to hold himself in readiness for orders. At about half-past 11 orders came to move at once to the right of the army, and form at right angles to the river. By 12 o'clock his entire force, except two regiments and a section of artillery left to guard the stores, was in motion toward the bridge over Snake Creek, near the right of Sherman's camp, about six miles distant over a very bad road. When the head of his column was within half a mile of this bridge, Captain Rowley, one of Grant's aides, rode up with orders to hurry, and stating that, as the camp on Sherman's right was in possession of the enemy, it would not be safe to cross the bridge. The column was accordingly countermarched, and, after returning to within half a mile of its starting-point, took a road leading to Pittsburg Landing by another bridge near the river. The whole afternoon was consumed by this marching and countermarching. About dark Wallace went into bivouac on Sherman's right, his own right resting on Snake Creek. From this position he took part early the next morning in the movement against the enemy, forming the extreme right of the National forces, and steadily pressing back the rebel lines. About four o'clock in the afternoon he repelled a vigorous assault led by Beauregard in person, and soon after recaptured Sherman's abandoned camp. He then pursued the retreating enemy beyond the camp occupied by Hardee on the night of the 5th and kept up the pursuit till dark.

General Wallace has been subjected to very severe censure for his conduct on the 6th. It seems to me, from a careful study of all the evidence, that the censure is uncalled for. He promptly obeyed every order, and moved as rapidly as could

be done over such roads. The movement towards Sherman's right seems the natural and proper one.

About the time that Beauregard issued the orders for his troops to fall back on the evening of the 6th, he telegraphed to the Richmond War Department: "We this morning attacked the enemy in strong position in front of Pittsburg, and after a severe battle of ten (10) hours, thanks be to the Almighty, gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position." Jefferson Davis made this telegram the text for a special message to the Confederate Congress. "I am able to announce to you, with entire confidence, that it has pleased Almighty God to crown the Confederate arms with a glorious and decisive victory over our invaders."

Early the next morning, according to his scheme of the night before, Beauregard ordered his troops forward to secure the fruits of the "glorious and decisive victory," for which such fervent thanks had been rendered. But he found a very different state of affairs from what he anticipated. He was met at the very outset by a resistance which he could not overcome, and before which he could not maintain himself. In his report, dated April 11, he says: "About six o'clock on the morning of April 7, a hot fire of musketry and artillery opened from the enemy's quarters on our advanced line assured me of the junction of his forces, and soon the battle raged with a fury that satisfied me I was attacked by a largely superior force." This attacking force consisted of Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions, numbering in all about 8000 men and three batteries. What it accomplished may be best told in Beauregard's own words: "On the right and centre the enemy was repulsed in every attempt he made with his heavy columns in that part of the field. On the left, however, and nearest the point of arrival of his reënforcements, he drove forward line after line of his fresh troops. Thus opposed to an enemy constantly reënforced, our ranks were perceptibly thinned under the unceasing, withering fire of the enemy, and

by noon eighteen hours of hard fighting had perceptibly exhausted a large number."

As already stated, the only troops with which Buell advanced on the morning of the 7th were Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions. These went into action soon after daylight, Nelson advancing southerly, his left on Lick Creek, and Crittenden moving westerly, and soon taking position on Nelson's right. Mendenhall's and Bartlett's batteries accompanied Crittenden. During the forenoon Terrill's battery of McCook's division came upon the field and went to Nelson's aid, doing good service in some of the hardest fighting during the whole of the battle. In his advance Nelson passed over the ground where the desperate contest between Johnston's right and Prentiss and Wallace had taken place, and was resisted by the same force which had so nearly captured the landing the afternoon before. When McCook came up he advanced to Crittenden's right. It was his column to which Beauregard refers when he speaks of "line after line of fresh troops" coming up on his left. Farther to the right of the Union line was Lew Wallace's division, with whom advanced also portions of the other divisions of Grant's army.

The greater part of the fighting on Monday was by Buell's troops, so opportunely on the field. Without going into details, it is enough to say that at every point and steadily, except an occasional local repulse, all day long they drove back the enemy which the day before had taken possession of all Grant's camps. Before night they recaptured the camps and twenty pieces of artillery as an offset to the twenty-seven lost the day before. This steady advance and splendid fighting of the well-disciplined troops under Buell's most gallant leadership is mentioned in terms of highest appreciation in all the reports of the division and nearly all the regimental commanders in Grant's army, and by Grant himself, who devotes more space to it in his reports than to the movements of his own army. Officers of regiments in McClernand's division

followed Crittenden's lead and took orders from him; Hurlbut's men advanced as reserves to McCook and took orders from him; Sherman's people coöperated with McCook, and Sherman says in his report: "McCook's splendid division drove back the enemy along the Corinth Road, which was the great central line of this battle. There Beauregard commanded in person, supported by Bragg's, Johnston's, and Breckinridge's divisions." Lew Wallace's division also advanced with equal steadiness on the extreme right, but without meeting such formidable resistance as the rest of the line. By noon the right of McCook connected with Lew Wallace's left, showing that the whole battle-front was occupied by the new troops that had come up during the night.

It was no easy conquest which they won over their brave foes. The troops they fought were, indeed, tired with the tremendous work they had done; but Buell's men had had no rest since Saturday night and were almost as tired as their opponents. All day Sunday, and all Sunday night, they were marching and crossing the river or making their way to the front and bivouacking in the rain and mud. Most of the rebel troops had slept under captured canvas Sunday night, and enjoyed a good supper and breakfast at their enemy's expense. The Union troops were all exposed to the heavy rain of Sunday night. At several points the fighting of Monday equalled that of Sunday, the difference being that the Union forces were the assailants. Hazen's brigade of Nelson's division was the chief sufferer, losing 406 killed and wounded, with only one missing out of a total in action of 1424 — being equal to 28.5 per cent. The 41st Ohio, which made a desperate and unsuccessful assault, lost 140 out of 373 engaged, or 37.5 per cent. The 32d Indiana — a German regiment — was the only one in Buell's army which had been in battle. It was handled with great gallantry by Colonel Willich, who says in his report: "As proof of the bravery and coolness of my officers and men I will mention that when during the last charge they fired at

too great a distance, I stopped the firing and practised them in the manual of arms, which they executed as if on parade-ground, and then reopened deliberate and effective fire."

The movements of Buell's divisions, one after the other, toward the enemy's left were, in effect, a grand left wheel of his whole army on the enemy's position, in echelon of divisions. With every advance the enemy were driven back from one point to another until after noon, when the whole rebel army was in full retreat before the resistless advance of the Union troops. The last assault was made by Rousseau's brigade, which followed up the enemy beyond Sherman's recaptured camp, near Shiloh Church. Beauregard represents that as early as one o'clock he had determined to withdraw, and that, in accordance with orders, his troops left the field in good order and with great steadiness, bringing away abundant spoils of all kinds.

General T. J. Wood, who commanded one of Buell's divisions which crossed the river too late to come into action on Monday, but early enough to get to Shiloh before dark, says: "It was left to the 20th brigade [of his division] to join in the pursuit. This was done at once; but though pressed with vigor, it was never near enough to reach the fugitives with small arms, notwithstanding it was under the fire of the battery covering the retreat of the enemy." In this division General J. A. Garfield commanded a brigade, and reached the front at nightfall, bivouacking on the ground abandoned by the enemy. Pursuit ceased at dark, and in the morning the enemy — except the rear guard under Breckinridge, which made a bold stand — was well on his way to Corinth. This rear guard drove back a cavalry force, which had gone out under Sherman's direction, in great disorder, and also threw the infantry supports into confusion. There was, however, no real fighting. Sherman advanced a mile or two, and found the roads strewn with abandoned wagons, ambulances, and limber-boxes. He also found tents which belonged to him

pitched all along the road, occupied as hospitals, and filled with wounded men. The check he received stopped all further advance, as General Grant, under Halleck's instructions, had already ordered that the pursuit should not be continued beyond Pea Ridge.

As already stated, General Buell captured from the enemy twenty guns and several colors. General Grant's loss of guns is not fully reported, but was at least twenty-seven guns, of which Sherman lost eight, McClernand eleven, and the other three divisions the rest. The artillery, on both sides, was used skilfully and effectively. Grant's batteries, on Sunday, fired an average of 120 rounds each. In Buell's army, on Monday, Terrill expended 242 rounds, Mendenhall 498, and Bartlett 600. These were all the batteries engaged.

The losses on both sides were very nearly equal. Counting only killed and wounded, Grant lost, in the five divisions which were under fire both days, eighty-four (84) commissioned officers and thirteen hundred and eighty-eight (1388) enlisted men killed; three hundred and twenty-five (325) officers and six thousand and twenty-five (6025) enlisted men wounded; a total of four hundred and nine (409) officers and seventy-four hundred and thirteen (7413) men — aggregating 7822. It is impossible to distribute the losses between the two days, but by far the greater part of them were on Sunday, and fully one third in the first desperate onset of the rebel army in the early morning. The two regiments having the greatest percentage of loss were the 9th and 11th Illinois — the latter a small regiment greatly reduced by the casualties at Fort Donelson, where it took a conspicuous part. Going into action with only 239 men, it lost 103, of whom only seventeen were reported missing. The greater part of this loss was in the first ten minutes on Sunday morning, when its gallant commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, — who afterward greatly distinguished himself, and died just after the close of the Atlanta campaign, — was severely wounded.

The losses in the 9th Illinois were still greater, being 61 killed, 300 wounded, and 5 missing — an aggregate of 366 out of 600 engaged, or over 60 per cent. The 11th Illinois was in McClernand's division, and the 9th in W. H. L. Wallace's division. The percentage of losses (by killed and wounded) in all the divisions was pretty evenly distributed — McClernand losing nearly 25 per cent; W. H. L. Wallace, 17.5; Hurlbut, 25.4; Sherman, 19; Prentiss, 22.5. The captured and missing amounted to 2830; of which 2314, or over 80 per cent, were from the two divisions of Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace.

Buell's loss was seventeen (17) commissioned officers and two hundred and twenty-four (224) enlisted men killed; ninety-two (92) officers and seventeen hundred and fifteen (1715) men wounded; an aggregate of two thousand and forty-eight (2048). The missing were fifty-five (55). This loss was 15 per cent of the number engaged, being within 4 per cent of the losses in Sherman's and W. H. L. Wallace's divisions in the two days. Lew Wallace lost three (3) commissioned officers and thirty-eight (38) men killed; eleven (11) officers and two hundred and forty (240) men wounded; an aggregate of two hundred and ninety-two (292), with only four (4) missing. The percentage was 5.6 of the number engaged. The grand aggregate is one hundred and four (104) officers and sixteen hundred and fifty (1650) men killed; four hundred and twenty-eight (428) officers and seventy-nine hundred and eighty (7980) men wounded; total, ten thousand one hundred and sixty-two (10,162). Missing, twenty-eight hundred and thirty-five (2835). Aggregate of all losses, thirteen thousand and forty-seven (13,047), being 25 per cent of the numbers engaged.

General Beauregard reported the Confederate loss at ten thousand six hundred and ninety-nine (10,699), to which Preston Johnston adds two hundred and eighteen (218); total, ten thousand nine hundred and seventeen (10,917), dis-

tributed as follows: Killed, seventeen hundred and twenty-eight (1728); wounded, eight thousand and twelve (8012); missing, nine hundred and fifty-nine (959); Bragg's corps lost five hundred and fifty-three (553) killed; twenty-four hundred and forty-one (2441) wounded; and six hundred and thirty-four (634) missing; total, thirty-six hundred and twenty-eight (3628); percentage of killed and wounded, 22. Polk's corps: Killed, three hundred and eighty-five (385); wounded, nineteen hundred and fifty-three (1953); missing, nineteen (19); total, twenty-three hundred and fifty-seven (2357); percentage of killed and wounded, 25. Hardee's corps: Killed, four hundred and four (404); wounded, nineteen hundred and thirty-six (1936); missing, one hundred and forty-one (141); total, twenty-four hundred and eighty-one (2481); percentage of killed and wounded, nearly 35. Breckinridge's corps: Killed, three hundred and eighty-six (386); wounded, sixteen hundred and eighty-two (1682); missing, one hundred and sixty-five (165); total, twenty-two hundred and thirty-three (2233); proportion of killed and wounded, 32. The percentage of all losses on the Confederate side is 30 against 25 on the National side.

Few, if any, of the great battles of the rebellion give greater evidence of tenacity, firmness, and unconquerable spirit than was shown by those soldiers who fought on the Union side, especially those of Grant's army who stood to their colors. Brought on unexpectedly to Grant and his whole army, there was everything to dishearten and little to cheer the defenders of the National cause, during that critical Sunday. A deep and impassable river at their backs, impenetrable swamps and thickets on either side, an enemy believed to be greatly superior in numbers and discipline in their front, with little or no hope of reënforcement or succor of any kind, and, for the most, with no experience either of themselves or their commanders on the battle-field, it required all the courage and intrepidity which belong to human

nature to endure the terrible ordeal. Considering all the circumstances, the wonder is — not that they did not do better, but that they did so well. There was none of that feeling of comradeship and mutual dependence which comes from marching and fighting side by side, and there was no commander there to call out enthusiasm and confidence.

The question whether General Grant was surprised at Corinth will probably never be settled, certainly not during the lifetime of those who took part in that great battle. General Sherman most tenaciously combats any such suggestion and to this day grows excited and angry over it. General Buell, in a letter written on the 19th of January, 1865, in reply to General Sherman, uses these words: "It was not such a surprise as might result from the fancied absence of an enemy; but it was the more culpable surprise, resulting from a total want of suitable preparation." General Grant confessedly had troops enough to meet any anticipated attack. The ground he occupied was especially well adapted for defence. Half his troops, Sherman's and Hurlbut's divisions, had been on the spot three weeks. The positions of all were deliberately selected. The enemy were known to be concentrating at Corinth twenty miles away. Sherman had undertaken three expeditions against the Memphis and Charleston Railroad and had had to abandon two because he encountered too large a force of the enemy. During the 4th and 5th of April all the pickets and reconnoitring parties reported unusual activity on the part of the rebels.

In spite of all these signs and warnings there was no consecutive chain of sentinels along the three miles which separated Sherman's right at Shiloh Church from his left at Lick Creek; not a spadeful of earth had been thrown up, nor a tree cut down to obstruct Johnston's advance; no place had been selected on which to form general line of battle in case of attack; and not the slightest instruction given how to proceed if the enemy should appear. Everything had been left

to the whim, or knowledge, or apprehension, or ignorance of brigade and regimental commanders. There were, at least, three trained soldiers present, of high rank and considerable experience — Grant, Sherman, and C. F. Smith; and among those of subordinate rank were a number educated in military science, like McPherson, and Ransom, and Worthington. A few regimental commanders, who had ventured rather importunately to recommend some system of defence, had been snubbed for their meddling. Thus it was that when, on Saturday night, the usual camp sentinels were posted, and the advance guards sent to a few of the cross-roads, not a word of caution was given, no extra pains were taken to prevent surprise; and it is safe to say that nobody, within the lines of the National army, dreamed that so much as a brigade — much less the entire rebel army — lay in wait for a terrific onset at day-dawn.

No clearer proof is needed on this point than Grant's letter to General Buell, written at Savannah on the morning of the 6th, just as he was embarking for the battle-field: "Heavy firing is heard up the river, indicating plainly that an attack has been made on our most advanced position. I have been looking for this, but did not believe the attack could be made before Monday or Tuesday. This necessitates my joining the forces up the river instead of meeting you to-day, as I had contemplated. I have directed General Nelson to move to the river with his division. He can march to opposite Pittsburg."

Certainly, in the face of this testimony, General Grant can scarcely affirm that he was not surprised, whatever his eager and over-confident friends may volunteer to affirm for him.

How was it with the other officers in that army when the storm of battle broke upon them that pleasant Sunday morning? Let their own reports answer. General Prentiss received the first attack, and he, or some of his subordinates, were

better prepared to receive it than either of the other division commanders. One of his brigades had gone forward to meet the enemy, and the check which was thus given enabled him to place the rest of his division in line to receive the attack. Yet, by six o'clock his entire command was under fire, unsupported either on right or left, and he was soon compelled to abandon his position. If he was not surprised, he was, at least, unprepared, as his conversation with Colonel Peabody clearly shows. In his report he says: "At about seven o'clock the same [Saturday] evening, Colonel Moore returned, reporting some activity in his front, an evident reconnaissance by cavalry." Yet at that moment the whole rebel army was in line of battle, waiting for daylight, to begin the attack.

General Sherman says in his report, dated April 10: "On Saturday the enemy's cavalry was very bold, coming well down to our front, yet *I did not believe that he designed anything but a strong demonstration.*" He got his division under arms early Sunday morning, in consequence of his advance guard being driven back on the main body. Yet he says: "About eight o'clock I saw the glistening bayonets of heavy masses of infantry to our left front . . . and became satisfied, *for the first time*, that the enemy designed a determined attack on the whole camp." Only the afternoon before he had reported to General Grant: "The enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery about two miles out." Colonel Stuart, who commanded Sherman's detached brigade, on Prentiss' left, says: "At 7.30 o'clock on Sunday morning, I received a verbal message from General Prentiss that the enemy were in his front in force. . . . In a very short time I discovered the Pelican flag advancing in rear of General Prentiss' headquarters." Colonel Parker, of the 48th Ohio (Buckland's brigade, Sherman's division), says: "The enemy came upon us so suddenly that our men wavered." Colonel Hare, commanding the first brigade of McClernand's division, says: "I formed a regiment

on the right, and, on joining the regiment on the left, found this portion of the brigade under fire of the enemy's cannon and musketry." In the 18th Illinois, several men were wounded before line of battle could be formed, in rear of McClernand's headquarters. The 11th Iowa, of the same brigade, had hardly got into position before the enemy appeared in force and opened fire. Colonel Marsh, commanding McClernand's second brigade, says: "I had scarcely assumed my position when the enemy were seen approaching in large force, with a steadiness and precision which I scarcely anticipated." In the 17th Illinois, of McClernand's third brigade, the long roll was beaten some time after heavy firing was heard, because, at first, no attention had been paid to it, under the belief that it proceeded from our own pickets discharging their pieces, as usual, when relieved. The lieutenant-colonel of the 43d Illinois, in endeavoring to rally the 49th, of the same brigade, in camp on his left, as ordered by the brigade commander, could scarcely make any one listen to him, so sure were they that the firing was from our own pickets. At last the regiment was formed in line, just in time to receive the enemy's fire. These regiments were all in McClernand's division, at least a mile in rear of where the attack was first made on Prentiss and Sherman.

Colonel Pugh, of the 41st Illinois, commanding a brigade in Hurlbut's division, says: "While at breakfast I heard heavy firing in front and ordered out the regiment." Colonel Veatch, commanding the second brigade in Hurlbut's division, which went to Sherman's assistance, says: "While most of the troops were at breakfast, heavy firing was heard on our lines." Colonel McHenry, of the 17th Kentucky, also in Hurlbut's division, says: "My regiment was ordered into line early, upon a sudden and unexpected attack." The commander of the 70th Ohio, in Sherman's division, says: "An alarm was made in front of the brigade, and I called my regiment from breakfast." The commander of the 12th Michigan, in Prentiss'

division, says: "About three o'clock in the morning, several companies were ordered out to watch, and endeavor, if possible, to capture a force of the enemy prowling near our camp." Colonel Foster, of the 25th Indiana, Hurlbut's division, reports: "My men were called out in the early morning of Sunday so unexpectedly that they had hardly completed their breakfast, and left without haversacks."

Many more reports to the same effect, all made within a week or ten days after the battle, might be quoted; but these are enough. The whole tenor of the newspaper correspondence — which could have no object in misrepresenting matters — is even more emphatic. It will be seen from what is already quoted, that brigade and regimental commanders, in all divisions, and in every quarter of the field, and even General Sherman himself, frankly state their surprise at the attack so suddenly and unexpectedly made upon them, but without any thought of censuring any one. Yet in spite of lack of timely preparation in those divisions they made a splendid resistance. Cleburne's brigade, which struck Sherman and, in his own words, "knocked Hildebrand's brigade to pieces," lost 1032; and Gladden's, which struck Stuart and Prentiss, lost 829. A number of the rebel regiments which went earliest into the fight had to be withdrawn. The repeated assaults of fresh troops from Polk's and Breckinridge's reserves had to be borne by the brave and weary remnants that resisted, not only the enemy's fire, but the still more difficult influence of the panic which sent so many to hide under the riverbank. When night approached, the presence of Buell's thoroughly disciplined regiments not only aided in repelling the last rebel assault, but also steadied and encouraged those who had fallen back, well-nigh exhausted by their long day's work.

The battle of Shiloh, like those of Belmont and Donelson, showed clearly Grant's predominant characteristics as a soldier, as, afterward, did those of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor. It was simply a fair and square fight. In it he

showed neither strategy, nor tactics, nor personal magnetism and leadership, nor any evidence of military ability, save that most essential one — perfect readiness to stand up to his work, and give and take the hardest kind of blows without flinching. It was like what Napoleon called "two-o'clock-in-the-morning courage." Nor was there much more evidence of military skill on the part of the Confederate commanders. If Johnston was a great captain, he did not prove it on the field of Shiloh. His troops were pushed in wherever it happened, as the exigency of the occasion demanded. His lieutenants, Beauregard, Bragg, Hardee, and Polk, were trained soldiers. The delay of the day before gave them a chance to make every needful preparation. Yet, Sunday night, the rebel army was nearly as much disorganized as Grant's. The troops of all the corps were intermingled and were with difficulty disentangled.

The battle of Sunday was like an old-fashioned country wrestling-match, where each combatant uses any method he chooses, or can bring to bear, to force his adversary to the ground. Johnston showed great courage and gallantry, as well as firmness of will; but he had little opportunity for the exercise of the high military ability with which he is credited. That he had such ability is an inference rather than a proved conclusion. Such an engagement as Shiloh is neither magnificent nor is it war in any civilized and scientific meaning of the term. It is merely the display of brute force which makes no account of human life or suffering in the fierce struggle for supremacy.

Though the battle ended in a notable victory for the National cause, its results fell far short of what they ought to, and what, under vigorous and energetic leadership, they might, have been. The purpose of the Confederate authorities was clearly not only to win the battle, but to follow up the victory by re-occupying Tennessee, and then, entering Kentucky with a triumphant army, to secure possession of that

state. After that, there was the great Northwest before them. Jefferson Davis never took a deeper interest in any battle during the rebellion than in that of Shiloh. Anything less than a great victory there would fail to satisfy the ardor and ambition of the chiefs of the rebellion; indeed, would be a confession of failure. To encourage these hopes, the insurgent governors of Tennessee and Kentucky accompanied General Johnston as volunteer aides. G. W. Johnson, the Kentuckian, was killed on Monday; Harris, the Tennesseean, returned to Corinth with Beauregard, and did not again enter Tennessee, except for temporary excursions, until he accompanied Hood on his disastrous campaign. The disappointment throughout the South was deep and lasting, as the final issue of the battle became known, followed, as it soon was, by the loss of Memphis and the whole Mississippi River, except about Vicksburg. It is doubtful if even the defeat of Lee at Gettysburg was a greater blow to Confederate hopes than the defeat and death of Sidney Johnston at Shiloh.

Nor was the disappointment at the Northwest very much less than at the South. The exultation felt at the surrender of Fort Donelson met with a sudden and severe reaction, and this was increased rather than diminished by Halleck's deliberate and elaborate siege of Corinth and the leisurely departure from that place of the whole rebel army. Probably if either Grant or Buell had been in supreme command the combined armies would have advanced against Corinth immediately, and have captured or driven out the enemy by the close of the week. There was nothing in Beauregard's condition to prevent such a result, if vigorous and energetic pursuit had been made. On Tuesday morning, the bulk of the rebel force was at Mickey's. Both armies were much exhausted, it is true, but Wood's division was well at the front, in good condition, and had not been engaged, while Thomas's veterans of Mill Springs were close at hand; nor was Lew Wallace badly damaged. On Tuesday morning Bragg wrote,

from a point three miles south of Mickey's, to Beauregard, who had gone on to Corinth: "Our condition is horrible. Troops utterly disorganized and demoralized. Road almost impassable. No provisions and no forage. . . . Our artillery is being left all along the road by its officers; indeed, I find but few officers with their men." At two o'clock Bragg was in Corinth, whence he wrote again to Beauregard: "The men are exhausted and dispirited, and work with no zeal. Myself and staff are utterly exhausted, and horses scarcely able to walk." Breckinridge also wrote from Mickey's at half-past two o'clock Tuesday: "I am getting forward stragglers, sick and wounded, as fast as possible. . . . I have about 1200 infantry, with rations for two days, but no forage." This dispatch was forwarded by Bragg to Beauregard with the endorsement: "If we are pursued by a vigorous force, we shall lose all in our rear. The whole road presents the scene of a rout, and no mortal power could restrain it." Still later, at 5.45, the same day, Breckinridge writes: "My troops are worn out, and I don't think can be relied on after the first volley."

But both the Union commanders were under imperative orders from General Halleck, at St. Louis, who telegraphed on Wednesday, the 9th, after hearing the result of the battles of Sunday and Monday: "I leave immediately to join you with considerable reënforcements. Avoid another battle, if you can, till all arrive. We shall then be able to beat them without fail." It was the 11th when he arrived. His coming was the signal for a renewal of that kind of querulous and magisterial chiding with which he had so effectively nagged Grant after the capture of Fort Donelson. He at once ordered that general to take immediate and active steps to improve his command, saying: "Your army is not now in condition to resist an attack," although a week had elapsed since the fighting of the battle, which Sherman has always avowed Grant would have won without any help from Buell.

Pope was also directed to join him, with the Army of the Mississippi, fresh from the conquest of Island Number 10. That army reached Pittsburg on the 21st of April, and was placed on the left, in front of Hamburg Landing. All the new regiments in the Northwest were also hurried forward. Halleck thus found himself at the head of an admirably disciplined army of 100,000 effective troops, with which he undertakes the defeat of the rebel army, 50,000 strong, at Corinth, under command of Beauregard.

His situation, with the Tennessee River close at hand, crowded with all the transports that the Western waters could furnish, became so critical by the 29th of April that it was found difficult to supply his army, and on the 2d of May he telegraphed the Secretary of War: "The flood has destroyed many of our bridges, . . . we have no pontoons, . . . and we cannot supply the army on the way." Indeed, there seemed danger of a repetition of the dreadful scenes which the British army underwent in the Crimea, — suffering for food with abundance close at hand. On the 5th of May Sherman issued a circular to all his division officers, in which he said: "Every ounce of food and forage must be regarded as precious as diamonds. All articles of food and forage must be put under guard and dealt out at half-rations."

It was while undergoing this tedious and wasteful delay, in those fever-feeding camps, with polluted water to drink, that the feelings of the two armies, under Grant and Buell, hardened into that controversial condition which can never be overcome during the present generation. Doubtless Buell's soldiers were not specially modest in claiming all that rightfully belonged to them as their share of glory in that eventful and persistent battle; and Grant's, under the emphatic declarations of Sherman and his admirers, had come to the conclusion that their first impressions were erroneous, and that neither surprise nor defeat had befallen them, and that

they were not beholden to anybody for the victory; while Halleck's pedagogical fussiness irritated nearly everybody.

The army, just before starting for Corinth, was entirely reorganized. General Thomas, with his division, was transferred to the Army of the Tennessee, and assigned to the command of the right wing; General Buell's army, less Thomas' division, constituted the centre, under his own command; General Pope's army was made the left wing, and McClernand, with his own and Lew Wallace's divisions, was placed in command of the reserves. General Grant was practically shelved, by being designated as second in command of the whole army. With this immense force, efficiently organized and ably commanded in all its subordinate parts, Halleck began his advance on Corinth. On the morning of the 30th of May, a month after the task was undertaken, Beauregard deliberately evacuated the place, having first sent away all his stores and munitions of war. An hour later Halleck's advance guard, under General Nelson, entered the deserted town.

III

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH

BY

EPHRAIM C. DAWES

MAJOR AND BREVET LIEUTENANT-COLONEL, 53D OHIO INFANTRY [1]

PART I

Read before the Society April 11, 1893

[1] The writer took part in the battle as Adjutant of the 53d Ohio Infantry. — ED.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH

PART I

On the 31st of January, 1862, Major-General George B. McClellan was general-in-chief of the armies of the United States.

Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell commanded the Department of the Ohio, consisting of the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and so much of Kentucky as lies east of the Cumberland River. Major-General Henry W. Halleck was commander of the Department of the Missouri, which comprised the states of Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Arkansas, and that part of Kentucky lying west of the Cumberland River.

In the Departments of the Ohio and Missouri there were in the field, east of the Mississippi River, seventy-five thousand movable troops of all arms. Of these, thirty-five thousand were under General Buell in easy reach of the Confederate force at Bowling Green, and fifteen thousand were at different points in Kentucky under his orders. Fifteen thousand men of the Department of the Missouri had been concentrated under Brigadier-General U. S. Grant at Paducah, Smithland, and Cairo, and moved to attack Fort Henry, Tennessee, February 3. This expedition was accompanied by the gunboat flotilla under Flag Officer A. H. Foote, and resulted in the capture of Fort Henry on February 6. Three gunboats were sent up the Tennessee River to destroy the railroad bridge, twenty-five miles above the fort, and capture or destroy steamboats and supplies. Six gunboats went around to the Cumberland River to aid the army in an attack upon Fort Donelson. The army invested Fort Donelson on February 12 and 13. On the 14th the gunboats attacked the

river batteries without success. On the 15th there was a severe battle on land. On the 16th the fort surrendered. Reënforcements meantime had swelled the army of General Grant to twenty-seven thousand. On February 15 General Halleck telegraphed to General McClellan that the Confederate forces were concentrating on the Cumberland and that he must have more troops. In response General Buell, by direction of General McClellan, sent General William Nelson's division, which embarked at the mouth of Salt River for Fort Donelson, February 16. On the same day General Halleck telegraphed General McClellan in reply to the question, "What are your plans for the future?" that he had no definite plan beyond the taking of Fort Donelson and Clarksville. General Buell in reply to a similar query answered that, as he had just heard of the evacuation of Bowling Green, he would move on Nashville with all possible speed. General Halleck, learning this, disapproved of the advance on Nashville as bad strategy and urged General Buell to bring his troops to help take Fort Donelson and Clarksville. He repeated this request in the most urgent terms in telegrams to General McClellan on the morning of February 16. The capture of Fort Donelson gave him new occasion to renew the demand for more troops. On February 17 he telegraphed to General McClellan that an immense number of boats had been collected at Nashville and that the whole Bowling Green force could come down in a day, attack Grant, and return to Nashville before Buell could get halfway there. A few hours later he telegraphed a demand for the chief command in the West in return for the victories of Forts Henry and Donelson. On the 19th he again wired General McClellan for reënforcements, saying that the Confederate garrison at Columbus had been strongly reënforced and was preparing to attack Cairo. February 19 General Grant notified General Halleck that Clarksville was evacuated and that he would take possession of it with General Smith's division and could take

Nashville the next week if it was desired. General Halleck repeated his demands for the command of the armies of the West, February 20, and said in a telegram to General McClellan, "Lay this before the President and Secretary of War."[1] General Buell, in his own methodical way, on hearing of the capture of Fort Donelson, moved directly on Nashville with the twenty-five thousand men of the divisions of Generals McCook and Mitchell. General Wood's division was three and General Thomas' division eight days behind. General McClellan replied February 21 to General Halleck's demand of February 20, that he saw no necessity of giving him the entire command and would not lay his request before the Secretary of War until he heard from General Buell. General Halleck then telegraphed direct to the Secretary of War that a week had been lost by hesitation and delay and that he must have control of Buell's army. The Secretary replied that he had submitted the telegram to the President, who did not think a change advisable. On the 23d it occurred to General Halleck to give orders to General Grant, whose army was the only idle one in both departments.[2] He directed General W. T. Sherman, who was in command at Paducah, to tell General Grant to concentrate twenty thousand men at Clarksville, including the divisions of Generals C. F. Smith and Nelson, and to encamp the remainder near Danville Bridge on the Tennessee River. Before this message was delivered the division of General Nelson arrived at Fort Donelson and reported to General Grant, who ordered it to proceed to Nashville and in person followed it, remaining one day. On his return, at General Buell's request, he sent General C. F. Smith's division to Nashville. By the 1st of March General Halleck had decided upon a movement. He wrote General Grant that transports would be immediately sent to him to move his column up the Tennessee River and directed

[1] For all the correspondence referred to, see 7 W. R. 612 *et seq.*

[2] For this correspondence, see 7 W. R. 641 *et seq.*

him to destroy the bridge of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad over Bear Creek, near Eastport, Mississippi, and the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt, and then to return to Danville, twenty-five miles above Fort Henry, and move on Paris, Tennessee. He was to avoid a general engagement and to retreat rather than risk a general battle.[1] General W. T. Sherman had been assigned to command at Paducah by General Halleck, February 14. He had been in command of the Department of the Ohio from the 8th of October, 1861, until November 13 following, when he was relieved by General D. C. Buell and ordered to report to General Halleck, whom he had known when both were subalterns in the old army in California. General Halleck assigned him to temporary duty at Sedalia, but soon relieved him because of his excited and nervous condition and gave him a twenty-day leave of absence. Upon his return from this leave, December 23, General Halleck, deeming him still unfit to take the field, placed him in command of the camp of instruction and post at Benton Barracks, St. Louis, Missouri.[2] His health appeared to be entirely restored when he reached Paducah and he displayed such energy and ability in forwarding troops and supplies to the army at Fort Donelson and was so hearty and cordial in his congratulations to General Grant upon his success there that he completely won his confidence. In the correspondence that arose in reference to General Sherman's mental condition, General Halleck was made aware that General Sherman could depend upon the active friendship of his father-in-law, the Honorable Thomas Ewing, who then stood *primus inter pares* among the lawyers practising before the United States Supreme Court, and of his brother, the Honorable John Sherman, then a young but remarkably able and influential member of the United States Senate. In the movement about to be made General Sherman had received from both General Halleck and General Grant the promise

[1] 7 W. R. 674. [2] 8 W. R. 441, 459, 514.

of an important command. By March 1 he had organized, from new troops that had reported at Paducah from Ohio and from three regiments stationed there, a division of twelve regiments, nine of which were unarmed.

General Halleck learned of General Grant's visit to Nashville March 2, and that Nelson's and Smith's divisions were there and wired an angry message to General G. W. Cullum, his chief of staff, then at Cairo, to know who sent them. He also telegraphed General McClellan, complaining bitterly of General Grant, following it with a telegram that a rumor had reached him that Grant had resumed "his former bad habits." General McClellan authorized him to arrest General Grant and give the command to General C. F. Smith. General Halleck replied that he did not think it advisable to arrest him at present, but that he would place General C. F. Smith in command of the expedition up the Tennessee River. March 4 General Halleck wired General Grant to place General C. F. Smith in command of the Tennessee River expedition and to remain himself at Fort Henry, and asked, "Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and position of your command?" General Grant replied, in admirable temper, that he had never intentionally disobeyed any order and that his reports had been almost daily made to General Cullum, the chief of staff. He issued the necessary orders placing General C. F. Smith in command and on the 6th of March reported that all the transports at Fort Henry were loaded and ready to go. On the same day General Halleck telegraphed to General Sherman and General Grant that General Sherman could join General Smith's column. He wrote General Grant again about his daily reports and informed him that the authorities at Washington were much displeased with his conduct and that they advised his arrest. General Grant replied March 7, by letter, that he was not conscious of having neglected any duty and asked to be relieved from further service in that department.

Columbus, Kentucky, was occupied by the Union troops

March 4, the Confederates having withdrawn the previous day. General Halleck then directed General C. F. Smith to establish the depot for the Tennessee River expedition at Savannah, Tennessee, 210 miles above Paducah. The expedition did not finally leave Fort Henry until March 11, when it sailed, General Sherman's division taking the lead, followed by the boats containing the divisions of Generals Lew Wallace, C. F. Smith, S. A. Hurlbut, and John A. McClernand.

March 10 General Halleck ventured to remind General McClellan of the grave error that had been committed in not consolidating all the military departments in the West and placing him (General Halleck) at the head. On the 11th the President issued a "war order" consolidating the departments commanded by Generals Buell, Halleck, and Hunter (except that part of General Buell's department east of a north and south line indefinitely drawn through Knoxville, Tennessee), designated the new department as the Department of the Mississippi, and placed General Halleck in command.[1] Upon the receipt of this order General Halleck forgave General Grant — perhaps he no longer feared him as a possible rival — and authorized him to resume command of his army in the field. General Grant promptly availed himself of the authority, and on March 17 established his headquarters at Savannah, Tennessee.[2]

General Halleck, on March 13, telegraphed General Buell to continue in command of his army and district and to advise him as to his strength and position and his information as to the enemy. On the following day he advised him that all his force not needed to defend Nashville should be sent by water from there up the Tennessee River, but in a few days yielded to the sensible request of General Buell that he be permitted to march overland from Nashville to form a junction with the forces on the Tennessee River. On the 17th of March General Buell began this movement with 35,000 men. March

[1] 11 W. R. 28. [2] Ibid. 32, 43.

16 General Halleck telegraphed General Grant that General Buell was moving towards Savannah and renewed his instructions not to advance so as to bring on an engagement.

General Sherman's division had embarked at Paducah on the 6th, 7th, and 8th of March. Arms were issued to nine of the regiments on the 5th and 6th. The orders were to move up the Tennessee River to Savannah. The First Brigade (the 40th Illinois and 46th Ohio Regiments, and the Morton Indiana Battery), Colonel Hicks commanding, was the first to move, and obeyed the order literally. Without waiting for the gunboat which was to escort the division it steamed directly to Savannah, arriving there on March 8 and 9. There was a strong Union feeling among the citizens of Savannah and the adjacent country. A draft had been ordered by the Confederate authorities in Tennessee, March 10. Many refugees came to Savannah on hearing that it was occupied by the Union troops, and nearly one hundred recruits were obtained for the 46th Ohio Regiment. The remainder of the division reached Savannah March 12. General Sherman was very angry at Colonel Hicks for preceding the fleet, and sharply reprimanded him. The 6th Iowa Regiment, reporting about this time, was assigned to the First Brigade, and its colonel, John Adair McDowell, succeeded Colonel Hicks in its command. March 14 the division moved to the mouth of Yellow Creek, thirty-two miles above Savannah, and at daylight on the 15th landed and started to march to Iuka to break the railroad. The rain fell in torrents, and the streams rose so rapidly that the troops were obliged to return to the boats which ran down to Pittsburg Landing. When this expedition passed up past Pittsburg Landing, Lieutenant Commanding Gwin, of the gunboat Tyler, called General Sherman's attention to the place, and told him of a fight he had had there with a battery supported by infantry, March 1. General Sherman wrote to General Smith suggesting that a division of troops and a gunboat be sent there to await his return. General Smith sent

General Hurlbut's division, and on learning that General Sherman had returned from Yellow Creek as far as Pittsburg, directed General Sherman to make from that point another effort to break the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, and to occupy Pittsburg strongly, extending pickets to include a semicircle of three miles. Pittsburg was a shipping-point on the river twelve miles above Savannah. From it there was a good road leading west and connecting with three roads, one mile from the river. One of these roads led to Crump's Landing, six miles north on the river, and extended south parallel to the river from the intersection, four miles to Hamburg Landing. This is known as the River Road, or, sometimes, as the Hamburg Road. A second road led directly to Corinth, and is known as the eastern Corinth or Bark Road. A third led to Purdy, county seat of McNairy County, Tennessee, four miles east of Bethel Station, which is twenty-three miles north of Corinth, and is called the Purdy Road. One and three fourths miles from the river a fourth road, known as the western Corinth Road, branches southwesterly from the Purdy Road, and intersects the eastern Corinth or Bark Road in a distance of two miles. Two miles south of Pittsburg a large creek, known as Lick Creek, flows into the Tennessee River. One and a half miles below, or north, is the mouth of another creek, known as Snake Creek; a mile and one half from its mouth, Snake Creek receives a large tributary called Owl Creek flowing to it from the southwest. Each creek has low swampy bottoms, the high land on either side approaching near enough to admit of bridges where the roads cross. The land between the two main creeks and southeast of Owl Creek for an average distance of about three miles is generally high, gently rolling, and was then partly covered with a growth of small oak timber. There were a half-dozen or more small farms within this space and a point three miles west of the landing. Most of the farmhouses were built of logs, and about each one was a peach orchard. There were springs of clear



water in nearly every ravine. Where the ground was low and wet there were clusters of azalea bushes and crape myrtle. About two and one half miles from the landing a stream known as Oak Creek flows from the southeast into Owl Creek. The western Corinth Road crosses it at its junction, with a branch which flows from the south. On the eastern bank, five hundred yards from the junction of this branch, was a small church built of hewed logs, known as Shiloh Chapel.

Crump's Landing was a shipping-point on the Tennessee River for Purdy and its neighborhood. From it there was a good road through Purdy to Bethel Station on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, fifteen miles distant. Near the river was good camping-ground for a division of troops. General Lew Wallace's division landed here on the evening of March 12. On the 13th he marched eight miles west, and sent forward a battalion of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, under Major Hayes, to cut the railroad. The cavalry returned at night, having destroyed one hundred and fifty feet of trestlework north of Bethel. It was thought that this would seriously interrupt travel and traffic between Corinth and Humboldt. It was repaired on the following day.[1] Returning to Crump's Landing, General Wallace established his camps, placing one brigade at the landing, another two and one half miles out on the road to Purdy, and a third at Adamsville, six miles out.

On the 17th of March the troops of General Sherman's division disembarked at Pittsburg and marched out the western Corinth Road, about nine miles, and bivouacked for the night in the woods. A party of cavalry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, preceded the division and attempted to reach the railroad, but found every approach occupied by an adequate force. In a skirmish with the Confederate cavalry two prisoners were captured. General Sherman wrote to General Grant this day from Pittsburg: "I am strongly impressed with the importance of the [this] position, both for its land advantages and

[1] 10 W. R. 11, Bragg to Jordan.

its strategic position. The ground itself admits of easy defence by a small command, and yet affords admirable camping-ground for a hundred thousand men."[1] General Hurlbut's division landed this day at Pittsburg, and by order of General Sherman, to whom General Grant on the same day had ordered all troops but General McClernand's division to report,[2] established one camp about a mile southwest from the landing. The regiments were placed in compact battle order, across both the River Road and the East Corinth Road. General Sherman's division returned to the landing on the 18th, and on the 19th moved with its trains to its encampment in accordance with the following order:

Order No. 15. Headquarters, Pittsburg, March 19, 1862.

The fifth[3] division will occupy the front of this camp.

1. The first brigade [McDowell's] [6th Iowa, 46th Ohio, 40th Ill.] will occupy the bridge on the Purdy Road about abreast of the Shiloh Chapel.

2. The second brigade [Stuart's] [55th Ill., 54th and 71st Ohio] will camp on the Hamburg Road where the Purdy Road comes in near Colonel Stuart's headquarters.

3. The third brigade [Hildebrand's] [53d, 57th and 77th Ohio] will camp on the left of the Corinth Road, its right near Shiloh Chapel.

4. The fourth brigade [Buckland's] [72d, 48th, 70th Ohio] will encamp on the right centre, its left reaching to Shiloh Chapel.

5. Each brigade must encamp looking west, so that when the regiments are on their regimental parades, the brigades will be in line of battle. The intervals between regiments must not exceed twenty-two paces. Convenience of water may be considered, but must not control the position of the camp.

6. The cavalry and artillery need not be in line, but will be stationed as the nature of the ground may admit.

[1] 10 W. R. 27. [2] 11 W. R. 43. [3] Force, p. 113.

The clause in this order, "convenience of water may be considered," was very liberally construed by Colonel Hildebrand, who, instead of camping his third brigade on the prolongation of Colonel Buckland's fourth brigade line and at right angles with the western Corinth Road, made a line almost parallel with the road to include in the camp limits two large springs. He sent one regiment, the 53d Ohio, across Oak Creek, separating it by three hundred yards from the 57th Ohio, but including in its camp two spacious log houses. All of the regimental camps and color lines were established to accommodate full regiments of eight hundred to one thousand men. The first brigade, Colonel John Adair McDowell commanding, made its line along the Purdy Road to the right and rear of Buckland's brigade and near the bridge over Owl Creek. The second brigade, Colonel David Stuart commanding, was at the junction of the Purdy and River Roads, one and three fourths miles south of Shiloh Chapel.

March 20 General Sherman, at request of General C. F. Smith, who was very ill and unfit for duty, directed the troops of General W. H. L. Wallace's division, which had just arrived, to encamp about one mile from the river and parallel to it.

General McClernand's division coming a week later camped in rear of General Sherman's division; one brigade was within one third of a mile of Shiloh Chapel, the others some distance to the right and rear.

March 26 General B. M. Prentiss was assigned to the command of the unattached troops arriving at Pittsburg Landing and was directed to organize from them a division to be known as the 6th Division. Its camp was established across the Bark Road about one and three fourths miles in front of General Hurlbut's division.

On the same day General C. F. Smith was assigned to command the post at Pittsburg. His continued ill health prevented him from actively assuming its duties. March 31

General Grant moved his own headquarters to Pittsburg, pending the decision by the War Office of the question of seniority between Generals McClernand and C. F. Smith, each of whom had been promoted to the rank of Major-General. General Grant, however, remained at Savannah and continued to entrust General Sherman with the active duties at Pittsburg. On the 24th of March General Sherman made a reconnoissance with two of his brigades to Pea Ridge, a ridge of high land nine miles west of Pittsburg, crossed by the East Corinth Road at a hamlet called Monterey. General Smith had directed him to seize this point and fortify it. For some reason which does not appear in the records it was not done. March 30 three men from the 53d Ohio Regiment were captured by the Confederate cavalry while at a farmhouse within two miles of the regiment's camp. April 1 General Sherman, under instructions from General Grant, went with the 77th and 57th Ohio Regiments, a battalion of the 5th Ohio Cavalry and one section of artillery, to Eastport, Mississippi, twenty-eight miles above Pittsburg. Three gunboats accompanied the expedition. No force of the enemy was found. On the 1st and 2d of April General Grant reviewed the troops at Pittsburg. On the 3d a battalion of the 5th Ohio Cavalry encountered a force of the enemy near Monterey. On the same day the brigade of Colonel Buckland marched to near Pea Ridge. His advance guard exchanged shots with a force of Confederate cavalry. On April 4 a lieutenant and six men from the picket of Colonel Buckland's brigade advanced beyond their line and were captured. The pickets fired, Colonel Buckland took three companies of the 72d Ohio Regiment to support them. They became sharply engaged, losing some prisoners but holding the ground until reënforced by the remainder of the regiment. General Sherman sent one hundred and fifty men of the 5th Ohio Cavalry to their assistance. These charged the enemy, who were now retiring, and found themselves in the presence of a large force

of cavalry, "at least two regiments of infantry,"[1] and a battery. They brought off, however, nine prisoners from the 1st Alabama cavalry regiment. General Sherman was not pleased with Colonel Buckland's action in going beyond the picket-line, told him so, and on that night issued an order, which was distributed April 5,[2] that in case of alarm, night or day, regiments should form on their parades. If attacked, the immediate commander should give the necessary orders. In case of an attack upon the advance pickets they were directed to fire and fall back on a guard posted between them and the brigade guard. This guard was to hold its ground, and if necessary, to be reënforced by the brigade commander from the nearest regiment. In no event was a brigade commander to go beyond the pickets without orders from the division commander. This was the first order issued by General Sherman in which a picket-line is mentioned.

The prisoners captured April 4 were confined in Shiloh Chapel until Saturday forenoon, April 5, when they were sent to Savannah. They were objects of interest to many of the men who had never before seen a Confederate soldier in uniform. They were not at all cast down by their capture, and to all inquiries replied that they were the advance guard of an army commanded by Beauregard which within twenty-four hours would drown every Yankee in that army in the Tennessee River. One was mortally wounded and was left at Shiloh Chapel. When told he could not live, he sent for Colonel Hildebrand, some of whose relatives he knew, and told him that a Confederate army of fifty thousand men would certainly attack the Union forces within twelve hours. Colonel Hildebrand promptly informed General Sherman, who refused to believe it. The picket of the 77th Ohio Regiment on April 5 was commanded by Captain William B. Mason. Early in the day his men called his attention to the rabbits and squirrels

[1] Major Ricker's report, 10 W. R. 92.

[2] Order No 19, Headquarters, 5th Division, April 4, 1862.

that were running into the lines. About noon he saw a bo
of cavalry passing along the front. A little after noon o
of the men who had been sent out in the front reported th
he could plainly see a large infantry force in line. Capta
Mason sent Sergeant C. J. Eagler[1] to Colonel Hildebra
with this report. Colonel Hildebrand sent him to Gene
Sherman; he was not at his tent; Sergeant Eagler made h
report to the adjutant general and returned to the line. Ge
eral Sherman on returning sent an aide to Colonel Hildebra
directing him to place Sergeant Eagler in close confineme
for bringing in a false report. Colonel Hildebrand sent
guard to the picket-line to arrest him. Captain Mason refus
to surrender him. Colonel Hildebrand rode out to the pick
line and Captain Mason convinced him that the report was tr
by showing him a line of infantry soldiers whose gun-stac
were plainly visible without the aid of a field-glass.[2] Colo
Hildebrand returned and went in person to General Sherma
who refused to believe that the alleged force was anything b
a reconnoitring party. Saturday was a beautiful, bright da
In the afternoon some companies of the 53d Ohio were dri
ing in the open field to the left of the camp. A party of hor
men were seen at the end of the field, less than five hundr
yards distant. Colonel J. J. Appler directed one of the co
panies to continue drilling until under cover of the woods a
jacent and then to go as fast as possible towards the end of t
field and see who the men were. In half an hour the compa
returned. They did not succeed in intercepting the horsem
but followed them until challenged and fired at by a pick
line of men dressed in butternut and gray. In going and co
ing they had seen no Union pickets. Colonel Appler at or
ordered the regiment into line, and sent Quartermaster J. V

[1] Sergeant, afterward Lieutenant Eagler is now, March, 1893, one of
County Commissioners of Noble County, Ohio.

[2] Captain William B. Mason's statement, Marietta, Ohio, *Register*, 1881; a
in History of Washington County, Ohio; also in manuscript letters from Ca
Shiloh, April, 1862.

Fulton to inform General Sherman. The Quartermaster came back and said to Colonel Appler in hearing of many of the men, "General Sherman says, 'Tell Colonel Appler to take his d——d regiment to Ohio. There is no force of the enemy nearer than Corinth.'" There was a laugh at the expense of the Colonel and the men broke ranks almost before the order was given.

Colonel Buckland visited his picket-line during the day and saw Confederate cavalry at different points. "The pickets reported seeing infantry and artillery."[1] He went to General Sherman, who advised him to strengthen his pickets.

General Prentiss reviewed the six regiments then composing his division, Saturday afternoon, in an old field in front of his encampment. Major Powell of the 25th Missouri, an old officer of the Regular Army, was officer of the day of Colonel Peabody's brigade. During the review he saw a body of mounted men a little way in front. They were not Union troops and were too numerous to be citizens. He reported the fact to Colonel Peabody, commander of the brigade, who directed him to take two companies and find out who they were. Major Powell went about one mile to the front and ascertained from some negroes that it was a body of Confederate cavalry. Colonel Peabody went to General Prentiss and urged him to put the division in "condition to resist an attack." General Prentiss "hooted at the idea of Johnston attacking."[2] Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. Graves of the 12th Michigan was officer of the day of the division. At 8.30 P. M. a report came to him from the picket-line that long lines of fires could be seen in front and the sound of drums and bugles had been heard. He went, with Captain Johnson who brought the report, to General Prentiss at 10 P. M., who told them that they "need not be at all alarmed, that everything was all right."[3]

[1] General Buckland's paper in Report of the 14th Reunion of the Society of the Army of the Tennessee.

[2] Statements of Colonel R. T. Van Horne and Lieutenant James M. Newhard, History of the 25th Missouri, pp. 126–130.

[3] Michigan in the War, p. 325.

April 2, General Grant issued an order[1] directing that the artillery and cavalry of the command should thereafter be parts of divisions and not be attached to brigades. New assignments of regiments and batteries were made. The 5th Ohio Cavalry, which had been with Sherman's division, was sent to Hurlbut's, and the 4th Illinois, which was better armed, was sent to Sherman. General Grant was at Pittsburg, April 4. While there he wrote to General Sherman[2] that information received indicated an attack by the enemy on General Lew Wallace at Crump's Landing, and in case of an attack, which he did not expect, he had ordered W. H. L. Wallace to support him with his entire division. He directed General Sherman to have his advance guards keep a sharp outlook in that direction, and if such a movement was attempted he ordered him "to give all the support of your division and General Hurlbut's, if necessary." This letter plainly indicates that General Grant regarded General Sherman as still in command of all the troops at Pittsburg, except McClernand's division. General Grant went to Savannah that night, expecting, as he wrote, "to return to Pittsburg at an early hour" Saturday, April 5. At Savannah he found a dispatch from General Buell asking to meet him there on Saturday. He, however, went to Pittsburg, but did not leave the boat, and, after stopping at Crump's Landing, reached Savannah about 5 o'clock.

Large details from the brigades of Colonel Buckland and Colonel Hildebrand had been all day at work building bridges over Oak Creek and cutting roads as far as the picket-line to facilitate the movement soon to be made towards Corinth.

General Sherman that evening took supper with Colonel Hildebrand. He told Colonel Hildebrand that from prisoners captured that and the preceding day he had definitely ascertained the Confederate force in the immediate front to be two

[1] Order 33, Headquarters, District of West Tennessee.
[2] 11 W. R. 91.

regiments of cavalry, two of infantry, and a battery of artillery. He said that it was a reconnoissance in force, that the men had three days' rations on Friday, which would be exhausted Sunday night, and the force would necessarily then return to Corinth.[1] He ordered Colonel Hildebrand to send the 77th Ohio Regiment under command of its major, Benjamin D. Fearing, to the See house, a farmhouse one mile from Shiloh Chapel on the western Corinth Road, at half-past six the next (Sunday) morning, and told him that a battalion of cavalry would go on beyond and beat up the enemy and fall back, when the 77th was to engage whatever force might pursue them. General Sherman asserted with emphasis that Beauregard would not attack, — that he knew him well and knew the "habit of his mind," that he would never leave his own base of supplies to attack the Union army at its base. Colonel Hildebrand at once sent this information to Colonels Mungen of the 57th and Appler of the 53d Ohio Regiments. Colonel Appler was much relieved, though still incredulous. He sent his adjutant to inform each company commander of General Sherman's view of the situation. He also directed him to detail sixteen men under a good sergeant and send them as a picket to the end of the field where the cavalry had been seen during the afternoon. Their orders were not to fire, but to report promptly anything unusual that might occur in their sight and hearing, and to return to the camp at daylight. Mindful of the severe rebuke he had received from General Sherman that afternoon, he did not report this action to either brigade or division headquarters.

General Sherman wrote General Grant that day, "The enemy has cavalry in my front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and a battery of artillery about two miles out." On the same day he wrote, "I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket-firing. The

[1] This conversation was told to the writer by Major Fearing that night and is confirmed by his published as well as his manuscript statements since.

enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday [4th], and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position."[1] This was the situation of the Union army at Pittsburg on the night of Saturday, April 5.

The commander of the army, General Grant, in his quarters at Savannah, awaiting the arrival of General Buell, wrote to General Halleck an account of Colonel Buckland's skirmish the day before, and added, "I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, but will be prepared should such a thing take place." One division of General Buell's army arrived that day at Savannah. The other two were to arrive on the 6th and 7th. "When they all get here," General Grant wrote,[2] "it is my present intention to send them to Hamburg, some four miles above Pittsburg." Such were his ideas of the necessities of the hour.

The commander of the front, General Sherman, went quietly to his rest confident in his theory that the "habit of General Beauregard's mind" would not permit him to leave his entrenchments and his railroads to attack the Union army at its base, when a few days' delay would bring that army reënforced by thirty thousand veterans to attack his army at its base.

General Prentiss ridiculed the officer who sought to convince him that there was danger in the front. He "had not the least idea that a general engagement" was imminent. He did not dream of a general attack.[3]

There were some commanders like Colonels Buckland and Hildebrand who strengthened their picket-line and warned their men to be ready to march to its support in the morning. There was a commander of a brigade in the division of Gen-

[1] 11 W. R. 93. [2] 11 W. R. 89.

[3] Speech of General B. M. Prentiss, 7th Annual Reunion, at Cincinnati, of the Society of ex-Army and Navy Officers, 1882.

eral Prentiss, Colonel Everett Peabody, an honored name in the annals of the Harvard alumni, who, upon his own conviction of impending danger, gave the order that resulted in saving many lives but not his own.

On all the front from McDowell's on the extreme right to Stuart's on the left, a distance of three miles as the birds fly, the tents were standing, the sick were in the camps, the rations, ammunition, clothing, medicines, sutler stores, and private baggage of officers and men were in their usual places. All knew there was an enemy near by. Most believed with General Sherman that it was a reconnoitring party that would be promptly dispersed in the morning. Many feared that they would not be permitted to take part in the skirmish. There were some who expected an attack upon the camps, but, except Colonel Peabody, there were none in authority whose orders, words, or actions indicated that they were of them. There was much sickness among all the troops; in Sherman's division there were nearly or quite two thousand sick in the regimental camps. That night the usual heavy details were made to complete, the next day, the nearly finished bridges across Oak Creek and the new roads beyond, to unload the steamers at the landing, and for camp and brigade guard and police duty.

This was the battle-line: Colonel John Adair McDowell's brigade of three regiments was encamped on the Purdy Road, near the Owl Creek bridge, facing northwest. Five hundred yards to its front and left were the three regiments of Colonel Buckland's brigade encamped on the high ground east of Oak Creek and facing south. The left of this brigade rested near the western Corinth Road opposite Shiloh Chapel. The right of Colonel Hildebrand's brigade rested on the road in front of the chapel, but his color lines and camps were parallel to the road and his front was west. The 53d Ohio Regiment of this brigade was encamped on the Rea farm. Its right was three hundred yards south of the 57th Ohio Regiment. In

the interval was a branch of Oak Creek, a large spring, a swamp about thirty yards wide, a wagon-road leading to the east, and an open space of clear high land. The 53d Regiment faced due west; on its left or south was a long narrow field known as the Rea field, extending to near a farm known as See's farm, and separated from the open fields about the See house by a narrow strip of timber and a farm-road. Directly in rear or east of the 53d Ohio, and just one half mile distant, was the right regiment of General Prentiss' division, the 25th Missouri. General Prentiss' regiments were in good line crossing the eastern Corinth or Bark Road at right angles and facing south. Between Prentiss' left and the right of Colonel Stuart's brigade was an interval of three fifths of a mile. Colonel Stuart's three regiments faced south and held the extreme left of the army. Behr's battery was with McDowell's brigade, Taylor's and Waterhouse's batteries and two battalions of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry were near Shiloh Chapel, and reported directly to General Sherman. Munch's Minnesota Battery and Hickenlooper's Fifth Ohio Battery were with General Prentiss. There was nothing to obstruct the passage of troops through the wide gaps in the front line.[1] General McClernand's division was encamped in rear of Shiloh Chapel, one brigade on the left, two on the right of the Purdy Road. There was no semblance of a line in this division; the three brigades had three different fronts and were widely separated. General Hurlbut's division was one and a half miles in rear of Prentiss and Stuart. General W. H. L. Wallace's division was within one mile of Pittsburg Landing. There was a connected picket-line in front of the brigades of McDowell, Buckland, and Hildebrand extending from Owl Creek to the western Corinth Road, and about three

[1] For the unique formation of General Sherman's division he declared himself responsible. In his letter to John Sherman, April 22, 1862, he says of the morning of the 6th of April, "Every regiment was under arms at the post I had previously assigned them."

fourths of a mile in front of Shiloh Chapel. There was no connection between the pickets of Hildebrand and Prentiss, and the left of Hildebrand's picket-line was almost in musket-shot of the 53d Ohio Regiment. Men passed in and out at the end of the open field south of the 53d Ohio camp without hindrance. Of the eighteen regiments in the front line, a portion of one only, the 25th Missouri, had been in action. Six had seen some service in Missouri, two had been some months in Kentucky, the other ten were fresh from their homes. In the line were six kinds of guns, each requiring ammunition of different calibre. To ten regiments arms had been issued in March. There were many men in the ranks who had never loaded or fired a gun. Some of the regiments had never had a battalion drill. Two thirds of them were unskilled in battalion movements. In the five divisions were sixty-one regiments of infantry, twenty-one batteries of artillery, eight different organizations (battalions, squadrons, and companies) of cavalry. Except two companies of regular cavalry all were volunteers. Twenty-eight of the infantry regiments and about one half the batteries had been at Fort Donelson. The rest were substantially new to field service.

These were some of the commanders at the battle-front: Colonel John Adair McDowell, of the 6th Iowa Regiment, who commanded the First Brigade, was a brother of General Irvin McDowell. He had had no military experience. Colonel Hicks, of the 40th Illinois in this brigade, had served in Mexico. He had little knowledge of drill and an utter contempt for the army regulations. He required obedience to his own orders, but made no attempt to enforce orders from higher authority that did not please him. He was on the most familiar terms with his men, whom he addressed as his "good boys." While under command of General C. F. Smith he was most of the time under arrest. His chief military virtue was his courage. Colonel Thomas Worthington, of the 46th Ohio, was a graduate of West Point of 1827. He resigned from

the army early, but had seen some service in a volunteer regiment in Mexico. Possessed of ample means, in early life he had devoted himself to literature and was an accomplished scholar. His weakness was his vanity. He graduated at West Point in 1827, some years before either Generals Grant or Sherman, and believed that he ought to command the army. He did not hesitate to so inform Generals Sherman and Grant, and to constantly tender them advice, and to notify them of their blunders, and beg them to entrench the camps.

Colonel R. P. Buckland, 72d Ohio, commanding the Fourth Brigade, was a lawyer of high standing at home. He had been twice a member of the Ohio State Senate. When recruiting began to lag in the fall of 1861 and greater efforts were needed, he promptly stepped forward and enrolled his own name and quickly raised a regiment in the vicinity of his own home. He had had no military experience and was past middle age, but he had courage, common sense, and self-control. Colonel J. R. Cockerill, commanding the 70th Ohio in this brigade, had been a Democratic member of Congress from the district where General Grant was born and grew to manhood. He had no military experience or training, but no braver man ever buckled on a sword, and he proved himself a competent commander of men. Colonel Peter J. Sullivan, of the 48th Ohio, a native of Ireland, was an odd character with many good qualities of head and heart but in no way fitted to head a regiment. In giving orders he often addressed his men as "gentlemen," and would request them to "please to present arms" or to execute such other order as he might give.

Colonel Jesse Hildebrand, 77th Ohio, commanding the Third Brigade, was sixty-two years old. He had been in early life a stage-driver, afterwards owner of a line of stages, once sheriff of Washington County, Ohio, and at the outbreak of the war was mail-agent on the railroad between Marietta and Cincinnati. He was fond of military life and from boyhood

had been connected with the militia organization of Ohio in which he attained the rank of major-general. Notwithstanding his militia experience he had no knowledge of drill, no idea of discipline, no belief in the necessity of strict compliance with any orders but his own. He established the headquarters of the brigade on its extreme right flank, as far away from the greater part of it as he could possibly get and remain within camp limits. He insisted on commanding his own regiment while commanding the brigade and compelled its adjutant to be also adjutant of the brigade. He had no staff and not even a mounted orderly. Like Colonel Hicks his shining military virtue was his courage. Colonel William Mungen, of the 57th Ohio, was a lawyer and a man of popular manners, as may be inferred from his nickname "Fiddling Bill Mungen." The military life did not suit him; he soon resigned and became a member of the Ohio Legislature and of Congress. Colonel Jesse J. Appler, of the 53d Ohio, was a man of fine appearance, having little education, but much general intelligence, good ideas of discipline but no knowledge of drill. The army regulations were a sealed book to him. He had been an officer in the Ohio militia and had commanded a company in the three months service from May to August, 1861. In some way he had obtained a reputation for desperate courage that induced some parents, when the regiment was recruiting, to refuse to allow their sons to enlist in it. In early life he had served for a time on a man-of-war. General Sherman was much pleased with him at their first meeting and before leaving Paducah had promised him a brigade at the first opportunity. His worst failing will appear in the course of this narrative.

Fortunate indeed it was that in subordinate places in the regiments named were officers like Walcutt, Corse, Ennis, Barnhill, Fearing, Rice, and Jones.[1]

[1] Lieutenant-Colonel Charles C. Walcutt, 46th Ohio Regiment, became brigadier and brevet major-general, and was especially distinguished for good con-

The brigade and regimental commanders of General Prentiss' division were above the average in soldierly qualifications. General Prentiss himself was an officer in the famous First Illinois Regiment in the war with Mexico. Several of his regimental commanders had also been in that war.

Colonel David Stuart, who commanded the Second Brigade of General Sherman's division, was a somewhat famous lawyer and orator in Chicago before the war and had served a term in Congress. He had no military training but he was brave to a fault, and if he committed errors in posting and handling his brigade it was in the endeavor to obey the orders that were given him.

On the first of February, 1862, the Confederate line of defence in Kentucky and Tennessee extended from Columbus on the Mississippi River, via Fort Henry on the Tennessee

duct in the Atlanta campaign and at Griswoldville, Georgia. He was severely wounded at Shiloh and at Griswoldville.

Major John M. Corse, 6th Iowa, was then detached on the staff of General Pope. He became a brigadier and brevet major-general and has a permanent place in history for his gallant defence of Allatoona Pass. He was wounded at Mission Ridge and Allatoona.

Adjutant Thomas J. Ennis, 6th Iowa, became major of the regiment and was killed at Ezra Chapel July 28, 1864, while commanding his regiment in a successful charge. He was one of the most promising young officers in the Army of the Tennessee.

Adjutant R. S. Barnhill, 40th Illinois, was killed in the assault on Kenesaw Mountain. He was then lieutenant-colonel. He fell within thirty feet of the Confederate works.

Major Benjamin D. Fearing, 77th Ohio, became lieutenant-colonel and colonel, 92d Ohio Regiment, and brevet brigadier-general. He was severely wounded at Chickamauga while commanding his regiment, and at Bentonville, North Carolina, while commanding a brigade.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Rice, 57th Ohio, became colonel and brigadier-general. He was wounded at Shiloh, Vicksburg, Resaca; and at Kenesaw Mountain lost one leg and was shot through the other. He had no superior as an officer in the positions he held.

Captain Wells S. Jones, 53d Ohio, became colonel of the regiment and brevet brigadier-general. He commanded a brigade from August, 1864, until August, 1865. He was particularly distinguished for good conduct at Kenesaw Mountain, Ezra Chapel, and Fort McAllister, where he was severely wounded.

River, Fort Donelson and Clarksville on the Cumberland River, to Bowling Green on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad at the junction of its Memphis branch. There were sixty thousand men in the line. Twenty thousand of these were at Columbus and near it under command of General Leonidas Polk. Thirty-five thousand were between Fort Henry and Bowling Green, and at those points, under immediate command of General Albert Sidney Johnston, who was also commander of the Western Department, which included Kentucky, Tennessee, part of Mississippi, Arkansas, Missouri, Kansas, and the Indian Country. There were five thousand troops, the remnant of the battle of Mill Springs, at Chestnut Mound on the Cumberland River, fifty miles east of Nashville, under General Crittenden.

General Beauregard, late in January, had been ordered from Richmond to report to General Johnston for assignment to command in West Tennessee, including Columbus, Kentucky. He reached Bowling Green on February 6. That day Fort Henry was captured by the Union troops. In a conference held between Generals Beauregard and Johnston on the following day, it was determined that Bowling Green should be evacuated and Nashville defended from some point on the Cumberland River to be at once fortified. Columbus was to be held by a small garrison and the gunboats. Most of the troops were to be withdrawn from Columbus to Humboldt, the junction of the Bowling Green and Memphis and Mobile and Ohio Railroads. If Columbus fell, the Mississippi River was to be held to the last extremity at Island No. 10 and Fort Pillow.[1] Upon receipt of the news of the capture of Fort Henry, General Johnston determined to defend Nashville at Fort Donelson and at once reënforced it with over twelve thousand men, making its garrison nearly twenty thousand. On the 11th of February he began the evacuation of Bowling Green, completing it on the 13th. The rear guard of the army reached

[1] Military Operations of General Beauregard, vol. i, p. 220 *et seq.*

Nashville on the 17th. In a second conference between General Johnston and General Beauregard at Nashville, February 14, the immediate abandonment of Columbus was decided upon, subject to the approval of the War Department. General Beauregard was then directed to go to his command and in the case of the separation of the forces east and west of the Tennessee River to use his own judgment in its management. General Beauregard left Nashville on the 15th and arrived at Jackson, Tennessee, on the 17th. His leisurely movements since leaving Richmond about February 1 were due to his very poor health. He may also have felt an indisposition to assume command at a time when he might be held responsible for untoward results he could not control.

Fort Donelson surrendered on February 16. Seventeen thousand Confederate soldiers at a single blow were removed from the battle-line. The navigable waters of the Cumberland and the Tennessee passed under control of the Union flag. No harder blow was received by the Southern Confederacy during its fitful career except the loss of Vicksburg.

General Johnston continued the march of his army, now reduced to fourteen thousand men, from Nashville to Murfreesboro without halting. He directed General Crittenden to join him there.

The Confederate authorities acted promptly. Without waiting details of the disaster at Fort Donelson, Secretary Benjamin, by direction of President Davis, on February 18 ordered General Bragg to abandon Pensacola, leave an effective garrison in the forts in Mobile Harbor, and to go at once with the remainder of his force to the line of the Memphis and Charleston Railroad.[1] On the 19th General Beauregard was ordered to evacuate Columbus. Five thousand men from New Orleans had been ordered to Columbus, February 8. They were stopped at Memphis and sent to Corinth, Mississippi, the junction of the Mobile and Ohio and Memphis and

[1] 6 W. R. 828.

Charleston Railroads. February 21, General Beauregard sent by special messenger a confidential circular to the governors of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Tennessee, urging them each to quickly send him 5000 to 10,000 men armed and equipped. He stated in it that he had then at his disposal but twenty-one thousand troops. He also wrote to General Van Dorn, commanding the army in Arkansas, urging him to cross the Mississippi River with his force and join in an offensive movement.

General Johnston meantime had called into Murfreesboro all available troops and reorganized his army, which on February 26 was twenty thousand strong, after detaching a brigade of twenty-five hundred under General Floyd to garrison Chattanooga. He had expected that the Union forces would immediately occupy Nashville after the capture of Fort Donelson and that he would be compelled to give battle at Murfreesboro. The Union troops did not occupy Nashville until February 25, and then showed no signs of moving farther. General Johnston then determined to unite the army under his immediate command with that of Beauregard and to fight a battle for the Mississippi Valley, near Corinth. He began the march from Murfreesboro via Shelbyville, February 28, and moving leisurely, without molestation, the head of his column reached Corinth on the 18th of March and the union of the two armies was completed March 25.

February 14, General Johnston placed General J. R. Chalmers in command of all Confederate troops between Memphis and the Tennessee River, with headquarters at Iuka. February 20, General Daniel Ruggles was by order of General Polk assigned to the same command, its eastern limits being defined as Decatur, Alabama. General Chalmers resumed command of his brigade at Iuka. General Ruggles, on February 26, reported to General Beauregard that he had one regiment of cavalry at Florence, Alabama, north of the river, and two 24-pound guns opposite Florence on the south bank. The 18th

Louisiana Infantry, Gibson's Battery, and a detachment of cavalry were at Pittsburgh, and a detachment of cavalry was opposite Savannah. With Chalmers' brigade at Iuka, this disposition enabled him to observe all landings on the western bank of the Tennessee from which it was practicable to move a force to the railroad. March 4 General Braxton Bragg, by direction of General Beauregard, assumed, in addition to his Department of Alabama and West Florida, command of all the troops in North Mississippi and West Tennessee south of Jackson. March 5 General Beauregard formally assumed command of the Army of the Mississippi Valley.

Immediately after the capture of Fort Henry, Flag Officer Foote of the United States Navy sent three gunboats under Lieutenant Commanding Phelps to go as far up the Tennessee River as possible. They went to Florence without resistance and destroyed a number of partly finished gunboats and captured a number of steamboats and burned others. Many recruits were obtained for the gunboat crews. Two gunboats, the Tyler and Lexington, made another trip up the river, leaving Fort Henry February 28. March 1, at Pittsburg, they were fired upon by Gibson's Battery. There were two companies of the 32d Illinois Regiment on the boats. Sixty men from these were landed, with thirty sailors. They charged the battery, which quickly limbered up and galloped to the rear; they then destroyed the houses where sharpshooters had been concealed, and, passing over an open field, suddenly found themselves facing a full regiment of infantry. They quickly retired to the boats with a loss of ten killed and wounded. The Confederate loss was thirty-one.[1] The affair was greatly exaggerated by all concerned. It resulted in the permanent withdrawal of the Confederate force. It also drew attention to the excellent landing and high banks at Pittsburg and the roads from there to Corinth.

In response to General Beauregard's confidential circular

[1] Military Annals of Louisiana, p. 37.

the Governor of Tennessee ordered a draft in that state March 10. The men secured were assigned to the regiments already organized and in the field. The Governor of Alabama sent forward a number of cavalry companies and asked authority from Richmond to send to Corinth all troops then being recruited under a call for twelve Alabama regiments, but was ordered instead to send every available man to Chattanooga. The Governor of Mississippi sent some cavalry battalions and companies. The Governor of Louisiana sent the Confederate Guards Response Battalion, three companies, the Crescent Regiment, the 20th Louisiana Regiment, the Orleans Guards, seven companies, Dreux's cavalry company, a company called the Orleans Light Horse, and the Orleans Guard Battery. These were state troops which had been uniformed, armed, and drilled from eight to twelve months. Ten thousand Confederate soldiers from New Orleans, Mobile, and Pensacola came with General Bragg. When General Johnston on the 29th of March took formal command of the forces of the united armies of Kentucky and Mississippi, the expected concentration of troops had been completed, except as regarded the army under Van Dorn. In his order assuming the command, General Johnston divided the army into three corps with a reserve. The first corps under General Leonidas Polk comprised the troops he had commanded at Columbus. The second corps under General Braxton Bragg contained the regiments and batteries from Pensacola, Mobile, and New Orleans. The third corps, under General W. J. Hardee, comprised the army of Kentucky, except three brigades, which were formed into a reserve corps under General John C. Breckinridge. To each brigade was assigned one battery, to each division, one regiment of cavalry; all surplus cavalry and artillery were placed in reserve. General Beauregard was announced as second in command of the army. General Bragg, in addition to commanding the second corps, was appointed chief of staff to General Johnston.

Under the efficient direction of General Beauregard the army had been concentrated at Burnsville on the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, fifteen miles southeast of Corinth, Bethel Station on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, twenty-three miles north of Corinth, and at Corinth. A close watch had been kept upon all movements of the Union army, and troops had been in hand in sufficient force to meet every considerable movement that had been attempted against the railroads. Accurate information was daily received from the Union camps. The most careful instructions in outpost picket and guard duty had been issued in general orders. Regimental commanders had been instructed in orders in the minutiæ of battle-field discipline and particularly as to the care of the wounded.[1] A large number of new rifles had been received from England and distributed to the troops, replacing inferior arms.

It was General Johnston's first intention to await the arrival of Van Dorn before attacking the Union army. But on the night of April 2 the news came that Buell was marching toward Savannah. On the same night General Cheatham telegraphed from Bethel Station that a strong body of the enemy was threatening his front. This indicated a division of the Union forces and General Beauregard forwarded the dispatch to General Johnston with the endorsement, "Now is the moment to advance and strike the enemy at Pittsburg Landing." General Johnston, after a full discussion with General Bragg and General Thomas Jordan, the assistant adjutant-general of the army, decided to make the attack.[2] A circular letter to all corps commanders was sent at midnight, April 2, directing them to be ready to move at once with cartridge-boxes full, three days' cooked rations in the haversacks, and sixty rounds of cartridges for each man, and

[1] 11 W. R. 325–335.

[2] See Military Operations of General Beauregard, vol. i, p. 270, and Life of A. S. Johnston, p. 551.

two days' uncooked rations in wagons. General Beauregard was directed to prepare the order for march and battle. This order was distributed at noon April 3. It was written by General Thomas Jordan from copious notes prepared by General Beauregard.[1] It is clear in its language and explicit in its directions. The Third Corps under General Hardee was to move at once by the Ridge (or Bark) Road [East Corinth] and bivouac on the night of April 3, at Mickey's house, fourteen miles from Corinth. At 3 A. M. on April 4, it was to move forward by the Ridge (or Bark) Road until within sight of the Union outposts, when it was to deploy in line of battle, its left resting on Owl Creek, its right extending towards Lick Creek; whatever interval there might be on the right was to be filled by troops from the Second Corps. The entire line was placed under command of General Hardee. The cavalry of the corps was divided equally for supports to the right and left. The Second Corps under General Bragg was to assemble at Monterey, eleven miles from Corinth, marching by the direct road to Pittsburg, south of the road General Hardee's column was on, and was to camp that night in supporting distance of Hardee, and to form, about one thousand yards in its rear, a second line of battle. The First Corps under General Polk was to march by the Ridge (or Bark) Road half an hour after the rear of the Third Corps left Corinth, to bivouac that night in its rear and on the morning of April 4 to follow its movements at the same interval of time. The reserve corps under General John C. Breckinridge was to be concentrated at Monterey after the Second Corps had passed that point. Its movements thereafter were to be by the direct road to Pittsburg or the Hamburg Road, as might be required. Minute instructions were given to the cavalry to guard and observe the different roads. A force of four regiments and two battalions of infantry and a battery was detailed to garrison Corinth. Each corps commander was required to leave

[1] Military Operations of General Beauregard, vol. i, p. 271.

guards to protect the railway lines and regimental camps.[1] With this order a memorandum was sent to each corps commander that "in the approaching battle every effort should be made to turn the left flank of the enemy so as to cut off his line of retreat to the Tennessee River, and throw him back on Owl Creek, where he will be obliged to surrender."

The army put in motion by this order contained seventy-four regiments and nine battalions of infantry, a full equivalent of eighty regiments. There were fifteen different cavalry organizations, regiments, battalions, squadrons, and companies, and twenty-two batteries of field artillery. The commander of the army, General Albert Sidney Johnston, was regarded by his old associates as the ablest officer in the field, North or South. The second in command, General Beauregard, was the idol of the Southern people. He was a graduate of West Point, had served with credit in the Mexican War, had received the surrender of Fort Sumter, and had been in command of the troops principally engaged in the battle of Bull Run. General Bragg was esteemed by the officers of the old army as a thorough soldier and a rigid disciplinarian. His gallant conduct at Buena Vista had made his a familiar name to the American people. General Hardee had been distinguished for his courage in the battles about the City of Mexico and was the most accomplished tactician of his day. General Polk was a graduate of West Point. He early laid aside the uniform of a soldier for the robes of an Episcopal clergyman, but he had been in the Confederate service since the war began and had the confidence of President Davis. General John C. Breckinridge had been a major of volunteers in the war with Mexico, a Congressman, United States Senator, and Vice-President of the United States. The army numbered forty thousand men for battle, excluding all non-combatants. Every regiment, battalion, and battery in it, except the 52d Tennessee and some cavalry companies, had

[1] 10 W. R. 392.

completed its organization in the year 1861. Some regiments had been in service over one year. More than one half had been under fire at Belmont, Pensacola, Mill Springs, and in outpost combats in Kentucky. Four fifths had been in the field in front of the enemy. In drill, in discipline, in field experience, in arms and equipment it was far the superior of the army it was marching to attack.

There were various delays by reason of the bad roads and heavy rains, and General Hardee did not reach Mickey's house until Friday morning, April 4. General Bragg's corps was one day late and bivouacked in the rear of the Third Corps on the night of April 4. That day the cavalry in the advance, with a part of General Cleburne's brigade, met a detachment from the 72d Ohio Regiment and the 5th Ohio Cavalry, captured some prisoners and lost some. The First Corps under General Polk did not reach Monterey until the evening of the 4th; one of his divisions, Cheatham's, from Bethel, did not join him until the evening of the 5th. General Breckinridge was also delayed one day by the heavy rains. At 10 A. M., April 5, General Hardee's head of column reached the Union outposts and he placed his corps in line of battle one mile and a half southwest of Shiloh Church, its left resting on Owl Creek. The other corps promptly followed, and at 5 o'clock on the evening of Saturday, April 5, the formation of the lines was completed ready for an attack Sunday morning. It had been hoped to effect a surprise, but the skirmish of the 4th and the firing all along the lines all day Saturday, the beating of drums and sounding of bugle-calls in some of the Confederate camps seemed to make this impossible. General Beauregard, believing this, advised General Johnston that evening to abandon the movement and return to Corinth. General Johnston refused. All reports from scouts indicated that the Union troops were not entrenched and were not expecting an attack. In any event he intended to give battle at daylight Sunday. He had men enough for three battle-

lines, each extending from Owl Creek to Lick Creek. These streams and their adjacent swamps completely protected his flanks, the enemy however numerous could not present a greater front than his own and he was confident of victory.[1]

At the hour of tattoo a loud beating of drums was heard. General Beauregard sent a staff officer to suppress it. To his astonishment the officer soon reported that the music was in the Union camps, so near they were. An officer and soldier of Sherman's division who had strayed into the lines were captured, and their amazement at sight of the army through which they were taken to General Johnston's bivouac told plainer than words that there was no knowledge of its proximity in the camps they had just left.[2]

This was the battle-line which, under command of the veteran Hardee, was to be the first to encounter the raw troops of Sherman and Prentiss on the following morning. On the left was the brigade of General Patrick R. Cleburne, whose name is a synonym for brave deeds on every battle-field of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee from Shiloh to Franklin, where he fell. Three years as a private soldier in the British army was his military school. Ten years a practising lawyer in Arkansas had taught him the character of the men in the ranks he commanded. Service in the Confederate army as a colonel since the beginning of the war had gained him promotion to the rank of brigadier-general. Next came the brigade of Brigadier-General S. A. M. Wood, who had won his promotion from colonel of the 7th Alabama by soldierly conduct under command of General Bragg at Pensacola. On its right marched the brigade of Brigadier-General T. C. Hindman, an old soldier of the Mexican War, a politician of influence in Arkansas, who had had a full year of service in the Confederate army. Upon its right was the brigade of Brigadier-General A. H. Gladden, "the gallant

[1] Life of A. S. Johnston, p. 568 *et seq.*

[2] Military Operations of General Beauregard, vol. i, p. 282.

leader of the renowned Palmetto Regiment in Mexico and the idolized commander of the fighting brigade of Pensacola." [1] In this line were twenty-two regiments and two battalions of infantry and seven batteries of artillery. Except a single regiment all had been in service from six to twelve months. The brigades of Cleburne and Hindman were armed with new English Minie rifles, part of the cargo of the Gladiator but recently received from the Atlantic coast.[2] The extreme right of the line was covered by a regiment of cavalry under the already famous Colonel N. B. Forrest, the extreme left by the Texas Rangers under Colonel afterwards Major-General John A. Wharton. Captain I. W. Avery, with his company of Georgia dragoons, on Saturday afternoon went within half a mile of the Union camps and within two hundred yards of a column of Union troops marching to drill.[3]

Colonel Peabody, who commanded the first brigade of General Prentiss' division, was the only brigade commander on the front who anticipated an attack upon the camps. Firm in the belief that there would be a battle on Sunday, and with a presentiment that he would not survive it, he remained up all night and in person gave instructions to Major Powell, when he took the three companies of the 25th Missouri at four o'clock Sunday morning as ordered, to go beyond our lines to drive in the Confederate pickets, compel that army to develop its strength, hold the ground as long as possible, and when driven back to return to the command. This movement, he explained, was upon his own responsibility, and to give the alarm to our army. Whatever of credit or censure might fall to his lot he would not live to receive it.[4] Major Powell went through the picket-line in front of the 25th Missouri to the road or path that led from the Bark Road to the western Corinth Road between the

[1] Letter of Alex. Walker to *New Orleans Delta*, April, 1862. [2] Ibid.
[3] 10 W. R. 612.
[4] Statement of Lieutenant James M. Newhard, History of the 25th Missouri, p. 124 *et seq.*

Rea farm and the See farm. Passing along it to its junction with the western Corinth Road he met Captain A. W. McCormick of the 77th Ohio Regiment, who was commanding the picket of Colonel Hildebrand's brigade, told him his orders, and moving forward a few rods along the western Corinth Road encountered and drove in the Confederate pickets, developed an advancing line of battle, and fell back as ordered.

Colonel Appler of the 53d Ohio Regiment was up at break of day. He woke his adjutant and took him to the open field at the left of the camp. The picket sent out the evening before came in. Their report was that they had seen what seemed to be a reconnoitring party of the enemy pass along the road through the woods at the end of the field a number of times and heard a good deal of firing apparently about half a mile in front. The firing of Major Powell's party began and Colonel Appler sent a man to the nearest picket post, about three hundred yards distant, to learn its meaning. Before the messenger returned a soldier of the 25th Missouri, wounded in the side, came through the woods and called out, "The rebels are coming! get into line!" Reveille had sounded, the companies had had roll-call, and the men were engaged in cooking breakfast. Colonel Appler ordered the long roll and sent a mounted officer to Colonel Hildebrand and another to General Sherman with the information obtained from the wounded man. The regiment formed on its color line. The messenger sent to General Sherman galloped back and reported that General Sherman gave no directions, but said, "You must be badly scared over there." The messenger sent to Colonel Hildebrand brought an order to send two companies at once to report to Major Fearing and support the picket-line, now sharply engaged throughout. The 57th Regiment formed on its color line. A messenger from Captain McCormick came to Major Fearing of the 77th asking reënforcements for the pickets. Major Fearing was in bed. He ordered the regiment into line and directed Captain Mason to take his company at double-quick to Captain

McCormick's support, requested that two companies of the 53d Regiment be also sent, and, hastily dressing, rode to General Sherman's tent with the message sent by Captain McCormick. General Sherman told him to obey the order given to Colonel Hildebrand the night before and take the 77th Regiment to the See house. Major Fearing returned, and putting the regiment in motion, rode forward to the pickets, who were now falling back, but with a firing-line. A glance showed him the situation and he rode back to the regiment and placed it in position across the western Corinth Road and east of the bridge over Oak Creek.[1] The 57th moved its right forward a few yards to connect with the left of the 78th. Buckland's brigade was now in line and the 48th Ohio Regiment was directed to go out to support the pickets. The two companies of the 53d had barely left the color line to go to the pickets when an officer of the regiment who had just got out of bed came hurriedly to Colonel Appler and told him that a large force of the enemy was marching across the end of the Rea field south of the camp. This information was sent to Colonel Hildebrand, who directed Colonel Appler to form his regiment on the left of its camp perpendicular to its color line and facing south. Colonel Appler gave the commands and directed the adjutant to conduct the left of the regiment to the proper point, which he designated as opposite the line of officers' tents. As the regiment filed left, one of the companies which had been sent to the pickets came back through the brush, its captain exclaiming as he took his place in the line, "The rebels up there are thicker than fleas on a dog's back." The adjutant halted the regiment at the proper point, and looking to the right saw the Confederate line of battle apparently within musket-shot and moving directly towards the right flank of the regiment. The sun had arisen in a cloudless sky and the bright gun-barrels of the advancing line shone through the green leaves. The

[1] Manuscript letter from Major Fearing, April 13, 1862, and letter from Major Fearing printed in *Marietta Leader*, February, 1885.

adjutant gave the command, "Front, left dress," and hastening to Colonel Appler, who was in rear of the centre of the regiment said in a low tone, "Colonel, look to the right." Colonel Appler looked up and with an exclamation of astonishment said, "This is no place for us," and commanded "Battalion about face, right wheel." At this time, about 6.45 A. M., the sick were still in the camps, the sentinels were pacing their beats, the officers' servants and company cooks were preparing breakfast, the details for brigade guard and fatigue duty were marching to their posts, and in one regiment, at least, the sutler shop was open. This order brought the regiment back through its camp. Colonel Appler, marching in front cried out a number of times in the loudest tones of his shrill, clear voice, "Sick men to the rear!" It is needless to add that they obeyed. When each looked from his tent he saw enough to nerve any helpless unarmed man to put forth every effort to escape. The regiment halted at the brow of the elevation in rear of the officers' tents, marched ten paces forward, faced about and the men lay down in the brush where the ground began to slope the other way. While the men were marching back through the camp the Confederate skirmishers fired upon them. No one was hit and there was no confusion. Two pieces of artillery of Waterhouse's battery took position on the right of the regiment as it halted and General Sherman and staff rode along its front, stopping a few paces in front of the sixth company. General Sherman with his glass was looking on the prolongation of the regiment at the troops marching across the end of the Rea field and did not notice the line on his right. Lieutenant Eustace H. Ball of Company E, 53d Ohio, had risen from a sick-bed when he heard Colonel Appler's command and was walking along in front of the line of his company. He saw the Confederate skirmishers emerge from the brush which fringed the little stream in front of the regiment's camp, halt, and raise their guns. He cried out, "General, look to your right." General Sherman dropped his

glass, and looking to the right saw the advancing line of Hardee's corps, threw up his hand, and exclaimed, "My God, we are attacked!" The skirmishers fired. An orderly fell dead by the General's side. Wheeling his horse he galloped back, calling out to Colonel Appler as he passed him, "Appler, hold your position, I will support you." He sent his aide, Major Sanger, to notify General Prentiss of the column moving towards him, and hastened to Shiloh Chapel. He sent another aide to General Hurlbut asking for a brigade and requesting him to support Prentiss with the remainder of his force. The view from the high ground on the right of the 53d Ohio Regiment at this time was one never to be forgotten. In front were the steadily advancing lines of Hardee's corps marching in perfect order and extending until lost to sight in the timber on either flank. In an open space in the western Corinth Road a battery was unlimbering. Directly in front of the spot where General Sherman's orderly lay dead, there was a group of mounted officers and a peculiar flag, dark blue with a white centre.[1] The camps of Buckland's and Hildebrand's brigades were in sight. All the regiments were in line, those of Buckland were marching forward. There were great intervals between them, for sickness had made heavy inroads in the ranks. All of the tents were standing. From the rear of all the camps hundreds of men were hastening to the rear. These were the sick, the hospital attendants, the teamsters, the cooks, the officers' servants, the sutlers, and some who should have been in line. In great numbers and without arms, they streamed back through the camps of General McClernand's division carrying the news of the attack, announcing their commands, and giving reason for the report that the entire front line had given way without firing a shot. There was a sharp rattle of musketry far to the left on General Prentiss' front. The long roll was beating in McClernand's camps. The

[1] This was General Hardee's corps flag. See letter of Alex. Walker, *New Orleans Delta*, April, 1862.

Confederate battery fired, its first shot cutting off a tree-top above the first company of the 53d. The two pieces of Waterhouse's battery each fired a shot, limbered up, and returned to the battery camp; the 6th Mississippi Regiment came through the line of officers' tents of the 53d. Colonel Appler gave the command to fire; there was a tremendous crash of musketry on the whole front of Hildebrand and Buckland's brigades. The battle was fairly on. The hour, marked by the first cannon-shot, was seven.[1]

When General Prentiss heard the firing of Major Powell's detachment he directed Colonel Peabody to send five companies of the 21st Missouri under Colonel David Moore to reënforce the picket-line which was about one fourth of a mile in front of the camps. Colonel Moore met Major Powell falling back, laughed at his report that an army was advancing, insisted that Major Powell should stop and together they would finish up "the skirmishing party" that was approaching, in short order. The enemy came in sight. The line seemed rather longer than Colonel Moore expected, he sent a mounted orderly to General Prentiss with the message, "We have met the enemy. Send my other five companies and I will lick them." General Prentiss directed Colonel Peabody to send them. Colonel Peabody's brigade was all in line. The men of the other brigade were still in their quarters. Before the five companies reached Colonel Moore, the Confederates attacked his line, displaying a force which convinced him that Major Powell was correct. Colonel Moore himself was badly wounded at almost the first volley. This volley convinced General Prentiss that there was danger in the front. The long roll was beaten and the whole division was ordered to form and advance. So the battle began on the front of the division of General Prentiss.[2]

[1] Colonel Ferguson, aide to General Beauregard, says nine minutes past seven. Colonel Jacob Thompson's report in 10 W. R. says seven.

[2] See History of the 25th Missouri, p. 125 *et seq.*; speech of General Prentiss at Annual Reunion, Cincinnati, of the Society of ex-Army and Navy Officers;

PART II

Read before the Society November 5, 1895 [1]

SHERMAN'S DIVISION

HILDEBRAND'S BRIGADE

General McClernand heard the picket-firing in General Sherman's front, and sent a messenger to know its meaning. The messenger returned with a request that a battalion of cavalry be sent to join the force General Sherman was sending to the See house to discover "the strength and design of the enemy." Before this cavalry could reach Shiloh Chapel, General Sherman's cavalry was seen retiring. General McClernand rode forward in person, saw the enemy, and sent orders to all of his brigade to form, and to his third brigade, the 49th, 17th, 29th Illinois, to move at once from its camps to the left of Shiloh Chapel.[2]

When Colonel Appler of the 53d Ohio Regiment gave the command to his men to fire he was standing in rear of the sixth company. Up to this time, though much excited, he had shown no indication of a lack of courage. When he saw the steady lines of Wood's Confederate brigade marching unopposed past the left of his regiment, he lost his self-control and cried out, "Retreat and save yourselves," and set the example. The regiment broke in confusion, except some companies on the right which went back in comparatively good order.

The enemy in its front had been twice repulsed. The 49th Illinois Regiment had just taken position in its rear. The enemy, rallying again, came to the brow of the little hill, but were driven back by the fire of the 49th Illinois and that of

and paper of Lieutenant L. Stilwell, of the 61st Illinois, read before the Kansas Commandery of the Loyal Legion.

[1] Colonel Dawes, the writer, died April 23, 1895. — ED.

[2] 10 W. R. 114.

the 43d Illinois, which now came up. Their discomfiture was completed by Taylor's battery in position at Shiloh Chapel, which opened on them as they drifted back without formation through the standing tents in the 53d Ohio camp. General McClernand was with his third brigade. The 53d Ohio Regiment re-formed in rear of the 49th Illinois. General McClernand ordered it to take position in rear of the 43d Illinois, near the front of General Sherman's headquarters. The two right companies, moving some thirty yards to the right of the remainder of the regiment across a small ravine, opened fire upon the enemy, who were now turning the left of the 57th Ohio Regiment, despite the fire of Waterhouse's battery and the 43d Illinois. Colonel Appler was appealed to to move the entire regiment to the right to help the 57th, which was falling back through its tents, its ranks disordered in spite of the almost superhuman efforts of Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Rice, the only field officer with it.

Colonel Appler was lying down in a slight depression in the ground behind his right company. He refused to give the order, and, jumping to his feet, literally ran away. Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, an officer of resolute courage, had been separated from the regiment in the confusion of the first retreat. The adjutant sent the sergeant-major, William B. Stephenson, to direct the left companies to close up to the right, and reported to the senior captain, Wells S. Jones of Company A, that he was in command, and repeated to him the order that had been given. Captain Jones replied, "Notify the company commanders and tell them my order is to stay right here as long as there is any one else on the line." Passing across the little ravine, the adjutant met the sergeant-major, who said, "The men have all gone." It transpired that Colonel Hildebrand had personally given an order to one of the captains on the left to "fall back to the road." He did not designate what road, but, supposing he would conduct them, the men obeyed the order and stopped at the first road

they came to and remained until they saw Major Fearing with the remnant of the 77th Ohio Regiment. They reported to him and acted under his command until rejoined by Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton about 2 o'clock.

The 49th Illinois Regiment had been compelled to change its front to rear on its right company to face Wood's Confederate brigade, whose commander fully discovered that he was on the flank of the Shiloh Chapel line, and had changed front forward on his left battalion and was advancing to the attack. The regiment fought well, but was driven back, exposing the flank of the 43d Illinois, which also fell back. Waterhouse's battery limbered up to retreat, but, at command of brave old Major Taylor, again unlimbered, and fired canister into the advancing line. Numbers of men from General Prentiss' division had retreated across the gap in front of Wood's brigade, and now, exposed to its fire, were hastening in disorder to the right and rear. Through all the confusion, with steady step the 17th Illinois Regiment came to the front, the men in the leading company singing "Dixie," and formed on the right into line on the left of the detachment of the 53d Ohio. Their fire and that of the battery checked the enemy for a while, but it was not long. Soon the battery was compelled to retreat, leaving three guns, but with no loss of honor. The 17th Illinois fell back slowly and towards its camp, contesting every inch of ground. The detachment of the 53d Ohio moved over to join Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, and with him retreated to the Purdy Road, and formed with the 72d and 48th Ohio Regiments of Colonel Buckland's brigade which was already there.

BUCKLAND'S BRIGADE

The 48th Ohio, moving out to support the pickets, met the line falling back at Oak Creek and saw the enemy's line of battle following. Colonel Sullivan formed the regiment about two hundred yards in front of its color line and opened fire. The 72d Regiment came up on the right, and the 70th on the

left. Discovering that the Confederate line did not cover his entire front, Colonel Buckland placed the 72d Regiment in position to partially enfilade it. The Confederates came forward with great spirit and in some disorder, forced their way across Oak Creek at many points, but after a few minutes' steady firing were completely repulsed. It was Cleburne's brigade. Two of his regiments advanced through the camp of the 53d Ohio, and were quickly and bloodily repulsed. General Cleburne attempted to force a column round the left flank of the 57th Ohio Regiment, but his horse mired in the swamp and threw him; the men who followed were driven back by the fire of Waterhouse's battery, the 43d Illinois and 53d Ohio Regiments, and were moreover isolated by the repulse of their comrades to their left and right. General Cleburne promptly re-formed his lines, and, reënforced by Anderson's brigade, essayed a second attack, which, though gallantly made, was as gallantly met, and a second repulse ensued. The 57th and 77th Ohio and the three regiments of Buckland's brigade are entitled to equal credit for this result, while Taylor's battery, stationed at Shiloh Chapel, made greener the laurels it had won at Fort Donelson. Conspicuous for their gallant bearing in this terrible struggle were the field officers of Buckland's brigade and Lieutenant-Colonel A. V. Rice and Major Benjamin D. Fearing of Hildebrand's brigade. Colonel Hildebrand, with utter disregard of danger, rode along his line urging the men to hold their ground and inspiring them to new efforts. And beyond all praise was the conduct of the common soldiers and subordinate officers, who here saved their comrades from destruction and their general from disgrace. The ranks were rapidly thinning. The casualties had not been excessive, for the men had good cover in woods and held their lines, but no orders had been issued in regard to the wounded. There were no details for stretcher-bearers. No field hospitals had been established. The ambulance, hospital attendants, and many of the surgeons had gone to the

river early in the morning with the worst cases of sick from the regimental hospitals. Very few had returned, for, to the hospital, improvised at the landing, there was a constant stream of wounded men, requiring for their care all whose duty it was to attend them. When a man was wounded his comrades took him to the rear; thus many who were faint-hearted found a way to escape from danger, and many good soldiers were lost to the firing-line. The regiments closed upon their colors, and the cartridge-boxes were replenished from the supply in the camps. The Confederates, falling back across Oak Creek, kept up a desultory fire, while Anderson's brigade was reforming for the attack. Pond's brigade had been brought up to fill the space to Owl Creek. Cleburne's brigade was a wreck. Except in detachments, it took no more part in the battle. One thousand of its men had fallen in the vain effort to carry the camps of Hildebrand and Buckland.[1]

With Pond's brigade protecting its left, a brigade of General Polk's corps on its right and another in its rear, Anderson's brigade again advanced to the attack, and, crossing Oak Creek, quickly penetrated the now wide intervals between the regiments in the brigades of Hildebrand and Buckland. Each of these regiments, seeing the enemy on its flank, assumed that it alone remained at the front, and hastily retreated. The Confederates advanced with spirit all along the line. Wood's brigade had driven in the left. One of his batteries was firing directly in the rear of Buckland's camps. General Sherman then directed his line to re-form on the Purdy Road, and ordered McDowell's brigade, which had not been engaged, to move against the flank of the Confederate attack. Colonel Hildebrand rode to the left, and, seeing a captain in the 53d Ohio Regiment whom he knew, said to him, "The order is to fall back to the road." Riding back to Shiloh Chapel he reported to General McClernand for staff duty. By this act Colonel Hildebrand did cruel injustice to

[1] 10 W. R. 580.

his brigade. His plain duty was to remain with it, however much it may have been reduced in numbers.

Colonel Buckland, on learning that Lieutenant-Colonel Canfield, the only field officer present with the 72d Ohio, was killed, took personal command of that regiment, "having full confidence that Colonels Sullivan and Cockerill would maintain their parts of the line." [1]

M'DOWELL'S BRIGADE

The pickets of General McDowell's brigade were driven in with those of Colonel Buckland. The brigade formed on its color line. At the request of Colonel Buckland, the 40th Illinois Regiment was sent to protect his right. It did not become seriously engaged and had returned to its camp when Colonel Buckland's line began to give way. Meantime Colonel McDowell ordered the teams of the brigade, with such property as could be quickly loaded, to go to the river on the Purdy Road. They had been started when General Sherman ordered the brigade battery, Captain Behr, to the centre of the division line. About the same time he directed the brigades of Buckland and Hildebrand and Taylor's battery to fall back to the Purdy Road. McDowell's teams, Behr's battery, Hildebrand's men, Taylor's battery, Buckland's brigade, stragglers and fragments from Prentiss' division, and the enemy were striving to gain the same point. There was not room for all. Buckland's and Hildebrand's lines gave way. Captain Behr was shot from his horse, — five guns of his battery were captured before they had fired a shot. McDowell's brigade was cut off from the centre, and moved from its camp to the rear until it reached the edge of a large swamp. Here it halted, and repulsed an attack of the enemy. The 40th Illinois advanced and fought its way through to where General Sherman was in person, and by his command charged a Confederate battery without success, losing in the attack two

[1] 10 W. R. 267.

hundred men in killed and wounded; among the severely wounded was Colonel Hicks. The other two regiments, in striving to obey General Sherman's order to attack the Confederate flank, exposed their own. By a rapid change of front Colonel Worthington of the 46th Ohio obtained the first fire upon the Confederate force, which had already passed the flank of his regiment and of the army, and checked its progress long enough to enable the 6th Iowa Regiment to change its front also, when the two regiments held the right of General Sherman's line until ordered to retire. They had lost four hundred men. Colonel McDowell was thrown from his horse and went to the river; the brigade crumbled to pieces; but no brigade on the field rendered more effective service or suffered greater proportionate loss.[1]

M'CLERNAND'S DIVISION

General McClernand, at 7.30 A. M., ordered his second brigade under Colonel Marsh to support the centre of General Sherman's line near Shiloh Chapel, but when his third brigade was forced to change front, he conducted Colonel Marsh's brigade to the left, and formed a new line facing southwest in front of the western Corinth Road. Colonel Veatch's brigade of General Hurlbut's division now coming up, formed on the left and rear of General McClernand's third brigade. Burrows' battery was in position in Colonel Veatch's line. General McClernand's second brigade joined it on the right; on its right was Schwartz's battery, and on the extreme left of the line were McAllister's guns. This line, which faced southeast in front of the western Corinth Road, had scarcely been formed when the Confederates attacked, forcing it back past the western Corinth Road, and capturing Burrows' battery and one gun of McAllister's. General McClernand's first brigade coming up during this action, the advance of the

[1] 10 W. R. 252. History of the 40th Illinois Regiment, and Colonel Worthington's pamphlet, Shiloh.

enemy was checked. About noon, the men having been re-supplied with ammunition, and General Sherman moving on the right with the remnant of his division and the 13th Missouri Regiment, of General W. H. L. Wallace's division, which had reported to him, General McClernand ordered a charge which drove the enemy back past the western Corinth Road. Colors and guns and prisoners were captured in this advance. The line was not long enough, however; its right was turned, and the men fell back, re-forming in the camp of McClernand's first brigade. In the first retreat the brigade of Colonel Veatch was divided, two regiments going to the extreme right of General McClernand's line, and two under command of Colonel Veatch moving on its left. All did their duty. The left of the line, though forced back with the rest, clung to the edge of the ravine separating it from the troops of W. H. L. Wallace. The camp of the first brigade was held until it became evident that the left of the army was retreating. The Confederates were pressing along the western Corinth Road; there was no adequate force to resist them. Generals McClernand and Sherman in consultation concluded to retire to the River Road. Directly in rear of the camp of General McClernand's first brigade is the deep broad ravine of Tillman's Creek, extending from Snake Creek, parallel with the Tennessee River, to the western Corinth Road, where it breaks into a number of smaller ravines. The River Road runs along its eastern bank, but crosses it near its mouth by a causeway of logs extending to Snake Creek Bridge. Directly west of this causeway is an impassable swamp, several hundred feet wide, extending along both sides of Snake Creek, to its junction with Owl Creek, and along Owl Creek beyond the Purdy Road. In preparation for this retreat General Sherman directed Colonel Buckland to post his brigade in front of the causeway in position to protect the Snake Creek Bridge by which the division of General Lew Wallace was hourly expected. He sent his assistant adjutant-general,

Captain J. H. Hammond, to the left, to procure a battery to protect that flank in the retreat, assigned Colonel Hildebrand to the command of a regiment made up mostly of fragments of Prentiss' division, and directed him to post it on Colonel Buckland's right. Captain Hammond found the battery of Captain Bouton, Company I, First Artillery (which had just arrived on the field and had not been under fire), near the camp of the 2d Iowa Regiment. With it was a battalion of 250 men of the 53d Ohio Regiment now under Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton. The battery was placed in position near General McArthur's headquarters, with the 53d Ohio in support, and became at once hotly engaged, while General McClernand was retiring and re-forming his line. There was much confusion in this retreat. The enemy undertook to take advantage of it, but was promptly repulsed.

SHERMAN'S DIVISION

BUCKLAND'S BRIGADE

When the line was broken on the Purdy Road, two of Colonel Buckland's regiments, the 72d and the 48th Ohio, remained together, and though much reduced in numbers by the retreat through the thick underbrush, took part in the action on the right of General McClernand's division until afternoon. The 70th Ohio Regiment was the last to leave the first position of the brigade, and became separated from it on the Purdy Road. Its subsequent movements will be sketched elsewhere. Colonel Buckland, about 2 o'clock, posted the 72d and 48th Regiments near Snake Creek Bridge, and rode to the front to report the position to General Sherman, who approved it. While he was away, Colonel Sullivan marched the 48th Ohio Regiment to the landing to procure cartridges, neglecting to notify Colonel Buckland, who was much puzzled to account for the disappearance of the regiment. The 70th Ohio rejoined him here as the 48th marched away. Colonel Sullivan, on reaching the landing, reported to Gen-

eral Grant, who obtained ammunition for his men and placed the regiment on the extreme left of the line of the army.

HILDEBRAND'S BRIGADE

Hildebrand's brigade was divided on the Purdy Road. A part of the 53d Ohio and of the 57th Ohio Regiments formed with the 48th Ohio and remained with it during the day. The 77th Ohio Regiment, and a part of the 53d under command of Major B. D. Fearing of the 77th, kept together, and, after a brisk fight on McClernand's line, were driven back; and about 2 o'clock Major Fearing reorganized his command in the camp of General John McArthur's brigade, where Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton assumed command of the men of the 53d Ohio Regiment. Colonel Hildebrand made no effort to rally his brigade or even to ascertain where it was after the line left the Purdy Road.

The battle on the right was now over. Fifteen thousand Union troops had been engaged in it; four thousand had been killed and wounded. There had been much straggling, but the battle had been hotly contested. The musketry fire for nine hours was absolutely without cessation. The ground was a succession of open fields, woods, and deep ravines, whose banks were covered with thick underbrush. Brigades and regiments lost their organization but remained in action. Throughout the whole, Generals Sherman and McClernand acted in perfect accord, and each displayed the highest personal courage. There was little opportunity for display of military skill.

An incident of the battle on the right will serve to show the impossibility of giving a clear description of it. The 70th Ohio Regiment, commanded by Colonel J. R. Cockerill, was the last of Buckland's brigade to leave its first position. It marched in order to the Purdy Road. There its line was broken by other retreating troops. The regiment re-formed, and was joined by a few men of the 57th Ohio and 53d Ohio under

Lieutenant-Colonel Rice. The enemy approached. The line on the road opened fire. After a few rounds the fire slackened and the regiment was alone. Neither friend nor foe was near it. There was a roll of musketry all around it, but immediately about it was the silence literally of death, for the ground was strewn with the slain of both armies. Colonel Cockerill then marched to the east along a narrow road. The way was through thick woods and tangled brush. Soon, through an open field on lower ground to the right, came a regiment with full ranks marching to the drum-beat. The men were uniformed in blue, but it seemed impossible that a Union regiment so large and in such perfect order could be marching from the battle-line. Their course was directly across the path of the 70th Regiment. A few moments would bring them together. The wind lifted the silken folds of their banner; it was the Louisiana state flag. Colonel Cockerill halted his men, brought them to the proper front; a single volley sent the Louisianians in wild disorder to their rear. Colonel Cockerill then resumed the march, and, passing the flank of a Confederate line which was hotly engaged, halted on the right of McClernand's division in the camp of its first brigade. Close to the right of McClernand's men, near an old log barn, entirely alone, Colonel Hildebrand sat on his horse intently watching the swaying lines and waving banners of the troops fighting across a long open field to the south. Some of the men of the 53d Ohio who had been with the 70th Regiment knew him well. They went to him and one said, "Colonel, where is the brigade?" "I don't know," he replied. "Where is the 70th Regiment?" "I don't know," he said; "I guess you will find them down along the road; I saw two or three of them going that way." One who knew him better than the rest said, "Colonel, why don't you come with us, get the brigade together, and do something?" "Go along down that road," he answered sharply; "I want to watch this fight." Cannon-shot were whistling through the air and musket-balls

were spatting against the old barn. It was not a pleasant place to tarry; the men went down the road as directed, and soon found some 200 men of the 77th Regiment under command of Major Fearing and about the same number of the 53d under Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton. This was at 2.30 o'clock.

There was a pathetic feature in the perilous journey of Lieutenant-Colonel Rice that morning. A captain in the 57th Regiment was killed early in the day. Colonel Rice detailed men to watch the body and carry it with the regiment wherever it went. The men were faithful to their trust. They carried the body with them, remaining close to Colonel Rice and using their muskets whenever the line halted. They escaped unhurt, and kept the body within the Union lines.

PRENTISS', HURLBUT'S, AND W. H. L. WALLACE'S DIVISIONS AND STUART'S BRIGADE

When General Prentiss finally became convinced that the enemy were in force, he displayed the greatest activity. He ordered all of his regiments to form and move forward, and directed the two baterries, Hickenlooper's 5th Ohio and Munch's 1st Minnesota, to take position on the infantry line. The regiments became engaged as rapidly as they reached the position of the 21st Missouri, and the batteries were scarcely in action before they were charged with so heavy a column that two of Hickenlooper's guns were captured. The attack in front was repulsed, but the Confederates had passed both flanks of the division, the infantry on either flank gave way, and the whole line was driven back to the camps. The loss in retreating over the open ground in front of the camps was very heavy, but the men rallied on their color lines, and, aided by the batteries, which were handled with conspicuous skill and gallantry, made a desperate but unavailing fight. Again the flanks were turned and the whole division gave way. Colonel Peabody was killed in front of his own tent. Major Powell was also killed. A large part of Colonel Peabody's brigade

retreated towards Shiloh Chapel, and, passing across the front of Wood's Confederate brigade, were by its change of front swept into the lines of Sherman and McClernand; the remainder, with the two batteries, retreated along the eastern Corinth Road. Two of Munch's guns had been disabled and sent to the landing. The regimental organizations had been broken up as the men were driven back through the standing tents. The loss in killed and wounded had been very great and included many of the best officers; among them, besides those mentioned, were Colonel Albau, 18th Wisconsin, Colonel Allen and Lieutenant-Colonel Fairchild, 16th Wisconsin. By great exertion on the part of General Prentiss, his staff, and many regimental officers, the troops, retreating along the eastern Corinth Road, were kept together, and soon a number of them were induced to take to the trees and fire. Once General Prentiss attempted to face them about and advance. The attempt had a good effect. The Confederates were pursuing in great excitement and much disorder. Meeting what seemed an advancing line of skirmishers they halted to re-form, and some valuable time was gained. About three fourths of a mile back from his camp General Prentiss met the 23d Missouri Regiment. This regiment had reached the landing at noon of April 5 with orders to report to him. A detachment with its camp and garrison equipage went to the camp that evening. The remainder bivouacked on the bluff by the river, and were now marching to the camp with their ammunition wagons. They had met Captain Jonas on his way to General Hurlbut for reënforcements, and had seen many fugitives and wounded men, and were not surprised at the order to file to the left of the road and prepare for instant battle. Close behind the 23d Missouri, though by a different route, came General Hurlbut with two brigades of his division; up the eastern Corinth Road came General W. H. L. Wallace with the brigades of Colonel Tuttle and Colonel T. W. Sweeney. By good fortune the junction was made at

a point where an abandoned road, running north and south, crossed the eastern Corinth Road. Heavy rains and long disuse had made it a gully; in many places and for a considerable distance it was deep enough for a good defence. General W. H. L. Wallace's men were formed along this road. General Prentiss stationed his artillery in and south of the eastern Corinth Road, and re-formed his division in its support, and on General Wallace's left, and partly in rear of General Hurlbut's line. Including the 23d Missouri Regiment he had now probably 2000 musket-bearing men.

At 7.30 A. M. General Hurlbut received a message from General Sherman asking for a brigade to reënforce the left of his line. In ten minutes Colonel J. C. Veatch's third brigade was on its way. Immediately thereafter came Captain Jonas of the staff of General Prentiss, with an urgent appeal for instant help. General Hurlbut in person conducted his two remaining brigades, marching a short distance south on the River Road, and then, turning sharply to the right, soon joined General Prentiss, as above described, and formed his line with its right resting near the eastern Corinth Road and extending southeast. His batteries were placed, one, the 13th Ohio, about 150 yards in front of his right; one, Mann's Missouri Battery, near the centre; and one in front of his left brigade.

The soldiers of General W. H. L. Wallace's division had breakfasted and were preparing for inspection. The details for fatigue duty were marching to their posts. Strange sounds were heard towards Shiloh Chapel, but no note had been taken of them. Suddenly, down the road in front of the camps came a rush of teams and fugitives, who bore the news of the battle at the front. General Wallace ordered his division into line. The details were recalled. Ammunition was issued to the men. The 13th Missouri, commanded by Colonel Crafts J. Wright (who was a classmate at West Point with Jeff Davis), was sent directly to the front to do

what service it could, and to ascertain and report to General Wallace the real condition of affairs. The 81st Ohio and 14th Missouri Regiments and the battalion of cavalry attached to the division were sent to the bridge by which the River Road crossed Snake Creek, to hold it and keep open communication with General Lew Wallace at Crump's Landing.

These regiments had but fairly started when a request for aid came from General Prentiss, quickly followed by another from Colonel David Stuart. General Wallace put his division in motion at 8 A. M., and in person accompanied the leading brigade. Marching out the eastern Corinth Road, he reached the line made by Generals Prentiss and Hurlbut just as Hurlbut's troops had got into position, and while the enemy were advancing to attack. He filed to the right, and formed on the prolongation of the line which General Prentiss had established, and in the same old road.

Colonel David Stuart's brigade camp was on the River Road, one half mile south of its crossing of Lick Creek. One fourth of a mile from its front and parallel to it was a tributary of Lick Creek called Locust Grove Run. Its southern bank was a bluff which commanded the brigade camp. The pickets were stationed, one company at the Lick Creek Ford on the River Road, and one company on a road connecting the eastern Corinth or Bark Road with the River Road at its crossing of Locust Grove Run, in front of the left of the brigade. Colonel Stuart had given orders for the men of his brigade to fire their guns into the bluff across Locust Grove Run after the usual routine of duty Sunday morning and prior to inspection. When firing was heard towards Shiloh Chapel, the men supposed the troops there were also preparing for inspection. At 7.30 o'clock the officers of the 71st Ohio reported as usual to Colonel Mason on the color line to recite their lesson in tactics. Seven o'clock was the hour for sick-call in the camp of the 54th Ohio. Surgeon C. P. Brent was somewhat disturbed by the continued firing, and upon taking his

report to the adjutant, called his attention to it. Even as he spoke there was a loud report near by and a peculiar sound in the air above them. The adjutant ran to the colonel's tent and woke him from a sound sleep. The colonel (afterwards Brevet Major-General T. Kilby Smith) came out rubbing his eyes, listened for a moment, cried out, "They are fighting," and ordered the regiment into line. About the same time a messenger came to Colonel Stuart from General Prentiss that the enemy were advancing on his camps, and another from the picket at Locust Grove Run, that there was a hostile force in their front. Colonel Stuart sent his adjutant to General Hurlbut for reënforcements, ordered the brigade into line, and sent two companies from the 54th Ohio and two from the 55th Illinois Regiments to support the two from the 71st Ohio that constituted the picket. He moved the 55th Illinois and the 54th Ohio down the River Road towards Lick Creek Ford, and placed the 71st Ohio in position to support the picket at the crossing of Locust Grove Run.[1]

The movements of this brigade prior to its actual battle are difficult to trace, but are not material. At one time a part broke under skirmish fire in wild confusion; Colonel Stuart rode by, and, facing them, with a "voice ringing through the woods like a trumpet, commanded them to halt." The men stopped, and in a few moments re-formed. A message came from the skirmish line that a large force of cavalry was advancing. By the advice of Lieutenant-Colonel Malmburg of the 55th Illinois, an educated Swedish officer, the 55th Illinois and the 54th Ohio Regiments were formed in squares. The absurdity of the manœuvre was manifest when the enemy opened with infantry and artillery at short range; the squares were promptly reduced and line of battle formed. When the Confederate infantry advanced, it became evident to Colonel

[1] It will be noted that all of the first movements of the brigade commanders of General Sherman's division and of General Prentiss' were in obedience to General Sherman's order, number 19, April 4.

Mason of the 71st Ohio that his position was untenable. Without waiting for orders, he retired to another more defensible position; a few minutes' firing convinced him that this was not altogether suitable; he continued the retrograde movement to Pittsburg Landing. The regiment was composed of good material, and except for the early death of its gallant Lieutenant-Colonel Barton S. Kyle, would have made an honorable record. As it was, its casualty list amounted to near twenty per cent of its effective strength.

General W. H. L. Wallace, upon receipt of Colonel Stuart's message (forwarded by General Hurlbut), sent General McArthur with the two remaining regiments of his brigade, the 9th and the 12th Illinois and the 50th Illinois of Sweeney's brigade, to his assistance. By a fortunate accident they mistook the road and came into line near the left of General Hurlbut's line and half a mile from Stuart's brigade. The divisions of General Hurlbut and General W. H. L. Wallace (except the detachments mentioned), together with the remainder of General Prentiss' division, were now in continuous line. The right was Colonel Sweeney's brigade, which rested near a deep but not impassable ravine through which ran one of the many little streams which formed Tillman's Creek; the left was the 9th Illinois Regiment of General McArthur's brigade; and it was nearly or quite a half-mile from Colonel Stuart, who had formed his first line entirely to the left of his brigade camp. The right was at a varying distance from General McClernand's left as that division swung back and forth in the storm of battle, but never connected with it.

General Hurlbut's men were scarcely in line when the Confederate artillery opened. The first shots struck in the 13th Ohio Battery, destroyed a caisson, killed and wounded eight men; the rest abandoned the field. Volunteers from Mann's battery brought in the horses and spiked the guns, which subsequently fell into the hands of the Confederates. A line of infantry followed, but, to the evident amazement of its com-

manders, it was met with so steady and accurate a fire from Hurlbut's and Prentiss' men that in half an hour it was completely repulsed. As the enemy in plain view were re-forming for a second advance, General Grant, now first appearing upon the field, rode along the line approving the dispositions made and giving a word of encouragement to Hurlbut, Prentiss, and Wallace, each of whom expressed his confidence that the line could be maintained. Another and heavier attack followed covering General Hurlbut's entire front. It was also repulsed with very heavy loss. Simultaneously, but apparently not connected with it, an assault was made upon the lines of Prentiss and Wallace. Here also the enemy, though displaying the greatest courage, were driven back in disorder.

General McArthur's troops were fired upon by an advancing line of the enemy about 11 o'clock. At first he directed his men not to return the fire, as he thought it must come from our own troops. He was quickly undeceived, and, after an hour and a half of the most desperate fighting, in which he was himself wounded and the 9th Illinois Regiment alone lost 350 men in killed and wounded from a line-of-battle strength of 686, his command was driven back, out of ammunition, and returned to its camp, where the men of the 9th Illinois cleaned their guns, filled their cartridge-boxes, and at 3 o'clock reported again for duty and were sent to General Sherman.

The retreat of McArthur compelled General Hurlbut to extend his left. This he was enabled to do without serious difficulty because of the heavy loss suffered by the Confederates in the fight with McArthur. Troops of General Prentiss that had been in reserve moved to the front and preserved the continuity of the line.

General Stuart, with the 55th Illinois and 54th Ohio Regiments, less than 1000 men, was now entirely alone. He had received no orders whatever. He believed (though erroneously) that the reënforcements sent to him had abandoned him. Fully realizing the importance of the point he held, conscious

also of the great superiority of the Confederate troops who in plain view advanced to attack him, he resolved to hold the position to the last, and most gallantly his men sustained him. None of them had been in action before, — the 54th Ohio had been armed but four weeks, — but these raw volunteers stood their ground against an overwhelming force until every cartridge was exhausted and 400 men were shot down in their tracks. At half-past two o'clock, Colonel Stuart sent word to General Hurlbut that he was about to fall back. Between Stuart's camp and Pittsburg Landing are several small streams running through deep ravines into the Tennessee River. The river was high and the ravines were filled with the back water; to avoid these, it was necessary to retreat to the right and along the River Road. This made some confusion, but the remnant of the gallant band were re-formed at the camp of General Hurlbut's division, and, marching to the landing, reported to General Grant. Colonel Stuart was severely wounded, but remained in command of the brigade until it reached a point near the landing, where he transferred it to Colonel T. Kilby Smith, the next rank officer, and sought surgical attendance.

When General Hurlbut received notice that Colonel Stuart's brigade was driven in, he withdrew Lauman's brigade from the right and sent it to the extreme left. He notified Generals Prentiss and Wallace to fill the gap, and brought up two twenty-pound guns of Cavender's battalion of artillery to cover the change with their fire, and enable him to withdraw the batteries of Ross and Mann, which had lost heavily in men and horses. The front of the First Brigade, now commanded by Colonel Pugh of the 41st Illinois, was also changed by retiring its left. General Lauman, reaching the position assigned him, met the enemy advancing in pursuit of Stuart. He charged them at once, drove them back a quarter of a mile, repulsed their counter-charge, and then, as commanded by General Hurlbut, faced to the rear in perfect order keeping in

line with the brigade of Colonel Pugh. The left of Lauman's brigade became entangled in one of the deep ravines; there was some crowding to the right; the enemy came near, but were checked by a single volley. Down the eastern Corinth Road, as the returning line neared it, came a rush of men without organization. Passing through their camp, the men saw that it was to be abandoned; many broke ranks and ran to their tents to secure their personal effects. The pursuing enemy opened with artillery; there was a panic and a wild race for a short distance. It ceased when the men saw a line of heavy guns on the north bank of a stream called Dill's Branch, which empties into the river just south of Pittsburg Landing. In rear of these guns and in their support, General Hurlbut rallied his division.

When General Hurlbut began to retreat, General Prentiss directed his line to fall back on the right as a pivot, maintaining connection with Hurlbut's men on the left. It was not easy to manœuvre raw troops over rough ground; there was some confusion; and when the men began to crowd to the right and the enemy to open fire, many broke ranks and sought safety in flight along the eastern Corinth Road. Mann's Michigan Battery and Munch's First Minnesota retired along the same road. In the mêlée Mann's battery was captured entire, and Munch's was obliged to halt, unlimber, and fire canister into its pursuers. This checked them and the guns were saved. Hickenlooper's battery was saved by the good judgment of its commander, Captain, afterwards Brigadier-General Andrew Hickenlooper, who, being directed to retreat, instead of going to the rear by the eastern Corinth Road, passed to the right by a new road directly in rear of General W. H. L. Wallace's line, and, skilfully eluding the Confederate troops who were marching through the ravine on General Wallace's line, reached the River Road near General McArthur's headquarters, and reported to General Sherman, who immediately put him in action to repel the last attack made upon the right of the

Union line. General Prentiss kept his line closed to the right. The defections from his ranks made a widening gap between him and Hurlbut; the Confederates passed through it, changed front, and, fiercely attacking, drove back his line until it faced nearly due east, and, forming on either flank, opened such a hot fire that General Prentiss, realizing that to resist longer was suicide, raised the white flag and surrendered the remnant of his division. This was near 5 o'clock.

The brigades of Tuttle and Sweeney, of General W. H. L. Wallace's division, had maintained their organization during the day better than any troops on the field. The position assumed by them at 9 A. M. they had held during the day without change. They had repulsed five different attacks, and had followed the beaten foe, capturing prisoners and colors. Officers and men were in the highest spirits, but when Hurlbut's men were driven past their rear, and Prentiss had swung his line almost parallel to theirs, facing the Tennessee River, and a new Confederate line attempted to pass their right, it was plain that retreat, capture, or annihilation were the alternatives. General Wallace directed the line to retreat by the right flank; riding at the head of the column to guide it between the two Confederate forces coming in on their flank, he was mortally wounded, and left on the field. The Confederates, closing in, cut off the greater part of the 8th, 12th, and 14th Iowa Regiments and the 58th Illinois, and they were compelled to surrender. The total number of men captured was — from the division of General W. H. L. Wallace, 951; from the division of General Prentiss, 607. The importance of the capture as well as the number of prisoners was greatly exaggerated by the Confederate troops engaged in it.[1]

The whole of the Union army was now in the semicircle between the bridge over Snake Creek on the River Road and Pittsburg Landing, a distance of about two miles.

[1] See paper of Colonel W. T. Shaw, 14th Iowa, volume 1, Iowa Commandery, Military Order of the Loyal Legion.

THE LAST LINE

When convinced that the entire line was being driven, Colonel J. D. Webster, General Grant's chief of artillery, placed four twenty-pound Parrott guns in position near the landing, and on the crest of the northern slope of Dill's Branch. As the field batteries came from the front he placed the serviceable guns in position on the right of the Parrott guns. There were twenty-two pieces of artillery in this line; they extended from the top of the riverbank near the landing due west, south of, and parallel with the road. On the extreme left of the line was the 48th Ohio Regiment of Buckland's brigade of General Sherman's division. In rear of the guns was Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division; its right connected with General Hurlbut's division, which had been rejoined by Colonel Veatch with two of his regiments. In Hurlbut's line was the 77th Ohio of General Sherman's division, 250 strong, and the 8th and 18th Illinois and 13th Iowa of General McClernand's first brigade. On the right were the seven companies of the 81st Ohio of General W. H. L. Wallace's division. This regiment had been but slightly engaged; its ranks were full. In line with it was the 53d Ohio Regiment, 250 strong, of General Sherman's division, which was at the junction of the main road from the landing with the River Road. Upon its right, but facing west, was the remainder of General McClernand's division, two regiments of Veatch's brigade, the 15th and 16th Iowa Regiments, Taylor's battery, the remainder of Schwartz's and McAllister's batteries, and a part of McDowell's brigade of General Sherman's division. Upon McClernand's right was General Sherman with a command which he well describes as "decidedly of a mixed character." Of his own division three regiments were present, the 57th Ohio of Hildebrand's brigade, and the 70th and 72d of Buckland's. With him were most of the men of Sweeney's brigade of W. H. L. Wallace's division who had escaped capture, and some of McArthur's

men, also the 13th Missouri and Birge's sharpshooters of the same division, and a large battalion of fragments from Prentiss' division, commanded by Colonel Hildebrand, who had made no effort to find his own brigade after the line broke in the forenoon on the Purdy Road.

The right of General Sherman's command did not reach the Snake Creek Bridge on the River Road, but it reached to the swamp west of it and protected the crossing. The whole line was not an ideal one, but it was composed of resolute men and was strong enough to resist any attack the Confederates could then make. Behind this line, hemmed in by the river and the wide swamp at the mouth, in seemingly inextricable confusion, were more than 20,000 men. Of these, 11,000 were the non-combatants, who have no place in the battle-line; these were the teamsters, the musicians, the sick, the hospital attendants, the employees of the quartermaster and commissary departments, the artificers, the chaplains, the sutlers and their assistants.[1] There were quite 5000 wounded men who had been brought within the line. The straggling had been very great, particularly from the raw regiments under Sherman and Prentiss. Under the circumstances it is surprising it was not greater. Five thousand will cover the number who abandoned their colors during the day. It was upon this crowd, composed mainly of sick and wounded men, that General Nelson says, in his official report,[2] he asked permission to open fire. If he had reached the field two hours earlier he would have been more charitable towards them. Later in the year, at Richmond, Kentucky, he himself experienced some of the difficulties of handling raw troops in the face of a disciplined and ably commanded enemy.

[1] The "Aggregate Present" in the part of the Army of the Tennessee engaged on April 6 was, on April 5, as shown by the War Department Records, 48,371. To arrive at this sum deduct the strength of the 14th Wisconsin, which was at Savannah on April 6, from the table given in the Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston, p. 665. The "Present for Duty" was 37,331, leaving a total of non-combatants of 11,040. 10 W. R. 112.

[2] 10 W. R. 324.

A little after 5 o'clock the Confederates succeeded in extricating, from the confused mass of men surrounding the captured prisoners from Wallace and Prentiss, the brigades of Chalmers and Jackson, and Gage's battery. These were sent forward to attack the Union troops as near the landing as possible. The battery was run forward to the ridge on the southern side of Dill's Branch and opened fire, some of the shot passing over the steamboats at the landing and plunging into the Tennessee River. The two brigades charged down the ravine; the back water, which extended a quarter of a mile from the river, compelled them to take distance to the left. The gunboats opened upon their right flank as they came into the ravine within range. The men ran forward for cover to the steep bank on the northern side of the ravine. Webster's guns and their infantry supports opened on them. The musketry fire amid the artillery sounded like pattering of raindrops amid continuous thunder. The attack was hopeless from the first. The men realized it and got away as rapidly as possible. The fight was won within twenty minutes. The Union line was at no time in danger. One regiment, and a part of one other of Nelson's division of Buell's army, came up in time to fire into the retreating Confederate troops.

LEW WALLACE'S DIVISION

General Lew Wallace's division was stationed, on the morning of April 6, one brigade at Crump's Landing, one brigade at Stony Lonesome (two and a half miles west, on the road from Crump's to Purdy), and one brigade at Adamsville on the same road, five miles from Crump's Landing. From Stony Lonesome there is a road extending southeast to the bridge by which the River Road crosses Snake Creek, three miles distant. There is another road leading from Stony Lonesome, crossing Snake Creek, and intersecting the road from Hamburg to Purdy, north of the Owl Creek Bridge. By this road it was seven to eight miles from Stony Lonesome to the

right of McDowell's brigade of General Sherman's division. The valley of Owl Creek, like that of Snake Creek, is a wide swamp, practically impassable for a mile from its mouth for troops of any arm of the service except at the bridges. General Wallace was at Crump's Landing. On hearing the firing he ordered the brigades at Stony Lonesome and Adamsville to load their camp and garrison equipage and send the trains to Crump's Landing.

About 8 o'clock A. M. General Grant, passing up the Tennessee River on the steamer Tigress, came alongside General Wallace's headquarters boat at Crump's Landing and directed him to hold his division in readiness for orders. General Wallace replied that he had already ordered the division under arms and the trains to be sent to Crump's Landing.

At 11.30 A. M. General Wallace, then at Stony Lonesome, received an order brought by Captain Baxter of General Grant's staff to march his division and "form junction with the right of the army," and, after junction, "to form line of battle at a right angle with the river." Neither the reports of Generals Grant and Wallace, nor the subsequent communications of either of them printed in the War Records, designate the road by which General Wallace was to march. It is fair to assume that it was left to the discretion of General Wallace. From Stony Lonesome, by the road leading to the River Road, it was about four miles or two hours' march to the camp of the 21st Regiment, the right of General W. H. L. Wallace's division. From Stony Lonesome, by the road leading across Snake Creek to the Purdy and Hamburg Road, and by it across Owl Creek to the camp of McDowell's brigade, was seven to eight miles.[1] After reaching the 81st Ohio camp, marching right in front, it would have been entirely practicable to have made the formation designated in General Grant's order. From McDowell's camp, assuming that Sherman still held his line, the formation was impossible, except by extending to the

[1] Colonel Whittlesey's pamphlet, 1876.

rear. General Wallace chose the route to McDowell's camp, and put his column in motion right in front. He seems to have been unaware that there were two bridges to cross.[1]

At 2.30 P. M. General Wallace was overtaken by Captain W. R. Rowley of the staff of General Grant, who informed him that the right of the army had been beaten back, and that the road he was on would bring him in rear of the enemy. From his representation it seemed "most prudent to carry the column across to what is called the River Road."[2]

At this time the advance of General Wallace's division was near the bridge over Snake Creek, the rear of his column must have been near to the point where the road to the lower Snake Creek Bridge diverges from the road he was marching on. Colonel Whittlesey's third brigade had just left Adamsville. General Wallace, instead of facing about and marching left in front, preferred to countermarch from the head of his column. Colonel J. B. McPherson and Captain John A. Rawlins, of General Grant's staff, met General Wallace while he was crossing to the River Road and urged him to move forward with the utmost rapidity.[3] General Wallace did not take any unnecessary risks; the road was deep with mud; he kept his column well closed up, and his advance crossed Snake Creek Bridge about 7 P. M. and connected with the right of the army. The countermarch of the column necessitated a second countermarch of each brigade when it came upon the field of action so that it might front the enemy, making still further delay, and it was after midnight when General Wallace's division line was formed ready for battle on the 7th. In its formation the brigade of Colonel Morgan L. Smith formed the left, next, on the right, came the brigade of Colonel Thayer, and Colonel Whittlesey's brigade, which was the rear of the marching column, was on the extreme right of the division.

[1] Map, 10 W. R. 177.

[2] General Wallace's Report, 10 W. R. 170.

[3] Ibid. 180 *et seq.*

GENERAL GRANT

General Grant was at breakfast at the house of Mr. Cherry at Savannah when he heard the opening guns of the battle at Pittsburg. Without waiting to finish his meal he hurried to the headquarters boat, the Tigress, with his staff. He wrote a note to General Buell (of whose arrival at Savannah the previous evening he had not been advised) explaining why he had gone to Pittsburg instead of waiting to meet him, and telling him of the order he had given Nelson; dictated an order to General Nelson, whose division of Buell's army was in camp at Savannah, informing him that the troops at Pittsburg had been attacked, directing him to "move his entire command to the river opposite Pittsburg," and advising him that he could obtain a guide in Savannah. Steam was already up on the Tigress; it could not have been later than half-past seven when the boat left Savannah. Passing Crump's Landing, the boat stopped for a moment while General Grant talked to General Lew Wallace, who was standing on guard of his headquarters boat, and directed him to hold his division in readiness for orders. Halfway between Crump's and Pittsburg the steamer Warner was met, with a message from General W. H. L. Wallace, that the enemy had attacked along the whole line in heavy force. Reaching Pittsburg Landing, after a few moments' conversation with officers there, he sent Captain Baxter of his staff to Crump's Landing to order General Lew Wallace to move his division at once and form junction with the right of the army. Leaving Captain Rawlins to put this order in writing, General Grant rode rapidly to the front, visiting first the lines of Hurlbut, W. H. L. Wallace, and Prentiss, and then those of McClernand and Sherman. Discovering that the men who had been driven from their camps were already short of ammunition, he directed Colonel Pride of his staff to go to the landing, organize an ammunition-train from such teams as he could find, and bring

to the front cartridges of every calibre used in the army. How well Colonel Pride performed this duty General Grant afterwards testified as follows:

"At Pittsburg Landing on that memorable 6th of April, 1862, when our men by being forced back from their first line were left without ammunition, except the supply in their cartridge-boxes, by your foresight and energy in superintending in person, you kept up the supply with wagons from a single ordnance boat and over roads almost impassable." [1]

Leaving General Sherman, General Grant rode towards the bridge by which the River Road crosses Snake Creek, and seeing some troops near, cried out to the only aide with him with unwonted enthusiasm, "There's Wallace, now we are all right." This was near noon. He was disappointed upon finding they were not Wallace's men, but made no sign. His ride along the line showed him its one weakness, and that was lack of numbers. Momentarily expecting the arrival of both Lew Wallace and Nelson, he encouraged his division commanders to hold their lines to the last, and sent to them every available man. The 15th Iowa Regiment, fresh from home, landed at Pittsburg on the morning of April 6. Disembarking, it joined the 16th Iowa, which, landing the day previous, had reported without ammunition to General Prentiss, and had been sent by him to the landing for cartridges. These regiments General Grant sent to reënforce McClernand. They found the enemy first, and, after a desperate fight, were driven back with heavy loss.

About noon, after Captain Baxter had returned and reported the delivery of the order to General Lew Wallace, General Grant sent his aide, Captain W. R. Rowley, to urge General Wallace to move to the battle-field with the utmost expedition. He sent earlier in the forenoon a message to General Nelson to "hurry up your [his] command as fast as possible." Soon

[1] Extract from manuscript letter of General Grant to Colonel G. G. Pride, dated Milliken's Bend, Louisiana, April 23, 1863.

after noon he sent a message addressed to the "Commanding Officer Advance Force Buell's Army," urging him to move to the field with the utmost dispatch, and saying that the presence of fresh troops might save the day. Between 1 and 2 o'clock he met General Buell on board the steamer Tigress. From the published accounts of both generals the meeting does not seem to have been particularly cordial or productive of any good results. Again to the front, General Grant rode out on the River Road to near the bridge over Snake Creek, sent his aide, Colonel J. B. McPherson, and his assistant adjutant-general, Captain John A. Rawlins, to find General Lew Wallace's division and conduct it to the field.[1]

At 3 P. M. he ordered the 81st Ohio, then near its own camp, to move by the left flank across the western Corinth Road, and then forward, to discover if the enemy had penetrated the gap between General W. H. L. Wallace's and General McClernand's divisions. The regiment found the enemy not far in advance of Hurlbut's camp, and, after a short engagement, fell back in good order to the last line of battle, where General Grant in person placed it in position. Meanwhile General Grant, after a short conference with General Sherman, rode back to the landing, and was present on the left when the final attack was made, and when the two leading regiments of General Nelson's division had crossed, he in person placed them in position. During the night he sent word to all the division commanders of the Army of the Tennessee to be ready to advance upon the enemy in the morning.[2]

[1] All the officers sent by General Grant to Wallace seem to have gone first to Crump's Landing and to have been ignorant of the fact that he was already marching. 10 W. R. 174–188.

[2] See Shiloh Reviewed, by General Buell, Century War Book, vol. i, p. 487; Reports of Generals Grant, Wallace, Buell, etc., 10 W. R. part ii, pp. 95, 96; Reminiscences of the Battle of Shiloh, by Colonel D. Putnam, Sketches of War History, Ohio Commandery, Loyal Legion, vol. iii.

IV

THE SECOND DAY AT SHILOH

BY

CAPTAIN EPHRAIM A. OTIS[1]

Read April 5, 1904

[1] The writer was a lieutenant in the 2d Minnesota Volunteers, and served as aide to Colonel Gibson commanding the 6th brigade, McCook's division, in the battle.—ED.

THE SECOND DAY AT SHILOH

On the morning of the 6th of April, 1862, lying on my blanket in camp at Indian Creek, about fifteen miles east of Savannah, on the Tennessee River, I heard distinctly the boom of a distant cannon in the direction of Pittsburg Landing, where General Grant's army was encamped. It was the first cannon-shot at Shiloh, fired by the Confederate advance under General Hardee. There had been heavy skirmishing between the outposts ever since daylight, but this seemed to be the signal for assault in line of battle. The cannonading soon became rapid and continuous, until it swelled into the heavy roar of battle, and although more than twenty miles distant, it seemed as clear and distinct as if close at hand. It lasted from daylight in the morning until after dark.

At that time I was serving as a staff officer in the division of General McCook, in the army of General Buell, marching to form a junction with the army of General Grant, and I recall as distinctly as if it were yesterday the rapid march of the division all that day in the direction of the enemy's guns.

It will be remembered that Pittsburg Landing was situated on the west bank of the Tennessee River, about five miles south of the town of Savannah in Tennessee, which was on the east side of the river, and where General Grant's headquarters remained until after the battle.

The position at Pittsburg Landing had been selected by General Sherman as the point from which an advance could be made upon Corinth, Mississippi, where the Confederate armies in the Southwest were rapidly concentrating. About three miles from the landing was situated Shiloh Chapel, after which the battle was named. The left flank was covered by Lick Creek and the right flank by Snake Creek, both at this time impassable except at one or two points where bridges

had been constructed. Between the advance lines of General Grant and the river, five divisions of his army were encamped without any regard to defence or mutual support, mainly for convenience of reaching the landing where they were supplied. The Tennessee River was a wide, rapid stream navigable at this time for steamboats, fleets of which were constantly arriving and departing at the landing, unloading supplies and bringing reënforcements. The position at Pittsburg Landing, while admirable for an immediate offensive movement, had in its rear a deep and rapid river with no means of crossing except by steamers, and no defensive works of any description in its front.

The incidents of the battle on the first day, and the movements of the army which led up to it, have been described by Colonel Dawes in Parts I and II of his paper on Shiloh, with a clearness of statement and an historical accuracy that leave nothing to be desired. It is a source of regret that he did not live to complete the full description of this battle, which was one of the most desperate and closely contested of any that occurred during the whole period of the Civil War.

The action on the first day was between the Confederate army, commanded by General Albert Sidney Johnston, and the five divisions of General Sherman, General Prentiss, General W. H. L. Wallace, General McClernand, and General Hurlbut, all of the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by General Grant.

The final result on the first day was substantially a dearly bought victory for the Confederates. The widely scattered forces of the Union army were driven from its advanced lines beyond Shiloh Church back to the immediate bank of the Tennessee River, a distance of about two miles, every foot of which, however, had been contested with the greatest bravery.

The divisions of General W. H. L. Wallace and General Prentiss, after an heroic resistance, had been surrounded by

the Confederates and a large proportion either killed or captured. Wallace was mortally wounded in an effort to rescue the last of his command from capture, and left on the field in the hands of the enemy. He was rescued the following day by the army of General Buell, but died on a steamer at Pittsburg Landing four days later. General Tuttle of Iowa, with two regiments, cut his way out and joined the remnant of the Army of the Tennessee, near the landing, and bore a gallant part in the battle on the following day. Prentiss and all that was left of his command, being completely surrounded, surrendered about five o'clock in the evening, after an heroic but ineffectual attempt to force their way back to Pittsburg Landing. The new levies of Sherman's divisions had been driven from their camps in front of Shiloh Church back to the river, many of them in the wildest disorder. By reason of the disintegration of brigades and regiments, a large number from all the divisions engaged left their ranks and were crowded together under the bluffs, and along the bank of the river, where they remained until the battle was over. The number of these stragglers has been variously estimated, but there is no doubt that between five and ten thousand men had deserted their colors and fled for safety to the shore of the river. Neither orders, persuasion, nor appeal could induce them to rejoin their commands, and when the reënforcements from the army of General Buell arrived on the field, they were compelled to force their way through this crowd of fugitives, in order to reach their place in the line.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, was killed on the field about half-past two in the afternoon. He was succeeded by General Beauregard, who remained in command of the army until the close of the engagement. When General Beauregard gave the order, about six o'clock on Sunday night, to suspend any further attack, it is doubtful if General Grant had ten thousand men to hold his last line of battle, which covered the landing in his

rear and the bridge over Snake Creek on his right, across which the forces of General Lew Wallace had been long and anxiously expected. It is claimed by Confederate writers that if a persistent and energetic attack had been made on this line at six o'clock in the evening, it would have resulted in the capture or destruction of all that was left of General Grant's army.

William Preston Johnston, General Bragg, and others insist that there was no actual assault upon the last line of the Federal forces, and that the attack of Chalmers, late in the afternoon on the extreme left, which closed the battle, was not pressed with vigor or energy. William Preston Johnston, in his "Life of Albert Sidney Johnston," says that it was neither the advance of Buell's army then on the field nor Webster's artillery, supported by the survivors of Hurlbut's, Sherman's and McClernand's divisions, that saved the Army of the Tennessee from capture. He insists that: "Neither they nor all that was left of the Federal army could have withstood five minutes the united advance of the Confederate line, which was at hand and ready to deal the death-stroke." General Bragg asserts that concurring testimony "left no doubt but that a persistent and energetic assault would soon have been crowned by a yielding of his whole force."

It would be well, however, to receive these statements of the Confederate writers with many grains of allowance, and it is at least doubtful whether an assault by the whole Confederate forces in the hour of daylight that remained would have resulted in the capture of the Union forces. The losses of the Confederates during the day had been appalling, and the last line of the Federal army was held by as resolute and determined a body of men as ever bore arms. They had fallen back to their last position; behind them was an impassable river — for the Tennessee was in full flood — and there was no alternative but to hold their lines or surrender as prisoners of war. The order of General Beauregard, recalling

the advanced forces of the Confederates at six o'clock in the evening, terminated the first day's battle. It had been a success for the Confederate forces. The final victory on the second day was substantially a new battle fought by new troops, largely made up of three divisions of the army of General Buell and the division of General Lew Wallace.

In order fully to understand this action on the second day it will be necessary to refer briefly to the organization and movements of the Army of the Ohio, whose arrival on the field at the close of the battle on Sunday night, turned defeat into victory, and saved what was left of General Grant's army from almost certain destruction or capture.

Almost immediately after the capture of Fort Donelson, in February, 1862, General Buell, whose army had passed the winter in Central Kentucky, moved rapidly forward and concentrated at Nashville. The army consisted of the first division commanded by General George H. Thomas, the second division, by General A. McD. McCook, the third, by General O. M. Mitchell, the fourth, by General William Nelson, the fifth, by General T. L. Crittenden, and the sixth, by General Thomas J. Wood, with a small force of cavalry and a full complement of field artillery. It was splendidly organized and equipped, and had been carefully disciplined and drilled, though only one division, that of General George H. Thomas, had ever been engaged in actual battle.

The generals in command of these divisions, only three of which took part in the battle, were all experienced soldiers and many of them graduates of West Point. Of General George H. Thomas it is hardly necessary to speak; he was promoted from a division to the command of a corps, and after the fierce and terrible battle of Chickamauga succeeded General Rosecrans in command of the Army of the Cumberland, which he held until the close of the war. It was under his immediate command that that army, in December, 1864, defeated and destroyed the last Confederate army in the West

at the battle of Nashville, and ended the war in all the region lying between the Ohio River and the Gulf. A native of Virginia, his patriotism and loyalty were not limited by state lines, but embraced his whole country. John Fiske, speaking of the splendid services of Thomas at Chickamauga, says: "The annals of warfare may be searched in vain for a grander spectacle, and in the years to come, so long as American children are born to love and serve their country rescued at such dreadful cost from anarchy and dishonor, may they be brought to revere the glorious name of Thomas, the Rock of Chickamauga."

General McCook belonged to the well-known family of that name in Ohio and had already distinguished himself by soldierly conduct. He commanded the 20th Army Corps with great credit and ability until after the battle of Chickamauga in September, 1863.

General Mitchell was a distinguished astronomer and scientist, and a man of great activity and energy. He was transferred to the Army of the Gulf, where he died later in the war.

General William Nelson, who commanded Buell's fourth division, was a native of Kentucky, and an officer of the old regular navy, where he had served for many years. He belonged to one of the most influential families of Kentucky, and at the very commencement of the war solicited and obtained permission from President Lincoln to raise in his native state an army in support of the Government. His tragic death at the hands of General Jeff. C. Davis, in September, 1862, will be remembered by all who are familiar with the events of that period.

General Thomas L. Crittenden was a son of Senator Crittenden of Kentucky, a distinguished Union man, and was a brave and gallant officer. He served with distinction as an aide to General Taylor in the Mexican War, and rendered gallant and efficient service in the Army of the Cumberland.

General Thomas J. Wood was an officer of the old regular army, who had been assigned by General Buell, in the winter of 1862, to the command of a new division which he had organized and brought to a high state of discipline and efficiency. He served with distinction through the whole war in the Army of the Cumberland, taking part in every one of its battles and campaigns, and was regarded by all as a brave, capable, and efficient officer.

Of these, only the divisions of Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook took part in the battle of Shiloh on Monday.

On the 16th of March, 1862, General Halleck, who had been appointed to the command of all the armies in the West, gave General Buell the following order:

"Move your forces by land to the Tennessee as rapidly as possible. Our troops have destroyed the railroad at Purdy, but find the enemy in strong force at Eastport and Corinth, reported 60,000. Grant's army is concentrating at Savannah. You must direct your march on that point, so that the enemy cannot get between us. He still holds to Island No. 10. We bombarded him yesterday and renewed it again to-day. The detention of your boats at Paducah is without my orders. It will not be repeated." [1]

This was the final order for the concentration of the two great armies in the West, which exercised so important an influence on the campaign which was about to open.

General Buell decided to leave General Mitchell's division to hold Nashville and complete the capture and occupation of Middle Tennessee and North Alabama. To give him sufficient forces for that purpose, Negley's brigade of McCook's division was transferred to Mitchell, and the new levies, as they arrived from the North, were placed under his immediate command. On the 18th of March General Buell ordered McCook to move steadily forward with his division on the road to Savannah, and to ford streams wherever they

[1] 11 W. R. 42.

were fordable, and leave guards for working parties only where permanent bridges were required. McCook was directed to "use all possible industry and energy so as to move forward steadily, and as rapidly as you can without forcing your march or straggling." There was no other indication of necessity for haste than that contained in this order, nor was there, so far as we are advised, any intimation from any source that a rapid or forced march to join the forces of General Grant was desired.

McCook started immediately on receipt of the order for Columbia, forty miles distant, but did not reach that place in time to save the bridge over Duck River, which was burned just as the advance of his column arrived. At that time Duck River was impassable by fords, and as the army was not then supplied with a pontoon train, the bridge had to be rebuilt before the army could advance a single step. The art of constructing temporary bridges for the passage of troops and trains had not then reached the degree of perfection which was attained later in the war, and the completion of this bridge involved loss of time, as well as a suspension of the movement to join the army of General Grant.

Nelson's division, followed by Crittenden's, moved out from Nashville and joined McCook about the 20th of March, while the work on the Duck River Bridge was pushed forward as rapidly as possible. Impatient at the delay Nelson finally obtained permission from General Buell to cross the river and take the advance with his command, the moment it was practicable to do so. On the 28th of March an examination was made and it was found possible to cross the river at the fords, provided proper care and precaution was exercised. The cavalry was stationed at points in the river to point out the ford and break the force of the current, while Nelson's infantry was directed to carry their clothing in a bundle on the bayonets and wade the stream. This was successfully accomplished on the 29th of March, when Nelson

moved his division through Columbia and camped about two miles out on the road to Savannah. He was closely followed by Crittenden, and two days later McCook moved his division over the newly constructed bridge and followed Crittenden, and the three divisions in this way promptly took up the line of march for the Tennessee River. General Buell accompanied the leading division and preceded Nelson, in order to confer with General Grant as to the position to be assigned his command upon its arrival.

Nelson, always active, energetic, and ambitious of distinction, pushed on with his command rapidly, and reached Savannah on Saturday, the 5th of April, by 12 o'clock of that day. General Buell and his staff arrived about the same time. Crittenden was about ten miles behind Nelson, and the head of McCook's column about the same distance in the rear of Crittenden. This interval had been preserved during the entire march for the convenient movement of troops and trains.

The graphic and extremely interesting diary of General Jacob Ammen, commanding Nelson's leading brigade, published with his report of the battle, throws some very interesting side-lights upon the movements and operations of the army at this time. He knew General Grant in the old regular service. Speaking of the arrival of his brigade at Savannah, he says: "About 3 P. M. General Grant and General Nelson came to my tent. General Grant declined to dismount, as he had an engagement. In answer to my remark that our troops were not fatigued and could march on to Pittsburg Landing, Tenn., if necessary, General Grant said: 'You cannot march through the swamps; make the troops comfortable; I will send boats for you Monday or Tuesday, or some time early in the week. There will be no fight at Pittsburg Landing; we will have to go to Corinth where the rebels are fortified. If they come to attack us, we can whip them, as I have more than twice as many troops as I had at Fort Donelson. Be sure and call at the brick house on the river to-morrow evening, as I have

an engagement for this evening.' He and General Nelson then rode off." [1]

At this very hour the entire Confederate army, under the command of General Albert Sidney Johnston, was formed in line of battle within two miles of General Grant's lines, ready for the order to advance, which, however, was finally postponed until the next morning at daylight. It is hardly necessary to say that General Ammen did not call "at the brick house on the river the next evening," but instead was lying in line of battle in front of the exhausted and decimated forces of General Grant in the drenching rain facing the victorious army of Beauregard.

General Ammen says that, expecting to remain in camp several days, the usual orders for Sunday inspection were issued, and the men were putting their guns in order, "and Jesse Crane is polishing my spurs and preparing my horse and its rider to appear to the best advantage at the review and inspection ordered," [2] when the proceedings were interrupted by the roar of distant cannon, which soon became continuous and rapid. When the battle opened, Nelson's division was immediately prepared for action and directed to proceed to the assistance of the Army of the Tennessee, either by boats or through the swamp along the bank of the river, if a practicable route could be discovered. The western bank of the Tennessee River where Pittsburg Landing was situated was lined by a high bluff rising abruptly from the river, but the opposite shore consisted of low marshy land liable to frequent overflow and with no means of transit except over country roads, difficult to follow, and almost impassable for troops. After considerable delay at Savannah, waiting for boats to take his men up the river, Nelson finally procured a guide and decided to march up the east bank of the Tennessee to a point opposite the landing, where the men would be carried across by steamers. No explanation in any of the published

[1] 10 W. R. 330. [2] 10 W. R. 331.

reports or dispatches has ever been given why a part of the fleet of steamboats lying at Pittsburg Landing was not immediately dispatched to Savannah at the opening of the battle, to bring up the advancing forces of General Buell, though it would seem as if this should have received immediate attention. Nelson pushed forward with his division through the overflowed valley of the river, and finally his leading brigade, commanded by General Ammen, crossed the river, and was formed on the left of the line and took part in repulsing the last assault of the Confederate forces under Chalmers, about 5 o'clock in the afternoon. Never was the arrival of fresh troops upon a field of battle more welcome. Wellington in the darkest hour at Waterloo never looked as anxiously for Blücher, as General Grant did for the well-ordered columns of General Buell to relieve his brave but shattered and disorganized forces. General Buell asserts that the only communication he received from General Grant on the 6th of April, after the battle opened, was the following dispatch delivered to him while he was ascending the river to the field:

Pittsburg, April 6, 1862.

Commanding Officer Advanced Forces, near Pittsburg, Tenn.

General, — The attack on my forces has been very spirited since early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops on the field now would have a powerful effect both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be more to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us. The rebel forces are estimated at 100,000 men. My headquarters will be in the log building on the top of the hill, where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide you to your place on the field. Respectfully, etc.

U. S. GRANT,
Major-General Commanding.[1]

[1] 11 W. R. 95.

Crittenden and McCook received orders from General Buell early in the morning, to move forward rapidly, leaving behind them the baggage and trains, but their progress was delayed, and they were compelled to wait in Savannah until steamboats were finally sent Sunday night to transport them to the landing.

Gibson's brigade, of McCook's division, reached Savannah about 9 o'clock and lay all night in the streets in the pouring rain and did not get upon the field until the following morning. The army of General Buell and the division of General Lew Wallace, which came up from Crump's Landing after dark, were formed during the night prepared to begin the battle at daylight on Monday morning.

General Ammen says in that picturesque and interesting diary of his: "About ten o'clock at night we commenced forming our new line of battle beyond the crest of the hill, in advance of our old line about 300 yards. Too dark to see, we prolonged our line by touch. . . . About 10.30 o'clock at night Generals Buell and Nelson returned and asked if I was almost ready to commence forming my advance line. The answer was, 'It is about formed,' which gratified them."

Later on Ammen says: "It is after midnight, rain falling, and I am sitting at the root of a large tree, holding my horse, ready to mount if necessary. Sleep, sweet, refreshing sleep, removes all my anxieties and troubles for two hours." [1]

The orders for the operations of the army on Monday morning were to this effect: Nelson's division was directed to occupy the left of the line, across the Hamburg Road, resting his left on Lick Creek. Crittenden, with the two brigades of his division, was formed on Nelson's right, while McCook's division was stationed to the right of Crittenden, facing Shiloh Church. What was left of the divisions of Hurlbut, McClernand, and Sherman continued the line and connected with General Lew Wallace on the extreme right. These

[1] 10 W. R. 334, 335.

positions were taken during the night, and formed a continuous line of battle covering the entire distance between Snake Creek and Lick Creek. It was made up substantially of the fresh divisions of Lew Wallace, and of McCook, Crittenden, and Nelson. They were supported by reserves from the Army of the Tennessee and had with them the two splendid regular batteries of Terrill and Mendenhall, in addition to other field artillery.

General Ammen records in that invaluable diary: "April 7, 3 A. M. Less rain. General Nelson, that energetic and wide-awake officer, is at my headquarters near a large tree, and issues his orders to me verbally: 'Colonel Ammen, you will put the Tenth Brigade in motion as soon as you can see to move at dawn; find the enemy and whip him.'" [1]

This was the substance and spirit of the orders to the whole line, though expressed in different language. There was to be no delay or hesitation. At dawn of day the army was to move forward, find the enemy wherever he was located, and attack immediately.

At the close of the action on Sunday, General Beauregard had directed the Confederate officers to withdraw out of the range of the Federal gunboats and camp for the night. In his official report he gives the reason for it as follows: "Darkness was close at hand; officers and men were exhausted by a combat of over twelve hours without food, and jaded by the march of the preceding day through mud and water. It was therefore impossible to collect the rich and opportune spoils of war scattered broadcast on the fields left in our possession, and impracticable to make any effective disposition for their removal to the rear." [2]

By this action on his part not only the opportunity to "collect the rich and opportune spoils of war," but all expectation of winning a complete and decisive victory in this great battle was irretrievably lost.

[1] 10 W. R. 335. [2] 10 W. R. 387.

Beauregard established his own headquarters in the captured headquarters camp of General Sherman, near Shiloh Church, and the different Confederate commands bivouacked on the field wherever the brigade and division commanders directed, some in the captured camps of Sherman and Prentiss, and others just out of range of the Federal gunboats. During the night Beauregard received intelligence that Buell had been delayed, and he confidently believed that he had only to move forward in the morning and complete the destruction of Grant's army. It appears from the official reports that a very general effort was made to collect and reorganize the scattered Confederate forces, though there was no general expectation of a new battle to be fought on the following day against fresh troops. The hopes of General Beauregard were broken at daylight in the morning by the fierce and determined advance of the Union forces along the entire line, from Nelson on the left to Lew Wallace on the right. General Prentiss, who was a prisoner at Beauregard's headquarters Sunday night, where he was kindly and hospitably entertained, could not forbear from saying to his captors that though they had had their way that day, it would be different to-morrow. "You 'll see," he said, "Buell will effect a junction with Grant to-night and will turn the tables on you in the morning." When the action opened at daylight on Monday morning by the advance of the fresh troops of Buell and Lew Wallace, Prentiss exultingly exclaimed, "Ah! did n't I tell you so? That 's Buell." It was the signal for beginning a new battle, with the Federal forces now fully prepared and ready to take the offensive.

Beauregard made rapid preparations to meet the advance of the Federal army; Hardee was placed in command of the extreme right wing of the Confederates, while Breckinridge commanded the troops on his left. The extreme left of the Confederate forces opposed to the division of Lew Wallace was placed under the immediate supervision of General Bragg,

assisted by General Polk. The Confederate troops were formed in line without much regard to the division or corps to which they originally belonged. The brigade and regimental organizations, however, seem to have been preserved, so that they could be readily formed in line of battle and placed under the immediate command of any commanding officer in the part of the field where their services were required. Nelson pushed out his columns and drove the Confederates nearly a mile, but finally encountered a vastly superior force and was himself compelled to fall back. His troops retreated in good order and were promptly rallied and again resumed the offensive, supported by Terrill's and Mendenhall's regular batteries. After fierce and desperate fighting the Confederate forces were forced back across the field which had been fought over so bravely the day before, until about 2 P. M. the firing in front of Nelson died away and he remained in possession of the field.

Crittenden followed in echelon on Nelson's right and had substantially the same experience. The enemy were driven back across the fields which Prentiss and Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace had defended the day before with such magnificent courage and heroism. The Confederate forces were finally, however, concentrated in Crittenden's front, and his leading brigade was repulsed with heavy losses. A battery, captured by the 41st Ohio in the morning, was now recaptured by the Confederates, although later again captured by the Union forces. Crittenden finally drove back the advance lines of the Confederates. One position of the enemy after another was carried by his enthusiastic and victorious troops, until, about three in the afternoon, the enemy disappeared from his front.

General Lew Wallace, on the extreme right, advanced at the same time with Nelson, and drove back for over a mile Pond's Confederate brigade, supported by a battery. He finally became heavily engaged with the enemy near the former

camp of Sherman's division, but the resistance he encountered was less resolute and determined than that in other parts of the field, and his losses in killed and wounded less severe.

McCook's division, formed on the right of Crittenden, moved out promptly at daylight and met with the most fierce and determined resistance of any portion of the Union forces on that day. His advance was directed straight toward Shiloh Church, which was the key to the battle-field, and possession of which was vital and indispensable to the safety of Beauregard's army. This division had been organized in Kentucky under the personal direction of General Sherman during the period when he commanded the Army of the Cumberland, and in his official report, speaking of the operations of the second day, Sherman says of McCook's advance: "Here I saw for the first time the well-ordered and compact columns of General Buell's Kentucky forces, whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined forces."[1]

General Sherman had attempted to reorganize his own command during Sunday night, but his division had already been thoroughly defeated and he could put in line only a small part of the force which met the first assault of Hardee on Sunday morning. Sherman, himself, was with the division of General McCook during a large portion of the action on Monday, and assumed general charge of the line, using part of his own and Hurlbut's division to fill the gap between the right of McCook and the left of General Lew Wallace. The contest in front of McCook was fierce and relentless. John Fiske says: "By ten o'clock a fierce struggle was encountered about the road to Corinth, between the Purdy Road and Shiloh Church, and here for six hours the fighting was as severe as any that Sunday had witnessed. To break down Bragg's division and to gain a firm hold of the Corinth Road southwest of Shiloh Church would cut the Confederate con-

[1] 10 W. R. 251.

nections with Corinth. To prevent such a catastrophe Bragg put forth his utmost efforts, returning the offensive with magnificent pluck and resource. In this great fight the decisive part was played by McCook's division on the spot. But scarcely less decisive was the pressure of Nelson and Crittenden against the rebel right, which obliged Beauregard to reënforce it at the expense of his left." [1]

The Confederates were slowly forced back to Shiloh Church, where Beauregard himself remained until the orders for the retreat of the army were issued, about half-past three in the afternoon. The last stand of the enemy was made at this point, and Gibson's brigade of McCook's division, in a fierce charge, swept through Sherman's headquarters past his division camps, close up to the place where the battle began Sunday morning, and fired at the retreating enemy the last volley in this memorable contest.

Beauregard, to cover the retreat, had ordered up two or three batteries which opened on McCook's division. They were, however, promptly answered by Mendenhall, whose splendid battery wheeled into position on McCook's left as steadily as if on parade, and promptly silenced the opposing batteries of the enemy, closing the battle of Shiloh almost on the identical spot where it began Sunday morning.

General Sherman came up with McCook's advance to his old headquarters, where Beauregard had spent the night. The tents had been thrown down during the engagement and Sherman pointed out, to those of us who were present, his spare horses killed at the picket-rope, when the enemy advanced the day before. There had not been time even to take his horses to the rear. His camp had been plundered of nearly everything which the enemy could carry away. A short distance in front of Sherman's headquarters was the little log chapel of Shiloh, after which the battle was named, filled at this time with Confederate wounded.

[1] Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, p. 96.

I remember while sitting on my horse, at the door of the church, immediately after the charge of Gibson's brigade, that a desperately wounded Confederate soldier turned to me and asked if General Thomas L. Crittenden of Kentucky was present on the field. I was able to inform him that General Crittenden was in the action with his command, but farther to the left. He said: "I wish you would get word to him that John Lewis, of the 5th Kentucky, Confederate, who lived next door to him in Frankfort, is lying in this place badly wounded, and I want him to have me taken care of and sent to a hospital. I used to play with him when we were school-boys in Kentucky." Making a memorandum of his name and regiment, I rode away, and fortunately, a few hours later, was able to deliver personally this message from the dying Confederate soldier to General Crittenden. He promptly gave orders that the friend of his boyhood should have every attention that it was possible to give. General Crittenden told me afterwards that the message came too late, and that before relief could reach him his schoolmate and friend had died on the floor of the little log chapel where I saw him lying on Monday afternoon. Such incidents were not uncommon in the Western armies, where Kentucky regiments were often opposed to each other on opposite sides in the same battle. Captain Henry Clay, whose father was killed at Buena Vista, a grandson of the great statesman, served on General Gibson's staff in Buell's army at Shiloh with distinguished bravery. His brother, Captain Thomas H. Clay, was in the Confederate service on the staff of General Buckner, and had been taken prisoner at Fort Donelson, only a few weeks before. The two brothers never actually met in actual battle, though serving on opposite sides, and both died early in the war from exposure in the field.

There was no pursuit of the Confederate army, though Wood's fresh division came on the field shortly after the battle was over. John Fiske states that he once asked General

Sherman why the retreating rebels were not pursued, and the reply was: "I assure you, my dear fellow, that we had quite enough of their society for two whole days, and were only too glad to be rid of them on any terms."[1] I am not aware that any other or satisfactory explanation has ever been given of the failure to pursue the enemy on Monday evening. General Grant, in his "Memoirs," says that he did not have the heart to demand more work from his jaded men, and, as Buell commanded a separate army, and had only been subject to his orders for a few hours, he felt delicate about giving orders for the pursuit by his army. But he was the senior officer present on the field, and the responsibility for the failure to pursue the Confederate forces would seem to rest upon General Grant. Seldom in the history of war has there been an occasion where a vigorous and energetic pursuit of a defeated army was so imperatively demanded. The Confederate forces were completely broken and demoralized by two whole days of fierce and destructive battle ending in final defeat. The official reports are full of evidence of the disorganized condition of the troops. Bragg reported the following morning that his men were "utterly disorganized and demoralized."

Breckinridge, who was stationed at Monterey a few miles distant from the field, to cover the Confederate retreat, in a dispatch to General Beauregard, says: "My troops are worn out and I don't think can be relied on after the first volley." A vigorous pursuit with the fresh troops then arriving on the field would certainly have resulted in the complete destruction of the Confederate army and the capture of its artillery and trains.

General Buell says, in "Battles and Leaders": "I make no attempt to excuse myself or blame others when I say that General Grant's troops, the lowest individual among them not more than the commander himself, appeared to have thought that the object of the battle was sufficiently accomplished when

[1] Mississippi Valley in the Civil War, p. 99. [2] 11 W. R. 400

they were reinstated in their camps; and that in some way that idea obstructed the reorganization of my men until a further advance that day became impracticable." [1]

When the history of the Civil War is finally written neither the explanation of General Grant nor that of General Buell will be accepted as a sufficient excuse for not following up the victory which had been achieved on Monday evening. The result was that Shiloh was one of the many fiercely contested but indecisive battles of the Civil War, where victory meant simply possession of the field.

Beauregard withdrew his broken columns to Corinth without pursuit or opposition, and the army he commanded continued to confront the Army of the Cumberland during all its campaigns for two and one half years more, until it was finally defeated and destroyed at Nashville in 1864 by General George H. Thomas.

There has been, as usual, a wide difference in the estimate of the numbers engaged on each side in this battle. Those writing from the Confederate standpoint, while they give in the main a reasonable estimate of the number of men engaged on their side, greatly overestimate the number of those opposed to them. The estimate of William Preston Johnston, in his "Life of General Albert Sidney Johnston," is especially reliable.

The Shiloh National Military Park Commission, created by Act of Congress in 1894, composed of men engaged in the battle on the Federal and the Confederate sides, has compiled, from all the official returns and published reports, a very careful and reliable estimate of the number of men present on this occasion. The commission reports that on Sunday the number of men on the field in General Grant's army amounted to 39,830, while the number engaged on the Confederate side that day was 43,968. General Albert Sidney Johnston took into action on that day over 4000 men more than General

[1] Vol. i, p. 534.

Grant had to oppose him. On Monday General Grant's effective force was increased by the division of Lew Wallace, who took into action, as he states in a communication to General Grant, about 5000 men. According to the returns of the Shiloh Commission, General Buell had under his command on the field, excluding Wood's division, which took no part in the action, a little over 15,000 men, making substantially 20,000 fresh troops which were brought into action on Monday morning. Assuming that the losses of the Federal and Confederate forces were equal, this gave the Union forces a superiority on Monday of about 15,000 men. The losses on the first day, however, were far greater in General Grant's army than in that of the Confederates. Over 2200 officers and men were surrendered as prisoners of war under Prentiss on Sunday afternoon. Without going into details, it is probable that on the first day the Confederates had about 4000 in action more than the Union forces, and that on the second day the united armies of General Grant and General Buell exceeded the forces opposed to them by about 12,000.

In any comparison of the number actually engaged in this battle based only upon official returns, it must always be borne in mind that "present for duty" in the Union army embraced men detailed as teamsters, clerks, and hospital attendants. In the Confederate reports the words "effective present" included only those actually present for duty in the fighting-line. The Confederates were able to and did bring into action a much larger proportion of those reported present than the Federals. If this fact is taken into account the superiority in numbers of the Confederates on the first day was considerably larger than the estimate given, while on the second day the numerical superiority of the Union forces was not so great as that given by the Shiloh Commission.

The result on Monday was never in doubt for a moment. The fresh division of General Lew Wallace and the well-organized forces of General Buell more than made up for the

disaster to the Federal forces on Sunday. After the fierce and determined battle on Sunday the reënforcements of entirely fresh troops could hardly help exercising a controlling influence upon the result. It must, however, be borne in mind that while the Confederate losses on Sunday had been very great, yet during the night an opportunity had been given to collect the disorganized and broken regiments, so that when morning came the Confederate brigades and regiments were, in the main, fairly reorganized and prepared to renew the battle. They were inspired by the success of Sunday and did not surrender the field and submit to ultimate defeat without a fierce and desperate contest. The battle on Monday was as vigorous and resolute as that on the preceding day, and every advance of the fresh troops of Buell and Lew Wallace was resisted with splendid courage and enthusiasm.

No one can read the dispatches of General Grant and General Sherman the day preceding the battle without realizing that it was a complete surprise of the Federal forces. It will be remembered that when General Ammen offered to march his command up to Pittsburg Landing on Saturday, he was assured by General Grant that there would be no battle at that place and was directed to wait until boats could be sent down to transport his men up the river to Pittsburg Landing. On the 5th of April Grant reports to Halleck that "the main force of the enemy is at Corinth with troops at different points east; also at Bethel, Jackson, and Humboldt are small garrisons. The numbers at these places seem to constantly change."[1] Another dispatch to Halleck the same day reports skirmishing between his advance and the enemy with the loss of a few prisoners on each side. He was assured by Sherman, in a dispatch from Pittsburg Landing, on the 5th of April, that: "I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket-firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday and will not press our

[1] 11 W. R. 94.

pickets far. I will not be drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend anything like an attack on our position." [1]

Everything that General Sherman said and did shows conclusively that he did not believe a battle was imminent, and probably he never realized that the Confederate army was before him until the camp of the 53d and 77th Ohio in front of Shiloh Church was attacked on Sunday morning, and his own orderly was killed at his side by a volley from the Confederate skirmishers. It is impossible to believe that these dispatches of General Grant and General Sherman would have been written if they had for a moment supposed that there was a Confederate army in line of battle within less than two miles of the camp, only waiting orders to advance.

It is reported that on the night before the battle, General Albert Sidney Johnston gave the most strict orders to preserve silence in his camps, in order that no knowledge of his presence might be communicated to the Federal army. During Saturday evening a Confederate staff officer was sent out with orders to put a stop to the bugle-calls which were distinctly heard at Confederate headquarters. He was astonished to learn that these bugle-calls came from the camp of the Union forces. The fact that the battle was a surprise, in the military sense of that term, is perhaps the only excuse that can be offered by the friends of Generals Grant and Sherman for the utter want of preparation on the part of the Federal forces. No directions had been previously given to the division commanders in case of an attack by the enemy, nor had any line of defence been selected. The different commands were widely separated, giving no support to each other, and Sunday morning inspection was going on in the most advanced camps when the battle began. The reason assigned by General Grant afterwards for not constructing earthworks to protect his front was that he intended his army to act on the offensive, and did not wish

[1] 11 W. R. 93, 94.

them to learn to rely on fortifications. This, however, can hardly be accepted as a sufficient reason for not taking the most common and ordinary precautions observed by a hostile army, operating in an enemy's country, with an impassable river directly in the rear. It would seem clear that the conduct of neither Grant nor Sherman can be explained upon any other ground than that they had no idea that a battle was likely to occur at Pittsburg Landing.

In view of what is now well established, it is curious to note the dispatches of General Halleck to Secretary Stanton on May 2, in which he officially reports as follows: "The newspaper accounts that our divisions were surprised are utterly false. Every division had notice of the enemy's approach hours before the battle commenced." [1]

In transmitting a topographical map of the field he again asserts, on the 15th of June: "That the impression which at one time seemed to have been received by the Department that our forces were surprised on the morning of the 6th is entirely erroneous. I am satisfied from a patient and careful inquiry and investigation that all our troops were notified of the enemy's approach some time before the battle commenced." [2]

It is safe to say that General Halleck, in sending these dispatches to the War Department, never looked forward to the publication of all official reports of the battle, where the evidence of a complete surprise of General Grant's army on Sunday morning is absolutely overwhelming.

It is interesting to observe that from the time the action began on Sunday, up to the close on Monday evening, Sherman seems largely to have directed the movements of the Union forces. Although his own division of new troops had been driven back in disorder and finally disappeared from the field, the influence of his genius for battle was everywhere present. The active, alert, and ready soldier appears in every-

[1] 10 W. R. 99, [2] Ibid.

thing he said and did. Many years later, after the relations between them had become strained, General Buell, speaking of an interview with Sherman on Sunday night, says: "In all his career, I venture to say, he has never appeared to better advantage. There was the frank, brave soldier, rather subdued, realizing the critical situation in which causes of some sort, perchance his own fault, chiefly, had placed him, but ready without affectation or bravado to do anything that duty required of him. He asked me what the plans were for the morrow. I answered that I was going to attack the enemy at daylight and he expressed gratification at my reply, though apparently not because of any unmixed confidence in the result. I had no conversation with General Grant and knew nothing of his purpose."

There seems to have been very little coöperation between General Grant and General Buell in the attack on Monday; perhaps there was little occasion for consultation or conference. There was but one thing to do, and that was to place the fresh troops in line of battle, attack the enemy at daylight, and drive back the Confederate forces and recover the ground which had been lost and the camps which had been captured.

It seems to me that the published reports of the battle have never yet given full credit to General Prentiss and General W. H. L. Wallace, and the brave men they commanded. With an indomitable courage and resolution that has seldom been witnessed in the history of war, they held the key to the main position and line of retreat for Grant's army from eleven Sunday morning until five o'clock that afternoon. We learn from the reports of the Confederate officers of the repeated desperate but unsuccessful assaults on their unbroken lines. William Preston Johnston, in his "Life of Albert Sidney Johnston," says: "It was nicknamed by the Confederates, by a very mild metaphor, 'The Hornet's Nest'! No figure of speech would be too strong to express the deadly peril of assault upon this natural fortress, whose inaccessible barriers

blazed for six hours with sheets of flame, and whose infernal gates poured forth a murderous storm of shot and shell and musket-fire which no living thing could quell or even withstand. Brigade after brigade was led against it. But valor was of no avail. Hindman's brilliant brigades, which had swept everything before them from the field, were shivered into fragments in the shock of the assault, and paralyzed for the remainder of the day. A. P. Stewart's regiments made fruitless assaults but only to retire mangled and disheartened."[1] Gibson's fine Confederate brigades of Louisiana and Arkansas troops, under the immediate eye of Albert Sidney Johnston himself, charged the position four times, and each time were repulsed with heavy losses. It was in front of this line that Johnston himself was killed while personally leading a charge with the bayonet. There was a lull in the battle for a short time, but it was soon renewed. William Preston Johnston says: "About half-past three o'clock the struggle at the centre, which had been going on for five hours with fitful violence, was renewed with the utmost fury. Polk's and Bragg's corps, intermingled, were engaged in a death-grapple with the sturdy commands of Wallace and Prentiss. The Federal generals had consulted, and had resolved to stand and hold their ground at all hazards, hoping thus to save the rest of the army from destruction; and there is little doubt that their manful resistance, which cost one his life and the other his liberty, so checked the Southern troops as to gain time and prevent the capture of Grant's army."[2]

The Confederates finally concentrated a fire of over sixty pieces of artillery, but the position was still held until they were completely surrounded and Chalmers' brigade formed squarely between them and the rest of the army at the landing. Wallace faced his men to the rear and in a desperate charge was mortally wounded in trying to cut his way out. General Tuttle of Iowa, with a portion of his command, succeeded in forc-

[1] p. 604. [2] p. 619.

ing his way out, reported to General Grant, and took part in the defence of the final assault by the Confederates on Sunday night and in the action on Monday. Prentiss and his men were forced to surrender as prisoners of war. The heroic defence of this position until the fresh troops of Nelson arrived on the field probably saved Grant's army from destruction or capture and will always be regarded as one of the bravest deeds in the history of war.

The total losses of the Confederate army were officially reported by Beauregard at 10,699, while those of General Grant and General Buell, including the 2200 men captured with Prentiss, aggregated 13,047. The number of killed and wounded on each side was about equal, but the Confederates, by the surrender of Prentiss, had a larger number of prisoners. The Confederate loss was estimated at 24⅛ per cent, while the five divisions of Grant's army engaged on Sunday lost over 26⅜ per cent. In some of the organizations the losses were appalling. The 9th Illinois lost 366 out of 617. The 6th Mississippi lost 300 out of 425. Cleburne's brigade went into battle with 2700 men and sustained a loss of 1013. It is stated that at the close of the action on Monday night he had only 58 men in his line. The ratio of killed and wounded in proportion to the number engaged was far greater than had ever occurred up to that time in this country, and was surpassed on but few occasions during the whole Civil War.

This desperate contest was almost wholly between Western troops on each side, the Union forces coming largely from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Wisconsin, while the Confederates were from Tennessee, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas. To the South especially the defeat and the terrible losses brought the war very close to every home. George W. Cable, describing New Orleans after the battle, says he used to go to the top of the unfinished custom-house and look down on the city, and that "When I did so, I looked upon a town that had never been really glad again after the awful

day at Shiloh. She had sent so many gallant fellows to help Beauregard, and some of them so young — her last gleaning — that when, on the day of their departure, they marched with solid column and firm-set, unsmiling mouths down the long gray lines made by the open ranks of those old Confederate guards, and their escort broke into cheers and tears and waved their gray shakoes on the tops of their bayonets and seized the dear loved hands as they passed in mute self-devotion and steady tread while the trumpets sang, 'Listen to the Mocking-Bird,' that was the last time; the town never cheered with elation afterwards, and when the people next uncovered, it was in silence, to let the body of Albert Sidney Johnston, their great chevalier, pass slowly up St. Charles Street behind the muffled drums, while on their quivering hearts was written, with a knife, the death-roll of that lost battle. One of them who had brought that precious body, a former schoolmate of mine, walked beside the bier with the stains of camp and battle on him from head to foot. The war was coming very near."

The picture was not overdrawn, and during the march that summer of Buell's army back through Tennessee and Alabama, every household was in mourning for those who had been killed in this fierce and desperate battle. In the Northwest there was mourning in many homes over the dead heroes who gave up their lives in this action that the nation might live. Their remains are now gathered in the beautiful Shiloh Cemetery, while a grateful country will ever honor and cherish their memory.

V

THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN OF 1862

BY

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THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN OF 1862

THE most of the campaigns of our Civil War afford lessons which are useful only to students of military science. That which we are about to describe is full of instruction concerning the relations which may exist between the duties of the soldier and the functions of civil government. It shows more clearly than any other of the incidents in the struggle between the North and South the evils which may arise from the effort to combine political considerations with those which properly guide commanding officers in the field. This peculiar aspect of the campaign between the Confederate army under General Bragg and the forces commanded by General Buell may justify a novice in the art of war in venturing to discuss its incidents.

During the first stage of the Civil War the main object of the Confederate authorities was to gain possession of the Southern States which had failed to cast in their lot with them. They chose to assume that Kentucky and Missouri were held within the Union altogether by the force of the Federal armies. Owing to the position of Missouri, the invasions of that state were never made in great force and it was soon abandoned to the control of the North. The struggle for the possession of Kentucky was more determined, for the reason that that state was of peculiar importance to the Southern plan of action, and moreover its geographical position was such as to make it accessible to detachments from the Confederate army of Virginia. If they could have gained Kentucky, the Southerners would not only have secured an excellent line of defence on the Ohio River, but by the possession of the Southern margin of that stream they would have deprived the Federal armies of all the important river naviga-

tion in the Mississippi Valley. Moreover the state itself would have been a valuable recruiting-ground and would have been of the first importance as a source of war supplies.

As the story which we have to tell concerns politics quite as much as war, it will be necessary for us to take account of the position which the state government of Kentucky occupied with reference to the struggle between the North and South. In the long-drawn preliminary debates which led to this conflict, the successive elections clearly show that Kentucky was sincerely attached to the Federal Union. The people were ardent followers of Henry Clay and generally detested the Calhoun school of politics. Although the agitation concerning slavery and the losses of fugitive slaves somewhat diminished the measure of this affection for the Union, there can be no doubt that at the beginning of 1861 the Union sentiment in Kentucky was still much stronger than the dis-Unionist. It happened, however, that the Confederate sympathizers included by far the larger part of the people who were accustomed to lead in the affairs of the state.

In consequence of the preponderance in social and political affairs which characterized the Southern sympathizers in Kentucky, it was impossible for the Union men to lead the state immediately to the support of the Northern cause. The legislature which determined the question of secession had not been elected with reference to its action in that matter. Therefore the Federal sympathizers, with the rare political sagacity which has so often characterized the governing body of that commonwealth, determined for a time to hold the state neutral in the conflict. In no other way could they hope to escape the dangers of the stampede into rebellion which had led the other Southern commonwealths astray. The wisdom of this course was shown in the final vote which determined that Kentucky should temporarily hold aloof from the conflict. The measure was carried by a vote of forty-eight to forty-seven. In accordance with this determination, the state proceeded to organize

and arm a militia force of about fifteen thousand men. In the Congressional elections which immediately followed the declaration of neutrality, the Union majority was about fifty-five thousand, anti-secession candidates being elected in nine out of ten districts. Two months after neutrality was declared a legislature was elected composed of a hundred and three Union men to thirty-five secessionists. The Union majority would have been yet larger but for the fact that one half the Senate held over from the preceding election.

President Lincoln appears to have had a much better understanding as to the situation in Kentucky than President Davis. He was content to respect the neutrality of the commonwealth and to await the turn which would be brought about by the course of events. The Confederate authorities were less patient. On the 3d of September, 1861, Leonidas Polk, who was at once a bishop in the Episcopal Church and a major-general commanding the Confederate forces in Western Tennessee, extended his line so as to include the strategically important point about Hickman, and at the same time General Zollicoffer entered the state through Cumberland Gap. The answer of the commonwealth was immediate. A resolution was passed that the United States flag be hoisted over the Capitol and by an overwhelming majority the legislature instructed the Governor "to inform those concerned that Kentucky expects the Confederate or Tennessee troops to be withdrawn from her soil unconditionally." On a motion in the House of Representatives to the effect that the small Federal force which had long been present in the state be also withdrawn the vote stood twenty-nine for to sixty-eight against the proposition. On the 18th of September the state formally cast in its lot with the Federal arms.

The first effort of the Confederate forces to obtain control of Kentucky by a military invasion was so well opposed that they secured control of but a small part of the state situated to the south and west of Green River. This area they quickly

lost by the fall of Fort Donelson, which fairly turned their flank. The subsequent campaigns which resulted in the battle of Shiloh for a time made any other effort in this direction impracticable. During the few months in which the Confederate army under General Albert Sidney Johnston occupied the southwestern portion of the commonwealth a political farce was enacted the results of which are evident in the campaign which we are about to describe. Although they held control of not more than one twentieth of the area of the state the Confederates called together what they were pleased to term "a sovereignty convention," which contained members from about half the counties in the state. These delegates were to a great extent from the men who were in the army or were self-appointed. Nothing approaching an election was held except within the limits of the small area which was controlled by the Southern forces. This so-called convention passed an ordinance of secession and elected a complete list of state officers from governor to state printer. Commissioners were sent to Richmond to ask the admission of the state into the Confederacy and on the 9th of December the Confederate Congress passed a vote admitting the commonwealth into the Southern Union. Thenceforth the Confederacy, the champion of states' rights, chose to assume that Kentucky was no longer rightfully a state in the Federal Union. The commonwealth was represented in the government at Richmond by representatives chosen from the armies in the field. To give a semblance of authority to this bastard government, it was necessary to win possession of the state capital and to instal the executive body in office. This political object was adhered to with singular persistency. It affords the key to the campaign of 1862.

The battle of Shiloh for a time gave the Federal armies control of all the country as far south as the Tennessee River and as far east as near Chattanooga. The Confederate forces south of this line were too weak to take the offensive. In

this position the Federal army was compelled to hold very extended lines of communication and to scatter its force along a great southern front. On the east its flank was totally unprotected. It was manifestly easy for the Confederates to concentrate a great army in Eastern Tennessee which could be made up of detachments from Virginia and from the forces in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia. It is doubtful if in modern war an enemy has ever been so temptingly invited to deal a crushing blow. Nothing approaching adequate preparation against a movement of the Confederate forces from Eastern Tennessee into Kentucky was made. An entrenched camp had been constructed at Cumberland Gap, which was held by a force of about four thousand men under the command of General George W. Morgan. Although this force was sufficient to hold the well-known pass at the Gap there were several other ways through the mountains in this part of the state which could be readily traversed by wagons and artillery. The defence of these roads was entirely neglected.

On the 4th of July, 1862, the Confederates began their advance into Kentucky from East Tennessee by a reconnoissance in force made by the cavalry brigade of Colonel John H. Morgan. This movement, which was made with admirable swiftness, clearly disclosed the fact that Kentucky was substantially undefended. Morgan's movements carried him over a large part of the state in the region east of the Louisville and Nashville Railway and showed him that no provision had been made to guard the commonwealth from invasion. In twenty-four days' campaign Morgan's force travelled over a thousand miles, captured seventeen towns, paroled about twelve hundred prisoners, and lost only ninety men. The movement in mass which followed this successful reconnoissance was admirably planned and at the outset brilliantly executed. A force of about fifteen thousand men, all veterans, was sent, under the command of General Kirby Smith, through the passes which lie to the west of Cumberland Gap into Cen-

tral Kentucky. The front of this column was so well masked by detachments of cavalry that its advance was unperceived until the body of the force was near Richmond, Kentucky, more than halfway of the distance from the southern line of the state to the cities of Louisville and Cincinnati. In three days, before arriving at Richmond, Kirby Smith's infantry marched the distance of ninety miles. At the last-named point there was a Federal force consisting of Manson's and Cruft's brigades amounting to about seven thousand men. This little army was under the nominal command of General William Nelson, a naval officer of brilliant parts but who had had little experience in land service. He had won credit at Shiloh, where he commanded a division. Although Nelson in a general way expected an attack, he was at Lexington nearly forty miles away from the seat of battle. Manson, the senior brigadier, believing that he had to deal only with a raiding party, moved southward from Rogersville a few miles beyond Richmond with half his force. Here he struck the vanguard of the Confederate army and easily drove it back. Emboldened by his success, he pushed still further away from his support, and on the following morning found himself engaged with the whole of the Confederate force.

Although very few of the men in the Federal force engaged in the battle of Richmond had ever seen a battle, and although they were outnumbered nearly two to one by their enemy, they made an admirable fight. It was not until they were taken in flank and rear that their lines gave way, and even then the retreat was in good order and re-formed at Rogersville. Here again they were speedily outflanked and put in retreat. In Richmond they were met by their commanding officer and a portion of the force was again rallied. At this point, however, Kirby Smith's cavalry formed in the rear of the retreating column, and although General Manson, with a small portion of his force which still remained in hand, gallantly undertook to beat them off, they held their place. All the artillery and

three thousand of the Federal troops were captured. Those who escaped were utterly disorganized: the débris of the force found its way to the Ohio River along a line nearly three hundred miles in extent.

Although Kirby Smith had gained a signal victory, it had been relatively costly to his army. Near one tenth of his men had been killed or wounded. Moreover he had found that the raw troops of the Federal army could not readily be brushed aside even by his veteran corps. He therefore did not venture at once on any movement in force to the north of the Kentucky River, a stream which afforded a strong line of defence to the Federal army which was swiftly gathered along its northern bank. His position enabled him to guard the main column of Bragg's army in the curious movement which that general at once undertook. Moving from his camps in Eastern Tennessee, Bragg proceeded by rather leisurely marches westward through the tableland district of that state towards Nashville. In taking this course he seems to have had two objects in view. The body of General Buell's command was in Southern Tennessee, and he had to apprehend that it might move to the northeast into Central Kentucky. By moving towards Nashville he probably thought to secure a chance to beat Buell's force in detail before that general had concentrated his army. Moreover, by moving in this direction, he could the more quickly obtain possession of the Louisville and Nashville Railway which was Buell's most valuable line of communication with the north. He appears also to have had some hope of capturing Nashville, a success which would have enabled him at once to replace the Confederate government of Tennessee in its capital and to secure a strongly fortified post which would serve to protect his rear during his efforts in Kentucky.

Crossing the Cumberland River above Nashville, the information he received from his scouts as to the state of the defences of that city led Bragg to abandon all idea of capturing

it. He then turned north, following the line of the Louisville and Nashville Railway as far as Green River, destroying the road as he went. At the crossing of the Green River he found some defences held by General Wilder with a force of thirty-five hundred men. Bragg spent three days in reducing these defences, thus sacrificing precious time which should have been devoted to more important ends. After this success he moved slowly towards Lexington and Frankfort, gathering enormous trains of booty as he went. From his success at Green River to the end of his campaign, the movements of the great army under Bragg's command appear to have been without distinct military aim. He had in his own army or within easy supporting distance an effective force of not less than fifty-five thousand men. The only enemy with whom he had seriously to reckon was the force under General Buell which was still in process of concentration about Nashville. He had at least ten days the start of this army. His cavalry arm was strong. Morgan's force alone could have been trusted greatly to delay the march of the Federal forces from the south and to secure information as to its movements. His well-organized system of scouts and spies gave Bragg abundant information as to the unprotected condition of Louisville and Cincinnati, the two cities which were the base of supplies of all the Federal operations in Kentucky and Tennessee. From Munfordsville to Louisville over excellent roads the distance is only seventy-five miles. At no point along this line are there any positions where he could expect to meet resistance. The city itself lay open to attack. The defences consisted in detached works which mounted a few pieces of artillery. At Cincinnati the Federal lines were even weaker. With the force at his command including Kirby Smith's division he could easily have captured these important posts and inflicted an almost irreparable loss to the Federal cause.

The movements of General Bragg toward Louisville and Cincinnati were limited to demonstrations in force against

these two towns. Each of these places was threatened by a force of about ten thousand men. At the time when these columns came within sight of the cities, either or both could have been captured by an immediate assault. At Cincinnati the situation was peculiarly tempting to an enterprising soldier. When, on the 6th of September, Kirby Smith's force encamped at a point five miles south of that city, the fortifications were so incomplete that he could have marched through the lines without encountering any fire from them. The force in his front was about equal to his own numbers and was made up of raw and undisciplined recruits who were half-armed and in a state of panic which makes new levies utterly unserviceable. At any time within forty-eight hours of the time when he came within sight of the Federal lines, General Smith could have captured the towns of Newport and Covington, the southern faubourgs of Cincinnati, with a loss of less than a hundred men. The only crossing of the Ohio River was by means of an entirely undefended pontoon bridge. A force of five hundred cavalry or mounted infantry with a field battery could have easily broken through the incomplete Federal lines and in an hour have seized upon the southern head of this bridge. Even with his infantry force he could have won the end in two hours' time and without any serious fighting. There is no question that the Confederates would have availed themselves of this golden opportunity had it not been that Bragg's instructions forbade an assault.

While General Bragg lingered in Central Kentucky, Buell had gathered his scattered command without the loss of a battery or a regiment and was moving along the roads to the west of the Louisville and Nashville Railway towards Louisville, which he entered on September 25. The body of Bragg's army had been near Bowling Green on September 12. We thus see that the Confederate force lost about ten days which might have been devoted to effective work. Against Buell's retrograde movement Bragg interposed no

obstacle whatever. Owing to the conditions of the country through which the Federal army was marching, there were many points where it could have been attacked to great advantage. So far as action was concerned, Bragg behaved as if he had forgotten all about his antagonist.

It is difficult to account for the singular neglect of his military opportunities which General Bragg displayed. The most likely, indeed we may say the historic, explanation appears to be found in the fact that he conceived his errand in Kentucky to be partly of a political nature. He felt that his first duty was to place the long wandering Confederate government of the state in office at Frankfort. He expected also a support from the people of the commonwealth and waited for them to flock to his standard. With these purposes in view he avoided the risks of battle and occupied as large an area of the country as he could conveniently secure. He soon found that he could expect no help from the population, and there were so many delays attendant on the inaugurational ceremonies at Frankfort that before the governor elected by the Kentucky troops in the Confederate army had finished his address the advance guard of Buell's army, which had refitted in Louisville, began to shell the capital and the fictitious authorities had to seek shelter in the tunnel which leads from the town on the road towards Lexington. The governor elected in the camps near Bowling Green had met a soldier's death while fighting in the ranks as a private at Shiloh. The worthy gentleman who replaced him presided at the State House for about an hour. Thus, what seems to have been Bragg's main object, which was to give some semblance of authority to the peripatetic, was condemned to ludicrous failure.

Buell arrived in Louisville on the 25th of September. His army was in such excellent state that it required but four days to reorganize the force and incorporate in it a considerable body of recruits which he received at this point. The

delay would have been but three days but for the fact that on the day appointed for marching against Bragg an order came for him to turn over his command to General George H. Thomas, who was one of his corps commanders. At Thomas' request this order was revoked, but it caused the delay of a day and the rumor of the event had a depressing effect upon the army. The problem before Buell was one of singular difficulty. Notwithstanding the reënforcements which he had received, his effective force amounted only to about fifty-five thousand and he was weak in cavalry. Bragg had about fifty thousand men, all seasoned troops who had been refreshed by a long rest in a field of plenty; he had an admirable body of cavalry which was so managed as to keep him in general well informed as to the position of his enemy. If Buell had essayed a direct attack upon Bragg it would have been necessary to cross the Kentucky River, which runs northward from near Harrodsburg to the Ohio, a distance in a direct line of near one hundred miles. The path of this river from its head waters to near the Ohio is through a deep gorge. The points where crossing is possible are few and they are all so placed that small detachments could hold them with ease. Bragg evidently expected that Buell would feel himself compelled to make a direct movement via Frankfort, but he reckoned without his host. The Federal commander very properly determined to push to the southeast and if possible to place himself between Bragg's forces and the line of their retreat.

Buell had left a sufficient force to secure Cincinnati and Louisville against all danger of surprise. His force indeed was large enough to coöperate with him in an attack on Bragg should he venture to remain to the north of the Kentucky River. Moving to the southeast by slow marches, which were made necessary by the weariness of his veteran forces and the raw state of his reënforcements, Buell arrived on the 8th of October at a point near Perryville, a few miles south of Harrodsburg. The advance columns of the army camped

on Doctor's Fork, a small stream which was reduced by a protracted drought to a few pools of stagnant water. The line of the brook was occupied by Sheridan's division. The outposts were pushed only a mile or so beyond the front. The greater part of the country near the stream was wooded. Although the army was all within easy supporting distance it was not arranged with the expectation of battle. Bragg was well informed as to Buell's movements and had begun to withdraw his force south of the Kentucky River. He intended to interpose his army between that of Buell and the gaps in the Cumberland Mountains toward which his enormous trains filled with military stores were already making their way over the difficult roads. When the Federal force went into camp on Doctor's Fork, about fifteen thousand of the Confederates under General Hardee occupied a line of low heights near Perryville, only two miles to the east. A proper reconnoissance of the Federal front would have shown the position of this force the night before the battle which we are about to describe. The failure to make this search of the ground in front of him was a grave mistake on the part of General Buell. It is, however, the only serious omission on his part which is recorded in his long, arduous, and generally successful military career.

Although Hardee had but fifteen thousand men, Cheatham's division and other reënforcements which came to him on the morning of battle raised his numbers to about thirty-three thousand men. The force under Buell, which with twelve hours' march could have been brought into line of battle, numbered about fifty-five thousand. Although the Federal commander knew that he had a considerable force in his front, and this at no great distance, he was ignorant of its position and of its numbers. He supposed that he had to deal with the whole Confederate army and he expected his enemy to await him at a considerable distance from the point where he had to meet their attack. The Confederates fell also into error. They

thought that they had to deal with but a small part of the Federal army. They seem to have supposed that the main body of Buell's troops was in the force which had moved on Frankfort. It seems clear that Buell supposed the Confederates to be well informed of the fact that they had his whole army before them. He knew that they needed time for concentration and presumed that they would await his attack. Therefore, although the more advanced part of his army was formed in line of battle on the evening of October 7, the arrangement was only a matter of ordinary precaution and with no expectation of the attack which the Confederates made on the following day. The battle came about twenty-four hours before it was expected, and when only half of the Federal force was in position to take part in the engagement. The formation of Buell's troops in order of attack was made exceedingly inconvenient by the wooded condition of the country. The line so far as formed consisted of Crittenden's command on the extreme right or south, which was separated from the other forces by a considerable interval. Gilbert's corps, including Sheridan's and Mitchell's division, was in the centre. McCook's corps formed the extreme left or northern part of the Federal line of battle.

The action of Perryville or Chaplin Fork began a little before noon on October 8 with a cannonade from the Confederate batteries which did not seem to presage a serious action. It was common enough in those days to waste artillery ammunition in an idle way. At 2 in the afternoon the Confederates delivered their first assault on the right of the main Federal line or rather the right of the centre, which was, as before remarked, separated from Crittenden's force by a considerable interval. The portion of this line which was held by the brigades of Lytle and Harris withstood the attack, but Terrill's brigade, which was on the extreme right of the centre, gave way in disorder. This part of the line was composed of raw troops, and the assault, which was led by General Buckner,

delivered a crushing blow. In this event the Federal force lost eleven pieces of artillery.

Although the Confederates had fairly broken the Federal line, Sheridan's force was unshaken. His men were partly sheltered by a wood, from which they delivered an effective fire upon the assaulting lines, which were in open fields. Although reënforced by two brigades of Cheatham's division they failed to shake Sheridan's veterans. They were equally unsuccessful in their effort to turn McCook's flank, which had been reënforced by a brigade of Mitchell's division under General Gooding. Although the fight was furious, the enemy were repulsed and nightfall put an end to the engagement. At the close the Federal lines were somewhat more advanced than at the beginning, and except for the capture by the enemy of a dozen pieces of artillery, they had suffered no heavier loss than they had inflicted. Although the contest had lasted but four hours it was, for the numbers engaged and for the time the forces were under fire, one of the most deadly in history. The portion of Buell's army actually engaged was probably less than twenty-five thousand. The loss in killed and wounded amounted to about four thousand. The Confederates brought about fifteen thousand men into action, and of these over three thousand were killed and wounded. Between 2.30 and 6 P. M. at least seven thousand men were disabled or slain out of a total of not more than forty thousand who were actually in the fight. Notwithstanding the weight of this action, it is hardly to be classed as a battle, for neither contestant had prepared for a decisive engagement. There are few instances in warfare where as momentous a struggle was in the same measure accidental.

His experience satisfied Bragg that he had to deal with the whole of Buell's army and needs must make an immediate concentration of his forces. To accomplish this end it was necessary for him to fall back northwardly towards Harrodsburg, where he could be joined by Kirby Smith's corps and

several other detachments which had been watching the eastern bank of the Kentucky River. This movement, though imperatively necessary, was clearly dangerous, for it carried him away from his line of retreat towards Cumberland Gap. Buell's advance after the action at Perryville was delayed by the need of reorganization, which is always necessary after heavy fighting, and also by violent rains which made marching very difficult. He could doubtless have forced an engagement near Harrodsburg, but the issue of the battle with an enemy so nearly equal in force and on ground of his own choosing would have been doubtful. He therefore wisely chose to continue his movement parallel with and south of his enemy's line of retreat, awaiting the chance of forcing the fight in some more advantageous position. It turned out, however, that Bragg by swift marching, for which his troops were well prepared by their long rest, so gained ground on Buell's weary army that he escaped all but trifling assaults on his rear guard and made good his way into East Tennessee. Bragg's retreat was skilfully managed; half the energy which was displayed in it would, if it had been devoted to the duties of his campaign in Kentucky, have made his expedition a success; as it is it must be regarded as one of the most ignominious failures of the Civil War.

There are several minor events which occurred during the Bragg campaign and which deserve mention, for the reason that they throw light on the morale of the armies and on the state of mind of the resident population. First among these we may note the retreat of General George W. Morgan from the entrenched camp which he commanded at Cumberland Gap. This post had been established with the expectation that it would guard the southeastern frontier of Kentucky from invasion. Owing to the imperfect maps of the country and to the inadequate reconnoissance of its topography, the Federal authorities appear to have remained ignorant of the fact that the position could readily be flanked by the invading

army, who in their march did not need to come within striking distance of its garrison. When Kirby Smith entered Kentucky, General Morgan, with about four thousand men, was cut off from communication with his government. After a month of waiting, finding that Central Kentucky seemed to be firmly held by the Confederate army, he wisely resolved to essay a retreat through the mountain wilderness of Eastern Kentucky. Destroying his military stores and spiking his heavy guns, he slowly but successfully worked his way through the great forests until he came to the Ohio River near the West Virginia line. Although the people of the country remained friendly to his cause, the population was so scanty that his men were brought to the starvation point before they came to the Ohio. The Confederates had due information concerning Morgan's movement, but their efforts to oppose his retreat were unsuccessful. I am unaware of any other movement during our Civil War which so well shows the independence and daring which may characterize our American volunteers.

One more incident may be given which serves well to show the singular fury which characterizes many of the combats between the citizens of Kentucky and their would-be deliverers of the Confederate army. On the 27th of September General Kirby Smith endeavored to create a diversion and hinder the concentration of the Federal forces against Bragg by a raid into Ohio. Colonel Basil Duke, of General John H. Morgan's famous command, was assigned four hundred picked men and a battery of horse artillery. He was directed to cross the Ohio at a ford situated in front of the village of Augusta, about forty miles above Cincinnati. There were no regular troops at this point. It was held, however, by about one hundred home guards, supported by two extemporized gunboats which carried several pieces of artillery. The home guards were in the main composed of boys and men beyond the military age, the war having already drawn away the

greater part of those who were fit for the field. At the outset of the engagement between Colonel Duke's force and the defenders of the town the gunboats, dismayed by the Confederate artillery, fled from the action. The home guards, however, though outnumbered about four to one, made a gallant fight, in which they killed and wounded over fifty of their assailants, including the greater part of their officers. Three of Duke's captains and six of his lieutenants were slain.

The following extract from Colonel Duke's description of the fight gives a good idea of the spirit which animated the militiamen:

"Details of men were posted in the middle of the street in front of every house to fire on the inmates as they showed themselves and prevent them from maintaining an accurate and effective fire. Other details were made to break in the doors of the houses and enter them. The artillery was brought into the town and turned upon the houses in which the most stubborn resistance was kept up. Planted about ten paces from a house, aimed to strike about a yard below the sills of the windows beneath which the defenders were crouched, except when taking aim, and double-shotted with grape and canister, the howitzers tore great gaps in the walls. . . . Flags of truce about this time were hung out of several windows, and believing that a general surrender was meant, I ordered the fires to be extinguished. But only those who shook the white flags meant to give up; the others continued the fight. One or two men putting out the fires were shot. I immediately ordered that every house from which shots came should be burned. A good many were soon in flames and even then the fighting continued in some of them. My men were infuriated by what they esteemed bad faith in a continuance of the fight after the flags of truce were displayed, and by the loss of their comrades and of some favorite officers. Few lives were spared in the houses into which they forced their way." Owing to his considerable loss in killed and wounded

and the expenditure of his ammunition, Colonel Duke was compelled to abandon his projected raid north of the Ohio.

Many other similar engagements in other parts of the state showed the Confederate authorities how unfounded was the notion that Kentucky was in sympathy with the rebellion. The portion of the population which sympathized with the South, and which was in condition to lend effective aid to its cause, had already entered the Confederate army. It is doubtful if Bragg received more than a thousand recruits during his stay of over a month in the state, and these accessions were probably more than offset by deserters from among the Union sympathizers who had been forced into his ranks.

The lessons which may be derived from the study of this remarkable campaign are numerous and in the highest degree instructive. First we may note the disasters which inevitably result from an effort to occupy a country without defeating the body of the enemy with which the invading force has to deal. Every great war affords instruction on this point, but few campaigns are so well suited to prove this proposition as that between Bragg and Buell. The critical nature of the Federal position at the outset of the summer of 1862 was due to this blunder. Buell was compelled to dispose his troops over an area of more than a hundred thousand square miles in such an order that a concentration required some weeks' time and in positions which laid their eastern flank fatally open to assault. He was more than twice as far from his base as the district in Eastern Tennessee where the Confederates gathered for their great movement. Next we note the failure on the part of the Federal commanders to use due care in exploring the territory with which they had to deal in order to learn its strategic value on the position of the enemy. In this regard the Confederates were very much more skilful and foresightful than our own authorities. A large part of their success depended on this better knowledge as to the military conditions of the field in which they had to operate.

In all that relates to its plan and to its initial operations Bragg's movement was admirably contrived. It is clear that this part of his task, the portion of it which could be foreseen before his march began, was clearly determinable. When he turned north from near Nashville he appears to have obeyed his general instructions, which provided for the occupation of Central Kentucky and the establishment of a pseudo-state government. His subsequent actions were left to the initiative energy which needs must be possessed by a commander to whom a task of this nature is confided. Although Bragg could follow a plan of campaign which had been devised for him, he evidently was destitute of originating power. It was open to him to capture the Federal base of supplies at Louisville and Cincinnati, but he neglected this golden opportunity. The conditions of Buell's retreat made it possible for him to attack that army in detail. If he had pushed south when he turned north from near Nashville, there seems little reason to doubt that he could have defeated the Federal concentration and set the several columns adrift in a disorganized condition. He could have lain in wait for Buell in the valley of Salt River and forced a battle with him while his army was weary and disorganized by its long retreat. The Federal commander could not safely have ventured on a general engagement under these conditions. They would have been forced to effect their retreat through the densely wooded country of the Green River district, where they would have been brought to the verge of starvation, and where, with Louisville and Cincinnati in Confederate hands, it would have been difficult for them to secure a refit. Bragg failed to see that until his account with Buell's army was settled he had no substantial hold on the district which he had occupied. It should have been clear to him that if Buell attained the Ohio with his veteran army unbroken and provided with ample reënforcements, it would only be matter of a few weeks before the Confederate control of Kentucky would be brought to an end. On the other hand, if he defeated

the Federal force he could have established his lines on the Ohio and thus secured a fair chance of holding the state. If Stonewall Jackson had commanded in Bragg's place the Confederate force would probably have held Kentucky through the winter of 1862–3 and the issue of the war would have been doubtful.

In reviewing the operations of Buell from the beginning of his retreat to the battle of Perryville there appears to be nothing to be criticised. His concentration was skilfully and speedily effected and his northward march so ordered as to bring his army in good condition into Louisville. It was there reorganized with admirable celerity, the plan of campaign was well contrived, and but for the curious accident at Perryville might have led to a very successful issue. If his force had attained Danville without a serious action Bragg would have been compelled to fight a general battle under disadvantageous conditions, with the Kentucky River at his back and his enemy well on to his strategic flank. The failure properly to explore the country in his front is the only serious omission which can be charged to General Buell's account. It was the common blunder of our Federal commanders during the first two years of our Civil War. At no time in this conflict was our cavalry service adequate to the needs.

It is tolerably evident that the key to the Confederate follies after they entered Central Kentucky was due to the distraction which was brought about by the needs of accomplishing at once political and military ends. Bragg was enough of a soldier to warrant us in assuming that if he had been sent into Kentucky with orders to do military work alone he would have devoted his energies to this simple task. As it was he was compelled to take counsel with a sort of a cabinet of politicans who were intent on affirming the civil authority of the Confederacy in the commonwealth. We can conceive the state of mind of an old-fashioned soldier of

moderate ability who had to listen to a body of men who had no sense of a military duty and who were naturally intent on what seemed to them the great task of winning the state to the Confederacy. While he was listening to these civilian counsels he should have been dealing with the army of General Buell in Western Kentucky.

We should not close this brief account of the great Kentucky campaign without a protest against the treatment which was accorded General Buell at the close of his admirable movements which expelled Bragg from Kentucky. After the battle of Perryville he was removed from command, and after remaining long under arrest was tried by court-martial. The finding of this court was never published,[1] and so he remained without even a chance of defence which the verdict might have given him. To appreciate the brutality of this action we should remember that until the battle of Perryville Buell's conduct had been admirable. By his swift march to Shiloh he saved Grant's army from utter destruction. He was not responsible for the condition of the Federal campaign when Kirby Smith and Bragg entered Kentucky from the east. The neglect of the situation had been evident ever since the battle of Shiloh. The action at Perryville, though a surprise to Buell, was an accident. The issue of the fight was as good as in the greater battles of Antietam and Gettysburg, for after both those contests the Confederates made an unhindered retreat. When Buell marched from Louisville to try the issue of battle with Bragg every reasonable critic would have been willing to compromise for the results which were won by the Perryville engagement. Much has been said of Buell's failure to pursue after that fight. Under the conditions a vigorous pursuit would have meant forced marches, by men who were already weary, over wet clay roads so far apart that the columns could not have been kept within good supporting distance and with the enemy's army well in hand and perhaps

[1] All the proceedings have at last been published in 22 W. R.

ready to strike a blow as swift and crushing as that they delivered in their assault at Perryville. If Buell had been defeated near Danville or Lancaster his army would have been in a most serious position. It was clearly his duty to move with care and to risk the chance which he thereby afforded his enemy of making good his retreat rather than to afford him an opportunity of giving battle under advantageous circumstances.

In the course of his retreat Bragg passed through a country which had been entirely stripped of provisions. His own army was well fed by his own trains, while that of Buell had to be supplied by wagons moving over muddy roads from Louisville. Under these conditions it is not surprising that the Confederate commander made good his retreat with no more fighting than a few skirmishes with his rear guard.

We cannot resist the conclusion that, so far as Buell's work is concerned, the campaign was one of the best conducted of our Civil War.

VI

RECOLLECTIONS OF THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN OF 1862

BY

CAPTAIN EPHRAIM A. OTIS[1]

Read before the Society March 3, 1903

[1] The writer was assistant adjutant-general on the staff of General Van Cleve, commander of division, in the campaign. — Ed.

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RECOLLECTIONS OF THE KENTUCKY CAMPAIGN OF 1862

In the spring and early summer of 1862 the Civil War in the West seemed to be rapidly approaching a conclusion. The advance up the Cumberland, followed by the capture of Fort Donelson and the surrender of the Confederate army by Buckner to General Grant, was quickly followed by the occupation of all Middle Tennessee, and opened the way to further movements up the Tennessee River into the heart of the Confederacy. Early in March, 1862, the Federal gunboats reached Florence in North Alabama. The army of General Grant followed soon afterwards, and was placed in camp a few miles from Northeastern Mississippi, at a deserted landing on the Tennessee River known as Pittsburg Landing, which has since become familiar to history as the battle-field of Shiloh.

At the conclusion of the fierce and desperate battle at that place on the 6th and 7th of April, 1862, the Confederate forces, under Beauregard, were driven back to Corinth, Mississippi, twenty miles distant, with a loss of one third their number, including their commander, Albert Sidney Johnston, who was killed on the field the first day of the battle. Four days later General Halleck arrived and took command of the entire Union forces, composed of the Army of the Tennessee, under General Grant, and the Army of the Ohio, commanded by General D. C. Buell. The army corps under the command of General John Pope was brought from Island Number 10, on the Mississippi River, a short distance above Memphis, and by the 20th of April Halleck had concentrated an army of over 100,000 men, nearly all veteran troops, flushed with successive victories and easily supplied

from a secure base on the Tennessee River. To oppose this magnificent army, Beauregard had a force not exceeding 50,000 men, after all available reënforcements arrived, located at Corinth, and dispirited by defeat. It took some months for the army to recover from its terrible losses at Shiloh. Perhaps at no time during the war were so great opportunities offered to win a decisive battle as were now presented to Halleck, and never were such chances so neglected. His advance on Corinth was cautious and deliberate to the last degree; defensive works were thrown up at the end of every day's march, and it seemed as if every effort was made to avoid, rather than bring on, a battle which would almost certainly have resulted in favor of the Union army. Although Corinth was only twenty miles from Pittsburg Landing, it took Halleck nearly four weeks to place his army in front of the enemy, and before any investment was completed, Beauregard retreated with his entire force to the little town of Tupelo in Central Mississippi.

The pursuit was neither vigorous nor effective, and the entire Confederate army, which could have been easily destroyed, escaped without loss of men or material. The town of Corinth was not strongly fortified, and it is now known, as many at the time believed, that there was not a day during the last month of the siege when Halleck could not have carried it by assault and probably destroyed the opposing army without serious loss. The place turned out to be of comparatively little value to either side after its capture, and might safely have been abandoned after destruction of the lines of railroad which constituted its only strategic importance. At this time East Tennessee was held by a Confederate force under General Kirby Smith, consisting of about 10,000 men stationed near Knoxville. Memphis was surrendered a few days after the fall of Corinth, and nowhere west of Virginia was there a force of the enemy which could stand for a single day before the magnificent army which Halleck

had collected in Northern Mississippi in May, 1862. With Memphis and New Orleans in our possession, the Mississippi River was practically open, for Vicksburg and Port Hudson were not then strongly fortified, and it is not surprising that the war was looked upon as nearly ended. If our army operations had been prosecuted with the same vigor and energy that was shown two years later, the "March to the Sea" might have been made by Halleck or Buell in the summer of 1862. Though General Halleck may have been familiar with the theory of war, he was shown to be wholly unsuited to command an army in the field, and his only campaign turned out to be a disastrous failure.

Early in 1862, Cumberland Gap at the southeastern corner of Kentucky, the gateway to East Tennessee, had been taken and was held by a division of Buell's army under Morgan, who was ready to advance upon Knoxville, and cut the East Tennessee and Virginia Railroad. Another division, commanded by General O. M. Mitchell, held Nashville and all Middle Tennessee and North Alabama, with the connecting lines of railway to the Ohio River. General Mitchell was an active, vigilant, and aggressive officer, widely and favorably known as a distinguished astronomer and scientist, and his early death by disease in the summer of 1862 cut short a military career which would doubtless have been a brilliant one. Early in May one brigade of his division under General Negley moved on Chattanooga and could easily have captured it if there had been any means of crossing the Tennessee River. A year later the Army of the Cumberland, in the advance to Chickamauga, found no difficulty in crossing it at several points without serious delay or difficulty. There can be little doubt that if Negley had persisted in his attack, or been properly supported, Chattanooga might have been taken, and the whole course of the war in the West would have been changed. The importance of Chattanooga from a military point of view was perhaps not fully appreciated at the time; it was left

practically defenceless by the enemy, while the attacking force made no vigorous effort to capture and hold it, beyond a harmless cannonading from the north side of the Tennessee River. The following year its possession cost us the terrible battles of Stone River and Chickamauga, and it was then regarded of such vital importance that Grant's first order to Thomas, after assuming command of the military division of the Mississippi, in November, 1863, was, "Hold Chattanooga at all hazards," and the characteristic reply was promptly given, "We will hold the town until we starve."

On the 10th of June, 1862, the old "Army of the Cumberland," then known as the "Army of the Ohio," about 30,000 strong, was stationed near Corinth, and on that day its columns were faced eastward, and the long march of the summer of 1862 began, which was not to end until that army had again reached the banks of the Ohio and rescued Louisville and Cincinnati from capture.

Buell's movement contemplated an immediate march upon Chattanooga and the permanent occupation of East Tennessee. The people of that section had given such distinguished evidences of loyalty to the Government that, for political as well as military reasons, it was of the utmost importance that it should be permanently occupied and held by our forces. Chattanooga is about 200 miles directly east of Corinth and close to the point where the state lines of Tennessee, Alabama, and Georgia meet. It could easily have been reached without forced marches or special effort long before it would have been possible for the enemy to gather up his scattered forces in Mississippi and place them in our front. There was certainly no haste in the movement of Buell's army, and many who took part in it will recall the leisurely march across North Alabama and up the beautiful valley of the Tennessee River in the summer of 1862. It was like holiday soldiering. The march usually began at the earliest dawn of day and ended by ten o'clock in the morning. There was no enemy

to oppose its operations except a few scattering bands of guerrillas. The country, formerly devoted to the cultivation of cotton, was now one vast cornfield, and we left growing in the fields the supplies which fed Bragg's army for a year afterwards. The vigorous conscription laws had forced nearly every man of suitable age into the rebel army, and the plantations seemed deserted by all but the women and the slaves. Almost every household was in mourning for some of its members killed at Shiloh. It was George W. Cable, I think, who stated that the people in the Southwest "never smiled after Shiloh," as long as the war lasted.

It was during this march up the valley of the Tennessee River that General Robert L. McCook of Ohio, a gallant and distinguished officer, was killed by guerrillas. It created great excitement at the time, but the circumstances are now nearly forgotten. McCook was riding in an ambulance, quite ill, a little in advance of his command, accompanied only by an aide and one or two orderlies. While in this situation he was suddenly attacked by a band of guerrillas under the command of Captain Frank Gurley, who had not been mustered into the Confederate service. Colonel Hunter Brooke, McCook's aide, and the orderlies were captured, but General McCook himself was shot through the body and almost instantly killed, lying helpless in the ambulance, after he and his escort had surrendered. His body was soon recovered, but the sword, which had just been presented to him, was carried off by Captain Gurley, who easily escaped pursuit. The following year Gurley was taken prisoner in the advance on Chickamauga, and was afterwards placed on trial before a military commission for the murder of General McCook. After a fair trial, conducted under all the forms of law, Gurley was found guilty and sentenced to death. The proceedings of the court were duly approved, but no order was given to carry them into effect until the end of the war, when Gurley, who, by some accident had been released, was again arrested, and in

September, 1865, General Thomas was ordered to carry the sentence into execution. The war was now over and at the request of prominent men on both sides, including the surviving relatives of General McCook, Gurley received a pardon. Some years afterward Gurley was elected sheriff of his county, and while holding that office made the acquaintance of a Northern lawyer who was a close friend of McCook's brother, and through him Gurley sent back to the family the sword which he had taken from General McCook's body at the time he was killed.

General McCook belonged to the well-known McCook family of Ohio, many of whom were killed in battle during the war. He organized the famous Ninth Ohio Regiment, composed wholly of Germans, by whom he was greatly beloved, and commanded a brigade under General Thomas at the battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky, where he rendered gallant and distinguished services. His early death was deeply lamented by all who knew him, and the circumstances under which it occurred created great indignation in his command. It is safe to say that if Captain Gurley had been captured at the time by McCook's old regiment there would have been no necessity for trial by a military commission.

The slow movement of the army during the summer of 1862 was the cause of great dissatisfaction to the authorities at Washington, and repeated telegrams from Mr. Lincoln and General Halleck were sent to Buell, urging the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and the relief of the oppressed Union people of that region from rebel conscription. General Buell, however, insisted that the railroads from Nashville must be kept open and supplies accumulated before any forward movement could be safely made. At this time Buell had over 50,000 veteran troops south of the Cumberland River, and was in easy communication with Nashville, from which city two lines of railroad led direct to Chattanooga. His army could easily be supplied over these roads which, in 1864,

were shown to be amply sufficient for the great army with which Sherman conducted the Atlanta campaign. Two divisions of Buell's army under McCook and Crittenden reached Battle Creek, a short distance from Chattanooga, on the opposite side of the Tennessee, about the 15th of July, 1862. At that time Chattanooga was defended by McCown's division, not exceeding 3000 in number. Boats could have been constructed, or procured, for crossing the river, and I am satisfied Chattanooga could have been taken and held by the Union army long before the Confederate reënforcements could have been brought from Mississippi. But the troops of McCook and Crittenden remained quietly in camp at Battle Creek until nearly the end of August without making a single offensive movement or firing a hostile shot. By this time the Confederate army of Beauregard had been reorganized, its ranks filled with conscripts, and a strong force under General Bragg had moved from Mississippi to Chattanooga prepared not only to resist an advance but to take the offensive. It is now known that Bragg brought with him an army not exceeding 30,000 men, which was concentrated at Chattanooga about the 20th of August, and prepared for the Kentucky campaign.

The delay in the movements of Buell in the summer of 1862 probably prolonged the war at least a whole year, and his movement for the capture of Chattanooga and the relief of East Tennessee ended in complete failure. The question whether Buell or General Halleck was responsible for this result has never yet been definitely decided. My own opinion, based on personal experience in the field, and upon everything that has been published since, is, that General Buell is largely responsible for this great disaster. I am aware that many military critics have reached a different conclusion. Mr. John Fiske, in "The Mississippi Valley in the Civil War," puts this responsibility upon General Halleck. Although his opinion is entitled to the highest consideration, Mr. Fiske forgets that Halleck was ordered to Washington early in July,

1862, as General-in-Chief, and certainly after that time gave only general direction to the armies in Tennessee. Buell had immediate command of the army in the field. His objective point was the capture of Chattanooga and the relief of East Tennessee, and he was given the absolute right to exercise his own discretion in regard to lines of supply and the movements of his troops. Although what is known as the Buell Commission in 1863 excused this delay on the ground that Halleck ordered the Memphis and Charleston Railroad, which ran parallel with the line of march, to be kept in repair, yet General Halleck in his review of the proceedings denied that this was true, and asserts:

"General Buell was not delayed an hour beyond what he himself deemed necessary to secure his supplies. Moreover, his lines of supply were those which he himself selected. Indeed, there were no others from which to select. The fault, here as elsewhere, was having too large supply-trains, and in not living more upon the country. He was frequently urged to subsist his troops in this manner."[1]

He could have reached and captured Chattanooga without a battle by the middle of July, long before the Confederate reënforcements from Mississippi could possibly have arrived. Buell left Corinth on the 10th of June under orders to repair the railroad, but on the 30th, after his army was well advanced up the valley of the Tennessee River, these orders were recalled and he was given the widest discretion in regard to the manner by which his army was to be supplied and his operations conducted. It is probable that Buell did not have that highly picturesque idea of war entertained by General Sherman; he was reluctant to live upon the country, as Halleck directed him to do. If Sherman had insisted on keeping open communications with his base of supplies, the march to the sea would never have been made. Grant did not hesitate to cut loose from his communications and place his entire army on the

[1] 22 W. R. 12.

east side of the Mississippi, below Vicksburg, in a campaign which resulted in its surrender and the capture of the whole Confederate army under Pemberton. In both these movements the army lived on the country, which furnished abundant supplies. It seems to me that General Buell cannot escape from the responsibility of his position as the immediate commander of an army in the field. He could have supplied his army as easily in Chattanooga as in Battle Creek Valley on the north side of the Tennessee, and kept his own lines of communication open by seizing those of the enemy. The opportunity to recover Chattanooga and East Tennessee without a battle was lost by Buell's delay, which I have always believed might have been avoided by the exercise of greater energy and vigor.

While the army of the Ohio was slowly moving eastward Bragg and Kirby Smith united in a plan for the invasion of Kentucky. Kirby Smith was to move from Knoxville and Bragg from Chattanooga, cross the mountains in their front, and march into and unite their forces in Central Kentucky. There were political reasons in favor of this movement, for a large portion of the population of that state sympathized with the South, and it was confidently hoped that the borders of the new confederacy might be extended to the Ohio, and Kentucky, like Virginia, made a battle-ground of the great Civil War.

The configuration of the country in which this campaign was to be conducted, with mountain ranges running through Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, which could only be crossed at gaps or passes few in number and difficult of access, made the movement bold and hazardous in the extreme.

Encouraged by victories on the Potomac, the new plan for invasion was soon put into execution. The vast cornfields could furnish the commissariat, and the famous blue-grass region of Kentucky was filled with everything needed to supply the wants of an invading army. About the middle of August the

column under Kirby Smith, over 12,000 strong, pushed across the mountains, leaving the Union forces commanded by General Morgan at Cumberland Gap in its rear and flank, and after defeating an inferior force of raw troops at Richmond, under Nelson, near the foot of the mountains, moved through Central Kentucky and placed Cincinnati in a state of siege. Kirby Smith's part of the programme had been performed with vigor and success; but that of Bragg was more difficult, for he could only reach Kentucky by crossing the mountains opposite Chattanooga, and moving directly past the front of Buell's army, which was superior to his own. He advanced over the Tennessee River on the 24th of August, 1862, and began crossing the rugged summits of Walden's Ridge, into the Sequatchie Valley and thence over the Cumberland range beyond, where the army of Buell, now fairly concentrated and well in hand, was watching his movements. Buell was regarded as an able leader; he had won distinction in the war with Mexico, and the soldierly conduct of his army at Shiloh gave proof of his qualities as an organizer and disciplinarian. Upon the first reports of invasion he ordered General George H. Thomas, then, as ever, one of the trusted leaders in the Army of the Cumberland, to proceed to McMinnville, in Tennessee, situated just at the foot of the mountains, north of and opposite Chattanooga, and take command of all the forces in that vicinity. Thomas immediately made the necessary preparations not only to defend his post from attack, but to use it as a base from which to force Bragg to give battle just as he was descending the mountains. It would be difficult to select a place which combined so many advantages for the purpose. McMinnville was in easy communication with Nashville by excellent roads, and Buell's army concentrated there could be moved to any point that might be necessary to attack Bragg as he was descending the mountains, where he could be placed at great disadvantage. A defeat of Bragg, under such circumstances, involved capture of trains and

artillery and practically the destruction of his command. General Thomas strongly advised that the army be concentrated and that Bragg should be forced to a battle without hesitation or delay. On the 22d of August he sent General Buell a dispatch from McMinnville, which read as follows:

Major-General Buell, Decherd:

By all means concentrate here. The enemy cannot reach Nashville by any other route across the mountains unless by Sparta. At Altamont I am positively informed that the enemy would have an equal advantage with ourselves. Here we will have a most decided advantage, and by being here, should he march by Sparta, we can meet him either there or at Allen's Ford, across Caney Fork. He is obliged to pass this place or Sparta to reach Nashville. I have six days' rations and plenty of ammunition. Did you get my dispatch of to-day? I cannot think that Bragg is coming here either by the Hill or Therman Road. My reconnoitring party went into Dunlap yesterday.

GEO. H. THOMAS,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.[1]

General Thomas has since stated that he had carefully studied the topography of the country, and was convinced that if his advice had been followed, and Bragg had been brought to battle at this point, the result would have been a complete victory for the Union forces, and the Kentucky campaign would have been ended. Bragg did not have over 30,000 men, while Buell could easily have concentrated a superior force of veteran troops, having the advantage of position. It was well known that two divisions from Grant were then marching rapidly to join Buell, which would fully protect his communications and give him a decided superiority in numbers.

[1] 22 W. R. 42; 23 W. R. 392.

The Buell Commission in 1863 examined many of the leading generals who took part in the campaign, and, after a careful investigation of all the facts, reported that General Buell could easily have prevented the recapture of Nashville and the invasion of Kentucky. The report states:

"This he could have done, in our opinion, by an early concentration of his army at Sparta, McMinnville, or Murfreesboro, with a view to active offensive operations against Bragg the moment he debouched from the Sequatchie Valley. Instead of that, he waited until the 5th of September before concentrating at Murfreesboro, from which he retired to Nashville, thereby allowing Bragg to cross the Cumberland River without interruption. The Commission cannot justify the falling back from Murfreesboro to Nashville, but is of opinion that it was General Buell's duty from that point to have attacked the rebel army before it crossed the Cumberland, and it is the belief that had that course been pursued Bragg would have been defeated."[1]

This, I think, will be accepted as the final verdict. The invasion of Kentucky in 1862 and the recapture by the enemy of substantially all Middle Tennessee and North Alabama resulted from the failure on the part of General Buell to discharge the duty which was imposed upon him as the commander of the army. Buell in many respects was like McClellan; he could organize and discipline an army, but, like McClellan, he greatly exaggerated the numbers of the army opposed to him. He was led to believe Bragg's army greatly exceeded his own. Bragg's morning report for August 27, 1862, shows an effective present of 27,320. Buell at this time had an army of more than 50,000 veteran troops south of the Cumberland River, with heavy reënforcements from Corinth marching to his assistance within supporting distance. The failure of Buell to give battle at this time was one of the most serious and disastrous mistakes of the war.

[1] 22 W. R. 9.

It was probably the original intention of General Buell to concentrate his army, as Thomas advised, and attack Bragg the moment he crossed the mountains.

The army was kept well in hand, great vigilance was used, and all the preparations for a battle were made, but at the last moment, instead of placing his army across the road to Kentucky, prepared for battle, the orders were issued to fall back to Murfreesboro, and thence to Nashville, leaving the road to Kentucky open and unobstructed. There had been dissatisfaction at Buell's delay, and the authorities were not in accord with his policy in protecting private property even to the return of fugitive slaves to their masters, and the failure to give battle to Bragg, at this time and place, confirmed President Lincoln in the belief that there must soon be a change in the command. The only reason assigned by General Buell for his action was that raids were being made on his communications with Nashville and Louisville, making it difficult to accumulate supplies for his army. That army could, however, easily have been supplied in the rich valleys of Middle Tennessee and North Alabama, which had not yet been occupied by hostile armies. A victory over the enemy in front usually insures the safety of lines of communication in the rear. On the 2d of September, 1862, Buell telegraphed to Halleck his resolution to abandon the whole country below Nashville, and move rapidly upon the enemy in Kentucky, and to open and hold the line of railroad to Louisville which had been broken in several places by the rebel raiders. Halleck's reply on the same day is characteristic and reads as follows:

Major-General Buell, Nashville, Tennessee.

March where you please, provided you will find the enemy and fight him.

H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.[1]

[1] 23 W. R. 471.

When Buell moved out of Bragg's road and fell back towards Nashville, the route to Kentucky was open and unobstructed, and the rebel columns moved straight north in the direction of Glasgow, close to the Kentucky line, while the army of Buell, at the same time, moved by equally rapid marches about forty miles west, and upon a route almost exactly parallel to that of Bragg, along the railroad between Nashville and Louisville towards Bowling Green, Kentucky. The leisurely movements from Corinth eastward, in the early summer, were in sharp contrast to the forced marches that were now made. It was a race for Louisville, which was liable to fall into the possession of the army that first reached it.

Bragg reached Glasgow on the line of Southern Kentucky about the same time that Buell arrived at Bowling Green, some twenty miles to the west. A short distance in front, the roads taken by each army united, and the race on parallel lines must be abandoned. Bragg halted his columns a day or two, while Buell hurried forward Thomas, who had been left at Nashville, and delayed an advance until he could join him. I think there was a strong feeling in the army that the presence and councils of Thomas were desired before battle should be actually delivered. Apparently any forward movement by either army must result in bringing on a collision, but a decisive battle at this time was evidently not desired by either of the leaders. Bragg wished to unite with Kirby Smith, who was now in Kentucky, while Buell wished to meet his reënforcements at Louisville, and not fight until his rear was secure. The two armies faced each other for a day or two, but when Thomas came up Buell decided to delay no longer but to move north, and if necessary bring on a battle. The familiar preparations were hurriedly completed, the trains sent to the rear, the ammunition-wagons to the front, and the army advanced towards Louisville prepared for action. The town of Mumfordville, garrisoned by some 4000 men, was situated on Green

River, a few miles beyond the point where the two roads united on which Buell and Bragg were moving, and as the army approached the junction of these two roads, the intelligence was received that Bragg had started first and was now directly in our front and between Buell and Mumfordville. Colonel John T. Wilder, of Indiana, a brave and accomplished officer, had been placed in command at this place with orders to hold it to the last, but, after having made a gallant defence, was finally surrounded by Bragg's whole army, and forced to surrender his command as prisoners of war. It has always seemed to me that Wilder might have been relieved without serious difficulty. It is part of our history that Buell's army remained in camp less than twenty miles away for two whole days, and permitted Wilder to be surrounded by overwhelming numbers. One of the results of Buell's deliberate movement was the receipt of 4000 paroled prisoners captured with Wilder, who were sent back to help consume the rather scanty supplies and embarrass our advance. Bragg was now between Buell and Louisville, but did not stop to give battle. His army was put in motion up the road, north, towards Louisville, just as our advance came in sight. Buell followed along in his rear, and, day after day, our advanced guard was constantly in sight of Bragg's rear guard. There was steady skirmishing, but evidently no prospect of a battle. Bragg kept his army well in hand, the stragglers and deserters were few, and his forces managed to keep just out of our reach. Finally, when we had gotten within about twenty-five miles of Louisville, the dusty, beaten road taken by the rebels turned to the east, and their rear guard was no longer ahead of us. Bragg moved out of our way to unite with Kirby Smith, who had been in Kentucky for nearly two weeks, and our road to Louisville was now unobstructed.

We learn from the War Records that on the 22d of September Buell sent a dispatch from Mumfordville to Nelson, then in command at Louisville, advising him under no cir-

cumstances to resist an attack by Bragg, but to abandon the city and move his entire forces down the Ohio, and join Buell's army at the mouth of Salt River, about thirty miles distant. Fortunately no occasion arose for carrying this order into execution. Louisville was the principal city of Kentucky, the chief depot of supplies, and the base of the Army of the Ohio. Its abandonment, or capture by the enemy, would have been a great disaster, second only to the capture of Washington by Lee. Nelson did not share in Buell's fear for its safety, and vigorous energetic measures were taken to resist to the last extremity. With Buell pressing upon Bragg's rear an attack on Louisville would probably have resulted in the destruction of the Confederate army. Doubt, timidity, and hesitation, it seems to me, paralyzed every movement of Buell from the day the retreat from North Alabama began until Louisville was reached.

Buell concentrated his army around Louisville about the 25th of September, 1862. Our communications were at least secure, but the movement northward had brought the army back from the banks of the Tennessee to the banks of the Ohio, and had uncovered the whole country south of us, where we held only Nashville, then closely besieged. It seemed as if all we had gained, so far, had been lost. Bragg, in his official report, truthfully states that the advance of his army gave him possession of all North Alabama, Middle Tennessee, and Kentucky, without firing a shot.

At Louisville, Buell's army was reënforced by the new levies of 1862, a new regiment being added to each of the old brigades, and vigorous preparations were made to drive the enemy from Kentucky. In the interval Bragg had united his forces with Kirby Smith, and, with the reënforcements which had joined him, had concentrated an army numbering about 50,000 men, flushed with success and prepared to make a desperate fight to hold Central Kentucky, and keep the war away from the homes and firesides of the far South. A rebel

state government was put into operation in Kentucky, a governor elected, and all the forms enacted of secession of the state and joining the fortunes of the Confederacy. Shortly before this time Lee's army had invaded Maryland, and at no period of the war was the outlook more discouraging. A vigorous and decisive campaign was imperatively demanded in Kentucky, but it was necessary that it should be conducted with prudence as well as energy, for the army Bragg now commanded was the most powerful of any in the Confederacy, except that commanded by Lee.

The interval of preparation was a short one, but during it there occurred one of the most tragic episodes of the whole war, and about which so little has been said or written that the event has almost dropped out of history. This was the personal encounter which resulted in the death of Major-General Nelson, a brave and distinguished officer, at the hands of General Jeff. C. Davis. Nelson was an officer in the old navy, and had spent the years of his early manhood on the quarterdeck of a man-of-war, where a more rigid discipline was enforced than was practicable in our volunteer army. He was a native of Kentucky, and at the commencement of the war was among the very first to apply to Mr. Lincoln for permission to raise a brigade of troops in his native state. This brigade grew into a division, which Nelson had organized and led in the battle of Shiloh, where it won justly merited credit and distinction. It was a brigade of Nelson's division, commanded by General Jacob Ammen, that crossed the river late on the afternoon of the first day's fight at Shiloh, and, moving on the field as steadily as if on parade, helped repulse the last rebel assault. Nelson was a martinet in matters of detail, brave and impulsive, but a man of strong passions which he did not attempt to control. He was greatly beloved by the soldiers, but his conduct towards his subordinate officers was brusque and often tyrannical and overbearing. Nelson had been sent back to Kentucky by Buell to

oppose Kirby Smith, and was in command at Louisville when the army arrived. General Jeff. C. Davis, whose division was en route with Buell, had reported for temporary duty to Nelson pending its arrival, and was placed in charge of a miscellaneous command of employees, home guards, and convalescents. General Nelson took great offence because Davis, when making a requisition for arms, was unable to give the exact number of men in his command as required by army regulations, and treated him with gross indignity and insult. In the controversy which followed, he ordered Davis out of his Department, and accompanied it with violent and abusive language, and threats of arrest and imprisonment if he ventured to return. Davis was a regular army officer, a native of Indiana, and as brave and ambitious as Nelson. He had already served with distinction under Curtis in Arkansas and Missouri, and the insult he had received at the hands of Nelson was something that could not be permitted. When Buell arrived at Louisville Davis came back from Cincinnati, and again assumed command of his division. He insisted that Nelson should apologize for his conduct, and accompanied by Governor Morton and other Indiana friends, he called at the Galt House, in Louisville, where Nelson was staying, and approaching him in the corridor of the hotel, reminded him of the former interview, and respectfully but firmly insisted upon an apology. Nelson, who had never learned to exercise the slightest control over his wayward, passionate temper, instead of meeting Davis' request with dignity or consideration, turned away in a most contemptuous manner with the remark, "Oh, go away, you d—d coward," accompanying it by a blow on the face. Davis, furious with rage, stepped back with the remark, "I will see you again, sir," walked across the room to a friend, Colonel T. Weir Gibson, under whom he had served in the Mexican War, and to whom he owed his commission in the regular army, borrowed a pistol, and again approached Nelson, who was then standing near the stairs leading to his

room on the floor above. Davis called out as he came up, "General Nelson, take care of yourself," levelled the pistol, and fired. Nelson fell to the floor shot through the body and mortally wounded. He was carried upstairs to his room, medical attendance was immediately procured, but the bullet had done its work, and he died that night. Davis went back to his division, which he subsequently led in battle in the most gallant manner in all the campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland, was promoted to be major-general, and at the close of the war commanded the old 14th Army Corps. He never ceased to regret this unfortunate occurrence to the close of his life.

The intelligence of the death of Nelson at the hands of Davis was not wholly unexpected. His furious and habitual outbursts of passion and uncontrolled and uncontrollable temper had often been discussed around the camp-fires, and many believed that sooner or later Nelson would be killed by some one whom he had insulted. No official notice was taken of the killing of Nelson beyond the announcement of his death in general orders, which omitted all reference to the circumstances under which it occurred, nor was General Davis relieved from his command or tried by any military court. The grand jury of Louisville did bring in an indictment for manslaughter at the following term of court, but there was no arrest or trial and the case was stricken from the docket shortly afterwards, but never finally dismissed until several years after the war.

The day after Nelson was killed another event occurred which was destined to have a wide influence on the fortunes of the Army of the Cumberland. Neither President Lincoln nor General Halleck was satisfied with the tardy movements of Buell at the commencement of the campaign or his conduct during its progress. It is safe to say that this want of confidence was greatly increased because Buell fell back from McMinnville, instead of giving battle at the time as Thomas

so strongly advised. It was felt by prominent men, in the army and out of it, that there should be a change in the command. The Governors of Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana were also unanimous in asking the President to remove Buell and appoint some other general from his army in his place. With the rank and file Buell was unpopular in the extreme. He had utterly lost the confidence of his army, many of whom doubted his loyalty, and all agreed in denouncing his official conduct which had resulted in such disasters.

Halleck had kept the change in abeyance, but when Buell had got back to Louisville with his army, without a battle, Colonel Joseph McKibben was sent to Halleck with an order removing Buell and placing General George H. Thomas in command of the army in his place. Colonel McKibben was directed to proceed at once to the army, ascertain the opinion of its prominent officers, and deliver the orders for the change of commanders, if, in his judgment, it was advisable to do so. One day with the army satisfied McKibben that the change was necessary, and the orders of the Secretary of War were formally handed to General Buell and General Thomas, by which the former was relieved from the command of the army and the latter assigned to his place. Buell's plans were then perfected and the preparations complete for a movement against Bragg the next day. Thomas knew this and also knew that a change in the command must involve some delay. It would be impossible for him to conduct a campaign planned by Buell, with the details of which he was not wholly familiar. It is not unlikely that Thomas felt a soldier's generous sense of honor towards his old commander and was desirous that one more opportunity should be given Buell to redeem himself from the sharp criticism to which he had been subjected. He immediately telegraphed Halleck as follows:

"Colonel McKibben handed me your dispatch placing me in command of this department. General Buell's preparations

have been completed to move against the enemy, and I therefore respectfully ask that he be retained in command. My position is very embarrassing, not being as well informed as I should be as the commander of this army and on the assumption of such responsibility."[1]

There are few instances in the history of the war where the command of an army was declined at the opening of an important campaign. General Thomas did not distrust his own ability for such a position, but realized that its acceptance would necessarily involve more delay in attacking the enemy, while there had been too much delay already. His action was, however, a source of regret in the army, where his distinguished services and wide experience fully entitled him to the position. It was perhaps better for Thomas that he took the course he did take, for no one can now claim that his conduct towards General Buell was not manly, disinterested, and generous. A year later the command of the army came to him under circumstances when its acceptance was an absolute duty.

On the first day of October, 1862, Buell's fine army, over 60,000 in number, fully equipped and reorganized, moved out of Louisville to drive Bragg from Kentucky. It was apparent that energy had finally taken the place of hesitation, and the different columns moved on parallel roads straight at the main force of the enemy, then at Bardstown, about forty miles distant, and it seemed as if Buell was determined to show that the confidence of the President, evidenced by restoring him to his command, was not misplaced. The army was divided into three corps, commanded by McCook, Crittenden, and Gilbert, with Thomas second in command. Buell's army was superior in numbers, and consisted largely of veterans from Shiloh and Donelson. Bragg was evidently unprepared for the prompt movement of Buell, and was at Frankfort, the capital, with a considerable portion of his army, inaugurating a Confederate governor for

[1] 23 W. R. 555.

Kentucky, the very day Buell made the advance. The latter thus acquired the advantage of position, and pushed his columns in the direction of Bardstown upon the main body of the enemy, which fell back to Perryville on the 7th day of October, closely followed by Gilbert on the direct road, McCook on the left, and Crittenden on the right. The details of the battle of Perryville on the 8th of October, 1862, are well known. It began with a fierce attack made on the left, commanded by McCook, by a superior force of the enemy, which lasted from two in the afternoon until after dark, while on the right, more than half of Buell's army, formed in line of battle, did not know that a battle was in progress. Buell had intended to attack, himself, at daylight that morning, and the orders were issued for the three corps to be in position by the dawn of day. The movement was, however, unavoidably delayed by a scarcity of water, and Buell, instead of bringing on the battle at once, decided not to do so until the following day. McCook made no report of the assault on his lines until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, and the configuration of the ground and direction of the wind were such that the roar of battle was mistaken for a sharp skirmish fire, with which we were daily familiar. It was certainly remarkable that a furious battle, in which three of the eight divisions of the army were fighting a superior force from 2 o'clock until dark should not be known three miles away; but this was undoubtedly the fact. The first gun at Shiloh was distinctly heard twenty-eight miles from the battle-field, and at Stone River the firing was heard at McMinnville, over forty miles distant. The reason why the artillery at Perryville was not heard must be left for science to explain, but the fact is well authenticated, and had a controlling influence on the result of the battle. Buell was in ignorance that a battle was going on until after 4 P.M., when the first intelligence of the assault on McCook reached him. For this it would seem as if both were to some extent

responsible. It was certainly Buell's duty to have learned that a battle was raging, either by personal observation[1] or through his staff, and McCook should have promptly reported it to him. If Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan had been in command of the army, it is difficult to believe they would have remained ignorant of the fact that a fierce battle was going on less than three miles away. Once during the afternoon Buell is reported to have listened for a moment in front of his tent to the dull rattling of musketry and remarked rather impatiently "that the skirmishers were wasting entirely too much ammunition." When the news did reach him, orders were given for an advance of the right, and the reënforcement of McCook's corps, but before any efficient measures could be taken the early darkness closed the battle. With it ended Buell's opportunity to have destroyed Bragg's army. The rebel forces were divided, while ours were concentrated, well in hand, and only needed an order of advance to have achieved complete success. Sheridan, impatient of the delay, actually pushed a brigade forward into Perryville until it was fairly in rear of the rebel lines, when he was ordered back to his original place. McCook, who was sharply criticised by Buell for not reporting the facts earlier, lost heavily; one division commander, General James S. Jackson, and two of the generals of brigade, Terrell and Webster, were killed at the head of their commands.

When Buell advanced at daylight the next morning the enemy had fallen back, leaving the dead unburied and the wounded in our hands. For the number engaged, the losses were exceptionally heavy, the casualties being about 4000 on each side. Some particular regiments suffered severely. The three field officers of the 15th Kentucky were killed within the first half-hour, and one color-bearer after another was shot down in rapid succession, until the senior surviving cap-

[1] Colonel Stone states (*post*, p. 284) that General Buell was disabled during the day as the result of a fall. — Ed.

tain tore the flag from the staff, shattered by bullets, tied it across his shoulders, and led his command into action.

On the rebel side, the famous Rock City Guards, from Nashville, were nearly annihilated. There was practically no pursuit of the enemy after the battle, but Buell slowly and cautiously renewed the offensive. The two armies faced each other for several days, until Bragg determined to retreat, and all night long the gray lines that had faced us the evening before were on their silent march for the mountains, which covered them as easily as the crags of Scotland did the followers of Roderick Dhu. Buell ordered a vigorous pursuit, which ended at the crossing of Rock Castle River, near Wild Cat Mountain, from which unbroken ranges of mountains stretched away to the Valley of the Tennessee for hundreds of miles. The retreat of Bragg without a decisive battle was sharply criticised by Confederate authorities, and his act bitterly denounced as a surrender of all that had been gained by previous bold, skilful, and successful operations. General Basil Duke, of Kentucky, ascribes to this retreat of Bragg the beginning of the downfall of the Confederate army in the West, and a blow from which it never recovered. It seems to me that General Duke was mistaken, and that from the Confederate standpoint the invasion of Kentucky was a military success. Bragg recovered possession of all North Alabama, Middle Tennessee, and Central Kentucky without firing a shot, and accumulated vast quantities of supplies and material which were safely carried away. It took the Army of the Cumberland a year to recover the position in front of Chattanooga which it occupied when Bragg opened the campaign. His entire army was withdrawn in the face of superior numbers without loss of men or material.

Halleck and the authorities at Washington were greatly disappointed that Bragg should escape without a decisive battle, and peremptory instructions were given to follow him across the mountains and relieve East Tennessee. President



Lincoln insisted that Buell's army could march where Bragg's did, and pressed upon Buell the paramount importance of an aggressive campaign to relieve the loyal mountain people of that region, whose patient suffering in the cause of the Union is unsurpassed in all history. Buell, however, determined that the advance should be from Nashville, and the heads of columns were turned west and south, towards Middle Tennessee, as soon as the rebel rear guard disappeared among the Cumberland Mountains. But the authorities at Washington had determined upon a change in the command, and on the 30th of October, 1862, orders were received by General Buell removing him from the command and assigning to that position Major-General Rosecrans. I think there can be no doubt about the necessity and propriety of the removal of General Buell. He had lost the confidence of the army he commanded, as well as of the authorities at Washington, and while he had organized a splendid army, events had proved he could not successfully lead that army in battle or conduct an aggressive campaign. His removal from its command was a military necessity which had been delayed too long. A year later, and at the close of the great battle of Chickamauga, Rosecrans was himself relieved by that noble patriot and soldier, the best loved, the ablest, and most honored of all the commanders of the Army of the Cumberland, Major-General George H. Thomas.

NOTE. — At the time of reading this paper to the Society the writer was not acquainted with Professor Shaler's paper, No. V (*ante*, p. 203), or Colonel Stone's, No. VII (*post*, p. 255). — ED.

VII

THE OPERATIONS OF GENERAL BUELL IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE IN 1862

BY

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Read before the Society November 1, 1892

THE OPERATIONS OF GENERAL BUELL IN KENTUCKY AND TENNESSEE IN 1862

THE Kentucky campaign conducted by General Buell, in the autumn of 1862, has never received the attention its importance, both political and military, amply warrants. At best, it has been but superficially treated by most writers, especially on the Union side. I know of no more astonishing travesty of history than the account of it in Draper's pretentious volumes. The Count of Paris also abounds in errors, but without the unfriendly bias so evident in Draper. Van Horn's work is very incomplete and inadequate. The proceedings of the Commission ordered "to investigate and report upon the operations" of General Buell have been well characterized as seeming "to have had no regard for law or justice"; and its findings, — though in the main they exonerated him from all blame, — it may truly be affirmed, were "founded on misconception or ignorance."

Confederate writers have far more clearly discerned the magnitude of the interests involved, and have treated the subject much more fairly and thoroughly. Their conclusions may be considered as well summed up by Basil Duke, a valiant and active Confederate officer, a careful and painstaking student of military operations, and a competent critic. Writing of it in 1885, General Duke says:

"It can be demonstrated, I think, that upon no effort which the Confederacy made, during its brief existence of constant struggle, did more depend than on the success or failure of Bragg's well-considered but futile attempt to transfer the combat to fields where victories might be of some value, and give hope of final triumph. . . . The promise of substantial and permanent benefit to the Southern cause which a success-

ful consummation of this campaign in Kentucky offered was larger and more certain, I am persuaded, than at Manassas or Gettysburg. . . . A victory in Kentucky would have destroyed the only Federal army in the West on which any reliance could be placed at that time, or which, indeed, then existed. It would have placed our arms impregnably on the Ohio, with Kentucky firmly in their grasp; it would have cleared the South of invaders and brought a vast host of recruits to the Confederate ranks. . . . But with Bragg's retreat the pall fell on the fortunes of the Confederacy."

Attentive observers in Europe also recognized its importance. Thus the *Presse* of Vienna, — one of the leading Continental papers, — in an article transmitted to the State Department at Washington late in 1862 by our Minister to Austria, Mr. Motley, says:

"The invasion of Kentucky — by population, situation, and resources the most important of the border states — would overwhelm the Union party in Tennessee, outflank Missouri, secure Arkansas and Texas, threaten New Orleans, and, above all, transfer the war to Ohio — the central state of the North — the possession of which would subdue the North. A Confederate army in Ohio would cut off the Western from the Eastern states, and would fight the enemy from its own centre."

It was the consummate leadership of General Buell which wrought Bragg's overthrow in Kentucky, and so prevented the direful consequences pictured in the above extracts. The current opinion about this memorable campaign is embraced in a few unconsidered phrases — such as "Bragg's sortie," "Buell's retreat," and the like. But phrases are utterly misleading. If one were to sum up the Gettysburg campaign as "Lee's sortie," or to call the march of the Army of the Potomac into Pennsylvania "Meade's retreat," men would justly resent such impertinent and belittling misrepresentation. Yet Bragg's advance into Kentucky was a much bolder and more far-reaching operation than Lee's into Pennsylvania. At most

Lee only meant to exact tribute, or, by success, gain recognition from foreign countries. Bragg intended to restore Tennessee, and to add Kentucky and Missouri to the Confederacy, and so dominate the whole Mississippi Valley. Buell's pursuit of his enemy into and out of Kentucky, in September and October, 1862, evinced far greater courage, energy, skill, and all the higher military virtues than were shown by the commander of the Potomac army in June and July, 1863.

It seems to be forgotten, also, that Kentucky was as truly a Union state as Pennsylvania. In proportion to population it furnished almost as many soldiers to the Union army; it compelled the resignation of Governor Magoffin, elected in 1859, because of his secession proclivities, and put in his stead a governor as devoted to the good cause as Governor Curtin himself. At the next election, in 1863, the Union candidate for governor — a gallant colonel in the Union army — received 80 per cent of all the votes; while, in Pennsylvania Governor Curtin received only 51.5 per cent. And all this while Kentucky also furnished some 15,000 to 20,000 soldiers to the Confederacy, and was continually tormented with raids and conspiracies. That state has always been of as marked individuality and self-complacency as Massachusetts; and likewise has taken its own way of expressing its opinion. But we must not overlook its most valuable, if not decisive, services to the good cause. If there were any better, more loyal, more devoted soldiers than Jackson, and Sanders, and Curran Pope, and McKee, and Forman — to name only a few who gave up their lives in battle — the army which possessed them was fortunate indeed. "The loss of such men" — well says General Buell — "would be mourned in any army and any cause where true manliness and earnest devotion are appreciated."

The occupation by Halleck, on the 30th of May, 1862, of the insignificant and deserted town of Corinth — the prize for which he had been so painfully contending for more than six

weeks — left that general, apparently, with no plan for the future. He seemed to be at the end of his tether. He had, with infinite labor, collected the largest and best appointed army ever gathered west of the Alleghanies — officered by singularly able and skilful generals. The only three men who, in this century, have held the rank of General of the Army of the United States were there as his subordinates — one with only the rank of captain. The troops themselves — the flower of the whole Mississippi Valley — had all been tried in victorious battle, and had everywhere shown singular capacity, valor, and endurance. The army which Grant afterward brought together at Chattanooga, and which won Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, was substantially the same — changed only in experience and leadership. Properly led, after Shiloh, it could have gone anywhere and done anything within the power of man. Both Vicksburg and Atlanta could surely have been in our possession before the close of 1862. The march from Corinth to Jackson is shorter and easier than that from Corinth to Chattanooga.

Beauregard's force, on the 31st of May, 1862, the day after the evacuation, numbered present for duty 53,217. At the same date Halleck had, near Corinth, 96,016 — after a loss by death or discharge from sickness since Shiloh of more than 10,000 — a loss greater than the killed and wounded at Fort Donelson and Shiloh together. Beauregard collected his army at Tupelo, fifty miles south, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. On the 10th of June it numbered 46,080 — a loss of over 7000 in ten days. A part of this loss was due to detachments, but more to desertion and self-granted furloughs.

Instead of following up the retreating enemy, whom he represented as in the last stages of demoralization, Halleck, on the day Beauregard deserted Corinth, wrote to Buell: "The first thing now to be done is to open the railroad to Decatur [95 miles east, where it crosses the Tennessee]. . . . And I shall immediately order working parties on the road

toward Humboldt" [75 miles north]. Thus, at the very moment when he was reporting to Washington, "General Beauregard evidently distrusts his army. His troops are generally much discouraged and demoralized. . . . Thousands are throwing away their arms," he determined to cease offensive operations, if such a march as that from Shiloh to Corinth can be called offensive. On the 9th of June all pretence of pursuit was abandoned.

On the 10th Grant, Buell, and Pope, by Halleck's orders, resumed command of their original armies, except that Thomas, with his division, was detached at Corinth. Buell thus came into command of 59,999 present for duty, of whom only 26,839 were with him. The rest were at various points in the department, from Cumberland Gap to Huntsville, and guarding over four hundred miles of railroad in Kentucky and Tennessee. The task now imposed on Buell was, practically, the resumption of that broken off by the Shiloh episode, *i. e.* the advance into and occupation of East Tennessee; — this time, by way of Chattanooga. This work was considered by the Administration as of the very first importance. On the 30th of June, after McClellan's disaster in Virginia, the President telegraphed to Halleck: "To take and hold the railroad at or east of Cleveland, East Tennessee, I think fully as important as to take and hold Richmond." In order to make his movement quick and effective Buell wished to concentrate at once all his movable force near McMinnville, with Nashville as his base. But Halleck forbade, and ordered, first of all, the rebuilding of the railroad east, and the use of that line of communication, with Corinth as his base.

In spite of his conviction that Halleck's plan was unsound Buell devoted himself, with unstinted energy, to the hopeless task. His force, however, small as it was for offensive operations, was thus transformed from a compact, aggressive army into scattered gangs of laborers and watchmen. On the 22d of June Thomas was ordered to report to him with 7000 men,

but with instructions not to move east of Tuscumbia, fifty miles from Corinth. The tenacity with which Halleck clung to that line seems unaccountable; but not more so than the rest of his conduct. On the 25th he wrote an elaborate letter to the Secretary of War, setting forth in full his circumstances, and how he proposed to spend the summer. His chief anxiety was for the health of his troops. After enlarging on the number now disabled by sickness — most of them through the six weeks' dawdling in the malarious marshes, about Corinth — he says: "If we follow the enemy into the swamps of Mississippi, there can be no doubt our army will be disabled by disease. . . . Grant's army could best guard the railroad [to Memphis] at . . . places on a plateau said to be the most healthy in Mississippi. . . . Pope's army will occupy the plateau covering the railroad to Decatur, represented to be a tolerably healthy country. Buell's army is moving east, through a healthy region . . . to Chattanooga. Should he be able to penetrate into Georgia, as far as Atlanta, he will still be in a dry and mountainous country. I cannot think of a better disposition of the army, so as to guard its health, and, at the same time, make it useful." Such was the ignoble outcome of all the splendid victories of the three months before Halleck took the field, including Mill Springs, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, and Island Number 10. Two thirds of the great army which had won these brilliant successes was to sit down in front of its often-defeated enemy, and nurse its health; the other third was to meet the force which had so strenuously blocked the way to Corinth.

Taking advantage of this strange inaction, squads of guerrillas began to raid every section of Kentucky and Tennessee. John Morgan captured post after post on the Louisville and Nashville Railroad, and was hailed, in many places, as a hero and a savior. Roddy was continually tearing up the railroad in North Alabama, which Buell was compelled to rebuild. Starnes had a force in the mountains north of Chattanooga,

terrorizing that region. Forrest was sent to Middle Tennessee to do all the mischief possible. His chance soon came.

On the 12th of July the railroad from Nashville to Stevenson, within thirty-eight miles of Chattanooga, was completed, and supply-trains were started over it. Buell's headquarters were at Huntsville, where also was Mitchel's division; Thomas was still at Tuscumbia; McCook at Stevenson; Nelson at Athens; Crittenden at Battle Creek; and Wood on the way to Stevenson — near which was to be a concentration, preparatory to the move on Chattanooga. Murfreesboro, Nashville and Columbia were each headquarters of brigades, guarding posts and the railroads in their vicinity. At the earliest break of day on the 13th of July Forrest, at the head of a formidable body of cavalry, 1400 to 1800 effectives, dashed into Murfreesboro. He had crossed the mountains almost undiscovered, and by a wonderful rapid march had gained his objective point. He was gallantly met by five companies of the 9th Michigan Infantry, and a squadron of the 7th Pennsylvania Cavalry, who had been roused by hearing the beating of the horses' hoofs on the stony pike, and had rallied into line. After a brave resistance, in which nearly one half its numbers were killed or wounded, the remnant of the 9th Michigan, about noon — cut off from succor and entirely surrounded — surrendered. The colonel of the 3d Minnesota — a splendid regiment, of exceptionally good material, in admirable drill and discipline — had, while in temporary command of the post, divided his forces, placing his own regiment and a battery a mile and a half away from the 9th Michigan. Soon after the surrender of the latter regiment, this pusillanimous colonel — without having made an effort to rescue or join his valiant comrades fighting on the other side of the town, and without consulting his officers — turned over his whole command to Forrest, as prisoners of war, without a shot. This cowardly conduct changed in a moment the destinies of the campaign. If in this, his first independent battle, Forrest had been de-

feated — as he assuredly would have been had the Union force been concentrated and all had fought like the 9th Michigan — who can estimate the consequences? Possibly all Forrest's after successes "would have been among the things that are unborn." It was a fatal blow to Buell. It threw him, at once, on the defensive, and compelled him to withdraw a division on its way to the front, in order to secure his communications. Instead of moving against the enemy he had now to bend all energies to his own security.

Bragg had succeeded Beauregard in command of the rebel forces at Tupelo on the 27th of June. On the 30th he started McCown's division to East Tennessee. His department was also enlarged so as to include all the country between the Mississippi River and the Apalachicola, embracing likewise Chattanooga and Atlanta. His whole force, exclusive of Mobile, Vicksburg, and all interior posts, exceeded 50,000 men. His advance reached Chattanooga on the 24th of July. Buell's occupation of that place, without a severe battle, was thus rendered impossible. Bragg, in person, reached there by the 5th of August. So secure did he now feel that on the 7th General Jordan, his chief-of-staff, wrote to General Beauregard: "The enemy in our front . . . are disposed in a manner astonishingly favorable for our attack. . . . Buell can have no serious notion of attempting to cross the Tennessee River with this army to contest the passage."

The essential viciousness of Halleck's plan was now fully demonstrated by events. Buell had, in front of Chattanooga, not exceeding 25,000 troops, at the outside. Bragg's force, July 16, numbered 53,240 present for duty, and he found, at Chattanooga, Kirby Smith's East Tennessee army, numbering over 15,000.

To capture Chattanooga the four divisions of Thomas, McCook, Crittenden, and Wood — the rest of the army being needed to guard communications — must cross two mountain ranges, a wide and deep river, and then meet and defeat

double their number. It was an exact reversal of Halleck's situation of a month earlier. During August Buell gave all his energies to the hopeless work. But it was a losing game. On every military ground he ought, long before, to have abandoned the effort, as a useless waste of time and means: or, rather, he ought never to have been placed in such a situation. But he was not his own master: — and besides, pride, hope, and a proper consideration for the safety of the Union people living in the country through which, a few months before, he had so triumphantly marched, led him to continue the struggle, even after he clearly saw that it was hopeless. Halleck had left Corinth on the 17th of July, to become General-in-Chief, and from Washington undertook, at arm's length, to direct operations. Thus, at its most critical period, the army in the Southwest was deprived of any common head. There were now three separate armies in the Mississippi Valley east of the river, each intent on its own work subject to no immediate control. For a while there was not even intelligent coöperation between them.

Meantime Kirby Smith, who commanded in East Tennessee, developed a scheme "for regaining possession of Middle Tennessee and possibly Kentucky," and offered to place himself under Bragg's orders for that purpose. He broached the subject before Bragg reached Chattanooga. The latter, approving of Smith's plan, wrote on the 1st of August to the Secretary of War at Richmond: "It has been determined that General Smith shall at once move against General Morgan in front of Cumberland Gap. Should he be successful, our entire force will then be thrown into Middle Tennessee, with the fairest prospect of cutting off General Buell, should that commander continue in his present position. Should he be reënforced meantime from the west side of the Tennessee River, so as to cope with us, then Van Dorn and Price can strike and clear West Tennessee of any force that can be left to hold it." By the 10th of August matters were so advanced

that Bragg wrote to Smith: "It will be a week before I can commence crossing the river, and the information I hope to receive will determine the route I shall take — to Nashville or Lexington. My inclination now is for the latter." This letter makes it evident that Bragg knew he so outnumbered Buell, and felt so confident in his strength, that he took no heed of the latter's possible movements. Two days later he again wrote Smith: "On Friday [the 15th] I shall probably commence crossing the river, by which I shall draw his [Buell's] attention from you. As soon as possible, we shall push on to Middle Tennessee, ignoring the enemy's strong works at Stevenson, Murfreesboro, etc. I have directed Van Dorn and Price to threaten West Tennessee with about 25,000 men, thus holding the force now there, or retaking the country." On the 11th Kirby Smith wrote to Jefferson Davis: "My advance is made in the hope of permanently occupying Kentucky." We thus get a clear view of the whole plan: — Kirby Smith was to march from Knoxville direct for the heart of Kentucky, through a region where he could not expect any opposition; Bragg was to clear Middle Tennessee, including Nashville, and then join Smith; Van Dorn and Price were to regain Western Tennessee, whence it was easier to go anywhere. Bragg wrote to Price two weeks later: "We shall confidently expect to meet you on the Ohio, and there open the way to Missouri." Breckinridge and Buckner were also to join the movement; and the magic of their names was to rouse all Kentucky, and secure it to the Confederacy. And all this change in the attitude, physical, mental, and moral, of the Confederate army, was wrought in less than three months after Halleck's boasted conquest of Corinth: "a victory," as declared by General Sherman in his congratulatory order of May 31, "as brilliant and important as any recorded in history." Hereafter, when men thrill at the mention of Marathon, or Marengo, or Waterloo, we have Sherman's authority for "pointing with pride" to Halleck's siege of Corinth, in

Mississippi, as equally important with those epoch-making battles which have changed the destinies of mankind.

Kirby Smith began his march about the 13th of August. Moving west of the Cumberland Gap, he passed through Rogers' and Big Creek Gaps, and on the 18th was at Barboursville, Kentucky, completely cutting off communication between General G. W. Morgan's force and its base at Lexington. Continuing north, by slow marches, and with occasional skirmishes, he met, on the 30th of August, at Richmond, Kentucky, a considerable body of troops under General Manson. They were all perfectly raw, recently mustered into service, only just brigaded, and had never been under fire. Manson had strict orders merely to observe the enemy, and not to bring on an engagement. He pursued exactly the opposite course. On the appearance of the enemy he pushed forward his undisciplined brigade, and soon came in contact with Cleburne's veterans. The result was what might have been expected. Scarcely halting to form line of battle Cleburne soon had Manson in full flight. Cruft — an able and skilful soldier — came up with his brigade to help rescue the remnant of Manson's. He was also quickly driven from the field. He sums up the story in a single sentence: "It was an attack by at least 15,000 well-disciplined troops, under experienced officers, upon 6250 citizens, ignorant of war, without officers of experience." The result was altogether disastrous. The Union loss was 206 killed, 844 wounded, 4303 unwounded prisoners — a total of 5353 — five sixths of the whole force. The total rebel loss — killed, wounded, and missing — was 451 — one twelfth the Union loss. This wretched catastrophe left all Central Kentucky, including Lexington, and Frankfort, the capital, and even to the very gates of Cincinnati, entirely unprotected. Nelson's plan had been to retire slowly before the enemy, behind the Kentucky River, and there concentrate all the forces that could be brought together in that region, — some 16,000, — certain that Smith

would not venture to cross with such an army threatening his flank.

Before Bragg began his advance Forrest and Morgan played havoc throughout Middle Tennessee, and all along the Louisville Railroad. Morgan tells his story of the opening operations in one sentence: "I left Knoxville on the 4th of July, with about 900 men, and returned on the 25th with 1200, having travelled over 1000 miles, captured 17 towns, dispersed 1500 Home Guards, and paroled 1200 regular troops." Forrest's operations were in the vicinity of Nashville, which, for a time, was in serious danger of capture or destruction. Morgan here joined him, and on the 12th of August captured Gallatin, on the railroad, twenty-five miles north of Nashville, destroying the tunnel there and even threatening the railroad bridge at Nashville. On the 21st General R. W. Johnson, who had boastfully started out to capture Morgan, was met near Hartsville, and, after a running fight, surrendered under a flag of truce. On the 20th a force of guerrillas bullied Colonel Rodney Mason into the surrender of five companies of the 71st Ohio at Clarkeville, on the Cumberland River, 100 miles below Nashville. Four companies of the same regiment, at Dover, still further down the river — less favorably stationed for defence than Mason — a few days later drove off, with considerable loss, the same force, with some reënforcements, and saved their post. Mason had shown the white feather at Shiloh, and was only permitted to continue in service at his own urgent request, to enable him to retrieve his reputation. He was now cashiered for repeated acts of cowardice; but the merciful soul of President Johnson was touched by his distress, and in March, 1866, the sentence was revoked, and he was mustered out as of the date of his cashiering. Thus, before the end of August, Buell had lost both railroad and river. He had accumulated no large supply, and the mountain country in which he was operating afforded no food for man or beast. Starvation or surrender seemed staring him in the face.

General Bragg began crossing the Tennessee River about the 28th of August. He heralded his advance by one of those lurid general orders which were supposed to "fire the Southern heart": "The enemy is before you, devastating our fair country; imprisoning our old and venerated men (even the minister of God), insulting our women, and desecrating our altars, . . . led by desperate adventurers, and goaded on by abolition demagogues and demons. . . . It is for you to decide whether our brothers and sisters of Tennessee and Kentucky shall remain bondmen and bondwomen of the abolition tyrant, or be restored to the freedom inherited from their fathers." On the 29th his headquarters were at Dunlap, in Sequatchie Valley. Thence, marching up the valley, through Pikeville, he reached Sparta on the 5th of September — the very day that Buell was concentrated at Murfreesboro. A small cavalry force was sent to Spencer to observe on that flank. At Sparta Bragg remained a day or two to close up his lines, collect supplies, enforce the conscript law and decide what route next to take. From that point roads radiate in every direction. He could move direct on Buell at Murfreesboro — not three days' march distant; or strike for Nashville, through Lebanon — one day's march farther; or for Gallatin, through Carthage, and so cut off Buell's line to Louisville; or aim for Glasgow, through both Gainsborough and Carthage. Glasgow is only about ten miles farther from Sparta than Nashville; but the roads to the latter are better and more numerous. While in waiting Bragg received information through Forrest — which he evidently credited — that Buell was rapidly evacuating Nashville, and that Cincinnati was in consternation over Kirby Smith's approach. This determined him to push for Kentucky, in the hope of heading off his enemy. Doubtless he was also influenced by the hope of supplies. He moved on rapidly, passing through Carthage on the 9th, Tompkinsville, Kentucky, on the 10th, and reaching Glasgow on the 12th. The right wing moved through Gains-

borough, but all came together at Tompkinsville, and so on to Glasgow. The distance of ninety miles was made in seven days — an extremely good rate of speed considering the rough mountain roads, the rivers and streams to cross, and the long line of wagons to drag.

Buell had moved his headquarters to Decherd on the 21st of August, thus placing himself at the central point of his crescent-shaped line extending from Jasper to McMinnville. He was entirely uncertain what course the enemy would take; whether he would debouch from the mouth of Sequatchie Valley, and so enter Middle Tennessee; or, crossing the mountains near McMinnville, descend upon Murfreesboro and Nashville; or, passing Cumberland River, invade Kentucky. Before reaching Decherd, he had ordered McCook, who was at Battle Creek, to move up the Sequatchie Valley to Therman, to intercept the rebel advance. He was then to fall back on Tracy City, where also Thomas and Crittenden were to concentrate, and give the enemy battle if attacked. McCook failed to accomplish his orders, and instead withdrew across the mountain to Pelham. Buell then planned to concentrate at Altamont, on the mountain, and meet Bragg if he should pass that way. But General Thomas, who had reconnoitred the ground, advised strongly against it and it was given up. There were also such weighty objections to a concentration at McMinnville that it was determined to collect the whole army at Murfreesboro instead.

Every probability pointed to a formidable attempt by Bragg to reconquer Middle Tennessee. He could hope to gain little by going into Kentucky, leaving Nashville in Buell's possession. His chances of "liberating" that state would be infinitely increased by regaining Nashville first. Then he could go on, with the prestige of having restored the capital — and so, practically, all — of Tennessee to the Confederacy. Otherwise he would be met with the taunt that he could not expect to carry the Union state into the Confederacy while he was

unable to rescue the capital of a rebel state. The question on both sides was political as well as military; and everything pointed to the imperative necessity of Bragg's making a desperate struggle for Nashville.

When Halleck went East he promised Buell that, in case of necessity, Grant would furnish two divisions. On the 12th of August Buell claimed the fulfilment of the promise; but Halleck had to interpose before Grant sent them. One joined Buell at Murfreesboro on the 1st of September; the other at Nashville on the 12th.

If Buell were to retain any foothold at all in Tennessee he must, first of all, reopen communication with Louisville. To secure this object he had, on the 18th of August, sent General Nelson, with Generals Cruft, Jackson, and Manson, to Kentucky to collect and organize all the troops there accessible and to return to Nashville as soon as he could, repairing the railroad as he came. "You have a great work to accomplish," wrote Buell to Nelson: "the credit of the selection will be mine; the honor of success will be yours." On reaching Louisville on the 23d of August, most unexpected conditions were found. A new department had been created, embracing the states of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Kentucky, including Cumberland Gap. General H. G. Wright — an unconfirmed major-general — was in command. Thus General Buell was practically left in control of only such portion of Tennessee as might be covered by his army. His base of supplies was in another department, and he had no authority over any of the new regiments pouring into Louisville and Cincinnati under the President's call of July 1 for 300,000 additional troops. General Nelson was directed from Washington to General Wright; by whom — instead of being ordered to fulfil his original purpose of reopening the way to Tennessee — he was sent to Lexington, Kentucky, with the disastrous result already stated. In trying to rally Manson's retreating rem-

nants, Nelson was painfully wounded, and barely escaped capture.

No better illustration of the exigent and chaotic condition of things on the Ohio border could be given than what actually took place immediately after that disaster. It was clear that somebody of good military capacity and experience and of sufficient rank was needed to organize and discipline the raw recruits. Nelson was laid up with his wound. Manson had demonstrated his incapacity. Wright was fully occupied with his duties as department commander. Jackson and Cruft — both brigadier-generals, of good ability and devoted patriotism — thereupon united in a letter to General Wright stating the emergency, and urgently recommending the appointment of Captain C. C. Gilbert to be major-general, to command all the forces about Lexington, and Captain W. R. Terrill to be brigadier-general to command a brigade. Both were men of ability and experience. Gilbert had been graduated at the Military Academy in 1846, had seen service in the Mexican War and on the Plains; had taken a valiant part under Lyon at Wilson's Creek, where he was severely wounded. He was now captain in the First Infantry, and Inspector-General on Buell's staff — charged particularly with the oversight of stockades and defences along the lines of railroad. Terrill was a graduate of the Military Academy of the class of 1853. As commander of a battery of the Fifth Artillery at Shiloh he had attained great distinction by his energy, skill, and courage. General Wright thereupon issued an order, appointing — subject to the approval of the President — Gilbert as major-general and Tirrell as brigadier, and at once assigned them to duty with the rank so bestowed. Thus it was that Gilbert came to command the corps, and Terrill to lay down his life at the head of a brigade, at Perryville.

General Buell at last reluctantly yielded to the conviction that he ought no longer to maintain even the pretence of a defensive attitude. In a confidential letter to Andrew John-

son, on the 30th of August, after stating the reasons which compelled that decision, he says: "These facts make it plain that I should fall back upon Nashville, and I am preparing to do so. I have resisted the reasons which lead to this necessity until it would be criminal to delay any longer." On the same day he ordered the concentration of his entire army at Murfreesboro. The whole movement was so admirably planned and so well executed that, without haste or confusion, or the loss of a wagon, a gun, or anything of value, everybody and everything was at the appointed place at the appointed time, on the 5th of September — the same day that Bragg was at Sparta. From Bridgeport in the east to Huntsville in the west, and from various points on the mountain, covering an area of at least 3000 square miles, the whole movement was conducted like clockwork, without jar or delay: and the army was ready for battle, or for marching in any direction.

As soon as this concentration was complete General Buell hastened to Nashville to arrange for continuing the campaign. The information of Bragg's movement which here came to him governed his decision. He determined to take his cavalry, the five divisions of McCook, Rousseau (formerly O. M. Mitchel's), W. S. Smith (formerly Nelson's), Crittenden, and Wood, with the division of Jeff. C. Davis, from Grant's army, — now commanded by General R. B. Mitchell, — move rapidly into Kentucky, drive out Kirby Smith, relieve or strengthen G. W. Morgan at Cumberland Gap, reopen his communications, and then turn upon Bragg (who, he believed, would move against Nashville) and overwhelm him. The rest of his army — Thomas' and Negley's divisions, and the divisions of Palmer, on its way from Grant — he would leave at Nashville, under command of Thomas, to hold that place against Bragg's expected attack, until he should return from Kentucky, his communications reëstablished, his army reënforced, and that state finally rid of all danger of rebel domination.

At Bowling Green, forty miles from Nashville, was a large quantity of supplies, accumulated after the destruction of the railroad at Gallatin. Wood was hurried there, and reached Gallatin on the 8th, closely followed by the other divisions. Buell in person left Nashville on the 10th. With him went a large number of refugees from various places in North Alabama and Middle Tennessee — exiles from their homes when the Union flag no longer protected them. Among them were some of the best people of their region, who could not live under Confederate rule. In this number was William Polk, of Columbia, Tennessee — brother of the late President — the sole representative of that name who remained true to the Union.

"Among the faithless faithful only he."

It was as touching a sight as ever witnessed when these devoted people — men, women, and children — rode away, in the darkness of night, on their uncertain journey, leaving behind everything which had made life pleasant and friendly, and going they knew not where.

On the day that he left Nashville General Buell learned that Bragg had crossed the Cumberland River. Even then it could not be certain that he meant to go to Kentucky. Indeed Bragg himself did not as yet seem to have made up his mind exactly what course to pursue. On the 12th of September he wrote to the Confederate adjutant-general: "My whole force will be in Glasgow on the 14th. We shall then be between Buell and Kirby Smith — for which I have been struggling. . . . With arms, we can not only clear Tennessee and Kentucky, but I confidently trust hold them both. General Buell is concentrating at Bowling Green. From Glasgow we can examine him, and decide on the future."

But whatever Bragg might finally decide, the concentration by Buell of a sufficient force to meet him near Bowling Green, which now seemed his destination, was the first necessity. Accordingly, he drew together all six of his divisions

at that point on the 15th. They amounted to about 35,000. Satisfied, also, that Bragg now meant to advance with his whole force into Kentucky, he had sent to General Thomas to join him, as soon as possible, with two of the three divisions left at Nashville. Thomas, however, believing that the safety of that place demanded a larger force, took only his own division, numbering 7000, with which he reached Bowling Green on the 17th. There remained at Nashville about 12,000, under General Negley. The post was well fortified. As early as the 3d of August works had been begun, and were now quite formidable and well manned. The capitol itself was converted into a citadel, defended by eight guns. Such other works were built as made the city secure, except against an overwhelming force or regular approaches and investment. Governor Johnson had established his home just across the street from the capitol; and there, and in the executive office, he daily thundered incoherent invectives against the "Hell-hounds of the hell-born and hell-bound Confederacy," when he was capable of articulate utterance, or could find so much as an audience of one to listen. This, and sending false and misleading telegrams to Washington, was the extent to which he exercised the mixed functions of his anomalous position as brigadier-general and military governor.

Having concentrated his army at Glasgow, on the 14th of September Bragg issued another flaming proclamation: "Kentuckians — I have entered your state with the Confederate army, and offer you an opportunity to free yourselves from the tyranny of a despotic ruler. We come to restore you the liberties of which you have been deprived by a cruel and relentless foe" — and so on. But the Kentuckians refused to dance to his piping. Kirby Smith wrote despairingly from Lexington: "The Kentuckians are slow and backward in rallying to our standard. Their hearts are with us, but their blue grass and fat grass are against us."

Glasgow is an important centre, whence good roads radiate in all directions. It is thirty miles east of Bowling Green, but not more than ten miles from the railroad, a section of which was soon destroyed. At Munfordville, a strongly fortified place, on Green River, twenty miles north of Glasgow, was a force of nearly 5000 men, stationed there by General Wright, with orders to hold the place. General Chalmers, whom Bragg had sent to tear up the railroad south of that point, could not resist the temptation to strike at larger game. Accordingly, without orders, he assaulted the works on the 14th, and was severely repulsed, with a loss of over 300, as against 70 on the Union side. Bragg was very much angered at the whole affair. Instead of attacking Buell, or waiting to receive an attack from him, he sent at once a large portion of his army to invest Munfordville. He entirely surrounded the works, and having convinced Colonel Wilder, the commander, that he had with him at least 25,000 men and 60 guns, he secured its surrender at 6 o'clock on the morning of September 17. The surrendering garrison marched out with all the honors of war, drums beating and colors flying, side arms and all private property, and four days' rations, and was immediately paroled. The Union loss was 15 killed, 57 wounded, and 4076 unwounded prisoners, and 10 guns. General Buell has been ignorantly censured for not marching to the rescue of this force. In the first place, they had not been stationed there by him; he knew nothing of the orders they had received; he had no communication with them, and did not know they were there until too late to help them. In the second place, he had but two divisions at Bowling Green on the 14th, the others coming up on the 16th, on which day he had planned to move against Bragg at Glasgow. But before that the enemy had left for Munfordville, which is only twenty miles from Glasgow, and more than twice that distance from Bowling Green; while from Bowling Green to Glasgow it is thirty miles.

In this deviation from his original plan Bragg showed an irresolution fatal to his success. It revealed his lack of that essential quality which determines one to adhere to a well-formed scheme in spite of temptations to secure minor successes. The first step toward Buell's complete overthrow — and his overthrow meant the holding of Kentucky indefinitely for the Confederacy, and perhaps even larger results — would be the capture of Louisville, and then, by the easily accomplished concentration of Bragg and Smith, to meet and defeat the Union army before it could reach the Ohio River. This was undoubtedly Bragg's purpose when he started for Kentucky. But the repulse of a single detached brigade, in its unauthorized attack on Munfordville, so angered Bragg that he forgot his main purpose — and turned aside to chastise the boy who had insulted him, instead of pushing on to seize the castle in which lived the boy and all his family.

Even at Munfordville Bragg's army was squarely across Buell's path. A comparatively small rear guard could have detained him a considerable time at Green River — long enough to have secured the junction of Kirby Smith with Bragg and the capture of Louisville — only three days' march distant. That city could not have offered more than a show of resistance. Indeed, so great was the alarm there that a pontoon bridge had been laid over the river, and many families, with their valuables, crossed into Indiana. Smith saw the need more clearly than Bragg, and as early as the 15th wrote to the latter: "Louisville is the great point to be aimed at, and the destruction of the force now there can, I think, be accomplished without difficulty." He also put in motion the division of Cleburne and a brigade, with orders to reach Shelbyville on the 22d. On the night of the 17th Buell learned of the surrender of Munfordville. He was then at Dripping Springs, and at once prepared to meet Bragg at Green River. Bragg at first seems to have intended to await Buell at Munfordville, but, after a delay of some hours, he ordered a move-

ment on Bardstown, by way of Nolin and New Haven. This left the direct road to Louisville open to his enemy — who at once availed himself of the advantage, and pushed on through Elizabethtown and West Point. The head of Buell's column reached Louisville on the 25th, eighteen days from the beginning of the movement from Nashville, one hundred and eighty-five miles away, and half the time in the near presence of the enemy. He was hailed as the savior of Kentucky. Everything at once changed from gloom and despondency to hope and confidence. By the 27th his concentration was complete, and the work of reorganization well advanced. The troops were all in position in front of the city, ready for any event. Bragg's advance showed itself within twelve miles of town — but came no nearer.

The moment Buell arrived he put forth most strenuous efforts to refit the old troops for the new campaign. Never did a general show greater foresight and energy, or higher administrative and organizing power. The response to all these labors was the delivery to him, at noon of the 29th of September, of an order directing him to turn over his command to General Thomas, and to repair to Indianapolis. The moment General Thomas received this order he telegraphed to Washington: "General Buell's preparations have been completed to move against the enemy, and I therefore respectfully ask that he may be retained in command." On the receipt of this dispatch the order relieving Buell was suspended — not revoked. His reply comported with his character: "Out of a sense of public duty I shall continue to discharge the duties of my command to the best of my ability, till otherwise ordered."

The day of Buell's removal was, in other respects, one of deep and tragic interest. Just after breakfast, at the Galt House, after a short but hot altercation between General Nelson and General Jeff. C. Davis — in which Davis was clearly the aggressor — and after they had angrily separated, Davis

borrowed a pistol from a bystander, and passing to the front of Nelson — who turned away from him — shot him through the right breast. Nelson slowly walked upstairs to General Buell's room, fell upon the floor, and died in half an hour. The whole tragedy made a profound impression; and but for instant and vigorous action of General Buell might have been followed by most serious consequences. With all his roughness of manner and language Nelson had shown such courage in action and such care in camp that his division was devoted to him. A strong provost guard was at once placed on the streets, and all soldiers ordered to their camps. Governor Morton, who was believed to have encouraged Davis in his imperious demand upon Nelson for an apology for a supposed affront committed a week before, instantly left the city for Indianapolis. Davis was put under arrest, and secured from possible violence. This sad occurrence delayed operations for a day. But for it the army would have begun its march on the 30th of September, with Nelson, instead of Gilbert, as commander of the Third Corps. There is no telling what the final issue might have been but for this untoward calamity.

About that time there were, in the Southwest, quite a number of peripatetic Confederate governors, in search of a constituency and a capitol. A so-called governor of Kentucky — elected in the same mysterious way in which representatives from that state were kept in the Confederate Congress — had been killed fighting in the ranks at Shiloh. Governor Jackson, of Missouri, — for want of a state which would recognize him, — kept company with General Price in his wanderings. Governor Harris, of Tennessee, had followed the Confederate army to Shiloh, to Corinth, to Chattanooga, even into Kentucky — and was now at Lebanon, Tennessee, whence, on September 20, he wrote to General Price, near Iuka: "Generals Bragg and E. K. Smith will doubtless take Louisville in the next ten or twelve days. . . . General Bragg expects your army to reach Nashville very soon, and to drive out the enemy

from that city." Meantime some people, somewhere in Kentucky, had perpetrated the farce of electing one Richard Hawes, as governor of that state, to succeed Johnson, deceased. He took advantage of Kirby Smith's presence at Frankfort to go through the form of an inauguration, at the capitol, on the 4th of October. Bragg left his army at Bardstown, to assist at the ceremony. All went off as if it were real till the sound of the cannon, fired by the minions of the abolition despot, broke up the solemnities. Polk was in temporary command at Bardstown, and out of his movements, when threatened by Buell's advance, grew quarrels which were never reconciled. In the following April, when Bragg was making himself uncomfortable to his generals, Hardee wrote to Polk: "If you choose to rip up the Kentucky campaign you can tear Bragg to tatters."

On the 1st of October Buell put his whole army in motion, on all the roads leading south and east from Louisville. Thomas was second in command. The force was divided into three corps. The First, commanded by General McCook and made up of the divisions of Sill, Rousseau, and Jackson — the latter entirely raw troops — moved out on the road to Taylorsville. The Second, Crittenden's, made up of the divisions of Van Cleve, Wood, and W. S. Smith (Nelson's old division), took the Mount Washington Road. The Third, Gilbert's, with Schoepf's (formerly Thomas'), R. B. Mitchell's, and Sheridan's divisions, followed the Shepardsville Road. All were to concentrate at Bardstown, where the main part of Bragg's army was halted, except Sill's division, which, with a provisional division under Dumont, was turned toward Frankfort, to guard the left flank against Kirby Smith's possible advance. The right, toward Elizabethtown, was looked after by Gordon Granger, with the bulk of the cavalry. Three regiments of cavalry as an advance guard, commanded by Captain Gay, of Buell's staff, led the way.

There was almost continual skirmishing from the very out-

set. But, on reaching Bardstown, on the evening of the 4th, the place was found deserted. Polk had retired that forenoon by the Springfield Road. Bragg had sent him orders on the 2d that the enemy was "advancing on Frankfort," and "to put your [his] whole available force in motion by Bloomfield and strike him in flank and rear." Had this order been carried out, the rebel army would have inevitably been entirely overthrown. Yet for not obeying it, though the conditions under which it was issued had entirely changed, Polk was severely censured by Bragg; and the trouble between them was never healed. Polk passed through Springfield on the 5th, closely followed by Buell. McCook's corps was on the left, Gilbert's in the centre, Crittenden's on the right. In this order, and with continually increasing resistance, the enemy was pursued, till, on the night of the 7th, it became manifest that a very considerable force had gathered near Perryville, and would probably offer battle there. The march for the last three days had been exceedingly distressing from the abundance of dust and the lack of water. General Buell was obliged to issue orders forbidding the use of water for washing; and he refused to permit the surgeon to bathe a painful injury he himself had received. Both McCook and Crittenden felt compelled to march considerably out of the direct course to find water. They consequently were not in immediate supporting distance of Gilbert, who, on the night of the 7th, went into bivouac within three or three and a half miles of Perryville, along the dry bed of Doctor's Fork. At 3 o'clock on the morning of the 8th Dan McCook's brigade, of Sheridan's division, moved out, and, after a sharp skirmish, occupied a height commanding Chaplin River, where the other two brigades presently joined him. Gilbert had been ordered, the night before, to move his whole corps forward, except one brigade. Accordingly Mitchell now took position on Sheridan's right, and Schoepf was held somewhat in reserve, near Sheridan's left. Here they all waited for the other two corps.

At 7 o'clock, the evening before, Buell had sent written orders to Thomas, for Crittenden to move at 3 o'clock in the morning, and to let him know as soon as the corps came up on Gilbert's right. At 8 o'clock orders were sent to McCook to move at the same time and join Gilbert's left. Crittenden did not receive his orders till the hour fixed for him to move. Consequently, instead of being at the designated place by 7 o'clock in the morning, it was fully 11 before he came up abreast of the central corps. McCook's orders reached him at 2.30 A. M., and he started at 5. But it was 10 o'clock before he gained his position on Gilbert's left.

Perryville is a little village of less than 500 population, at one apex of an equilateral triangle, of which Danville and Harrodsburg are the other two. The region is a watershed of Central Kentucky. Within a few miles of Perryville rise streams which flow north into the Kentucky River, south into the Cumberland, and west into Salt River. General Hardee thus describes the battle-ground: "The country is boldly undulating, and varied with farmhouses, corn-fields, and plantations, bordered by native forests. A creek, called Chaplin's Fork, flows northwardly through the village, and unites beyond it with another little stream called Doctor's Fork. . . . A good road, running from Mackville to Perryville, crosses this stream. The key of the enemy's position was at a point where the Mackville Road crosses Doctor's Fork," *i. e.* between Rousseau's right and Sheridan's left. From this crossing to McCook's extreme left — almost due north — is not more than a mile and a half. Into that space the five brigades of Rousseau and Jackson — some 12,000 men — were crowded. Just north of the crossing the Fork makes a bend, almost a right angle, toward the west. Sheridan's left now rested on the south bank, with Mitchell on his right, and Schoepf covering the road from Springfield to Perryville.

In retiring from Buell, Bragg, deceived by Sill's movement into the belief that the Union army was aiming for

Frankfort, had divided his force, ordering Polk's corps toward Versailles and Frankfort, to join Kirby Smith; while Hardee took the road through Perryville toward Harrodsburg — to which place Bragg himself came on the 7th. Up to a late hour that day he continued in the belief that Buell was marching on Frankfort. But toward night he changed his opinion, and concluded that the corps of the Union army were scattered, on separate roads, along a front of some sixty miles. He therefore determined to strike and overwhelm what he thought was the southerly column, near Perryville, with Hardee's corps, reënforced by Cheatham's division of Polk's corps — all to be commanded by Polk. By midnight he had concentrated this force, numbering at least 24,000 men, prepared for a vigorous assault at daylight. He came in person to Perryville during the night, but left the entire conduct of the operations to Polk, to whom, the evening before, he had written most urgently to "give the enemy battle immediately, rout him, and then move to Versailles. . . . No time should be lost," he added.

General Polk, with that deliberation which always distinguished him, instead of making an immediate attack — *i. e.* at daylight — called a council of officers in the morning, at which it was determined to act on the "defensive-offensive" and await Buell's attack — though, in the early morning, and even up to ten o'clock, Gilbert's corps was entirely unsupported. He had written to Bragg at six o'clock — sunrise — that he would "give them battle . . . vigorously." After waiting with such patience as he could command until nearly ten o'clock, Bragg rode to the field and himself put the troops in motion. It was not, however, until nearly one o'clock that any vigorous assault was made. At about that time Polk's right wing came under Rousseau's fire, and, though suffering severely, kept on, driving back the whole Union left nearly a mile, killing a great number, and capturing prisoners and guns. This success was followed up until

about four o'clock, when Liddell's brigade made a charge, by which, according to that officer's report, "the enemy's command in my immediate front was well-nigh annihilated." This ended the work for the night. Such is the substance of the Confederate reports, and it is not greatly exaggerated.

Only a general outline of the part taken by the Union army in this battle will be attempted.

Late in the afternoon of the 7th General Buell — an unusually good and daring rider — was thrown from his horse and received a painful cut in the thigh, which prevented his getting into the saddle on the morning of the 8th. He had expected the battle to open early. As time wore on, and no sound of contest or word from the corps commanders reached him, he concluded that the delay meant the retirement of the enemy, and his injury kept him from going to the front in person.

McCook reached the field about 10.30, and, having marked his line of battle, directed Rousseau and Jackson, his two division commanders, to deploy on it. Then, as previously ordered, he reported to Buell, to whom he stated that he had seen, as he came upon the field, a few Confederate troops skirmishing with Gilbert's left; but when he started for headquarters all was quiet, and he was "well satisfied that the enemy had retired from the field." On his return, in perhaps an hour, he found that Rousseau, instead of establishing himself on the line marked out for him, had advanced his right some 800 yards, thus increasing the interval between him and Sheridan, as well as exposing his own flank. His left brigade had been cut off from the other two by the interposition of Jackson's division. So when Jackson came into line with his left brigade (Terrill's) somewhat refused, Starkweather, of Rousseau's division, formed on his rear, making a second line — its left also refused. Near this point were stationed two batteries. It was a fortunate condition, for when Jackson's raw troops were stampeded, and Jackson

and Terrill both killed, this veteran brigade firmly held its ground against great odds; and when forced to retire, toward night, drew off the guns by hand.

The main attack on McCook's right opened between one and two o'clock, and quickly spread to the left. The whole right brigade of Rousseau's division was compelled to retire, and the left was afterward obliged to fall back. Seeing himself endangered, at half-past two o'clock McCook sent to Sheridan to beg him to take care that his (McCook's) right flank was not turned. Sheridan was already occupied with an assault on his own front; but he turned some guns against the exposed flank of the enemy across the ravine. Half an hour later McCook found matters so threatening that he sent another staff officer (Colonel Horace N. Fisher) to Gilbert to ask for help, reporting that "his entire command was engaged, his reserves all in line, and the safety of his corps compromised." Gilbert referred Fisher to General Buell, to whom, at 3.30, was repeated the story already told. Soon after, McCook sent still another staff officer to the nearest commander — whoever it might be — begging for help. Such is McCook's report. Gilbert states that, after showing Crittenden his position, he reported to the commanding general, and on his way back from Buell to his own headquarters he met Fisher and heard McCook's request. At the same time word came from Sheridan that he needed help. Gilbert immediately ordered up Schoepf's division for the support of Sheridan and to aid McCook. Mitchell was ordered to Sheridan's right, and Gooding's brigade and a battery were sent to McCook. Gooding had just started when Major Wright, of Buell's staff, came with an order for two brigades to report to McCook. Steedman's was sent, under Wright's guidance, in addition to Gooding's. Both rendered valiant service. Gooding lost 499 out of 1423 — over 35 per cent. Yet the general feeling among McCook's friends is that Gilbert did nothing and was an indifferent spectator of the former's discomfiture.

In this battle Sheridan for the first time commanded any considerable body of troops in action. He showed great skill and enduring courage. His division numbered about 5000 men, and all but four of his twelve regiments were new recruits. His loss was 350. Gilbert says in his report: "Brigadier-General Sheridan I commend to notice as an officer of much gallantry and high professional ability. He held the key of our position with tenacity, and used the point to its utmost advantage." General Terrill — killed while trying to rally his broken brigade in Jackson's division — was the cadet officer with whom Sheridan had the quarrel which led to his suspension for a year at the Military Academy. Before the battle they met and were reconciled.

When the contest was ended, at nightfall, Carlin's brigade, of Mitchell's division, had pushed the right of Gilbert's corps into and through the town of Perryville, making the only real advance of the day. Its movements show what might have been done if Crittenden's corps had been swung upon Bragg's flank.

Though Buell's headquarters were within about two miles of where the battle raged most fiercely, not a sound of the musketry firing was heard by him or any of his staff, and the artillery firing was but little heavier than it had been for several days. Major Wright, who conducted Steedman's brigade, tells how, as he reached the crest of the ridge, the whole sight and sound of battle burst upon him with startling suddenness. "There was not the warning of an instant. At one bound, my horse carried me from the stillness into the uproar of battle." If General Buell had heard or been informed of the musketry — which began as early as eleven o'clock and then died away, was renewed before two, and then steadily increased — he would certainly have been upon the field in time to have thrown Crittenden's corps into action with probably decisive results. "I was not early enough apprised of the condition of affairs on my left," says General Buell in his report.

"This must be admitted to have been a grave error. I ascribe it to the too great confidence of General McCook, which made him believe that he could manage the difficulty without the aid or control of his commander."

Buell considered it certain that the battle would be renewed in the morning, and made every preparation to attack the enemy at daylight. But early morning showed that he had retreated on Harrodsburg, evidently to form junction with Kirby Smith, and there make a stand. Sill was at once sent for, and Buell took up a strong position, his right four miles from Danville, his centre on the Harrodsburg and Perryville Road, and his left near Dicksville, facing northerly, and covering the roads leading to Bragg's army. Here he remained till the 11th, waiting for Sill. A reconnoissance on the afternoon of that day showed the enemy in force, two miles south of Harrodsburg. Sill having joined that night, orders were given to move to attack on the morning of the 12th. But at dawn of that day it was found that the enemy had again abandoned his chosen position, leaving behind all his sick and wounded and a number of guns, and had crossed Dick's River, whose high bluffs commanded every position where a crossing could be made. Buell at once moved to intercept him, in case of retreat, or to give battle. But Bragg pushed his main force and all his trains rapidly to the south, while Buell was finding possible crossing points. This practically ended the campaign.

It is impossible to ascertain, from the returns, how large was the Confederate force at Perryville, or its total loss in the battle. Bragg claims to have had only 16,000 effectives; but this is clearly misleading. He had there sixty regiments of infantry, besides artillery and cavalry. A moderate estimate would make his infantry force 24,000. Buell — a very cautious and conservative judge — makes it 26,000. In the two corps of the Union Army engaged were not exceeding 27,000 men. Buell states them at 24,000. Of these, fully one half were per-

fectly raw troops, never in action, and unused to the field. Jackson's division of 5300 men was composed entirely of new troops who were scattered at the first onset of the Confederate veterans. The Union loss was 845 killed, 2851 wounded, and 515 missing — of whom 233, nearly one half, were from Jackson's division — a total of 4211. More than three fourths of these — 3299 out of 4211 — were from McCook's corps. Adding the 513 from the two brigades sent to McCook's aid, and the total loss of the left wing was 3812 — over 92 per cent of the whole. Rousseau's loss was 32.5 per cent; Jackson's 21.6 per cent of the number engaged.

Bragg claims that he lost only 2500 and captured 600. But Polk's report contains a detailed statement of partial losses which show 510 killed, 2635 wounded, 251 missing — a total of 3396. All Bragg's men were veterans, and nearly all were thrown upon McCook's corps, numbering, with the brigades sent to help him, less than 16,000.

Bragg began his final retreat on the 13th. He gives as his reasons that Buell had moved to possess himself of the line towards Cumberland Gap; that his supplies at Bryantsville amounted to only four days' rations; and that the disasters at Iuka and Corinth had left the whole country in his rear open to the enemy. Buell pursued until the 21st, when, finding it impossible to overtake or cut off the enemy, he put his whole force in motion toward Nashville, now threatened by Forrest, Breckinridge, and others. On the 18th he received the strongest assurances from Halleck at Washington that the rapid march of his army, and the victory at Perryville, had "given great satisfaction to the Government." On the 24th orders were issued placing General Rosecrans in command of the army and department, re-christened with its original name — that of the Cumberland.

The nominal cause of this supersession was the alleged reluctance of General Buell to undertake an immediate and direct campaign into East Tennessee, by way of Cumberland

Gap, which was declared to be "the main object of the campaign." But in the instructions given to General Rosecrans, the first "object to be kept in view" was "to drive the enemy from Kentucky and Middle Tennessee, and the second to take and hold East Tennessee by cutting the railroad at Chattanooga" or other points east of that, — thus adopting the precise plan which Buell had proposed and for insisting on which he was relieved. The real reason for his removal is to be found in the flood of mischievous misrepresentation about himself and his operations with which the War Department was deluged from various high political sources — chiefly the Governors of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio — all stimulated and urged by Andrew Johnson, who, from the first, had shown an unaccountable hostility to Buell — unaccountable, that is, on any theory which can credit Johnson with any degree of patriotism, intelligence, truthfulness, military or other administrative capacity, or good morale.

Commenting on Bragg's conduct of this campaign, General Duke very justly emphasizes the weakness shown by that general on several critical occasions. His failure to deliver or receive attack at Glasgow has already been referred to. A still more striking instance of weakness is found in his deviation to Bardstown from the direct road to Louisville — thus leaving open the way to Buell — and his holding for several days his own army in a position whence it could not advance alone to the investment of that town, nor form junction with Kirby Smith for that purpose. His leaving the army in this improper position, at such a critical juncture, to take part in the absurd ceremony of a gubernatorial inauguration, is also evidence of entire lack of appreciation of the gravity of the situation. His last act of precipitate retreat, without waiting for the aid of Kirby Smith to renew the contest after Perryville, is difficult to account for, unless we consider the whole adventure as a mere raid, undertaken for the occupation of his troops and his own amusement. The ultimate result was

to render Bragg henceforth unable to rely implicitly on the support of his officers or the confidence of his army. Jefferson Davis continued to sustain him to the end, but his retreat from Stone's River, his failure at Chickamauga, his overthrow at Missionary Ridge, were all legitimate consequences of the weakness by which he threw away every opportunity afforded by his boastful invasion of Kentucky.

In summing up the causes which led to Napoleon's failure in Spain, and so to his final overthrow, Napier says: "By his march upon Madrid in 1808 . . . he lent his flank to the enemy. . . . Though he repaired the error for the moment by his astonishing march from Madrid to Astorga, the fate of the peninsula was then decided." So with Buell's struggle in Tennessee. Halleck's dilatory policy after the capture of Corinth allowed Bragg to recuperate his strength. Then the determination to make Corinth the base for the army intended to seize East Tennessee compelled Buell not only to lend his flank to the enemy, but also so delayed his movements that Bragg reached Chattanooga first. The rebel invasion of Kentucky was thus made possible. Buell's vigorous march of more than 400 miles from Stevenson to Louisville, and on to Perryville, in a measure retrieved Halleck's stupendous blunder; though, if the people of Kentucky had shown the disposition Bragg expected, the fate of the French army in Spain might have befallen Buell. But, in any event, Halleck's policy deferred the occupation of Chattanooga for more than a year, and, in connection with McClellan's and Pope's reverses in Virginia, gave renewed life to the Confederacy, which in May, 1862, seemed, in the Mississippi Valley, well-nigh moribund. For all the disasters which befell the Union cause in the Southwest between May and November, 1862, Buell, with cruel injustice, has been made the scapegoat. To quote Napier again: "Fortune, that name for the unknown combinations of infinite power, was wanting to him." But the impartial historian, carefully studying his

operations, can hardly fail, not only to hold him blameless of the disasters so improperly connected with his operations, but to ascribe to him a very high degree of commendation for the timely exercise of unusual energy, tenacity, endurance, and courage.

By his early fortifying of Nashville he enabled a comparatively small force to hold that important position, during his three months' absence with the main army in Kentucky. By his rapid and skilful concentration at Murfreesboro he placed himself between Bragg and the prize of that city. By his energetic march into Kentucky, as soon as he knew that Bragg had crossed the Cumberland, he placed the Confederate army on the defensive from the moment it left Glasgow. By his speedy refitting and reorganization of the heterogeneous collection of troops at Louisville he was enabled to move a formidable force against Bragg before that general had secured coöperation with Kirby Smith. By his skilful arrangement of his forces he deceived Bragg into the conviction that his destination was Frankfort, until too late for that general to bring together all his scattered forces for a decisive battle. By his vigorous and well-directed action after Perryville he compelled the rebel army to abandon Kentucky and all its dreams of conquest. The ignorant and hasty judgments, so thoughtlessly pronounced against him, will all be reversed, as the work he did, and the means with which he did it, are more closely examined. The skill, ingenuity, and ability shown by him in so many ways — often under almost unprecedented and overwhelming adversity — will mark him, in the estimation of competent judges, as one of the very best among the illustrious soldiers who helped save our freedom and nationality.

VIII

THE MURFREESBORO CAMPAIGN

BY

CAPTAIN EPHRAIM A. OTIS [1]

Read before the Society April 2, 1907

[1] The writer was assistant adjutant-general on the staff of General Van Cleve, commander of division, in the campaign. — ED.

THE MURFREESBORO CAMPAIGN

THE closing days of the year 1862 were full of despondency and discouragement for the Union. In the East the battle of Fredericksburg had resulted in disaster, and the Army of the Potomac, with all its sacrifice and heroism, was apparently no nearer the capital of the Confederacy than it was when it embarked under McClellan on the Peninsular Campaign. The man and the hour that were to lead it to victory had not yet come.

In the Mississippi Valley Grant had been forced to abandon a forward movement through Northern Mississippi, while Sherman had been defeated in an assault on Vicksburg, and forced to reëmbark his entire command and fall back clear to Memphis. The first victory which was to turn the tide of battle in favor of the Union cause was in the Murfreesboro campaign, in which I took a modest part as a staff officer, and of which I shall briefly attempt to give some recollections.

There has been but little said of this campaign in the history of the Civil War, though it involved a fiercely contested battle, lasting practically five days, between two opposing armies each about 40,000 strong, and resulted in an aggregate loss of over 20,000 killed and wounded. The modern historians have given it slight notice. Mr. James Ford Rhodes, in his history, devotes barely sixteen lines to the entire campaign, in which there was a greater loss in battle than in the war with Mexico from the beginning to the end.

While the result did not involve the destruction or capture of the Confederate army under General Bragg, it was a closely contested battle between the Army of the Cumberland and the Confederate Army of the Tennessee in which victory rested with the Union cause.

At the close of the Kentucky campaign in the fall of 1862 the Army of the Cumberland was rapidly concentrated at Nashville in Tennessee. General Buell, who had been its commander in the field up to that time, was relieved, wisely, as I believe, and General William S. Rosecrans was appointed his successor. Rosecrans had just defeated Van Dorn in the desperately contested battle at Corinth, Mississippi, and had shown himself on other occasions to be an able, fearless, and successful leader. The Confederate Army of the Tennessee, under General Bragg, after the retreat from Kentucky, was reorganized and heavily reënforced, and was concentrated at Murfreesboro, Tennessee, and the cavalry under Wheeler and Morgan were pushed up until within sight of the capitol at Nashville. Bragg's army was well organized and he, confident of success, was fully determined to contest the control of Tennessee and all the roads that led to Chattanooga and Atlanta. Middle Tennessee had not at that time suffered materially from the ravages of war, and the whole country was practically one great corn-field, which furnished the supplies needed by the Confederate army there and left a surplus to be transported to the armies of the East. This entire region had been abandoned by Buell in the fall of 1862, and its recovery was the first step towards a movement of the Union army on Chattanooga and the relief of East Tennessee.

The city of Nashville, the capital, and substantially the geographical centre of the State of Tennessee, is located on the Cumberland River, with railroad and river communication with Louisville, about two hundred miles distant, and the states north of the Ohio. It was the military base for any army operating against Chattanooga, which was acknowledged to be one of the most important positions in the whole Confederacy and the gateway to East Tennessee and Georgia.

About thirty miles southeast from Nashville, on the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, was the little village of Murfreesboro, the county seat and centre of one of the oldest and most

populous counties in the state. The immediate country was filled with supplies, so that Bragg was able to support his entire army from the surrounding country without difficulty, leaving the railroad in his rear free for the movement of troops. The town of Murfreesboro is reached by a series of turnpike roads, then in excellent condition, radiating from it like spokes in a wheel in all directions, so that it could be easily approached by an invading army as well as easily defended.

It must be borne in mind that from the beginning of the war it was the earnest wish of Mr. Lincoln that vigorous efforts should be made to advance into East Tennessee and relieve the loyal citizens of that region from the persecution to which they had been subjected by the Confederate authorities. A direct advance, however, was a military impossibility until Chattanooga had been captured. The valley of the Tennessee River, which traversed the entire region of East Tennessee, was protected by the lofty ranges of the Cumberland, which could only be crossed at passes difficult to reach and easily defended, and with these difficulties overcome, an invading army was without base of supplies or means of procuring additional munitions of war. It was the deliberate conviction of General Buell, and of General Rosecrans also, that the road to East Tennessee was through Chattanooga, which could be reached only by an advance along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, by which the army could be supplied and which led to the heart of the South.

When Rosecrans reached Nashville in November, 1862, every effort was made to accumulate subsistence for the army and establish communication with the Ohio by rail and river, so that his base of supplies at Nashville should be secure. The railroad to Louisville was reconstructed about the 1st of December, while the Cumberland River, swollen by the autumn rains, furnished easy facilities for additional communication and supplies, and an early forward movement was

promptly decided upon by those in authority. A strong force of Confederate cavalry, far superior in numbers to that of Rosecrans, kept the Union army quite closely confined to its lines in front and almost in sight of the capitol at Nashville.

On the 13th of December, 1862, the President of the Confederacy, Mr. Davis, visited the army at Murfreesboro and remained with it several days, finally returning to Richmond full of hope for success in the approaching battle and of an early advance to the Ohio River and a new attempt to annex Kentucky to the Confederacy.

Bragg had posted his army at Murfreesboro and its vicinity, and evidently did not really expect an immediate advance on the part of Rosecrans. The operations of Grant and Sherman against Vicksburg in the fall of 1862 made it necessary for the Confederate authorities to reënforce Pemberton in command of the Confederate army at that place, and early in December, by order of General Joseph E. Johnston, Stevenson's division of Bragg's army, over 6000 strong, was sent from Murfreesboro to Vicksburg, where later it took part in the defence of that city and was surrendered to General Grant on the 4th of July, 1863.

A few days later the cavalry command of General John H. Morgan was dispatched by Bragg to destroy the railroads in Kentucky in the rear of Rosecrans, while Forrest with his cavalry force was sent on a similar raid into East Tennessee. The detachment of these forces reduced Bragg's army to about 40,000 men available for battle and had a very important bearing on the campaign which was soon to follow. Rosecrans, having received early information of these movements of the enemy, at once decided that a favorable opportunity was presented for an immediate advance in force to attack and defeat the army of Bragg at Murfreesboro or wherever it should be found, and re-occupy the fertile region of Middle Tennessee, which had been abandoned by Buell in the fall of 1862.

The preliminary orders were given and the movement began on the 26th of December, 1862, when the army broke camp in front of Nashville and moved forward in the direction of the enemy.

General Rosecrans had organized the Army of the Cumberland into the right wing, commanded by General McCook, the centre under General George H. Thomas, and the left wing under General Thomas L. Crittenden. McCook had three divisions commanded by General R. W. Johnson, General Jeff. C. Davis, and General Philip H. Sheridan. General Thomas took with him in the advance only two divisions of his corps commanded by General James S. Negley and General L. H. Rousseau, while General Crittenden had three divisions commanded by General John M. Palmer, General Thomas J. Wood, and General H. P. Van Cleve. In addition to these forces there was a small but highly disciplined force of cavalry under the command of General David S. Stanley, not, however, equal in number to the cavalry force of the enemy, but quite as brave, gallant, and efficient. The army in the main was made up of veteran troops who had been engaged in the battles of Shiloh and Perryville, full of confidence and enthusiasm, and was led by brave and gallant officers.

It is perhaps proper to say that since the war I have witnessed the evolutions of the highly disciplined troops of England, France, and Germany, and through the newspapers have carefully followed their movements in battle, and I do not hesitate to say that for bravery, discipline, intelligence, and efficiency, the army that Rosecrans commanded in this campaign was at least the equal, man for man, to any in the world.

According to the morning report of the Army of the Cumberland on the 31st of December, 1862, Rosecrans had with him a force of 43,400, including Starkweather's brigade, which reached the field at 5 P. M. that day after the fighting was

over, while the official report of Bragg, made after the battle, states that he took into action about 38,000 men. It must be borne in mind, however, that "present for duty" in our reports embraced men on detached service as teamsters, mechanics, and laborers, while the same terms employed by the Confederates included only the men in actual line of battle, so that it will be seen the number of the two armies was nearly equal. The Confederates, however, were acting on the defensive, in a country with which they were entirely familiar, and were protected by a line of works extending along their front near Murfreesboro and thus had a decided advantage over the army of Rosecrans. It is probable that Rosecrans underestimated the number of Bragg's army, for it will be seen his force was not large enough under well organized military canons to cover his lines of communication with Nashville and assume the offensive in an enemy's country. When the campaign opened, Bragg rapidly concentrated his command in front of the town of Murfreesboro, leaving the corps of his army commanded by General Hardee near the little village of Triune, a short distance northwest of Murfreesboro, for the purpose of covering the left wing of his army and to prevent an advance of the Union forces in that direction without notice and resistance. General Hardee was instructed, however, to fall back on Murfreesboro whenever he was attacked by force. The three divisions under General McCook, forming the right wing of the army, marched out of Nashville on the morning of December 26, on what is known as the Nolensville Turnpike, in the direction of Triune, where Hardee's corps was posted. The two divisions under General Thomas followed McCook to support him, if necessary, while the left wing under General Crittenden with three divisions moved straight upon Murfreesboro along the Murfreesboro Turnpike, which ran parallel to the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, and was the only line by which the army communications with its base could be kept up and sustained.

Hardee, after a short resistance, fell back in the direction of Murfreesboro, and the three columns of McCook, Thomas, and Crittenden resumed the advance on substantially parallel roads converging as they approached the town, and were in easy supporting distance of each other. There was more or less resistance as the army advanced, but by the evening of December 29 the two armies faced each other substantially in the position they were expected to occupy during the coming engagement.

A shallow sluggish stream, easily forded, called Stone's River, ran in a generally northeasterly direction a short distance in front of the town of Murfreesboro, while the Nashville Turnpike and the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad passed directly through the lines of both armies. General Bragg formed his army about two miles in front of Murfreesboro, a short distance in advance of the point where the railroad and turnpike crossed the river.

Breckinridge's division, comprising four strong brigades, was placed on the east side of Stone's River, with Jackson's brigade, hurriedly ordered forward from Bridgeport, on his right, thus covering the right flank of the Confederate army. Cleburne's division, numbering over 7000 men in line of battle, was placed in reserve to Breckinridge, the whole forming a corps under General W. J. Hardee. On the west side of the river the two divisions of Withers and Cheatham, with McCown's division in reserve, commanded by Lieutenant-General Polk, extended in a southwesterly direction, covering all the roads leading into Murfreesboro over which Rosecrans' army was then advancing. The conformation of the ground was such that each wing of the Confederate army could be easily reënforced from the other as circumstances might require, while their entire front was covered by a line of rifle-pits and breastworks and supported by a powerful force of artillery. The Confederate army was skilfully posted in a strong position, and if Bragg had been content to remain on

the defensive it is by no means certain the battle would not have resulted in a Confederate victory.

The different columns of Rosecrans' army closed up in front of Murfreesboro on the night of December 29, and extended in a general southwesterly direction from Stone's River across the Murfreesboro and Wilkinson turnpikes, parallel with the lines of the enemy. Two divisions of General Crittenden, composing the left wing, extended from Stone's River across the railroad and Nashville Turnpike, with Van Cleve's division in reserve. On the right of Crittenden the command of General Thomas was formed, with Negley's division in line and Rousseau in reserve, forming the centre of the army. McCook, with the divisions of Sheridan, Jeff. C. Davis, and Johnson, in the order named, formed the right of the line, with Johnson's flank slightly refused. The key to our position was the turnpike leading directly to Nashville, only thirty miles distant, upon which the supplies and ammunition trains were located, and the possession of which was vital to the safety of the Union army.

As the different columns converged on Murfreesboro there was so much doubt whether Bragg would deliver battle or fall back towards Chattanooga that Rosecrans, always sanguine and impulsive by nature, and confident of success, signalled an order to General Crittenden commanding the direct advance on the Murfreesboro Turnpike on the evening of December 29, to "occupy Murfreesboro with a division to-night." The officers commanding the advance were better informed, and earnestly assured Rosecrans that Murfreesboro would not be won short of a battle, but a brigade commanded by the gallant Colonel Charles G. Harker of Ohio, in the dusk of the evening, dashed across Stone's River in the execution of the order, drove in the Confederate skirmishers, and had almost brought on a battle before it was hurriedly recalled. Aided by the darkness Harker succeeded in bringing his brigade back to the line without material loss. The two armies faced

each other all day during the 30th of December, the skirmishers actively engaged, while McCook's already rather extended line was pushed still farther forward until it was almost in contact with the enemy. McCook's line was badly posted for defence; there was no adequate reserve, and its position seemed to invite the disaster which was swiftly to follow. The responsibility for this condition was afterwards the subject of bitter controversy, and has never yet been satisfactorily settled. My own opinion has always been that McCook, as the senior officer commanding the entire corps, was largely responsible for these conditions which came near involving defeat of the whole army.

In the evening of the 30th Rosecrans announced his plan of battle, which was, in substance: that the division of Van Cleve, supported by Wood, comprising two of the three divisions of the left wing, should cross to the east side of Stone's River and attack the enemy under Breckinridge, to be followed by a determined advance of the rest of the whole army from left to right. McCook was instructed to hold his position at all hazards, and to occupy the attention of the enemy in his front until the assault by Rosecrans' left should be made, and then to join in the general attack along the whole line of the army. The army was to wheel to the right with McCook as the pivot.

There was a high point of land just across the river on the extreme left, from which the whole Confederate line could be enfiladed by artillery, and which Rosecrans believed was not occupied in force, so that if the movement were successful Bragg would be compelled to fall back from his position, or be cut off from Murfreesboro and possibly his army destroyed. It is now known that Rosecrans' information as to the force defending the right of Bragg's army was incorrect, and if the attack had been made as he had planned it the two divisions of Van Cleve and Wood would have been confronted by a superior force in position protected by rifle-pits and acting on

the defensive, and the result would have been doubtful at least, and possibly disastrous. It was the confident belief of Rosecrans that the defeat of that part of Bragg's army on the east side of the river involved the result of the battle, and to accomplish this object he gave his entire attention, to the neglect of his own right which was intrusted to McCook. To further mislead the enemy as to the point from which the attack was to be made long lines of camp-fires were started on McCook's right, and commands were given by staff officers to imaginary regiments in tones loud enough to be heard by the enemy's skirmishers, to induce the Confederates to think our line extended much farther to the right than it actually did. I have always doubted whether Bragg was misled or deceived by this subterfuge; and not unlikely he considered it rather a confession of weakness on our right, and formed his own plans accordingly. As no offensive movement was made by Rosecrans on the 30th of December, Bragg decided to take the offensive himself. His plan of battle, curiously, was almost an exact counterpart of that adopted by Rosecrans. He decided to begin the battle by an attack from his left at daylight the next morning upon the extended and comparatively weak line of McCook, and to accomplish this purpose the two divisions of Cleburne and McCown and Jackson's brigade were quietly marched to his extreme left, thus extending his line of battle far beyond that of McCook. Hardee was placed in command of that wing of the Confederate army with instructions to attack at daylight with the utmost vigor. This was to be followed by an advance of Polk commanding the centre, while Bragg's right was protected by Breckinridge's division in reserve. It was intended that the entire force under Hardee should wheel to the right so as to turn Rosecrans' right wing and push for the Nashville and Murfreesboro Turnpike, which was the key to our position. The two strong divisions of McCown and Cleburne, with Jackson's brigade, moved to their positions around our extreme right during the early part of the night of December

30 as silently as possible, and quietly formed in line of battle close up to our picket-line, waiting only for daylight to begin the action. This movement was not unobserved by the vigilant division commanders, and General Sheridan, accompanied by General Sill, who commanded one of his brigades, went up to McCook's headquarters during the night and reported the continuous movement of troops and the rumbling of artillery across his front to the right which had been going on for a large portion of the night. McCook, however, made no change in the position of his extended line, and told Sheridan that as they were to act on the defensive the attack contemplated by Rosecrans himself on the Confederate right would soon relieve the situation. The fact is that Rosecrans was so much occupied with his own plan for taking the offensive that he did not give sufficient attention to the formation of the line of battle composing the right of his army. The defence of that line was left wholly to General McCook, with instructions, however, to maintain a defensive position, and if attacked to hold the enemy at all hazards for at least three hours. Rosecrans was sanguine that his own attack on Breckinridge on the east side of the river would be successful, and would not only relieve pressure on McCook but result in a defeat of the Confederate army. This is probably the reason McCook did not give greater attention to the reports of his division commanders of the movement along his front.

The order of battle, which was issued on the night of December 30, gave Van Cleve's division the advance, and he was directed to cross the river and attack whatever force was in front of him, and was assured that he would be promptly supported by the rest of Crittenden's entire command. Van Cleve was in line and began the movement at daylight, but as he had been placed in reserve in the rear of our left, and had a river to cross before the troops could be formed for attack, a considerable time elapsed before the battle could be opened on our part. It was for this reason that the battle

opened on our right before our attack could be made, thus giving the Confederates an immense advantage, and placing Rosecrans on the defensive from the very beginning. I recall as distinctly as if it were only yesterday how the fierce roar of battle broke out on our extreme right as we moved rapidly forward on the left, forded the river, formed in line of battle on the other side, and were moving forward to attack whatever force lay before us. Before this could be accomplished the significant sounds of battle on our extreme right grew more distinct and nearer, and the conviction grew into a certainty that McCook had been attacked and was being forced back. Shortly afterwards hurried orders were received from General Rosecrans to re-cross the river immediately, leave a brigade to guard the ford, and march to the right of the army, which was in most urgent need of assistance.

The Confederate column of attack, consisting of McCown and Cleburne supported by the division of Cheatham, had moved into position on the night of the 30th, and having no river to cross, they were ready to begin the assault at daylight, and were thus able to take the initiative, and in addition were familiar with the ground over which the attack was to be made. The extreme right of our army was commanded by General R. W. Johnson, who had one brigade in line, a second brigade slightly refused on his right flank, and another in reserve. They were not well posted, and although they were in line of battle before daylight they had been led to believe they would not be attacked in force, and that the real battle was to be decided by Rosecrans' movement on the extreme left. They were veteran soldiers commanded by able and experienced officers, but they were not expecting such an attack as Hardee was about to make, and were largely outnumbered. At the angle of Johnson's line, where he had only three brigades, the enemy had eight brigades in line, with their left reaching far beyond Johnson's right. There was a light fog early in the morning, but it soon cleared away, and

shortly after daylight the long gray line swept swiftly forward and Johnson's whole division was furiously attacked in front and flank, and after a short but gallant defence was driven clear off the field in great disorder with heavy loss. It was said at the time that Johnson's headquarters were too far from the line of battle; that his troops were surprised, and that the artillery horses were sent back to be watered, so that many of the guns were captured because they could not be hauled to the rear. Johnson, however, asserts that he breakfasted at three o'clock that morning, and was on his horse a short distance from the line when the attack was made; that his men had stood in line of battle with guns in their hands long before it began, and that the number of dead artillery horses killed in the attack, and left on the field, showed that a few only had been sent to the river.

Johnson had also observed the movement of the enemy during the night, and reported it to McCook, but received no new instructions as to the position he was to occupy. General Willich, commanding Johnson's right brigade, allowed his men to stack arms and make coffee, and just before the attack rode back a short distance to Johnson's headquarters, leaving no one above the rank of regimental commander at the point where the assault was made to give orders or direct the movements of the troops. Willich in attempting to rejoin his brigade rode straight into the Confederate lines and was taken prisoner within half an hour after the first shot was fired. I think it will be conceded that while there may have been no surprise in a military sense, yet Johnson was not prepared for the furious assault in front and on his right at the same moment.

Whatever the cause the disaster to Johnson's command was complete, and his whole division was driven back in great disorder, leaving nearly all the artillery and many prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

The two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis and Sheridan were

uncovered by the defeat of Johnson, and open to attack in front, and flank also, but they had immediately taken the precaution to swing their right regiments back at right angles with the original line, and when the attack was made on them their commands were better in hand and the resistance was far more serious and effective. One assault after another of the advancing column was repulsed by the gallant soldiers of Davis and Sheridan, but there was not time then to re-form the line or to guard their right which had been left unprotected by the defeat of Johnson's division. After an heroic resistance the right flank of Davis and then Sheridan's was turned by the enemy and they were forced to fall back or be taken prisoners. Sheridan, however, by direction of Rosecrans, faced to the rear and by a furious charge with the bayonet drove back the enemy and held his ground until Rosecrans had time to form a new line of battle and meet the attack which threatened the destruction of his entire army. Finally the whole right wing, comprising more than one third of the army, was forced back clear to the Nashville Turnpike, in disorder and confusion, with a loss of many prisoners and cannon.

The loss in killed and wounded on the Union side had been very heavy. Sheridan had four brigade commanders, one after another, killed on the field, while his loss in killed and wounded embraced more than one third of the entire number of his division. The ground over which the battle had been fought was broken, with dense thickets of cedar and occasional clearings, so that it was very difficult to preserve the formation either of the troops in retreat or of the enemy in pursuit. In the main the soldiers of McCook's corps came out of the cedars with empty cartridge-boxes and broken ranks, but not discouraged or disheartened. They were ready to engage again as soon as ammunition could be supplied and an opportunity for the scattered regiments to re-form. McCook had given Rosecrans positive assurance that if his line should

be attacked he would be able to hold the enemy in check for at least three hours, by which time Rosecrans confidently believed that his move on the right of the enemy would be successful, and that his own column of attack would be in possession of Murfreesboro. At the expiration of this period of time, however, McCook, instead of holding the original line of battle occupied in the morning, had been driven to the right clear back over a mile and a half to the Nashville Turnpike, where the enemy's cavalry were already engaged in capturing wagons, prisoners, and hospitals. They were, however, driven off by one of Sheridan's brigades commanded by Colonel Bradley, who moved down the road to our right as soon as they came out of the cedars, and charged the enemy, having at the time only three rounds of ammunition per man, and drove them clear back into the woods. When it became apparent that McCook's right had broken and was being driven to the rear in disorder, Rosecrans at once abandoned all attempt towards an offensive movement on his own part, and bent every energy towards forming a new line in front of the Nashville Turnpike, behind which the disordered forces of McCook could be re-formed and prepared for battle. The division of Van Cleve was promptly recalled from the east side of Stone's River and hurriedly sent to the right, to cover the Nashville and Murfreesboro Turnpike, which was our only means of communication with Nashville and was in imminent danger of passing into the hands of the enemy. Bradley's brigade of Wood's division was formed on Van Cleve's right, and the Pioneer Brigade, about 2500 strong, composed of detailed men from the different regiments, and organized to prepare roads and bridges and to do the work of engineers, was put into line on the left of Van Cleve, connecting with the centre and left wing, where it rendered gallant and effective service. Rosecrans called up every available man in his army to strengthen the new line which must be held at all hazards to save it from destruction. These rapid changes in the dis-

position of the army were made under the immediate direction of Rosecrans, who gave personal attention to the movement of every brigade, regiment, and division. Back of the Murfreesboro Turnpike and between it and the Nashville Railroad all the artillery of the army which had not been captured was posted in an open tract of ground, where it could command an advance of the enemy in every part of the field. The new line of battle was now practically at right angles with that originally formed in the morning. Our left rested on the river and extended west across the turnpike, thence parallel to and in front of the turnpike towards Overall's Creek, a short distance in the rear. It was much stronger than the original line and was so placed that each flank could be reënforced from the other if necessary, while behind it the artillery was available to protect any part of the line which might be assailed. Rosecrans showed great military skill and personal gallantry in making these new arrangements, and was everywhere present encouraging officers and men. Behind the new line the disorganized men of McCook were rapidly re-formed, and, the empty cartridge-boxes supplied with ammunition, they were soon ready for a new engagement. Before these hurried arrangements were fully completed the enemy, flushed with success, renewed their furious attack, but they now met a perfectly organized line of battle whose flanks were properly covered, and they were driven back into the cedar forest in great disorder. From this time on until darkness put an end to the battle there was a constant succession of attacks by the enemy at every part of the line from left to right without intermission or delay. When repulsed at one point it was at once renewed at another. Bragg brought over two brigades of Breckinridge's division from the east side of the river and put into action his entire force in fierce and successive assaults in the hope of gaining a complete victory. But all his efforts were unavailing; and when night put an end to the first day's battle our army held the new-formed line in

every part and had inflicted very heavy loss on the enemy. During the whole of this eventful day the personal gallantry of Rosecrans was most conspicuous. Wherever the fighting seemed the heaviest he could be seen with his staff riding through and even in front of the lines, encouraging the troops by his personal presence and inspiring new confidence in success. Colonel Garesche, his chief-of-staff, was instantly killed sitting on his horse by Rosecrans' side.

Of the death of Garesche Sheridan says that while his own command was formed in column to support Wood, in the afternoon, Rosecrans passed in front of him with firmly set lips and a calmness which inspired confidence in all around him. "As he passed to the open ground on my left I joined him. The enemy, seeing this mounted party, turned his guns upon it, and his accurate aim was soon rewarded, for a solid shot carried away the head of Colonel Garesche, the chief-of-staff, and killed or wounded two or three orderlies. Garesche's appalling death stunned us all, and a momentary expression of horror spread over Rosecrans' face; but at such a time the importance of self-control was vital, and he pursued his course with an appearance of indifference, which, however, those about him saw was assumed, for he felt most deeply the death of his friend and trusted staff officer."

Colonel Garesche was an accomplished officer, a West Point graduate, whose duties had heretofore kept him in the Adjutant-General's department at Washington. This I believe was his first campaign in the field, and in the six weeks he had been with the Army of the Cumberland he had won the confidence and respect of all with whom he came in contact. He and Rosecrans were close personal friends, were both devoted members of the Catholic faith, and had received the highest offices of the Church in the morning, side by side, before the battle opened.

Bragg had been successful in driving back the right wing so that the line of battle at night was practically at right

angles with that established in the morning. But all efforts on his part during the afternoon to complete his victory and acquire absolute possession of the Nashville Turnpike had proved unavailing. The losses in his command had been simply appalling; one of the Tennessee regiments, which went into action in the morning with 425 men, lost 306 officers and men, killed and wounded. The percentage of losses in many other regiments was nearly as great. The first day's battle in many respects resembled Shiloh. There was the furious attack by the enemy in the morning, followed by a large measure of success, but towards the close of the day it was observed that these attacks were less desperate, and that the rank and file of the Confederate army began to realize that the last line of the Union army could not be carried, and became themselves discouraged and disheartened. It is safe to say that at the close of the first day's battle, which lasted from daylight in the morning until after dark, the number of killed and wounded on the Confederate side was fully equal to the number of killed and wounded in the Union army. There were, however, a number of prisoners, mainly from Johnson's division, captured by the enemy before the new lines had been formed, so that our aggregate loss was greater than that of the enemy.

While Bragg had driven back in defeat one half of the army, yet, after the new line had been formed, he had not been able to gain one foot of ground, and every assault on it had resulted in defeat and disaster. On the night of December 31, when the first day's battle was over, Rosecrans and his corps commanders met at a little log cabin where headquarters had been established, for the purpose of considering the situation and to determine what course should be pursued in the future. It is stated that some of his advisers recommended a retreat to Nashville, giving as a reason for their decision that the safety of the army was far more important to the country than the possession of the field of battle. In the main, how-

ever, the opinion was expressed that the army should stay where they were and fight it out to the end. This was the opinion of Thomas, upon whose judgment the army had learned to rely with implicit confidence. A little later, Rosecrans, accompanied by McCook, rode back to Overall's Creek for the purpose of inspecting the position there, to determine whether it could be more successfully defended than the line where his army was then placed. On his return he decided to remain where he was and continue the battle. He realized that while his own command had suffered severely, and a portion of it had been driven back in disorder, his new line had been held firmly against all assaults, and that the losses of the enemy in killed and wounded must be at least equal to his own. To have fallen back, even to Overall's Creek, would have been a confession of defeat, and perhaps have resulted in the destruction of his army. Late that night Van Cleve, who had been severely wounded, was sent to Nashville in an ambulance, and his division was placed under the command of Colonel Samuel Beatty, the senior brigade commander. It was withdrawn from the line it had held during the day, and at daylight, on the 1st of January, 1863, was again quietly moved across the river for the purpose of taking possession of the high ground on the east side of Stone's River, from which artillery could successfully enfilade the Confederate line. This was practically carrying out the original design of Rosecrans, and resuming the offensive which had been suspended by the disaster to McCook. Bragg hoped that the following morning would show that our army had fallen back, but he soon discovered that our lines of the day before were held more strongly than ever, and that Rosecrans was already taking steps towards an offensive movement on his part. The long New Year's Day passed in demonstrations by both sides, but no resolute determined attack by either. The small division of Van Cleve, which had been heavily engaged on the 31st day of December, remained across the river, but it had met with

such large losses that it was compelled to act purely on the defensive. Bragg attacked the line on our right and centre at two or three points, but was met with such a strong resistance that his columns were driven back in disorder. In his report Bragg claims to have received information that Rosecrans was being heavily reënforced from Nashville. In this he was certainly misinformed, for Rosecrans got no reënforcements from any source, and held his line with the men he had taken with him at the beginning of the campaign. The fact was Bragg and his men had met with terrible losses and were becoming already discouraged and demoralized.

On the morning of January 2, 1863, the attention of General Bragg seems to have been particularly called for the first time to the location of Van Cleve's division on the east side of the river where it could inflict great damage in the event of the continuance of the battle, and Breckinridge was ordered to drive it back across the river. The two brigades which Breckinridge had sent to Polk during the first day's battle were returned to him and other reënforcements were sent, until his command was more than twice the number of Van Cleve's, and was supported by a strong force of artillery.

When the Confederate Army of the Tennessee was organized in 1861 it included several regiments of Kentucky troops which were organized into a Kentucky brigade. As this state never joined the Confederacy the Kentucky regiments were designated as the "Orphan Brigade," and under that name became famous in Southern song and story. This brigade had covered the retreat at Shiloh, and had been pushed to the front in every battle in which the army had been engaged. It was now commanded by General Roger Hanson, of Lexington, and had been held in reserve with Breckinridge to cover the Confederate right during all the first day's battle.

This brigade was now placed in the advance, strongly supported by the rest of Breckinridge's division, and covered by a heavy fire of artillery. About 4 o'clock on the 2d of Jan-

uary the column of attack was formed to renew the battle on the extreme Union left for the purpose of forcing Van Cleve back across Stone's River. The Confederate line extended clear beyond Van Cleve's right, and between it and the river where there was no force to oppose it, and was closely followed by a second line of battle, and heavy reserves. After a short but fierce contest, the right flank of Van Cleve's division was turned, and it was forced back clear to and part of it across the river. On the opposite side Rosecrans had brought up and posted strong reënforcements taken from other parts of the line. In addition to this, Captain John Mendenhall, a gallant and accomplished officer, then chief of artillery of Crittenden's command, had placed on the high ground on the west side of the river fifty-seven pieces of artillery, so that as soon as Van Cleve reached the river the attacking column under Breckinridge was unexpectedly brought under a terrific artillery fire, which covered every portion of the ground with canister and shell. The advance of the first line of the Confederates was repulsed, the Orphan Brigade broken to pieces, and its commander, General Hanson, killed on the field; but the supporting line pressed on and attempted to hold the position which had been gained. Nothing, however, could live under that withering artillery fire, which swept the entire line of battle of the Confederates. To complete the repulse the supporting troops crossed the river, and joined by portions of Van Cleve's force charged the already wavering lines and drove them back in headlong flight. Three pieces of artillery were captured and Breckinridge's whole division was literally cut to pieces. With one hour more of daylight the Union forces would have taken Murfreesboro and driven the whole Confederate army away from its base and inflicted upon it still greater disaster. Breckinridge, in his official report, admits a loss of 1700 men in his division alone, in less than forty minutes. Three of the four guns of the famous Washington Artillery were taken,

and nothing but prompt reënforcements from every part of the Confederate line and rapid approaching darkness saved the whole Confederate army from total defeat.

The action of the 2d of January left our line of battle firmly established on the east side of the river, from which the Confederates could be enfiladed, and nearer Murfreesboro than the enemy, so that their retreat became a military necessity. In the early morning following the crushing defeat of Breckinridge the leading officers in the Confederate army united in a written communication to General Bragg in which they say:

"We deem it our duty to say to you frankly that in our judgment this army should be promptly put in retreat. You have but three divisions which are at all reliable, and even some of these are more or less demoralized from having some brigade commanders who do not possess the confidence of their commands. Such is our opinion, and we deem it our solemn duty to express it to you. We do fear great disaster from the condition of things now existing, and think it should be averted if possible."

Such a letter from his corps and division commanders, who had shown such heroism and accomplished so much the first day, was too important and serious to be disregarded. It was apparent that the only means of saving the Confederate army was an immediate retreat along the line of the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, towards Shelbyville and Tullahoma, where their trains and supplies had already been prudently removed when the battle began. This course was promptly adopted, and on the night of the 4th of January Bragg's entire army was in full retreat. This movement was covered by a strong cavalry force and was not seriously molested by the Union forces, who had themselves suffered such losses that pursuit was practically impossible. In addition to this the ammunition was nearly exhausted, owing to the capture of McCook's trains on the 31st of December, and every round

had to be saved to provide against the emergency of another battle. In view of his own losses Rosecrans was willing that Bragg should confess defeat, abandon the objective point of the campaign, and leave the field of battle in our possession.

The losses in this battle in proportion to the number engaged were very large. Rosecrans lost in killed, wounded, and prisoners considerably more than one third of his entire force. Sheridan left on the field more than one third of his number in killed and wounded alone, while the loss in many divisions was almost as great. Sheridan asserts in his memoirs that in no other action in which he was engaged in the whole war was the percentage of killed and wounded so large. During the afternoon of the 31st the battle seemed particularly severe at the point of junction of our left wing with the Nashville Pike, where the monument to Hazen's brigade now stands, and known in the reports of the time as the Round Forest, where charge after charge was made by the enemy under Polk, all of which were repulsed with terrible loss.

A very attractive paper published in a Southern army magazine, by the wife of a Confederate officer from Augusta, Georgia, throws quite an interesting side-light on the operations of the Confederate army. Her husband was on the staff of General Jackson, commanding a brigade in Hardee's corps, and she had come up to a plantation about fifteen miles from Murfreesboro to be near her husband during the coming battle. She writes that she could hear the terrible cannonading of December 31, which began at daylight and lasted until dark. She publishes extracts from hurried notes from her husband written on scraps of soiled paper without envelope, sent by soldiers going to the rear, which convey interesting information of what was going on inside the Confederate lines. On the 31st of December, 1862, her husband writes: "We have a very honorable place assigned us in line of battle in Hardee's wing. The enemy has not advanced since Saturday." On the 1st of January he writes from the field

of battle as follows: "Our brigade lost more than half its number yesterday. The general and staff safe. My horse shot and killed under me. We hold the battle-field. I do not know whether there will be any more fighting." As a matter of fact, however, they only held a part of the battle-field, and all doubts as to whether there was going to be any more fighting were speedily solved. On the 3d of January her husband again writes as follows: "Field of battle, January 3, 1863. . . . No serious fighting since Wednesday. Enemy intrenched. General Breckinridge attacked them and was repulsed. If things continue thus uncertain many days you had better go home. Keep your trunk ready to move at a moment's notice. Notwithstanding the bitter cold, inclement weather, and no shelter, we are well."

The lady continues in her interesting article: "The fourth day after the battle had begun I was wandering, as usual, aimlessly and restlessly about the grounds, when I saw a horseman approaching the house, and, hoping he might have some tidings of interest to me, I hastened to intercept him. Then I saw a gaunt and travel-stained looking soldier who wearily dismounted, and not till he spoke did I recognize my own husband. How rejoiced I was, one can well imagine, to see him alive, literally just 'out of the jaws of death,' even though he told me he had but a few hours to stay."

It has been asserted by Confederate writers that the battle of Murfreesboro was substantially a drawn battle. I cannot permit this assertion to pass into history without contradiction, and on the contrary I claim that it was a Union victory. It was the first time the two armies of Bragg and Rosecrans had met in battle about equal in number, both confident of success and determined to win victory at any cost. At the close of the battle, on the 31st of December, the Confederates had gained very great advantages. They had broken a portion of our line to pieces and forced the right wing back to the Nashville Turnpike, a distance of more than a mile and

a half. But the new line which Rosecrans had formed was maintained the rest of the day, although most furious efforts were made to break it, until darkness put an end to the battle.

On the 2d of January the division under Breckinridge was broken to pieces and the whole right wing of Bragg's army driven back in utter confusion and disorder. Another hour of daylight would have placed the Union army in Murfreesboro and left Bragg cut off from his supplies and trains. It must be conceded, however, that the loss in Rosecrans' army had been so great it was impossible for him to make any effective pursuit. He was content to occupy the battle-field, the town of Murfreesboro, which had been the objective point of the campaign, and to allow the enemy to retreat without serious pursuit. It was another of those indecisive but fierce and deadly battles which illustrate the whole history of our Civil War, where the army that holds the battle-field and buries the dead may safely claim that it has won the victory.

Rosecrans marched into Murfreesboro, which was at once strongly fortified so that it could be held by a comparatively small force, and remained in our possession until the close of the war. All Middle Tennessee, as a result of the battle, came into our hands, with a vast amount of provisions and army supplies, while Bragg was forced back to the foothills of the Cumberland Mountains, his army discouraged and disheartened by defeat. Nashville, our base of supplies, was made absolutely secure, and all hopes of a successful invasion of Kentucky, except by raiding parties of cavalry, were forever abandoned by the Confederate authorities. A few months later Bragg was forced to retreat across the Tennessee River, and Chattanooga and all East Tennessee passed under the control of the Union forces.

At the close of the campaign Rosecrans seems to have reached the zenith of his career. His personal courage and the skill with which his troops were handled in the face of disaster endeared him to every man in the army.

These high soldierly qualities seemed to desert him after Murfreesboro, and there was a marked failure to come up to the standard he had previously established, until at Chickamauga his army was saved from destruction by the courage and heroism of General George H. Thomas and the men he commanded in that great battle, after Rosecrans had himself given up the field as lost.

IX

THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

BY

H. V. BOYNTON[1]

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND BREVET BRIGADIER-GENERAL
35TH OHIO VOLUNTEERS

Read before the Society January 14, 1906

[1] The writer commanded his regiment in Brannan's Division in the campaign. — ED.

THE CHICKAMAUGA CAMPAIGN

CHICKAMAUGA was, for each side, in proportion to the numbers engaged and the time of their fighting, not only the deadliest battle of our war, but of all modern wars from the days of the first Napoleon to the Appomattox of General Grant.

The strategy of the campaign which led up to the battle is without a rival in our war, and is not surpassed in the story of wars.

It was a campaign successfully prosecuted through over a hundred miles of formidable mountains far within the enemy's lines, and directed against one of the most important Confederate centres, which was at the same time the most notable natural stronghold in the South. And although this was secured as the direct result of the battle of Chickamauga and thereafter permanently held, a very general impression has prevailed throughout the intervening years that this engagement ended in serious defeat for the Union army.

The circumstances under which the Army of the Cumberland moved against Chattanooga in the summer of 1863 were remarkable.

Seven weeks before, it had completed a campaign in which, by brilliant strategy, involving a total loss, in killed, wounded, captured, and missing, of only 570, General Rosecrans had driven Bragg from two fortified camps of great natural and artificial strength, out of Central Tennessee, over the Cumberland Mountains, and across the Tennessee River. This had been accomplished in eleven days by feigning in front and on the right of Bragg, and moving rapidly on his left flank. A violent rainstorm, without precedent in that section for the season, continued day and night throughout the move-

ment, rendering the roads, in which there was everywhere a strong admixture of quicksand, almost impassable, filling the streams above their banks, and causing the troops to operate far in advance of their trains and provisions. In the face of these difficulties there was, from start to finish, most energetic movement, and, at the end, the Army of the Cumberland had advanced its main lines fifty miles, while Bragg had retreated to Chattanooga, a distance of a hundred miles from his recent position.

The Army of the Cumberland then found itself two hundred and sixty-four miles from its base at Louisville, and eighty-three miles from its main depot at Nashville. It was necessary to heavily guard the entire line.

The period intervening between the close of the Tullahoma campaign and the beginning of the movement upon Chattanooga was one of intense activity. The very order for the halt in the pursuit of Bragg through the mountains, given on the 4th of July, contained a clause for instant and heavy details for working the roads and hurrying forward supplies. Many bridges were to be rebuilt, and one hundred miles of badly damaged railroad was to be repaired before proper depots for the next advance could be established and stocked. The energies of the army were unceasingly directed to these ends.

General Rosecrans had between him and Chattanooga, his next objective, two precipitous and barren mountain ranges seventy miles across and twenty-two hundred and thirteen hundred feet, respectively, in height, if he moved on the north side of the Tennessee River; and the river and three ranges, each twenty-two hundred feet in elevation and equally as difficult, if he approached from the west and south of the city. By the latter route the centre of his army would have a march of nearly a hundred miles.

Establishing his headquarters at Winchester, near the base of the Cumberland Mountains, General Rosecrans gave him-

self with ceaseless energy to opening the railroad northward to Murfreesboro, southward through the mountains to Stevenson, and eastward to the summit of the mountain plateau, at Tracy City. Every resource of an army in splendid condition was exhausted to hasten this work, and every other pertaining to an advance.

With this the careful study of an immense and comparatively unknown mountain region, both north and south of the river, became necessary. Its roads were few, and mainly mountain trails. It would be difficult to move an army over these, even if unopposed. A small force could securely hold their passes. Only by strategy of high order and brilliant execution could these frowning ranges be successfully passed. Much distant scouting, and extended expeditions, and many and daring observations by spies were required. Four thousand feet of bridges must be made for the two crossing-points. Such extensive and varied preliminary work demanded weeks, and none of it could be prudently omitted.

While all this work was being pushed to the utmost of a vigorous and willing army's ability, and while General Rosecrans was rapidly deciding upon and executing the preliminaries of his plan, and only twenty days after his victorious army had halted in the storms of a flooded country, far in advance of its trains and provisions, he was justly surprised to receive this dispatch from General Halleck dated July 24:

"You must not wait for Johnston to join Bragg, but must move forward immediately after the latter. Take with you hard bread, sugar, coffee, and salt, and push forward rapidly, supplying yourself with forage, bacon, beef, and mutton in the country. Organize supply parties under your quartermasters and commissaries, and live as much as possible on the country. Reduce your trains to the lowest point possible and move rapidly. There is great disappointment felt here at the slowness of your advance. Unless you can move more

rapidly, your whole campaign will prove a failure, and you will have both Bragg and Johnston against you."

And later in the day the following:

"Private and confidential.

"General, — The tone of some of your replies to my dispatches lately would indicate that you thought I was unnecessarily urging you forward. On the contrary, I have deemed it absolutely necessary, not only for the country but also for your own reputation, that your army should remain no longer inactive. The patience of the authorities here has been completely exhausted, and if I had not repeatedly promised to urge you forward, and begged for delay, you would have been removed from the command."

General Rosecrans at once replied with considerable spirit, setting forth the character of the natural obstacles before him, the condition of his lines of supply, the barrenness of the mountain region, and the nature and activities of the preparations which were being pushed with all the energies which the army could exert, and giving assurance that every means would be exhausted to advance the projected movement.

With all that could be done toward repairing the railroad track and restoring its bridges, it was only possible to get the first provision train through the mountains to Stevenson on the 25th of July, that is one day after the date of these dispatches from General Halleck. No better evidence is needed to show the ignorance at Washington of the country before General Rosecrans than the order to supply his army with bacon, beef, and mutton as he advanced. The region was poor at best, and had been further impoverished in its live stock by Bragg's forces, and an army could have been provisioned with these articles on the Great Sahara as well.

General Rosecrans, after exhaustive and wise study, had

decided upon his plan. It was, to make an extended feint on the river above Chattanooga, cross below, thrust his columns over the intervening mountain ranges, and, descending into the rear of Chattanooga, south of that city, compel Bragg, by threatening his communications, to come out and fight or evacuate the place.

To prepare for this plan it was necessary to provide twenty-five days' rations, to cut loose from the depots, and carry partial supplies of forage, and ammunition sufficient for two battles. It also involved extended movements through nearly one hundred miles of mountain country along the river from Stevenson to Kingston, thirty miles above Washington, and for fifty miles through the low country westward to a point considerably below Bellefont.

It was ascertained that the country to be traversed south of the river was but scantily supplied even with forage. It was impossible to so increase the trains as to carry a sufficient quantity to supply this lack for twenty-five days, the time it was estimated that the army must be absent from its lines of supply, and so it was decided to begin the move about the middle of August when the corn would be ripe, and the trains thus enabled to transport such other supplies as were absolutely needed.

Meantime the work of preparation for such a move as was in contemplation demanded every moment of time, and the extreme of energy.

While thus busy with countless details General Halleck, three days after receiving General Rosecrans' full explanation of the situation, telegraphed abruptly, on August 4:

"Your forces must move forward without further delay. You will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River."

To this General Rosecrans replied:

"Your dispatch, ordering me to move forward without further delay, reporting the movement of each corps until I cross

the Tennessee, is received. As I have been determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations, and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops."

The next day, showing deliberation, General Halleck telegraphed:

"The orders for the advance of your army, and that its movements be reported daily, are peremptory."

It was easy to write this and pass it over to operators on the military telegraph lines. Doubtless the frowning battlements of range after range of formidable mountains seemed like plain country when seen under the haze which settled over them from the distance of Washington. It was easy to put a directing finger on the maps and say: "Move for Chattanooga at once, and keep moving, and let us hear from your advance daily before the close of office hours." But it was a far different and more responsible matter for those charged with the execution of such orders.

To make a parallel case of the Eastern army, it was as if the Army of the Potomac had fought its way across Virginia to Danville, as the Army of the Cumberland had penetrated to Murfreesboro, and after a successful strategic campaign thence to Salisbury, South Carolina, had, with the loss of only a few hundred men, driven Lee over the mountains of that state to Knoxville, and, while bending every energy to repairing railroads, and gathering supplies sufficient to justify leaving its base and crossing the mountains to attack Lee in strong position, Halleck had telegraphed two weeks before the necessary preparations could possibly be completed by the use of every human effort: "Move at once. The orders to cross the mountains are peremptory. Report your advance nightly."

Is it surprising that General Rosecrans and his corps commanders felt outraged, or that his correspondence in reply was

decided and pointed? However, the work of his preparations was not checked, and two days after the receipt of Halleck's dispatches he telegraphed that his plans were complete, and the army nearly ready, and that the movement would begin in a week.

On the 16th of August it was in full tide of execution.

An inspection of the map will reveal the grand features of the plan, and make plain the elements of the most remarkable strategic campaign of the war.

The railroad had been opened through to the Tennessee on the 25th of July, and Sheridan's division had been sent over the mountains to establish depots at Stevenson and Bridgeport. On the 8th of August sufficient supplies of provisions and ammunition had been accumulated along the line to justify issues for a general advance over the Cumberlands to the Tennessee River.

Owing to the narrowness and ruggedness of the Tennessee Valley and the boldness of the abutting mountains it was impossible to take Chattanooga by that approach. For the same reason it could not be successfully attacked in front. An army must either cross the intervening mountains, and then the river above the city, or cross the Cumberland range below it, next the ranges of Raccoon or Sand Mountain, and Lookout, and thus approach the city from the rear.

The first plan would involve from sixty to seventy miles of mountain marching over two ranges, and the dependence upon wagon-trains for bringing supplies over roads which at best were only mountain trails.

By the other, while the move would involve still longer mountain marches, and cutting loose from the depots of supply, it afforded the chance of undisturbed crossing of the river, and kept the river and the railroad below Chattanooga within the Union lines. General Rosecrans, therefore, chose the latter.

It was absolutely necessary to the success of the plan that

General Bragg should be deceived as to the place of crossing and the plan of campaign until it was too late for him to disturb either.

The plan adopted, therefore, involved most vigorous demonstration along the line of the river for many miles above Chattanooga, while the army was quietly concentrated for crossing at points ranging from twenty to forty miles below.

As to the entire mountain region which formed the theatre of the movement the slopes were everywhere precipitous, and except where the few trails ascended from the various coves the rocky escarpment was perpendicular and inaccessible. The valleys were little more than cañons. The roads were narrow and rough, and on the mountain sides so steep as everywhere to require the doubling of teams on artillery and trains, and generally the help of the infantry pulling on ropes, to accomplish the ascents.

The river was twelve hundred and fifty-four feet wide at Caperton's and twenty-seven hundred feet at Bridgeport, the points where the bridges were to be thrown.

When the movement began the Union army lay along the foot of the Cumberland Mountains. McCook's corps was on the right near Winchester, Thomas in the centre at Decherd, and Cowan and Crittenden on the left at Manchester and McMinnville, with Minty's cavalry still further to the left. Of McCook's three divisions Sheridan's was chiefly out of sight, above Bridgeport and Stevenson; Thomas had four divisions and Crittenden three.

The cavalry consisted of five brigades; of these, four operated on the right of the Union army, and one on the left.

The general advance to the river began on the 16th of August. At daylight on the 19th Crittenden, to whom the demonstration above Chattanooga was committed, had crossed the Cumberlands at three points and occupied the Sequatchie Valley from Jasper to Pikeville.

Minty had crossed the mountains still further to the north-

ward, attacked Dibrell's cavalry, which was on its way to reconnoitre the Union left, drove it back over the extremity of Walden's Ridge into the Valley of the Tennessee, and across the river at Kingston, some seventy-five miles above Chattanooga. Minty thence rode down the valley towards that city.

Meantime Hazen's and Wagner's brigades were thrown over Walden's Ridge on the 19th, and Wilder's mounted infantry reached a point opposite Chattanooga on the 20th and opened its guns on the city.

These three brigades and Minty's cavalry, numbering 7000 men under the command of Hazen, began a series of demonstrations which fully convinced Bragg that Rosecrans was seeking a junction with Burnside, whose 20,000 men were moving toward Knoxville, and that Chattanooga was to be attacked from above. Union forces appeared at every ford for over seventy miles. Long lines of tents were pitched on the crest of Walden's Ridge, and at night fires were kindled at intervals for miles along its escarpments. At dusk, and before daylight, bugles were sounded at widely separated points. Two or three batteries, by continued circling through openings visible from the other side of the river, conveyed the impression of the arrival of heavy artillery trains. There was ostentatious hammering upon and throwing of lumber in the mouths of all the creeks, and into all were thrown chips and pieces sawn off to float down and create the belief that boats were being prepared for crossing.

Bragg was thoroughly deceived. Buckner was hurried down from East Tennessee to save him from being caught between Rosecrans and Burnside, this being decided to be Rosecrans' first object. Hill's corps at Tyner's was advanced to cover all the fords from the Hiawassee to the Chickamauga, and Hindman and parts of Breckinridge's were dispatched to support him.

So completely was Bragg misled that the infantry brigade

sent to watch Sheridan, when the latter first made his appearance at Bridgeport, after observing for some days the sluggish work which Sheridan, as a part of the plan to deceive, was purposely performing on trestles for a bridge, was withdrawn to Chattanooga to help resist what was believed to be the real line of the Union advance above the city.

Meantime the whole army had moved simultaneously with Crittenden. The cavalry on McCook's left was dispatched toward Athens and Decatur and directed to make only a show of advance in order to deepen the impression of the enemy that the movement in that direction was a feint. McCook crossed the Cumberland to Bellefont and Stevenson. Thomas came down to Jasper, Battle Creek, and Shellmound, and with one division toward Stevenson. The cavalry made slight show on the river far below Bellefont, and thus the front of this imposing movement extended over one hundred and fifty miles of territory, most of it among formidable mountains, and yet was progressing exactly according to plan. There was no departure from this plan at any point, nor was there, anywhere, delay.

The right wing of the army was, as far as possible, kept hidden. The small force it was necessary to show only strengthened into conviction the enemy's belief that the point of danger was above Chattanooga.

The ten days of this concealment were busily occupied in preparing bridges, rafts, small boats, and other means of crossing the deep and wide river, and in accumulating sufficient supplies for the final advance. All this time the lines of fires were extended and kept bright on Walden's Ridge, and the tumultuous activity of Hazen's forces was maintained. Bragg's concentration, and fortification of fords, to prevent the expected crossing in this quarter was also continued.

At daylight, on the 29th of August, a brigade carrying pontoons dashed out of the woods at Caperton's, and launched them speedily, and a strong force was rowed to the south shore. Only a small cavalry picket opposed.

The next day Davis, holding the advance, camped on top of Raccoon Mountain. On the 4th of September he had taken possession of Winston's Pass, forty-two miles south of Chattanooga, at Valley Head, and the next day his head of column was over Lookout, headed toward Alpine. On the 9th McCook occupied Alpine, and the rest of his column was between that point and Valley Head and well closed up.

Brannan, at the mouth of Battle Creek, had constructed rafts, and cut out canoes from immense poplar trees, and with these crossed his division, except that those men who could swim gathered rails enough to float their guns and knapsacks, and pushing them before them effectually hastened the crossing.

Reynolds also crossed with rafts, and a few small boats, at Shellmound.

Thomas' four divisions were over in three days. On the 7th he was at Trenton, and on the 8th his heads of columns had seized Cooper's and Stevens' Gaps on the eastern slope of Lookout.

Crittenden marched down the Sequatchie on the 1st of September, and began crossing at its mouth the next day. Hazen's force was left to continue its demonstrations.

On the 4th Crittenden, though without bridges, had crossed by the methods which Brannan and Reynolds had used, and, turning up the Tennessee Valley, on the 6th he was beyond Whiteside and within seven miles of Chattanooga.

So successful had the whole movement been that General Hill, in his official report, says that Bragg only learned by accident, through a citizen, and several days after the event, that McCook had crossed at Caperton's. It was then too late to effectually oppose the Union army on the slopes where it was moving.

The moment that Rosecrans' troops began the crossing of Lookout Mountain, Bragg, seeing that his communications were in danger, decided to evacuate Chattanooga and await

reënforcements, which, unknown to the Washington authorities or to General Rosecrans, were on the way from Lee's army in Virginia and from Johnston's in Mississippi.

His retreat began on the night of the 7th and was completed the night of the 8th. His headquarters were established at Lafayette, but his rear guard halted, after crossing the Chickamauga, at Lee & Gordon's Mills.

On the 9th Crittenden passed around the northern point of Lookout and entered Chattanooga with a division. Leaving one light brigade he marched at once in pursuit to Rossville, and his other two divisions, turning to the right after passing Lookout, marched to the same point without entering the city.

Wagner, from Hazen's lines, crossed on the 9th above the city, and his brigade was selected to remain in Chattanooga. On the 10th Hazen and Wilder crossed and marched out to join Crittenden, then at the crossing of the Chickamauga near Ringgold. All of these crossings were without bridges. There was some fording and much swimming.

Thus, without fighting, except the little between Minty and Dibrell on the extreme left, a few replies from Chattanooga to Wilder's guns, and some light cavalry skirmishing before Alpine, General Rosecrans had successfully repeated, though on much larger scale, the strategy of the Tullahoma campaign, and by moving through a wide region of tremendous mountain difficulties had forced Bragg out of his apparently impregnable stronghold, and, in a sense, but not in a military sense, had secured Chattanooga, the main objective of his campaign. Military possession could not be secured until the Union army had been concentrated at the city, or between that point and the enemy.

General Rosecrans has been censured in high places for so widely separating his army when crossing Lookout into the rear of Bragg. The answer to this criticism is simple. It was necessary to do it this way or not at all. It is not customary

to advance an army by corps, in single file, in an active campaign, into an enemy's country, and the only roads crossing this range next south of Chattanooga were the two that were used. Even these were scarcely more than mountain trails.

General Rosecrans had crossed the Tennessee with an effective force, of all arms equipped for duty, of a few hundred more than 60,000. Of this number Wagner's brigade with 2061 effectives held Chattanooga, leaving the Union force in front of Bragg slightly less than 58,000.[1] It was several thousand less at the battle.

In a letter from General Lee to President Davis dated September 14, 1863, the following figures of Bragg's actual and prospective strength are thus stated:

"If the report sent to me by General Cooper since my return from Richmond is correct, General Bragg had, on the 20th of August last, 51,101 effective men; General Buckner, 16,118. He was to receive from General Johnston 9000. His total force will, therefore, be 76,219; as large a number as I presume he can operate with. This is independent of the local troops, which you may recollect he reported as exceeding his expectations."

It will be well to remember, in connection with these official figures, that Bragg after the battle reported Longstreet's force, which was not included by Lee, at 5000. This, according to the figures furnished General Lee, gave him 81,219.[2] According to General Johnston's correspondence, after he had sent 9000 to Bragg, he subsequently dispatched him two small brigades, and these latter reached him the day before the battle.

General Rosecrans had every reason and every right to suppose that Burnside was detaining the larger part of Buckner's command, and the results of the Tullahoma campaign and the remarkable triumph of the present movement made

[1] 58,222 effectives engaged in the battle of Chickamauga. N. & L. 105. — Ed.

[2] 66,326 effectives engaged in the battle. N. & L. 106. — Ed.

him confident of his ability to cope successfully with Bragg's army wherever he could reach it.

Because, at this juncture, he ordered the vigorous pursuit of a retreating army which had abandoned a great natural stronghold of incalculable if not of vital importance to the Confederacy, rather than face him, he has been widely criticised.

Suppose, with his victorious army, — standing in the pride of its power, and exulting in its achievements on the flank of this retreating enemy, its provisions plentiful, its ammunition abundant, — he had made no move in pursuit, but had withdrawn from Bragg's front to Chattanooga had he found it possible to do so? Would the country have been satisfied? Would the War Department, which had urged the forward movement and attempted to force it in advance of preparation, have approved the sudden cessation of offensive movements? With the mailed hand raised, and armed with thunderbolts, should he not attempt to strike?

When, on the 10th of September, he gave the orders for a vigorous pursuit, he was justified in believing that he was dealing with Bragg's army as he had known it. Two days after crossing the river, namely, on September 6, Halleck, in reply to inquiries, had telegraphed: "There is no reason now to suppose that any of Lee's troops have been detached"; and the day after Rosecrans' orders for pursuit were issued, Halleck telegraphed: "It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is reënforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible."

Not till after Rosecrans himself had discovered it did the Washington authorities send word that Longstreet had gone to Bragg.

But Rosecrans' heads of columns at once developed Bragg concentrating for offensive operations.

McCook, from Alpine, pushed his cavalry within seven miles of Lafayette and found no signs of retreat.

Negley, the advance of Thomas, moved out from Stevens' Gap towards Lafayette and found the enemy in force in the gaps of Pigeon Mountain. On the 11th Negley, reënforced by Baird, was heavily attacked, but fought stubbornly, and withdrew successfully to the mountain where Brannan and Reynolds had already arrived, and where Thomas' four divisions were placed in impregnable positions.

Crittenden, from the morning of the 10th to the night of the 11th, had been most energetically occupied with Bragg's rear guard, and on the latter day had discovered that it was strongly established on the Lafayette Road, near and south of Lee & Gordon's.

General Rosecrans had also learned of Buckner's presence from East Tennessee, and of some of Johnston's troops from Mississippi. Longstreet's movement was as yet unknown. Bragg had simply withdrawn to await reënforcements, and was rapidly preparing to interpose between the Union army and Chattanooga. With the Confederacy rapidly rallying unmolested, and otherwise unoccupied, to assault him, it became, as he expresses it in his report, a matter of life and death to concentrate his army.

It has been insisted by many that General Rosecrans should, upon finding Chattanooga evacuated, have at once recrossed Thomas and McCook to the west side of Lookout, and moved them into Chattanooga under cover of that wing.

But it is easy to see that, as Bragg was then sure of his reënforcements and ready to advance, the moment McCook's and Thomas' columns had ascended Lookout, Crittenden would have been at the mercy of Bragg unless saved by rapid retreat; and that, before Thomas could have reached the point of Lookout, Bragg, who was only one day's easy march from it, would again have occupied it in force, and the object of Rosecrans' campaign would have been utterly defeated. Only concentration east of Lookout would enable Crittenden to hold his position and make the possession of Chattanooga

possible. Such concentration was also not only on the shortest lines, but on the only lines that would admit of constantly holding the Union army between Bragg and the city.

The failure at Washington to discover the movement of Longstreet's corps is one of the remarkable incidents of the campaign. On the 14th of September General Lee wrote President Davis that, although he had only communicated the order for transportation of Longstreet's troops to the quartermaster on the 6th, he had been informed that the New York "Herald" of the 9th contained the movement in the order in which the divisions moved. As a matter of fact, the "Herald" announced on the 8th, over the signature of one of its responsible army correspondents, that Longstreet had gone south, and attention was called on the editorial page to this dispatch and its important information. And yet this seems to have escaped notice, or serious attention, at Washington, for three days later General Halleck telegraphed General Rosecrans: "It is reported here by deserters that a part of Bragg's army is reënforcing Lee. It is important that the truth of this should be ascertained as early as possible."

It was while waiting for Longstreet's troops to reach Atlanta, and for further reënforcements from Mississippi and Charleston, that Bragg had concluded to strike Thomas' corps from Lafayette, with the idea that he could crush it in its isolation, before help could reach it from McCook, while Crittenden could easily be prevented from rendering aid.

Here, again, unbounded criticism has been visited upon General Rosecrans for what is called this critical exposure of his army. But a glance at the map, and an examination of the forces available on either side, disposes of this ground of attack.

McCook, at Alpine, with his trains on the mountains and his front and flanks covered with cavalry, was in no danger; his advance was within striking distance of Lafayette, and the roads were good.

Thomas, with four divisions at or near Stevens' Gap, occupied Missionary Ridge from the point where its spurs touched Lookout to Cooper's Gap. The space between the Ridge and the mountain was well watered, and was ample for his trains and reserve artillery. He had more troops, by five brigades, in position in this great natural fort than the number with which some days afterwards he held Snodgrass Hill against Longstreet's entire wing. At this time, also, Bragg had received a portion of his reënforcements. Had he marched against Thomas with only equal numbers, and it would have been madness to have assaulted in such position with less, his remaining force would have been at the mercy of Crittenden and McCook on his flanks.

Although General Bragg held Generals Hill and Hindman and others responsible for the failure to overthrow Thomas, the above was the view held and firmly expressed by General Hindman in his official report, and in it he had the support of his own general officers and of at least one corps commander, General Hill.

Meantime McCook had been ordered to join Thomas at Stevens' Gap, by the road on the top of Lookout, and Bragg, having withdrawn from Thomas' front, his corps was gradually extended towards Lee & Gordon's Mills.

Crittenden was then operating with great vigor between Chickamauga and Ringgold, the energy of his movements creating an impression of a strength far greater than three divisions and two mounted brigades.

On the afternoon of the 12th General Polk, with his own corps in advance and Walker supporting, was ordered to attack Crittenden at daylight. But so vigorously had his deployed line been engaged by a single brigade from Crittenden that he retired to a defensive position, and at midnight called on Bragg for heavy reënforcements. Being ordered the next morning by Bragg, who had come on the ground in person, to attack, it was discovered that Rosecrans had directed Critten-

den to hastily withdraw behind the Chickamauga. This he did, occupying the strong position on the bluffs of the river, near Lee & Gordon's.

Again disappointed, General Bragg, regarding the corps of Rosecrans' army as within supporting distance of each other, began to move his trains and supplies to safe positions, and dispose of his forces, threatening Rosecrans along the line of the Chickamauga, below Lee & Gordon's.

Thomas had held his right and centre at Stevens' Gap until the 17th, when McCook had reached him. Reynolds was then moved to the left to Pond Spring, within four miles of Crawfish Springs, in front of which a part of Crittenden's corps was in position.

McCook had been unable to find a guide for the road on the top of Lookout Mountain which he had been ordered to take, and as all the information he could gather either made its existence or its practicability doubtful, he felt justified, as the emergency of his movement was great, in assuming no risk. He therefore decided to join Thomas by the road he knew, and therefore recrossed Lookout, with his leading divisions, at Valley Head, ascended it again on the road where Thomas had crossed from Trenton, and so joined him at Stevens' Gap on the 17th. But for this delay Rosecrans would have been solidly concentrated before battle between the enemy and Chattanooga.

Bragg had received his reënforcements from every quarter — from in front of Washington, Knoxville, Charleston, Mobile, and Vicksburg, while Governor Brown, on the 5th of September, had called the whole force of local state troops into the field to relieve veterans on guard duty and at all minor posts, and in Mississippi the forces at the parole camp were similarly utilized.

Rosecrans confronted the Confederacy. Every other Union army was quiet in its camp. Longstreet's corps had been withdrawn from under the eyes of the authorities at Washington,

Johnston had arrived from Mississippi without a movement from Vicksburg to hold or delay him. Buckner had left Burnside's front without molestation, and Burnside, although fully informed of Rosecrans' plans before the latter crossed the river, and though his outposts connected with Rosecrans on the 8th of September, and he had been peremptorily ordered fifteen times by Halleck and three times by Lincoln to join Rosecrans with haste, utterly failed to do so, though he had promised cordial coöperation.

Grant had foreseen this rallying of the Confederacy in Rosecrans' front, and in July, soon after the surrender of Vicksburg, had vainly urged a diversion against Mobile by his unoccupied troops. He thus relates the matter in his memoirs:

"It was at this time that I recommended to the General-in-Chief the movement against Mobile. I knew the peril the Army of the Cumberland was in, being depleted continually, not only by ordinary casualties but also by having to detach troops to hold its constantly extending lines over which to draw supplies, while the enemy in front was as constantly being strengthened. Mobile was important to the enemy, and in the absence of a threatening force was guarded by little else than artillery. If threatened by land and from the water at the same time, the prize would fall easily, or troops would have to be sent to its defence. Those troops would necessarily come from Bragg. My judgment was overruled, and the troops under my command were dissipated over other parts of the country where it was thought they could render the most service."

General Rosecrans, before he crossed the river, had suggested a diversion by Grant, and had repeatedly urged that Burnside be brought down to his flank. But not an order was given in any direction, except the fruitless one to Burnside, until Longstreet, and Buckner, and Johnston, were found with Bragg. Then, when it was utterly impossible to get a man or

a rifle to Rosecrans before the impending battle, the energetic orders of the War Department for reënforcements to march from every quarter, became frequent and vigorous beyond precedent.

Thus situated, but undismayed and confident, the Army of the Cumberland stripped itself for the battle which was to decide the possession of Chattanooga.

Bragg, having received all his reënforcements, except a portion of Longstreet's column, which, however, had reached Atlanta, issued the following orders for a general movement to begin at six o'clock on the 18th of September:

Headquarters of the Army of the Tenn.
In the Field, Leet's Tanyard,
(Circular.) Sept. 18, 1863.

1. Johnson's column (Hood's), on crossing at or near Reed's Bridge, will turn to the left by the most practicable route, and sweep up the Chickamauga toward Lee & Gordon's Mills.

2. Walker, crossing at Alexander's Bridge, will unite in this move and push vigorously on the enemy's flank and rear in the same direction.

3. Buckner, crossing at Tedford's Ford, will join in the movement to the left, and press the enemy up the stream from Polk's front from Lee & Gordon's Mills.

4. Polk will press his forces to the front of Lee & Gordon's Mills, and if met by too much resistance to cross, will bear to the right and cross at Dalton's Ford, or at Tedford's, as may be necessary, and join in the attack wherever the enemy may be.

5. Hill will cover our left flank from an advance of the enemy from the cove, and by pressing the cavalry in his front ascertain if the enemy is reënforcing at Lee & Gordon's Mills, in which event he will attack them in flank.

6. Wheeler's cavalry will hold the gaps in Pigeon Mountain, and cover our rear and left and bring up stragglers.

7. All teams, etc., not with troops, should go toward Ringgold and Dalton, beyond Taylor's Ridge. All cooking should be done at the trains. Rations, when cooked, will be forwarded to the troops.

8. The above movement will be executed with the utmost promptness, vigor, and persistence.

By command of General Bragg:

GEORGE WM. BRENT,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

On the Union side the period from the 13th to the 18th was a season of great anxiety. At the first-named date it had become evident that Bragg was concentrating for battle. While the orders to McCook to join Thomas were received at midnight of the 13th, it was not till the morning of the 17th that his columns were able to close upon Thomas in McLemore's Cove. Three brigades of the reserve corps under General Steedman reached Rossville on the 14th and operated in the direction of Ringgold, thus protecting Crittenden's flank. On the 18th Rosecrans' army was concentrated, and at four o'clock of that day moved to the left with the purpose of thrusting itself between Bragg and Chattanooga. Meantime, on the same day, Bragg had been moving down the Chickamauga since daylight with a similar object in view, namely, to cross the river, seize the Lafayette Road and place his army between Rosecrans and Chattanooga, or, as Bragg himself designates the move in his report, "our efforts to gain the main road to Chattanooga in his rear."

Minty's cavalry at Reed's Bridge, supported by Daniel McCook's infantry brigade of the reserve corps, and Wilder's mounted infantry at Alexander's, had, by close and brilliant fighting, delayed the heads of Bragg's columns so that a crossing was not effected until the middle of the afternoon in Wilder's front, and not until five o'clock before Minty. The Confederate crossing and the march toward Crittenden's posi-

tion then continued well into the night, and was resumed at daylight, the whole movement, and the formation of the line for attack, being predicated upon the supposition that Crittenden held the left of the Union army. And so he did at sunset. But that night was big with fate. It brought the utter defeat of Bragg's plan of battle and the sure possession of Chattanooga to the Union army.

The field of the approaching two days' battle is easily defined. The Chickamauga River bounded it on the east, and Missionary Ridge on the west, while that part of the Lafayette or State Road running north from Lee & Gordon's Mills through the centre of the field to Rossville, formed the axis and the prize of the fight. Whichever army secured that, could grasp Chattanooga. It is eight miles from Lee & Gordon's to Rossville. The country between the Chickamauga and the Lafayette Road was for the most part heavily wooded, with much underbrush. It rises gradually and rolls gently from the river back to the spurs of Missionary Ridge. West of the Lafayette Road there are a number of farms, but each of these contained considerable forest, so that only small areas of the field were visible from any point.

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 19th Bragg's formidable columns of attack were in position. So near was their deployment that Crittenden's guns had caused casualties in the front line as they were taking position.

As against the three Union divisions it was a tremendous array, composed of seven divisions, four in the front line and three in the second. The right was held by Law and Bushrod Johnson's divisions, the left by Stewart and Preston; while Walker's two divisions — Liddell and Gist — supported the right, and Cheatham's division with five brigades the left. With these, in formidable array, Bragg stood ready to strike Crittenden and crush him back on Thomas, whom he supposed to be still far beyond Crawfish Springs, with McCook on the extreme left at Stevens' Gap. When the blow descended it

was to block Rosecrans' advance to Chattanooga, drive his columns back over their narrow and precipitous roads, and disperse the army among the mountains.

At eight o'clock the order for attack was given. But just as his troops were springing into line, and the officers were taking positions for advance, there broke upon Bragg's ears the roar of battle rolling in from a point some miles to his right and rear. The order for attack was suspended until this mystery could be understood.

Forrest had moved down the river at an early hour to reconnoitre and protect Bragg's right. As batteries opened and added to the roar of musketry it was evident that he had struck a heavy force. Soon Forrest himself dashed up to the vicinity of Alexander's house in search of supporting infantry. Wilson's brigade, which was just closing up on Walker's corps, was turned from its advance and hurried to the right.

The battle became heavier, and rolled nearer, Walker's corps was called for, hurriedly detached and plunged into this unexpected fight. In another hour Cheatham's five brigades were hastily marched to the right and thrown in. And thus Bragg's plan of battle had broken and disappeared from the field of action almost as quickly as the morning fogs.

Rosecrans, by a night march, had inverted his army. At daylight Thomas with three divisions was across the Lafayette Road at Kelly's. At half-after seven his advance division had attacked Forrest at Reed's Bridge. McCook's corps was at Crawfish Springs ready to move into the space between Crittenden and Thomas, and Rosecrans' army was between Bragg and Chattanooga, and the battle for the city had begun.

Heavily guarding all the fords on his right flank, and screened from the view of the enemy by the forests, Generals Thomas' and McCook's divisions had been drawn out of the woods at four o'clock the preceding afternoon, and the march

from McLemore's Cove to turn Bragg's right began. At the same hour, as has been described, Bragg in force was crossing the Chickamauga at Reed's and Alexander's bridges to turn the Union left, each aiming to interpose between the other and Chattanooga.

As the head of Thomas' column started, Van Cleve and Palmer of Crittenden were moved from the vicinity of Crawfish Springs and strongly posted on the left of Wood, already established on the rocky cliffs at Lee & Gordon's. Here, at night, they faced the heads of Bragg's advancing columns.

By dusk Thomas' and McCook's columns had been drawn out into well-ordered position for advance.

It was ten miles to the Kelly farm, and three from there, by way of McDaniel's, to Reed's Bridge.

All night those solid columns streamed forward, the troops marching in the fields, leaving the roads clear for the ammunition trains and the artillery. It was chilly, and at times foggy. The troops set fire to the fences, and soon the line of march for many miles was light and warm. The ammunition trains moved between lines of fire. The forests concealed the movement from the enemy, while the light was evidently accepted as that from the camps of the evening before, and thus, instead of revealing, helped to hide the movement.

At daylight Thomas arrived at the Kelly farm, and Baird, in the advance, was posted across the Lafayette Road facing south. Brannan following passed on toward the McDaniel house to form on his left, and Reynolds pressed closely on the rear. Negley had been halted at Crawfish Springs and thrown forward toward the Chickamauga to occupy the ground from which Van Cleve and Palmer of Crittenden had been withdrawn when sent to form on the left of Wood at Lee & Gordon's.

The troops had just begun to make coffee when reports from the vicinity of Reed's Bridge made it seem prudent to General Thomas to explore his front in that direction.

Without breakfast, Brannan's division was sent east on the road from McDaniel's to Reed's, while Baird was pushed directly across the Kelly farm and through the heavy woods beyond.

At 7.30 Brannan's three brigades, Croxton, Connell, and Van Derveer, struck Armstrong's division and Pegram's brigade of Forrest's corps in front of Jay's Mills, and attacked vigorously. Forrest's troops fought dismounted, and repeatedly assaulted Brannan's lines with the utmost stubbornness, but were pushed back with great loss. So desperate did his situation become that Forrest, after dispatching several aides for help, himself rode off in haste to find infantry supports. Meeting Wilson, the rear brigade of Walker's corps, Forrest conducted him in person toward his hard-pressed lines. During his absence, Pegram' s brigade in front of Van Derveer, the left of Brannan, had lost nearly one fourth of its men, while Dibrell in front of Connell's and Croxton's brigades had also suffered terribly. The arrival of Wilson's infantry temporarily relieved these lines, but Croxton, Connell, and Van Derveer finally repulsed both Wilson and the assembled cavalry. Ector's infantry brigade was next hurried to this field, where the fighting had become desperate and almost hand to hand. Croxton, after replenishing ammunition, drove Ector back. At nine o'clock Baird, pushing rapidly in on Brannan's right, was taken in flank by Liddell's division of Walker, consisting of Walthall's and Govan's brigades, which had been sent to check the pursuit of Forrest and his infantry supports. At first Baird was thrown into considerable confusion on his right, but with the assistance of Johnson's division of McCook's corps, which arrived at noon, Walker's four brigades were soon forced behind Forrest, who, with his supports, had been driven by Brannan's troops back close to the river near Jay's Mill, where they all remained unengaged throughout the afternoon.

Nothing could have exceeded the valor and the persistence

of Forrest's and Walker's assaults, but their losses were such as to compel their withdrawal.

Next, Bragg dispatched Cheatham's five brigades to the assistance of Walker. They arrived on the ground at noon, just as Walker had been finally repulsed.

As Cheatham started from his position in reserve, Crittenden, without waiting for orders, sent Palmer up the Lafayette Road toward the sound of the furious battle. Cheatham had arrived on Johnson's front just in time to check his pursuit of Walker, but Cheatham himself was immediately taken in flank by Palmer and obliged to retire. Johnson then drove Cheatham's front line back on its reserves, and then, in turn, forced these to the rear, driving them to the vicinity of Alexander's house, and holding them there until five o'clock.

While this battle between Cheatham and Johnson was progressing with great fury from two till five o'clock, Brannan and Baird, having utterly broken Bragg's extreme right, were withdrawn to higher ground near the Lafayette Road to await developments on other portions of the field.

At the same hour a still more desperate engagement was in progress on the Lafayette Road in the vicinity of Brotherton's, a mile and a half west of Cheatham's centre.

While Johnson was steadily driving Cheatham back toward Alexander's, Stewart's division, which had been sent to Cheatham's left, wheeled to the west, and at two o'clock became hotly engaged, first with the right of Palmer, next with two brigades of Van Cleve's, which Crittenden had hurried from Lee & Gordon's to support Palmer, and next with the right of Reynolds. Stewart, reënforced by Bushrod Johnson, drove Van Cleve across the Lafayette Road at Brotherton's, and finally forced him over the Dyer farm and across the Dry Valley Road. Part of Stewart's then turned toward Reynolds at the Poe house, but was repulsed at dark after a stubborn fight. At the same time Harker, of Wood's division, coming up from Lee & Gordon's, had moved at double-quick along

the Lafayette Road, and, before Johnson was aware of Harker's approach, the latter dashed on his lines from the rear and dispersed them. At the same time Brannan arrived from the left, and Negley from the right, where he had been hotly engaged above Lee & Gordon's, both having been sent for when the movement of the centre assumed formidable proportions. In the face of these advances, and the active fighting of Harker, the rebel line was forced back across the Lafayette Road and into the forests east of Brotherton's.

This, as well as that in front of Johnson, had been a fierce and independent battle.

Still a third was at the time in progress a mile further south, at Vineyard farm.

Davis had reached the vicinity of Widow Glenn's, from Crawfish Springs, at noon, and at two o'clock was sent with his two brigades, Heg and Carlin, across the Lafayette Road, with orders to find the Confederate left and attack it. In conjunction with this movement, Barnes' brigade, which Van Cleve had left on his line, moved in on the right of Davis, and Wilder's mounted infantry, armed with repeating carbines, fighting on foot, on his left. The whole line was soon fiercely engaged with Trigg's brigade, of Preston, and all of Bushrod Johnson's division. After two hours' fighting at close range, and many charges and counter-charges, Davis' line was driven back across the Lafayette Road at four o'clock.

Sheridan, at Crawfish Springs, was sent for before three o'clock to replace Wood, but without waiting for his arrival, Wood immediately hastened to Davis' assistance, and arrived on his line at half-past three. Harker, of Wood, had passed on, as already described, and fallen on Fulton's brigade, then in pursuit of Van Cleve. Buell, of Wood, halted to assist Davis, and at first was thrown into partial confusion by the latter's retiring lines. Sheridan had left Lytle's brigade at Lee & Gordon's, and pushed on at once and in haste to Davis' assistance. Reaching his vicinity, Bradley's brigade

was immediately sent in with Buell, of Wood, on his left, and thus reënforced and by deadly fighting, the enemy at five o'clock had been finally driven back into the woods east of the Vineyard farm.

There was then quiet on every part of the field till about half an hour after sundown, when a furious battle broke out on Johnson's lines, which had been successfully maintained near Alexander's house. Baird had been brought forward on Johnson's left, and, under instructions to withdraw to the Kelly farm at nightfall, the two divisions were just beginning the movement when they were assaulted with great fury by Cleburne.

The latter, about two o'clock, had been ordered from his position above Lee & Gordon's, on the east side of the Chickamauga, to the right of Bragg's army at Jay's Mill. The narrow roads, obstructed with trains and artillery, delayed his march, so that he did not reach his destination till six o'clock. This was sunset. Forming in the rear of Walker, and supported by part of Cheatham, he fell with great vigor upon Johnson and Baird, and a terrific and confused fight occurred in the gloom of the thick woods, and over a front of a mile in its tangled thickets. The Union divisions, however, maintained their lines, and, as darkness settled, withdrew slowly out of fire, and took up position near Kelly's.

Hindman had not been able up to 2 P. M. to make the least impression upon Wood at Lee & Gordon's, and Negley, in front of Glass' Mill, had, by sharp fighting, effectually held Breckinridge at bay. Soon after 2 o'clock both Hindman and Breckinridge were withdrawn and moved into the position Cleburne had vacated.

Lytle's one brigade at Lee & Gordon's remained unmolested there, the only force on either side to mark the objective point of Bragg's morning plan of battle.

Thus ended the first day's fight. Bragg's plan of battle had been entirely thwarted, and the Union army was still

between him and Chattanooga. Rosecrans' trains during the day had safely passed along the Dry Valley Road through McFarland's Gap to Chattanooga. Rosecrans had been successful at every point.

The losses on each side were very great. There were no works on either side, and the lines had fought stubbornly at close quarters hour after hour. The Union troops had marched all night, and without halting for breakfast had fought all day over a field that was almost entirely without water. The various divisions of each army bivouacked on the ground where their fighting ceased.

Active preparations for the battle the next day continued throughout the night on both sides.

Every available man had been hotly engaged on the Union side.

Of Bragg's army, the divisions of Breckinridge and Hindman and Preston's large division, excepting one brigade, had not been seriously engaged. At eleven o'clock at night General Longstreet arrived on the field in person, and with him came Kershaw's and Law's brigades of Hood's division, from Virginia. Gist, of Walker's division, also arrived from Rome, Georgia.

A partial attempt was made by each commander to reunite corps and divisions, which had become widely separated in each army by the exigencies of the battle. But this could only be accomplished in part on either side.

Johnson of McCook, and Palmer of Crittenden, who had fought on Thomas' line throughout the day, remained with him. On the Confederate side, Hindman and Cheatham, of Polk's corps, were separated from each other by three intervening divisions.

At midnight General Rosecrans decided to refuse his right wing. During this movement, which began before day, his divisions were to some extent reunited. Sheridan's division was brought back from the Lafayette Road, near Vineyard's,

to a position on the high ground near Widow Glenn's. Here it was joined by Lytle's brigade from Lee & Gordon's. Barnes was withdrawn with Sheridan and sent to Van Cleve. Davis was brought over from Vineyard's and placed on Sheridan's left, while Harrison and Wilder's mounted infantry were posted to the right and rear of Sheridan. Negley remained in the position near Brotherton's into which he had fought himself at nightfall.

Early on the 20th the divisions of the Union line were thus established from left to right: Baird, Johnson, Palmer, Reynolds, Brannan, Negley, Davis, and Sheridan. Wood and Van Cleve were in general reserve in rear of the right centre. It had been agreed at the midnight council that Brannan should be left as the reserve for General Thomas, and that Negley should be moved to the left of Baird to close the interval to the Lafayette Road. But before daylight two brigades of Brannan had been moved forward and placed in echelon on Reynolds' right and rear, and by some mistake General Thomas was not notified. Wood, who was to relieve Negley, had not arrived at 6.30. These errors a few hours later caused most serious results.

Bragg's divisions, counting from the right, were thus arranged: Forrest on the extreme right with three divisions of cavalry, Pegram's and Armstrong's, the latter dismounted, Breckinridge, Cleburne, Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman in the front line, Walker's two divisions, Gist and Liddell, were in reserve in rear of Breckinridge, Cheatham with five brigades in rear of Cleburne, Law and Kershaw in columns by divisions in rear of Johnson, and Preston to the left and rear of Hindman. Longstreet commanded the left wing beginning with Stewart's division, and Polk the right wing. The Confederate infantry considerably overlapped both flanks of the Union army. On the Confederate right Forrest had two divisions, or four brigades, of cavalry against one, Minty's. On the Confederate left each army had two divisions of

cavalry under Generals Mitchell and Wheeler as corps commanders. The cavalry on this flank, however, operated about five miles from the infantry flanks.

Bragg ordered the battle to open, at daylight, on his right, and to be taken up successively by divisions to the left. But a heavy fog hung over the field until nine o'clock, and Breckinridge's troops, which had marched nearly all night, were scarcely in condition to assault at that hour; neither could the rest of Polk's wing be in any degree certain of its lines, for the fog.

This delay had brought John Beatty, Negley's reserve brigade, to Baird, and Johnson had sent his reserve of Dodge's brigade, so that at the opening of the battle Baird's line had been extended to within about two hundred yards of the Lafayette Road.

Breckinridge attacked at 9.30 with his three brigades in line, Adams on the right, Stovall in the centre, and Helm on the left. Helm struck the salient of Baird's left and assaulted there three times with great fury. His lines were shattered, considerably over half his men killed and wounded, and Helm himself was killed.

Cleburne and Stewart attacked at ten o'clock on the fronts of Johnson, Palmer, and Reynolds, assaulting with great vigor and as rapidly as their broken lines could be re-formed, but in every case unsuccessfully. The Union troops had shielded themselves with rude log-works which ran along a low crest, and overlooked the wooded slopes over which the Confederates advanced.

While the attacks of Cleburne and Stewart were at their height, Breckinridge had gained the rear of the Union line, and had reached a point where his musketry began to take effect on the rear of Reynolds' line at the very time Stewart was hotly engaging it in front. When Helm encountered Baird's works and was shattered in front of them, Stovall and Adams had continued westward to the Lafayette Road, op-

posed only as Beatty's and Dodge's brigades could turn a part of their attention away from Helm. Reaching that road, these two brigades of Breckinridge marched directly south, having the road between them, and had reached the rear of Johnson's left unopposed.

At this point Adams, the right of Breckinridge, found itself confronted with Stanley's brigade of Negley, and Van Derveer's brigade, the reserve of Brannan, while proceeding hurriedly to Baird, marched out of the woods from the west of the Lafayette Road in two lines, without knowing of Breckinridge's presence, to find itself enfiladed by the fire of Adams' brigade not over one hundred and fifty yards on its left.

Here occurred one of the most remarkable tactical movements under hot fire which the history of the field affords. Van Derveer's troops, emerging from the woods in double lines, each deployed, were marching through a thicket of low pines toward the open ground beyond. The flags and the glistening bayonets above the pines revealed the lines to the advancing Confederates close on their flanks. Van Derveer's mounted officers could see the enemy, and they alone understood the meaning of the fierce enfilading fire which swept through the trees. The Union lines, however, advanced without a break. Rushing them into the open field, Van Derveer swung them on the run almost into the faces of the Confederates. Both front and rear lines dropped on the ground, and the front line from this position fired a full volley into the faces of Breckinridge's line, then not over fifty yards distant. This staggered it, when Van Derveer's second line, rising, charged with a tremendous yell over the first, the latter rising and following as the second passed. Breckinridge's troops broke and were pursued by Van Derveer on a run beyond and around Baird's left. So rapid and deadly was this charge that the horses of Slocum's battery of Adams' brigade were shot down, and it was necessary, in order to save the guns from the Union charge, to haul them off by hand.

This repulse was ended at noon. Breckinridge was then withdrawn entirely and replaced by Walker's corps. The latter shortly after assaulted over nearly the same ground upon which Breckinridge had first attacked, but was in turn repulsed, the fighting in front of Baird, and the brigades which had strengthened his left, being terrific. The Confederate reports represent that whenever their lines came within range of the log-works, they were met by a steady stream of bullets. The fact is, that during every assault the Union troops crowded up to the works, and all in rear busied themselves in loading and passing the rifles to the firing-lines in front. The fire was therefore unbroken and crushing.

So serious had been the Confederate losses from Breckinridge's right to the left of Stewart, that, except as the pickets were engaged, there was no further attack attempted on Baird, Johnson, Palmer, or Reynolds, after one o'clock until nearly six, although a general advance had been ordered for this wing at 3.30. So badly was this Confederate right crippled that, as General Longstreet says in his report, "About three o'clock in the afternoon I asked the commanding general for some troops of the right wing, but was informed by him that they had been beaten back so badly that they could be of no use to me."

The persistent attacks during the forenoon along Polk's wing upon General Thomas' line had led him to call repeatedly upon General Rosecrans for a division to enable him to extend his left to the Lafayette Road and hold it.

Negley had been replaced by Wood at 9.30, and his two remaining brigades of Stanley and Sirwell were dispatched to the left. Just before eleven o'clock Thomas had asked for Brannan, and Rosecrans sent a staff officer directing him to report to Thomas, but at this moment the enemy's line was moving vigorously on his front, and hastily dispatching his reserve brigade, Van Derveer, in partial compliance with the order, he continued to oppose Stewart, and sent a staff officer

to acquaint Rosecrans with the situation and ask him if he should withdraw from the line in the face of attack.

Before this officer reached Rosecrans, the latter, in the belief that Brannan had moved to Thomas, ordered Wood to "close up on Reynolds as fast as possible and support him." This was the noted order for which General Rosecrans has been so widely criticised.

Brannan being in echelon to the rear of Reynolds, it contemplated Wood closing directly to his left on to Reynolds' right.

Wood, however, instead of moving to the left across Brannan's front, withdrew wholly from the line and passed to Brannan's rear. While Wood was thus in motion, and before his left brigade was covered by Brannan's line, Longstreet delivered his noted attack on the centre. The signs of it were fully developed before Wood left his position. If he had exercised the same discretion as Brannan, and reported the impending attack to Rosecrans, then only a few hundred yards away, and remained for a reply, the line would have been very solidly formed to meet Longstreet's advance.

The latter says that no line unprotected by strong field-works could have successfully resisted the attack he had organized. While this is probable, it is at best a speculation which finds partial answer in the fact that, later in the day, a much thinner line on Snodgrass Hill but poorly supplied with ammunition, held his whole wing at bay from one o'clock till dark.

Longstreet's attack was indeed tremendous. The divisions of Stewart, Bushrod Johnson, and Hindman formed its front, with Law and Kershaw in column of divisions in rear of Johnson, who held its centre. The column thus formed was eight brigades deep opposite Wood's position.

The attack was delivered at eleven o'clock, just when Breckinridge had gained the rear of the Union left, and Barnes' brigade had reached Baird's position. Davis and

Sheridan had been put in rapid motion to close the space Wood had vacated. Harker, of Wood, had reached the rear of Brannan when Longstreet's blow fell.

Buell, of Wood, was struck in flank and in part carried away through the Dyer fields to the Dry Valley Road, on which it continued its march without molestation. Parts of Van Cleve's two remaining brigades, which had halted in the rear of Brannan, were, when the lines of the latter had been taken in flank, forced to the rear, whence they passed over Snodgrass Hill, and thence toward McFarland's Gap.

Davis' two brigades of McCook's corps rushed bravely into the face of Longstreet's advance in the attempt to hold the line Wood had left, but, though they fought desperately, were overwhelmed. Lytle, of Sheridan of McCook's corps, coming to their assistance, fought with stubbornness, but was also forced to yield, Lytle himself falling in the very front line. But Johnson, Law, and Kershaw had penetrated between Brannan and where Davis and Sheridan were vainly fighting, and so without fault on the part of either of these commanders their lines, terribly thinned by their fierce fighting of the evening before, were forced off the field and pursued by two brigades of Hindman to the high ground west of the Dry Valley Road.

Wilder's dismounted brigade, with its repeating carbines, had attacked Manigault, the left brigade of Hindman, as it advanced upon Sheridan, and driven it across the Lafayette Road at the Vineyard, and back to the rear of Trigg's brigade of Preston's division, and here it remained for several hours. After reaching the crests of the spurs of Missionary Ridge, Sheridan and Davis were thereafter unmolested, and continued their march to McFarland's Gap, whence Sheridan proceeded to Rossville.

General Rosecrans had just completed an inspection of the whole line from left to right when the break occurred. Being on the high ground back of the centre, he soon found about

him men from all the corps, as Negley, supposed to be on the extreme left, had directed his men into the trail leading back to the Dry Valley Road. He was further deceived by the knowledge that officers bearing Baird's headquarters flag had passed to the rear. Concluding that the whole line was in retreat, he rode with General Garfield and part of his staff to the gaps of Missionary Ridge to decide upon a new line and establish the troops upon it. Reaching the gaps, in discussing the division of the responsible duties to be performed, General Garfield urged that while he returned to find General Thomas and directed him to withdraw to Rossville and take defensive position, General Rosecrans himself should ride to Chattanooga to make all dispositions there to ensure the safety of the army, its trains and the bridges, and to choose such lines as seemed best for holding the town. The decision that he had better do this was urged by General Garfield upon the theory that where such rapid examinations and decisions were needed it was best that the authority having full power of direction should be on the ground. General Rosecrans' withdrawal to Chattanooga was therefore deliberate, and not in panic. Nor was there any appreciable stampede of troops to Chattanooga. Nearly everything that left the field stopped and organized either at McFarland's Gap or Rossville.

When Bushrod Johnson, followed by Law, crossed the Lafayette Road and pushed into the space vacated by Wood's two brigades, they turned to the right.

Johnson advanced across the Dyer field and at the end of an hour had captured nine guns of Crittenden's corps posted on the high ground fronting the Horseshoe Ridge, and assembled his divisions upon this spur. He then went in person to seek reënforcements, and, finding the two brigades of Hindman which had halted in their pursuit of Davis and Sheridan, he brought them back to his line and placed Anderson on the right and Deas on the left of it.

Law, following Johnson, was attacked by the right of Brannan, which faced to the rear and fought him persistently at short range. While Brannan's right was thus engaged, Harker's brigade, of Wood, which had passed beyond Brannan's left, hastily returned and formed in the Dyer field in the face of Law, and by a vigorous charge drove him back upon Kershaw, and so badly shattered Law that his troops did not enter the fight again during the afternoon.

This brilliant operation of Harker enabled Brannan, who being taken in reverse was obliged to retire his line, to re-form it with considerable care on the crest of Snodgrass Hill, his left resting at the Snodgrass house. Here, in addition to his own troops, he formed Stanley's brigade, and one regiment of Sirwell's, both of Negley's division, and one of Buell's of Wood's. This position had been occupied by Negley with two brigades and about forty pieces of artillery, and here also the ammunition trains of General Thomas had been assembled. Upon seeing the break in the line, Negley had ordered everything to follow him, and before any part of his force was under fire he rode off hastily to Rossville. The troops named above refused to follow him, and Brannan's own battery, Lieutenant Frank Smith, I, 4th Regulars, who had reported to Negley, also refused to go. These troops Brannan formed with his own in commanding position.

Kershaw, following in the trace of Law, passed over the lines of the latter which Harker, by his charge, had thoroughly disorganized, and after severe fighting Harker was forced back to a bald spur running down from Brannan's new position at the Snodgrass house to the woods opposite Reynolds' right. Here he remained, under the personal command of General Wood, till the close of the fight, repulsing all assaults.

At two o'clock Snodgrass Hill, or the Horseshoe, was attacked by the divisions of Bushrod Johnson and Kershaw, assisted by Anderson of Hindman. The assault was delivered with great spirit, but was repulsed with heavy loss both on

the fronts of Harker and Brannan. During this and subsequent assaults Harker's entire force in two lines fired by volley, each line falling back of the crest to load while the one in rear advanced and fired. The Confederates were not able during the afternoon to bring up any line, or combination of lines, that could withstand this crushing fire.

In this assault, however, Fulton's brigade of Johnson's left overlapped Brannan's right, and crossing the ridge gained his rear. Here, just as this force had been strengthened and re-formed to move against Brannan's flank, salvation came from unexpected quarters.

Gordon Granger, at McAfee's Church, four miles away, with three brigades of the reserve corps under Steedman, had been listening to the sounds of battle since morning, and, though under orders to hold the bridge toward Ringgold, at noon concluded with General Steedman that their troops were sorely needed on the field. They had, therefore, moved rapidly toward the vortex of Thomas' battle, paying little attention to Forrest's brigades, which shelled their flanks, sweeping one brigade of Forrest's from possession of the Union hospital at Cloud's, and posting Dan McCook's brigade with its battery on the ridge opposite Forrest's main position, Granger swept on, with Whittaker and Mitchell, to Snodgrass Hill, which rose before him still wreathed in the smoke of Longstreet's first assault.

Being directed by General Thomas, Granger pushed on under the slope of the hill below Brannan, and at once encountered the left of Johnson's line, which had overlapped Brannan and was about enveloping his right.

Whittaker first attacked this advancing line, and in a desperate charge drove it up the ridge, over it, and down into the ravines from which it began the first assault. In this attack Whittaker was joined by Mitchell, as soon as the latter could gain ground for movement on the right of the former.

Just as Whittaker reached the crest Van Derveer's brigade also, which, after driving out Adams and other portions of Breckinridge's line on the Kelly farm, had withdrawn to the Kelly house, hearing that General Brannan was fighting on Snodgrass Hill, without seeking orders, or waiting for any, had moved rapidly through the woods to the sound of the assault, and, facing the ridge, charged to the crest on the left of Whittaker and over into the face of the troops still assaulting Brannan's front.

Simultaneously with these movements General Palmer sent Hazen's brigade to fill the gap between Reynolds' right and Harker, and though Hazen's line would not close it, being in echelon with respect to Reynolds, his line of fire effectually covered the space.

General Thomas' line was then solidly formed from Dodge and King's brigade on the left of Baird to Mitchell on the right of the Horseshoe, and, while portions of McCook's and Crittenden's corps, with much of Negley from Thomas, were moving undisturbed towards McFarland's Gap, this thin and contracted line of heroes was girding itself for continued and desperate battle against the entire Confederate army. The stragglers had all gone, and demoralizing signs had passed from the scene. From that moment no foot of General Thomas' line was carried by the enemy.

With Steedman came 100,000 rounds of ammunition, in itself scarcely less important than his own arrival, since before its distribution Brannan's line was almost out of cartridges, and portions of it had already repulsed assaults with empty rifles.

At three o'clock Longstreet again attacked the ridge with the divisions of Hindman, Johnson, and Kershaw. For an hour the crest of the ridge from Harker's left to Steedman's right was a sheet of flame. Into this withering fire Longstreet's veterans marched, only to be driven back in defeat, but, as rapidly as they could re-form their lines, they persist-

ently pressed on again toward the summit. At five o'clock they had been so badly shattered as to require fresh troops before they could again advance.

After the two o'clock assault Longstreet called in vain for reënforcements from the right wing. The troops there had suffered to such an extent as to be unavailable, and he was so informed. At 3.30 that wing was ordered to assault in force as a diversion to relieve Longstreet, but, though the reorganization of Polk's lines had been in progress on that part of the field since one o'clock, the attack ordered was not delivered till nearly six o'clock.

At 2.30 Preston was moved from his position near Vineyard's, towards the centre of Longstreet's line, and reached Brotherton's at four o'clock. At this hour Gracie and Kelly, not previously engaged, moved to the front, and passing over the exhausted brigades of Kershaw, and the right of Johnson, assaulted twice on the fronts of Harker and Brannan and were repulsed with extraordinary loss. For want of ammunition on portions of the Union line some of these attacks were resisted with the bayonet alone. These brave attacks continued until sunset. At that hour Trigg was moved to the front through Johnson's line toward Steedman's position, while Kelly moved to his left along a ravine which led up to Brannan's right.

At half-after five o'clock all was quiet on the Union left, and the force of Gracie's and Kelly's assault on Harker and Brannan had been broken, and General Thomas resolved to execute the following order which he had received from General Rosecrans through General Garfield during one of the heaviest assaults on Snodgrass Hill, but which could not then be obeyed:

Headquarters, Department of the Cumberland,
Chattanooga, Tenn., September 20, 1863.

Major-General Thomas:

Assume command of all the forces, and with Crittenden and McCook take a strong position and assume a threatening

attitude at Rossville. Send all the unorganized forces to this place for reorganization. I will examine the ground here, and make such disposition for defence as the case may require, and join you. Have sent out ammunition and rations.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.

The decision to execute this order involved a movement without parallel in the war, namely, the withdrawal of his army from the active firing front of the enemy, involving as it did the withdrawal in daylight of the entire left wing and half of the right from a position within point-blank range of the enemy's rifles.

It was not a forced withdrawal, and it was an advance toward Chattanooga. The moment Baird and Johnson at 5.30 received the order for the movement they sent a staff officer to ask its revocation, representing that they could hold their line without difficulty against any assault the enemy could make. But before the officer reached General Thomas the movement had begun.

On General Thomas' part it was both in accordance with orders, and because he deemed it best to ensure the possession of the roads and gaps which controlled the way to Chattanooga, lest the enemy, in pursuance of his purpose and the object of his battle to secure them, should, during the night, move into these positions which were the prizes of the battle.

Feeling confident that the enemy was too badly broken to deem it prudent to follow his lines into the forests west of the Lafayette Road after sundown, he began to withdraw the left wing in time to bring it west of the road immediately after sunset.

Beginning on the right of Reynolds, a strong line of skirmishers being left at the breastworks, his two brigades, Turchin's and King's, now Robinson's, were marched out on either side of the road by the flank, General Thomas leading.

A short distance north of Kelly's house they were fired on by the advance of a force moving from the enemy's right southward through the woods. Turchin's brigade, under the personal direction of General Thomas, filed to the left into the woods, then faced this force, and charging, passed on a double-quick through the woods and the fields north of them, forcing back the front of Walker's corps, which had crossed to the west of the Lafayette Road at McDaniel's, and overrunning some of its artillery, formed beyond McCook's position near Cloud's, and behind his line. Robinson, following, was turned westward at the first road by General Thomas, and directed to form on the high ground to the left faced back to the field. Willich was then moved to the left of Robinson. These troops formed the covering line for the withdrawal of the army.

As soon as Reynolds had uncovered Palmer, the latter marched directly to his rear, and passed unmolested into the woods west of Kelly's, except as a battery of eleven guns at Poe's opened on his line as it crossed the road and was for a few moments in view of the gunners.

As Johnson and Baird moved out of their positions at 5.45 P. M., the attack of the left wing, ordered by Bragg for 3.30, was delivered. The left of this attack easily entered the abandoned lines of Palmer and Reynolds, although the resistance of the skirmish line left in them was so great as to create the impression among the Confederate troops that they had really carried these works by assault. Baird and Johnson, perceiving this advance, deliberately marched back to their works and repulsed two assaults of Breckinridge's entire division and the advance brigade of Cleburne's and Cheatham's divisions. Then, in obedience to their orders, they rapidly withdrew to the forest west of the Lafayette Road. There was some confusion in crossing the Kelly field, owing to their converging lines of march, but order was at once restored after the road had been passed, and from that moment the troops

proceeded on in well-conditioned columns to McFarland's Gap, and thence to Rossville.

At six o'clock Hindman and Bushrod Johnson had been effectually driven out on Steedman's front, and at that hour, his line being entirely out of ammunition, was withdrawn to the ridge next in his rear, his only battery being first placed on the second ridge to deter the enemy from following. At that hour the sun had set, and the woods were gloomy with the smoke of battle and of burning leaves, and all offensive movements against the positions supposed to be strongly held were necessarily made with exceeding caution.

At seven o'clock Hazen moved to the rear followed by Harker, Steedman started along the ridge toward the Dry Valley Road, and Brannan was left alone in position upon the Horseshoe.

At that hour Trigg, finding Steedman's first line abandoned, moved over the ridge and along its northern slope and found himself in rear of three regiments which had been temporarily attached to Steedman's left, and which, by an oversight, had not received notice to withdraw. At the same time Kelly, moving up the ravine to the right of Brannan, closed in on the front and flank of these three regiments and between 500 and 600 men from the 21st and 89th Ohio, and 22d Michigan were captured.

By some mistake of Granger's, for which he afterward assumed the sole responsibility, Brannan had not been notified of the withdrawal of Steedman, and it was only discovered by accident when Kelly appeared on Brannan's right flank and Trigg in his rear, in a joint attempt made in the gathering gloom to repeat the movement just made by similarly surrounding Van Derveer's brigade. This officer, hastily refusing his right, and seeking fragments of regiments to assist him, speedily dispersed both Trigg and Kelly by a murderous volley at close range, thus firing the very last cartridges in his rifles. He then disposed his line to hold the position with the

bayonet if again attacked. But the battle was done, and Brannan at 7.30, beginning with his left, withdrew without molestation, Van Derveer descending from his position at the highest point of the ridge at eight o'clock, and Brannan then moved with the rest of the withdrawing columns through McFarland's Gap to Rossville.

None of these troops that left the field under Sheridan, Davis, Negley, or Van Cleve had returned. After they penetrated the spurs of Missionary Ridge, about one o'clock, they had been unmolested as they marched along the rear of General Thomas' resounding battle, to and beyond McFarland's Gap. About 4.30 Davis and Sheridan, then in conference at the McFarland house with Negley, received a message from General Thomas at the hands of Colonel Gates P. Thurston, adjutant-general and chief-of-staff of their corps, requesting them to move back to his line. Davis at once faced about, and about six o'clock reached a point on the Dry Valley Road, three quarters of a mile from Vidito's, and there received notice that Thomas was withdrawing. Sheridan decided to proceed to Rossville and telegraph Rosecrans for orders from that point. This he did, and being directed to proceed to the front, moved out on the Rossville Road, the head of his column reaching the church in front of Cloud's at seven o'clock, and halting there. At this hour General Thomas' line had been wholly withdrawn from the west of the Lafayette Road, Hazen and Harker were just retiring from the vicinity of the Snodgrass house, and the enemy held the road for a mile between Sheridan and Thomas, and even prevented Daniel McCook from learning of Sheridan's approach. The latter returned to Rossville without communicating with General Thomas, who was entirely unaware of the movement until he met General Sheridan at Rossville toward midnight. Daniel McCook withdrew about nine o'clock by a road over the hills to the top of Missionary Ridge near Rossville, and his was the last brigade to leave the field.

The Union army lost 39 pieces of artillery, and captured 36 pieces. It lost 4774 prisoners, many of them wounded, and captured 2005.

General McCook's corps, the 20th, lost only five guns by capture, though two more were so disabled that they could not be moved, while it captured seven guns, and besides on Sunday it recaptured an entire battery lost on Saturday. Davis' division of this corps did not lose a gun or a wagon.

This narrative makes clear the injustice of the impression which the country received immediately after the battle, and which has endured through the years, that McCook's and Crittenden's corps, the 20th and 21st, were bodily broken off and driven from the field. Of the 20th Corps, Johnson's large division fought entire with General Thomas from noon on Saturday till the very last of the heavy fighting of Sunday evening attending the withdrawal of the extreme left.

Davis had but two of his brigades in the fight, the third, Post's, being with the trains. But this division and Sheridan's fought desperately Saturday afternoon, and both exposed themselves with great valor to resist the overwhelming lines of Longstreet after these had pierced the centre on Sunday. Sheridan lost one of his brigade commanders, Lytle, and Davis a large per cent of his men, and when he was finally forced from the field his command did not number over 1000 men. McCook, in person, remained on the firing-line until it was necessary to retire to avoid capture.

Wilder's mounted brigade, which was attached to McCook for the 20th, charged and drove back Manigault's brigade of Hindman's division, which was the right of Longstreet's line, and pursued it beyond the Lafayette Road to the cover of Preston's line. Wilder thereafter remained on the field until after four o'clock, and did not withdraw to Rossville till three o'clock on Monday morning.

Of the 21st Corps, Palmer's strong division fought continuously with Thomas from the opening till the very last.

Wood had but two brigades, Harker and Buell, Wagner being in command at Chattanooga. The story of Harker's brigade, and of Wood's personal conduct throughout the fight, form one of the most brilliant pages of the battle history. A portion of Buell's troops, one regiment entire, and remnants of the other, remained on Harker's line.

Of Van Cleve's division of three brigades, Barnes fought both days with distinguished credit, Saturday on the extreme right, and Sunday afternoon with Baird on the left, and to the very last. Of the remaining two brigades of this division, three regiments, or nearly half, were on the firing-lines till the fight ended.

This corps had as large a proportion of its strength in the fight as any other. It lost a larger percentage of killed and wounded, and the smallest proportion of prisoners.

General Crittenden displayed the greatest energy, watchfulness, and ability on the first day, and the successful forcing of the army between Bragg and Chattanooga was as much due to him as any other officer on the field.

When the break occurred on Sunday his troops had all been ordered from him, and he was wholly cut off from them and without command. He then, personally, served a battery which was without infantry support, and continued firing it till the enemy's skirmishers were close upon the guns. He then rode in search of General Rosecrans, and, learning that he had gone to Chattanooga, followed him. There was not only nothing in the slightest degree censurable in the conduct of General Crittenden, but everything to praise.

Negley took off as many men from the 14th Corps as left the field from either of the others, and more guns, and had not the excuse at starting that they were even under fire.

The losses of the battle were appalling. The fighting of the first day was everywhere at close range, and without works of any kind on either side.

At two o'clock on the 19th the three dismounted brigades

of Forrest, which opened the battle, and the infantry brigades of Ector, Wilson, Govan, and Walthall, which came to their assistance, had lost so heavily as to be unavailable for the rest of the day.

At 1.30 o'clock on Sunday Polk's entire right wing, except Forrest, who was observing the extreme right, was so badly shattered by its successive and terrific assaults that it could not be again brought into action until a quarter of an hour before sundown.

At ten o'clock on Sunday Law had lost so heavily in trying to drive Brannan and Harker back, after penetrating to their right and rear, that his troops were not again brought into the fight, although they continuously remained near the base of Snodgrass Hill.

On the Union side 206 officers were either killed outright or mortally wounded, and 542 besides were wounded. General Wood lost 1070 in two brigades. Brannan's loss was 38 per cent, while Van Derveer's brigade of this division lost 49 per cent. Steedman lost 48 per cent of his two brigades in four hours. The losses in killed and wounded in the 20th and 21st corps, which are popularly supposed to have abandoned the field, averaged over 32 per cent.

Hill's corps (Cleburne and Breckinridge) of the Confederate right wing numbered 8884 in action, and the loss was 2990 or over one third, while Helm's brigade of Breckinridge in assaulting Baird's position lost 75 per cent, or three men out of four. In Longstreet's wing the loss was 7856 out of 22,885, or over 34 per cent, not counting the loss of one brigade among those most heavily engaged which was not recorded. The loss of this wing on Sunday afternoon alone was 30 per cent, and in one of his brigades 37 per cent, nearly all in two hours in front of Steedman.

In Stewart's division, the right of Longstreet's corps, Brown's brigade lost 33.3 per cent, Senator Bate's brigade 48.7 per cent, and Clayton 42.4 per cent.

Preston's division lost 33 per cent in an hour's assault on the Horseshoe, Sunday evening. Gracie's brigade of this division lost 34.8 in an hour in front of Brannan, Sunday afternoon, while its total loss in the second day's fight was 37 per cent. This brigade took into action 2003 officers and men, and in one hour lost 698. One regiment of this brigade, the 2d Alabama, had its colors pierced in 83 places, and lost 169 killed and wounded out of 239 in action.

In Cheatham's division Johnson's brigade lost 35 per cent, several regiments of Maney's over 50 per cent, and Marcus J. Wright's over 38 per cent.

Wilson's brigade of Walker's division lost a little over 50 per cent, Govan of Liddell 50 per cent, and Senator Walthall's brigade of the same division 39 per cent.

As stated in the outset, the figures show Chickamauga to have been, for the numbers engaged and the time of their engagement, the deadliest battle of our war between any of the principal armies. Not only this, but, according to the statistics, the percentages of losses very much exceed those of any battle of the modern world from the days of the first Napoleon to the close of the Franco-Prussian war.

Wellington lost 12 per cent at Waterloo, Napoleon 14½ per cent at Austerlitz and 14 per cent at Marengo. The average losses of both armies at Magenta and Solferino in 1859 was less than 9 per cent. At Königgrätz, in 1866, it was 6 per cent. At Werth, Mars la Tour, Gravelotte, and Sedan in 1870, the average loss was 12 per cent.

The marvel of German fighting in the Franco-Prussian war was by the Third Westphalian infantry at Mars la Tour. It took 3000 men into action and lost 49.4 per cent. Next to this record was that of the Garde-Schutzen battalion, 1000 strong, at Metz, which lost 46.1 per cent. There were several brigades on each side at Chickamauga, and very many regiments, whose losses exceeded these latter figures.

The average losses on each side, for those troops which

fought through the two days, were fully 33 per cent, while for many portions of each line the losses reached 50 per cent.

The Army of the Cumberland was concentrated at Rossville directly and fully between Bragg and Chattanooga, at midnight on the 20th, where it offered battle throughout the next day. But Bragg's army was too much exhausted to attack. During the night of the 21st the Union army advanced to Chattanooga, and on the morning of the 22d the Army of the Cumberland first saw the city for the possession of which it had successfully fought.

During the first day of the occupation of the city by his army General Rosecrans, knowing that the Confederacy had been allowed to concentrate against him, and that his flanks were wholly exposed, was inclined to believe that he would be obliged to withdraw to the north bank of the Tennessee, unless reënforcements were promptly forwarded. But this opinion was temporary, and at 9.30 P. M. of the day of occupation, namely, the 22d, Mr. Dana telegraphed Secretary Stanton: "Rosecrans has determined to fight it out here at all hazards."

Before starting on his campaign he had contracted for new bridges at Bridgeport, and at Running Water, near Chattanooga, the only formidable structures on the railroad line. He immediately began to perfect plans for opening the river. The one finally adopted was his, and General Thomas gives him full credit for it. In fact he was absent from his headquarters engaged in reconnoitring opposite Brown's Ferry, where he proposed to throw his bridges for opening the river, when the order came relieving him from command. The best commentary upon its injustice is found in the fact that General Thomas' first impulse was to resign rather than take the command under such circumstances, and it was with extreme difficulty that he was persuaded by General Rosecrans to change his determination.

My part in this necessarily rapid sketch has been to set

forth the general features of the campaign, and the salient facts of the battle. It must be yours to reason upon them and draw conclusions.

Most of those who fought at Chickamauga till the battle was done, when for the whole line every third man among their comrades, and, for portions of it, every other man was killed or wounded, have always been satisfied with the result. They have regarded the campaign as unprecedented in the brilliancy and success of its strategy, and have looked upon the battle as one waged, not for the possession of those unknown forests along the Chickamauga, but for Chattanooga, the objective of the campaign, which lay beyond them, and toward which the Army of the Cumberland was steadily pressing forward over mountains and rivers, from the moment that its bugles first sounded the advance.

X

THE BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA, LOOK-OUT MOUNTAIN, AND MISSIONARY RIDGE

BY

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Read before the Society April 5, 1893



THE BATTLES ABOUT CHATTANOOGA, LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN, AND MISSIONARY RIDGE

After the fall of Nashville and Corinth, in the spring of 1862, Chattanooga, the central and formidable mountain stronghold of the Confederacy, became the objective of the Army of the Ohio. General Buell moved against it from Corinth; but Bragg, under cover of the Cumberland ranges, turned his left flank, and so threatened his communications as to cause a race for the Ohio River. Buell reached Louisville with Bragg close at hand. The Union forces had yielded everything between Louisville and Chattanooga except the city of Nashville, which had been strongly fortified as a secondary base of supplies. Bragg was turned south again at Perryville, Kentucky, in October, 1862, and Rosecrans, succeeding Buell in command, promptly returned to Nashville, marched on Bragg at Stone's River, defeated him, and occupied Murfreesboro the first week in January, 1863. The Middle Tennessee or Tullahoma campaign followed in June. It was almost pure strategy, as it was most brilliant strategy, since Rosecrans, with a total loss of 560 killed, wounded, and missing, manœuvred Bragg out of the state, pushing him from two strongly fortified camps, over the Cumberland Mountains, and across the Tennessee to Chattanooga.

Then followed, in August and September, the Chickamauga campaign, the direct objective of which was Chattanooga.

When I was honored two years since by an invitation from this Society to read a paper on Chickamauga, the narrative ended leaving General Rosecrans in military possession of Chattanooga. The present paper will treat of the three days' battles about that city, namely, Orchard Knob, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge, fought by the combined armies

of Thomas and Sherman, Hooker being assigned to Thomas, the whole under the command of Grant.

For the purpose of starting with a clearer understanding of the situation it may be well to briefly restate the salient points of the Chickamauga campaign, which ended at Chattanooga on the 22d of September, 1863, with the Union army in possession.

Starting from his camps along the western base of the Cumberland Mountains, Rosecrans threw Crittenden's corps, which formed his left, over these mountains, into the Sequatchie Valley. A brigade from each of its divisions and a cavalry brigade on the left flank were pushed over Walden's Ridge into the Tennessee Valley, Wilder's mounted infantry on the right shelling Chattanooga from the Ridge, and the whole making so pronounced a feint that Bragg was thoroughly deceived into the belief that Rosecrans was moving to turn his right. Meantime the corps of Thomas and McCook also crossed the Cumberlands far below the city, were hastily thrown over the Tennessee, next across the Raccoon Range, and, before Bragg penetrated Rosecrans' designs, Thomas in the centre was crossing Lookout Mountain at Stevens' Gap, twenty-six miles south of Chattanooga, and McCook on the extreme right was effecting a crossing forty-two miles south of that city. Counting the cavalry lines on the right and left, this movement, through most formidable mountain regions, had a front of one hundred and fifty miles, and yet every detail of the move was in perfect time. The direct march of the left wing in the feint was sixty miles, the centre under Thomas marched one hundred, and the right more than one hundred and fifty. Upon the appearance of Rosecrans' columns on Lookout Mountain, Bragg hastily withdrew his main force to Lafayette, where he awaited Longstreet's troops on the way from Virginia. He, however, held his rear guard firmly established just south of the Chickamauga River at Lee & Gordon's Mill, and when the trains with Longstreet's forces

reached Atlanta, Bragg moved northwardly again to interpose between Rosecrans and Chattanooga. But by a night march, Rosecrans, also moving northward, thrust his columns between Bragg and that city. The two days' battle of Chickamauga followed, resulting, on the second day, in partial disaster to the right wing, but through the firm stand of the rest of the army under Thomas, in securing, first, the control of the roads to Chattanooga, and next the military possession of the city. Bragg followed and established his lines upon Lookout Mountain, Missionary Ridge, and across the intervening plain, and the final struggle for Chattanooga began.

Before considering its details or attempting to describe the magnificence of its battles, it is necessary to examine the field. This has been made an easy task for you by the clear and beautiful map executed by my honored friend, Major George B. Davis, in charge of the War Record Office, from the official map of General W. F. Smith. Every veteran and every student of our military history knows of his excellent work, and in common with all of these I am under deep obligation to him. The map is a good specimen, but only a fair specimen of the varied and important work executed by him and under his direction.

Chattanooga was of vital importance to the Confederacy. The opening of the Mississippi had crippled or destroyed its communications along the great Western waterways. Chattanooga was the centre of its lines of railway. It was just midway on a direct line from Richmond to New Orleans, and halfway between Charleston and Memphis. Other lines centring there penetrated every section of the Confederacy. It was the only gateway for the Western armies through the Appalachian Range south of Harper's Ferry. It was, besides, a formidable mountain stronghold and deemed impregnable. Two broad precipitous and barren ranges and the wide and deep Tennessee separated it from Union advances on the front and right; while one range on the north, the river, and two

ranges south of it barred approach on the left. All roads through this region were narrow and difficult. The summits of all the ranges were walled around with perpendicular palisades of rock through which the roads over the ranges threaded their way at most infrequent intervals.

These obstacles had all been overcome, and General Rosecrans was in possession of Chattanooga. Bragg, reënforced by troops from every quarter of the Confederacy, closed in around the city, and days of sore trial for the Army of the Cumberland, and of tremendous energies on its part for the retention of its prize, began.

Bragg occupied Lookout Mountain; the river was closed as a means of communication with Bridgeport, the Union base of supplies; and Rosecrans' army, on the threshold of a rainy season, was forced to depend upon sixty miles of wagon communications over the Cumberlands and Walden Ridge.

Turning to the maps, let us examine the theatre of the great operations which form the subject of the present paper. These maps follow each other, the tops of each are north, and the position of Rossville upon each will serve to properly connect them and show the relations between the Chickamauga campaign and the battle-field of Chickamauga (indicated by the red area on the first map), and the surroundings of Chattanooga where the final battles of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge were fought, resulting in its firm and continuing possession by the Union army.

The town itself, then a place of less than 5000 inhabitants, lies in a bend of the Tennessee River upon a high bluff and plateau broken by low ridges. The lines of earthworks in blue, close about it, indicate the positions taken by Rosecrans' army. These consisted of heavy detached earthworks, partly completed by Bragg before the evacuation, and afterwards finished and strengthened and connected by heavy trenches by the Union army. Standing upon these works, and looking out over the plain about Chattanooga to the south and

west, at a distance of three miles, the palisaded point of Lookout seems to dominate the town. Five miles southeast is Rossville Gap in Missionary Ridge, opening toward the Chickamauga field. East of the city, at a distance of about three miles, and running northward from Rossville some seven miles, lies the crest of Missionary Ridge. Halfway between the eastern limits of the town and this latter ridge was a low line of hills of which Orchard Knob formed the central elevation. The crest of Lookout Mountain is some eighteen hundred feet above the river, and the rugged, and for the most part heavily timbered, slopes from its base to the foot of the palisades, are about a mile and a half wide. On the slope facing the city was the cleared farm about the Craven house, over which swept that part of the battle which could be seen from Chattanooga. Missionary Ridge rises from three hundred to five hundred feet above the plain, and its slopes are precipitous, broken by ravines, covered with detached masses of rock, tangled with fallen timber, and, as will be readily understood, difficult of ascent even when undefended.

Bragg occupied Lookout Valley, the summit and the slopes of Lookout Mountain, a line of earthworks across the plain from the foot of the mountain to the foot of Missionary Ridge, and thence northward along the base of the ridge for several miles to a point beyond the Union left. Lighter rifle-pits were also constructed halfway up the ridge, while batteries and earthworks along the summit still further strengthened this most formidable position.

General Rosecrans has been severely criticised by unfriendly writers for abandoning Lookout Mountain shortly after his occupation of Chattanooga, upon the theory that he thus yielded the control of the river to Bragg. A mere glance at the map will show the fallacy of this criticism. To have maintained a line from Chattanooga to the crest of Lookout Mountain, merely to hold that position, would have made necessary a heavy fortified line three miles in extent and open

to most favorable lines of attack, and this would have in no sense controlled the river, since Bragg held the roads over the mountain. He could have established a force at a point on the river beyond the range of the guns on Lookout and still have effectually closed that line of supplies. Rosecrans' withdrawal from the mountain, therefore, greatly strengthened his position at Chattanooga, and exposed him to no additional dangers either from the closing of the river or from Bragg's batteries on the mountain, since the latter were at no time able to inflict any serious damage upon the Union forces. Twenty-four hours after Rosecrans' occupation of the city his lines were safe against any assault which Bragg could make so soon after the exhaustion of the Chickamauga battle, and within a few days thereafter the men of the Army of the Cumberland deemed the works which protected them impregnable.

Rosecrans was established around the city during the 22d of September. The afternoon of that day there was some consideration given at headquarters to the question of retreat to the north side of the river, but only as a possible alternative in case reënforcements could not be speedily forwarded, and dispatches designed to make this reënforcement appear most urgent were sent to Washington. But that very evening the question was finally decided and the decision, as telegraphed to Washington by Mr. Dana, was to hold the town at all hazards. Two days later he reported it so strong that it could only be taken by regular siege.

By the middle of October the question of holding the city turned on that of supplying the troops. A raid of Wheeler's cavalry north of the river the first of October had destroyed between 250 and 300 wagons. The rains which followed made it impossible to haul much more than forage to last the trains over the sixty miles of mountains. However, October 13 the army was receiving three fourths rations and was very comfortable, and that day 300,000 full rations arrived. The animals suffered greatly, for corn was taken from them

for the men. At no time did the men suffer, and at no time were the troops of the Army of the Cumberland either discouraged or demoralized. All statements to the contrary are of that class of historical myths which are fast disappearing under impartial study.

There were controversies over the responsibility for the disaster to the right wing at Chickamauga, and sharp criticism of several officers, including the general in command, and other indications of this kind of demoralization. But the Army of the Cumberland, as an army, never complained of its short supplies, never for a moment lost the spirit which held the bulk of it on the Horseshoe under Thomas that Sunday afternoon at Chickamauga; and, so far as the spirit of the men was concerned, there was never a day when its lines could not have been led against Missionary Ridge with the same magnificent *élan* as that which finally planted its victorious banners along the crest. Men followed the wagons for the crumbs of crackers which they could pick up; they gathered the scattered kernels of corn about the storehouses, for parching; they ate mouldy crackers and sour pork, when they could get it, and all the time looked up at the smoking batteries on Lookout or on the rebel flags along Missionary Ridge with the same grim determination and exultation with which, on Snodgrass Hill, when their ammunition was gone, with empty barrels they had awaited Longstreet's assaults and repelled them time and again with their bayonets.

But the river line of supplies to Brown's Ferry was opened at length, and the problem of holding the town was finally solved, and the prophecy of salvation and disaster uttered by Jefferson Davis from the point of Lookout Mountain was brought to nought.

It is another of the myths of history, which are as thick about these operations as the fogs over Lookout in falling weather, that the coming of Grant had something to do with this opening of the river. True he approved plans which he

found perfected down to the smallest details. But these would have been executed exactly in their final form and time if Grant had not been ordered to Chattanooga.

The general plan of opening the Tennessee to the vicinity of Williams' Island was Rosecrans'. The details were committed to that able officer and noted engineer, General W. F. Smith. He fixed on Brown's Ferry as the place for throwing the bridges, and General Rosecrans was engaged with him in general reconnoitring of the river below Lookout the day that the order for his relief from the command arrived. That very day he had ordered Hooker to be ready to move up from Bridgeport along the south bank of the river, and that night, upon assuming command, one of General Thomas' first orders was to direct Hooker to be ready to execute General Rosecrans' last order. Grant came and approved the plans already fully perfected, and gave orders for their execution, nothing more. They were executed, and the line of abundant supplies was open.

It is now possible to fix the responsibility for this lack of supplies at Chattanooga where it properly belongs. When that wonderful transfer of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Potomac to the Tennessee was ordered, General Rosecrans had a right to suppose that upon General Hooker's arrival at Bridgeport he would be able to coöperate at once for the relief of Chattanooga. Hooker reached that point October 1, and the same day was ordered by Rosecrans to put down his bridges and make immediate preparations for crossing the river to move toward Chattanooga. Then it was found that he had no trains, and so he could not obey.

The finely equipped and thoroughly efficient trains of these two Eastern corps had been turned in at Alexandria and orders issued that new trains should be furnished at Nashville. But the Nashville depot had been thoroughly depleted, and had only exhausted animals and crippled wagons. Surely this should have been known at Washington. When at length

apologies for trains had been fitted up, the extra Eastern railroad rolling-stock had been sent back, and the wagon-trains were obliged to march two hundred miles, much of the way over rough and mountain roads, between Nashville and Bridgeport. As a result, Hooker was held immovable at that point from October 1 to 24—in other words, throughout the entire time of short supplies at Chattanooga. Had his trains been shipped from the East so as to follow his troops, he could have occupied the Wauhatchie Valley during the first week in October; or, in other words, before the pinch over short supplies at Chattanooga began.

On October 12 General Rosecrans repeated his order to Hooker to move up from Bridgeport to Wauhatchie to open the river, but his trains were still behind. On the 19th the order to be ready to move was again given by Rosecrans, and repeated the same night by Thomas. Finally, on the 24th and 26th, Hooker's trains arrived. At daylight of the 27th he crossed the river at Bridgeport, the rear of the column passing the bridge at 9.30 A. M. At three o'clock in the afternoon he was at Wauhatchie in Lookout Valley, and at five o'clock at Brown's Ferry, and the line of supplies was open. It is easily seen that the failure to send Hooker's splendidly equipped trains from the East, upon the erroneous belief that this essential need could be supplied at Nashville, is the historical fact which so nearly caused starvation at Chattanooga.

While you are doubtless familiar with the general features of the brilliant movement which opened the Tennessee from Bridgeport to Chattanooga, it may be interesting to follow its salient features on the excellent map which Major Davis has made.

Brown's Ferry lies on the Tennessee below Lookout Mountain, and was just beyond the effective range of the guns upon its summit. The Confederate pickets lined the river from the base of the mountain nearest Chattanooga to a point far below the ferry. From this latter point the road was a short one

across the peninsula to the Union bridges at Chattanooga. By observing the floating of timber, the time from the city to Brown's Ferry was accurately determined. At three o'clock on the morning of the 27th of October fifteen hundred men were launched in pontoon boats at the wharves of the city and floated silently, hugging the right bank of the river, and thus keeping within the shadows of the trees which fringed it, passed seven miles of rebel pickets without discovery, and landed just at daylight under the heights on the left bank of the river at Brown's Ferry. The Confederate pickets were surprised, and the heights on each side of the road were speedily occupied. With the assistance of the covering forces which had been stationed during the night on the right bank of the river, a bridge was quickly thrown, the forces from the right bank transferred to the left, and the heights fortified and rendered secure.

General Hooker's coöperating column mentioned above left Bridgeport the same morning, arrived at Wauhatchie at three o'clock, and effected a junction at Brown's Ferry with the troops from Chattanooga at five o'clock. Meantime a steamer with full supplies left Bridgeport and reached the ferry almost simultaneously with its capture by the Union forces, and waiting trains were soon on the way to the city with abundant rations. From that hour the one thought in Chattanooga was of preparation for driving Bragg from the surrounding heights.

During the night succeeding Hooker's arrival in Lookout Valley, Longstreet made a desperate attack upon the head of his column at Wauhatchie. But the Eastern troops, both of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, with brilliant dash and splendid courage charged in the darkness on the heights where Longstreet's men were entrenched and drove them from the field. With this defeat the enemy abandoned the river to the Union forces, and gave up the valley west of Lookout. Soon after, Longstreet, with his corps of three divisions, com-

prising eleven brigades, was sent to Knoxville. Thereafter, there were no aggressive movements of moment on the part of Bragg against the forces operating about Chattanooga.

Upon the Union side the preparations for battle were pushed with the utmost vigor. Supplies of food and clothing, ammunition and heavy guns, everything needed to strengthen and reëquip an army was poured with profusion into Chattanooga. Reserves and railroad guards were brought forward, and Sherman with four divisions which had started from Vicksburg September 22 to reënforce Rosecrans, and in five weeks had only reached Florence, Alabama, about one hundred and sixty miles from Chattanooga, was ordered to drop railroad and bridge building and join General Grant at Chattanooga at the earliest moment. This order reached him October 27, and his reports of progress were such that Grant ordered him to have all his troops in position above Chattanooga on Friday night, November 20, ready to cross the river and attack the north end of Missionary Ridge on Saturday morning, the 21st, at daylight.

Specific orders for general attack on this date were issued to Sherman and Thomas. The plan of battle was very definitely set forth: (1) Its central and controlling idea was a secret night-crossing of the Tennessee opposite the north point of Missionary Ridge by Sherman's four divisions, strengthened by one sent from the Army of the Cumberland, an advance at daylight, and the carrying of Missionary Ridge as far south as the tunnel before Bragg could concentrate against him.

(2) Thomas was to coöperate with Sherman from Chattanooga, concentrating his forces on his left flank and joining Sherman's right after the latter had executed his initial movement, and placed his lines astride the ridge at the tunnel.

(3) Howard's corps was to be marched from Lookout Valley to a point near the bridges entering the city, and held there to aid either Sherman on the north bank or Thomas in Chattanooga.

(4) Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps with Cruft's division of the Army of the Cumberland was to hold Lookout Mountain against any attack from Bragg's left.

The entire work of preparing for Sherman's crossing, including the construction of boats, providing a covering division of infantry, supports of artillery, and a brigade of cavalry, and the throwing of the bridge, was committed to the Army of the Cumberland. General Sherman's part was to arrive, march over, and turn Bragg's right on the ridge.

Three days in succession General Thomas, who at once completed all arrangements which the battle order called for from him, received notice of the postponement of the attack because of the delays in Sherman's advance. It seems that he was marching with his heavy baggage-trains following each division of troops, and thus the progress of the latter had been seriously impeded. Then, when he arrived, a rise in the river parted the bridge at Brown's Ferry after three divisions had crossed, leaving the fourth, Osterhaus', on the south bank.

At this point it is well to fix in the mind the composition and the location of the Union forces.

General Hooker had arrived in Lookout Valley with two divisions, Schurz's and Steinwehr's, of the Eleventh Corps, and Geary's division of the Twelfth Corps. The first division of this corps was with General Slocum on the line of railroad north of Bridgeport. These forces were assigned to the Army of the Cumberland, and were under the orders of General Thomas. Cruft's division of the Fourth Corps of the Army of the Cumberland, after assisting in the operations at Brown's Ferry, had remained with Hooker.

The Army of the Tennessee, arriving with Sherman, consisted of the Fifteenth Corps, General Frank Blair, and the 2d division of the Seventeenth, General John E. Smith. After three divisions had crossed at Brown's Ferry on their way toward the mouth of North Chickamauga, the bridge broke, and Osterhaus' division was left with Hooker.

The Army of the Cumberland, aside from the forces brought by Hooker which were incorporated in it, consisted of the Fourth Corps, General Gordon Granger, the Fourteenth, General Palmer, each of three divisions, a division of engineer troops, under General W. F. ("Baldy") Smith, the artillery reserve under General Brannan, and Long's brigade of cavalry.

Before the bridge broke down at Brown's Ferry, Howard's corps had crossed to the north side of the river, and been stationed near the bridge into Chattanooga, as directed in the order for battle.

After the second postponement General Thomas, on the 22d, urged General Grant to allow him to assault Lookout, using the troops then with Hooker. The fear that Sherman's unexpected delay would expose the waiting plan to Bragg constrained General Grant to accede to the request, but its execution was fixed by Grant for the 24th, in the hope that by that day Sherman would be up. Meantime a report that Bragg was withdrawing from Missionary Ridge caused General Grant to request Thomas to ascertain whether the enemy still held his lines and his camps in the plain. In response Thomas at once organized a reconnoissance which was virtually an advance of his army, and an unexpected opening of the battle.

The Confederate line of works through the centre of the plain east of the city, and parallel to Missionary Ridge, was about two miles in length. It ran along the crest of a low range, of which Orchard Knob and Indian Hill to the right of it were the most prominent points.

For this so-called reconnoissance General Thomas utilized all that portion of the Army of the Cumberland then in Chattanooga. Upon the slopes before Fort Wood, and those to the right and left of it, he set an army in battle array in the afternoon of November 23, in plain sight of the opposing lines and all the surrounding heights. Wood's division was dis-

played in front of the fort, Sheridan in echelon, on the right and rear, Baird on the right of Sheridan in support, and the Eleventh Corps on the left and rear of Wood. The Eleventh Corps had been previously brought over into the city and displayed in full sight of the enemy to aid in concealing Sherman's movements, by creating the impression that the troops crossing the bridges at Brown's Ferry were reënforcing the city. Johnson's division was assigned to hold the main works along the centre and right.

The near lines of the enemy's pickets and outposts made no demonstration toward resistance, and it afterwards appeared that the pageant was regarded as a grand review, up to the moment that Wood's division covered its front with a swarm of skirmishers and at once advanced firing, followed by all supporting divisions. It was the onward march of an army, and it swept the valley nearly a mile to the front, and while it found the enemy there in usual force it carried, and reversed, and held his central fortified line.

It was intended by General Thomas as a reconnoissance from which there should be no return. Thus this movement — a great success — became the first, and a radical departure from Grant's plan of battle.

That night Sherman, in execution of the central feature of the plan, crossed the Tennessee and before daylight had two of his four divisions, numbering 8000 men, entrenched on the south bank of the river. Here the key movement of the whole plan of battle failed entirely.

First, the advance from the river was to have been made at daylight in the nature of a surprise. It was not made until one o'clock in the afternoon.

Next, its objective was the north end of Missionary Ridge as far south as the tunnel. When the columns moved, they were directed, through an error in reconnoissance, upon a short outlying range of hills in the valley of the Tennessee north of Missionary Ridge, wholly isolated from it, and, like

the real extremity of the ridge opposite to it, unoccupied by the enemy. This isolated position was taken by Sherman, without opposition, at four o'clock in the afternoon of the 24th and strongly fortified during the night, but the real north end of the ridge was not carried by his forces at any period of the battle, although they obtained a lodgment on its slopes. The next morning Sherman was astonished to find himself separated from Missionary Ridge by a gorge a thousand yards wide between the crests and sinking to the bases of the ridges, with one of the oldest and best-known roads about Chattanooga running through it to the Tennessee beyond.

On the morning of the 24th, while General Sherman was forming his columns at the point where he had crossed the river, Hooker, ten miles away, beyond the point of Lookout and near Wauhatchie, under Thomas' order, was preparing for an assault on the mountain. The bridge at Brown's Ferry had remained broken, so that Osterhaus' division could not join Sherman, and General Thomas' request to be allowed to move Osterhaus and Hooker against Lookout had been granted — a second departure from the original plan of battle.

Hooker had in hand for this movement Geary's division (three brigades) of the Twelfth Corps, Cruft's division (two brigades) of the Fourth Corps, and Osterhaus' division (two brigades) of the Fifteenth Corps, — in all seven brigades of nearly 10,000 men. Thus, these soldiers from the Army of the Potomac, the Army of the Cumberland, and Sherman's Army of the Mississippi formed each other's acquaintance at the foot of Lookout Mountain as they faced its heights and fought together in that memorable assault.

The Confederates had six brigades available for the defence of the mountain, though until some time after noon the heaviest fighting was largely done by one, commanded by the brilliant soldier, General (now Senator) Walthall, of Mississippi.

At eight o'clock Geary's division, with Whittaker's brigade

of Cruft's division following, crossed Lookout Creek a mile above Wauhatchie, and, wholly concealed by the fog, moved by the flank directly up the mountain until the head of the column reached the palisades; then facing toward the north point of the range, it advanced in line.

Meantime Cruft's other brigade (Grose's) and Wood's brigade from Osterhaus' division were building a bridge over Lookout Creek in front of the Confederate works opposite the point of the mountain and on its western slope. Just as this was completed Geary's line appeared on the flank of these works. Thus enfiladed by Geary, and attacked in front by all the rest of Hooker's force, and enfiladed by Brannan's batteries on Moccasin Point, the Confederates were steadily driven up the slope and around the point of the mountain. The roar of battle approaching from Lookout Valley had intently fixed all eyes in both lines about Chattanooga upon the point of the mountain. But while the battle drew rapidly nearer from the western side, the mists concealed all movements. Just as the Confederate lines had been pushed back till they reached from the foot of the palisades under the point of the mountain to the river bluffs below, the fogs were widely rent as if the curtain in some great play-house of the gods had been raised to show this tremendous battle-scene on those slopes reaching upward toward the skies. For a little season the sun shone over the wonderful but indescribable scene, gleamed brightly on banners and bayonets, and rested softly on the white billows of the powder-smoke. For an instant both armies below confronting Missionary Ridge looked on in silence, while each observer was solving the situation for himself. But a glance showed clearly that the Confederate lines were falling back, and a moment later the banners of the Union, flag after flag, came into sight streaming forward above the curling surf of the battle-smoke. Then the Union army, stretched across the plain below, cheered and cheered, and all the bands played on and on, while Hooker's

men, under this inspiration, and still aided by the enfilading fire of Brannan's heavy batteries on Moccasin Point, swept the northern face of the mountain. Then the curtain of fog settled down again as if the giant play were done.

At five o'clock, by Thomas' order, Carlin's brigade from the Army of the Cumberland in the plain, with stores and ammunition, climbed the mountain to Hooker's position and relieved his right under the palisades, — a most energetic, courageous, and brilliant movement well performed.

There was sharp skirmishing through most of the night, but this was to cover the Confederate withdrawal from the top of the mountain by the Summertown Road. At daylight it was found that the summit had been abandoned.. It had been a day's fight. It will live in history for a thousand years.

The morning of the 25th broke bright and clear. The mountain was sharply defined against the sky. All the camps were astir at earliest dawn, and every eye was searching for signs which would show who held the summit. Just before sunrise a group of soldiers stepped out on a rock which forms the overhanging point of the mountain. They carried a flag, but held it furled, waiting for the sun. The instant the rays broke full upon them they loosened its folds, and the waiting thousands below beheld the stars and stripes. Then the cheers throughout the valley roared again like Niagara, and the pealing of the bands was as if all the harps of Heaven were filling the dome with triumphal music. But, my friends, it is useless to attempt a description of such a scene as that.

During the night Bragg had abandoned his positions on the mountain and in the valley, and withdrawn his lines to Missionary Ridge, occupying the foot to the Shallow Ford Road, and crest from Rossville Gap to the tunnel.

The 25th of November — the day of final and complete triumph for the Union army — was clear, and still, and warm from dawn to twilight.

After ascertaining that the mountain had been abandoned

by Bragg, Hooker's column was directed on Rossville. A reconnoissance from Baird's division then on the right of Thomas' line showed that the enemy's camps in the plain were deserted.

Outside of Hooker's lines the whole attention of the army was turned toward Sherman. It was supposed that his movement had succeeded, since he had telegraphed Grant the evening before that he held the north end of Missionary Ridge to the tunnel. His operations were therefore still treated by General Grant as the key of the whole plan of the battle. He did not then know how completely it had failed.

Thomas, in execution of his orders to join Sherman at the tunnel, dispatched those portions of the Eleventh Corps which had not already joined him at the bridge the day before, to the left, to be ready to support Sherman's right at the tunnel and advance with him up the valley to aid in the general object of sweeping Bragg away from his depot and communications at Chickamauga Station.

As this movement of Sherman's on Bragg's right flank was designated by General Grant as the central feature of the battle, its execution merits close attention.

General Thomas had favored bringing Sherman's troops directly into the city, together with the coöperating forces from Hooker's columns, and marching them by night along the south bank of the river to the north end of Missionary Ridge. But General Grant, after finding that this portion of the ridge was unoccupied, thought its possession could be more certainly effected by a night-crossing of the river near the ridge, and an advance upon it at daylight.

So General Thomas sent from his army, by Grant's direction, a division of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and two batteries; the latter contributed toward making up forty guns to form a covering party for Sherman's crossing. A pontoon train was brought up from Bridgeport and Stevenson and sent floundering up to the North Chickamauga, and 116 boats,

mostly built in Chattanooga, requiring 750 oarsmen, were carried up and secretly floated in that stream. General Thomas furnished half of the latter force. To reward these tremendous efforts the crossing was completely successful under the direction of those eminent engineers, General Baldy Smith and General James H. Wilson.

That no such exhaustive work was necessary is shown by the fact that General Howard, who had ridden up from Chattanooga unmolested, accompanied only by his escort and three regiments of infantry, appeared on the south bank to welcome General Sherman as he came first over the bridge. As if to emphasize the meaning of this, he left his troops with Sherman, and rode back to the city with his escort alone. If there could be anything comical in war, this meeting would deserve the attention of the wits. Think of the tremendous effort to prepare at such a season and in such a country for this crossing of over 20,000 men, and of the comment on its needless character furnished by Howard's unmolested ride from Chattanooga.

To make this situation more remarkable, at daylight, when General Sherman had two divisions of 8000 men in line facing Missionary Ridge, there was no enemy in force, either on the ridge or along its base within two miles and a half of General Sherman's position. Further than this, there were no Confederate forces nearer than a mile and a quarter from the hill over the tunnel, which was his objective, until after two o'clock of the day he crossed the river, nor were any ordered towards it till that hour. If he had marched at daylight for Tunnel Hill, as was contemplated by the order of battle, he could have occupied the entire north end of Missionary Ridge not only to the tunnel but for some distance south of it without encountering a Confederate in arms.

He moved to attack the ridge at one o'clock in the afternoon, having five divisions in his columns — it was not until two o'clock that Cleburne, then a mile and a quarter south of

Tunnel Hill, was instructed to move to that point to resist Sherman's advance. Cleburne did not occupy the position until 2.30 P. M. It was not entrenched when he reached it, and throughout the afternoon he had only three brigades and one battery with each, with which to hold it against Sherman's five divisions.

But the astonishing error, an error which caused utter failure to the whole movement against Bragg's right, and which ever since has been covered thick in official reports and misleading histories, was the first day's occupation of a range of detached hills north of Missionary Ridge, and completely separated from it. Since the plan of battle turned on occupying the north end of the ridge, it was certainly one of the most remarkable oversights of the war that this position was not thoroughly identified. Even the John Phœnix method of preliminary reconnoitring, namely, when roads, distances, and positions were not known, or had been omitted from his notes, to stop at a farmhouse and ask a citizen, would have answered the purpose, since every field-hand in the vicinity could have given the needed information.

So at daylight of the 25th Sherman found himself on a crest one thousand yards distant from Cleburne's works on the real north point of Missionary Ridge, with a deep gorge between the lines; and in order to assault Cleburne's position he was obliged to move down an open slope under the direct fire of the Confederate guns and rifles, and then up the steep ascent to his fortified lines.

Nevertheless, Sherman moved promptly. His unflinching lines suffered heavily in the descent to the foot of Missionary Ridge, and were repulsed in the direct assaults which followed, except that Corse's brigade, by magnificent effort, secured and continuously held a lodgment close to the flashing of the enemy's guns.

Howard's remaining division had been hastened toward Sherman from the centre at an early hour, thus giving him

six divisions against the five brigades then at the control of Cleburne on Sherman's front. After a second repulse, Baird's division was hurried from the extreme right of Thomas' advanced lines to Sherman's assistance. When he arrived there was no place, with the six divisions already on the ground, to put him in, and he was sent back to Thomas, fortunately reaching the left of his lines just in time for the grand assault of the Army of the Cumberland on the centre.

This seems to be the proper place to give the needed attention to that venerable but still stalwart misstatement that Sherman's attack caused Bragg so to weaken his centre as to make Thomas' assault there successful. All reports, memoirs, and histories to the contrary, nothing of the kind occurred. Not a single regiment or a single piece of artillery was withdrawn from in front of the Army of the Cumberland at any time during the day.

It is best to present the contrary statements in their boldest and most authoritative form. Says Grant in his report: "Discovering that the enemy in his desperation to defeat or resist the progress of Sherman was weakening his centre on Missionary Ridge determined me to order the advance [of Thomas] at once."

Grant thus wrote Sherman at the close of the fight: "No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas' corps carried Missionary Ridge this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command in taking first, so much of the same range of hills and then attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make Thomas' part certain of success."

Grant, in his "Memoirs," says: "From the position I occupied I could see column after column of Bragg's forces moving against Sherman. Every Confederate gun that could be brought to bear upon the Union forces was concentrated upon him."

Sherman, in his report of the battle, says: "Column after

column of the enemy was streaming towards me. Gun after gun poured its concentric shot on us from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of the ground held by us." (And when he saw that Thomas was moving on the centre) "I knew our attack had drawn vast masses of the enemy to our flank, and felt sure of the result."

Says Badeau, in his "Military History of Grant": "Grant was watching the progress of the fight from Orchard Knob. . . . A massive column of Bragg's force soon was seen to move northward along the crest of the ridge, regiment after regiment filing toward Sherman. . . . Grant had marked the movement of the rebel columns toward his left, and instantly perceived his opportunity. Bragg was attempting the most difficult manœuvre that can be executed in war. He was weakening his centre, and making a flank movement in the presence of an enemy. . . . He [Grant] determined to order the assault."

And again: "Sherman's assault began and was so determined and at so critical a point that Bragg threw battalion after battalion to resist the Army of the Tennessee. That army was indeed resisted, was unable to make its way; but this was accomplished only by the sacrifice of all that Bragg was fighting for. The rebel centre, as Grant had foreseen, was weakened to save the right, and the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland was precipitated on the weakened point. The centre was pierced, the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won."

I repeat, in the face of all these statements, that not a single Confederate soldier was withdrawn from Thomas' front to Sherman's on this final day of the battle. All the Confederate reports are clear and specific on this point. They tell, in detail, exactly what was done.

At daylight of November 25 three brigades of Cleburne's division, namely, Smith, Lowrey, and Govan, with their batteries, were entrenched at Tunnel Hill in front of Sherman.

At sunrise Brown's brigade of Stevenson's division arrived near the tunnel from Lookout Mountain, and at nine o'clock Cumming's brigade of the same division arrived and reported to Cleburne, and this comprised his whole force up to 2.30 P. M. of the 25th.

On the night of the 23d, after the capture of Orchard Knob, Walker's division had been brought from the eastern foot of Lookout and posted on Missionary Ridge considerably north of Thomas' front, and three quarters of a mile from Tunnel Hill. At 2 P. M. of the 25th Maney's brigade of this division was dispatched to Cleburne. And this latter move represents the whole of the "streaming" along Missionary Ridge toward Sherman for the entire period after the battle opened shortly after ten o'clock, except the march of one small regiment of Brown's brigade of Stevenson's division which was belated by coming down from Lookout by a circuitous route. This movement of Maney from far north of Thomas' position, some shifting of Walthall's brigade in the same vicinity, and the manœuvring of Cleburne's forces near the tunnel, form the sole basis for the visual errors of the day and the subsequent persistent and remarkable distortions of history.

While Cleburne had six brigades available against Sherman's six divisions, in his congratulations after the battle to those who fought it, he thus wrote:

"It is but justice for me to state that the brunt of this long day's fight was borne by Smith's (Texas) brigade and the Second, Fifteenth, and Twenty-fourth Arkansas (Consolidated) regiment, of Govan's brigade, together with Sweet's and Key's batteries. The remainder of my division was only engaged in heavy skirmishing. The final charge was participated in, and successful, through the timely appearance and gallant assistance of the regiments of Cumming's and Maney's brigades before mentioned. . . . I suffered the following losses in the three brigades of my division engaged, viz.: 42 killed, 178 wounded, and 2 missing. . . . My thanks are also due to

Brigadier-Generals Polk and Lowry, and Colonel Govan, commanding brigades. Although not actively engaged they were rendering good service. . . . Brigadier-General John C. Brown's brigade (Stevenson's division) on my left flank, was engaged in heavy skirmishing most of the day."

So on the Union side the brunt of that long day's fight was borne by the brigade of General Corse.

Of course that portion of Sherman's force which was engaged fought with splendid courage, and suffered heavy losses. The brigade of General Corse was the centre and vortex of it all. But of the seventeen brigades under Sherman's command throughout the day in front of Cleburne's position, eleven were not at any time brought into action. Of Howard's two divisions of five brigades only one was sent into the fight. General Jeff. C. Davis, whose division from the Army of the Cumberland numbered 7000 men, asked permission of General Sherman to assault the ridge from its eastern base, where the slope was comparatively gradual, but was refused, and he took no part in the action. Neither histories, memoirs, nor reports give any explanations of these remarkable facts.

It is pleasant to turn from these errors, myths, and mysteries of the left to the grand culmination of that remarkable day at the centre, namely, to that miracle of military story, the storming of Missionary Ridge.

During the day Thomas' lines faced the ridge for two miles and a half at an average distance of a mile from the crest, and in plain view of the troops in the earthworks at the base and along the summit. He was waiting, according to directions, for Sherman's forces to carry the ridge to the tunnel, when he was to join their right for movement up the valley. Meantime Thomas had early sent Howard's two divisions to help Sherman, and at eleven o'clock had dispatched Baird to his assistance. The latter returned at 2.30 and took position on the left of Thomas' line, which was then formed, as already described, from right to left, as follows: Johnson (two brig-

ades), Sheridan, Wood, and Baird, each three brigades — in all eleven brigades and four batteries. Before him stretched a plain for the most part open, or very thinly wooded, extending a mile to the earthworks at the foot of the ridge. Halfway up the rough, steep, rocky, and tangled slope was a lighter line of rifle-pits, and above them the works along the crest. These defences above and below were held in Thomas' front by four divisions, Stewart's on Bragg's left, next Bate, then Anderson, then Cheatham, and fifteen batteries, all the latter on the summit; and with them two siege-pieces at Bragg's headquarters — in all, 14 brigades of infantry and 15 batteries just mentioned, holding this position of tremendous strength against only 11 brigades and 4 batteries.

At three o'clock Thomas' line stood ready to advance. The front was two miles and a half, the column four lines deep and covered with a cloud of skirmishers. This was a battle-array of those soldiers of whom Sherman wrote thus in his "Memoirs," citing Grant as his authority: "The men of Thomas' army had been so demoralized by the battle of Chickamauga that he [Grant] feared they could not be got out of their trenches to assume the offensive. The Army of the Cumberland had been so long in the trenches that he [Grant] wanted my troops to hurry up, to take the offensive first; after which he had no doubt the Cumberland army would fight well."

Standing before those frowning and embattled heights, five hundred feet above the plain, trenched with earthworks, held by superior numbers, gleaming with bayonets, and with fifteen batteries ready to open upon them at the first steps of an advance, what would these grovellers from the trenches do? True, three brigades of their fellows from the Chickamauga field had helped Hooker storm Lookout, and this very line itself had swept out from the city and carried the central entrenchments along which they stood. But they had not yet received the inspiration which might have been derived from seeing Sherman's troops fight. They only knew of him that

the battle orders had been countermanded three days in succession because he was not on time, and they had just heard that he had failed to carry the north end of the ridge, which was the key movement of the battle. What could these burrowers in trenches do? There was to be a signal of six guns from Orchard Knob to test this question.

At a quarter after three o'clock they began to sound. Every man of the 20,000 counted, and at the sixth discharge there went up a mighty cheer which rolled over the plains and re-echoed from the surrounding mountains. Eighty-nine regiments rushed for the earthworks at the base of the ridge — every soldier like an arrow shot from a string which had been drawn to its full tension. Great guns in the outer works of the city threw shells over their heads at base and slopes and crest before them. Riflemen in the Confederate earthworks and belching batteries above pelted them with the varied hail of battle. The sun swung low over the ridge. It never looked in all its shining over battle-fields upon a more imposing rush. Two miles and a half of gleaming rifle-barrels, line after line of them, and more than a hundred and fifty banners, state and national, blossoming along the advance. Not a straggler, only the killed and wounded, dropped from the ranks. They swept over the lower earthworks, capturing many prisoners, and, except on a part of the line where there was a brief confusion of orders, they everywhere swarmed up the slopes. The colors rushed in advance, and the men crowded towards the banners. Each regiment became a wedge-shaped mass, the flags at the cutting edge cleaving the way to the summit. Without faltering, without a stay, the flags went on, — not long, it is sadly true, in the same hands, but always in willing hands, and in an hour from the sounding of the signal guns for starting the crest for three miles was crowned with the stars and stripes, Bragg's whole centre was in flight, and forty of his guns and two thousand prisoners were in the hands of Thomas' victorious army.

The sun, which at its rising lighted up that one flag on Lookout, smiled at its setting on the countless banners which a storming army had planted along the crest of Missionary Ridge.

And here we are faced with another of the persistent myths of history, and are told that Missionary Ridge was carried without orders, and by the inspiration of the lines, and that the movement only contemplated carrying the rifle-pits at the base.

Hooker's column had been sent forward from Lookout toward Rossville at ten o'clock. The destruction of the bridge over Chattanooga Creek delayed him till one o'clock.

Grant says in his report that Hooker's advance astride the ridge at Rossville was to be the signal for "storming the ridge in the centre with strong columns," but seeing Sherman pressed, and believing that Hooker must be near, "determined me to order the advance at once." He therefore ordered Thomas to move forward his force "and carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and when carried to re-form his lines on the rifle-pits with a view to carrying the top of the ridge. These troops moved forward, drove the enemy from the rifle-pits at the base of the ridge like bees from a hive, stopped but a moment until the whole were in line, and commenced the ascent of the mountain from right to left almost simultaneously, following closely the retreating enemy without further orders."

Now let us see what orders General Thomas gave his line. They are found in General Baird's report. "I had just completed the establishment of my line, and was upon the left of it, when a staff officer from Major-General Thomas brought me verbal orders to move forward to the edge of the open ground which bordered the foot of Missionary Ridge within striking distance of the rebel rifle-pits at its base, so as to be ready at a signal, which would be the firing of six guns from Orchard Knob, to dash forward and take those pits. He

added, this was intended as preparatory to a general assault on the mountain, and that it was doubtless designed by the major-general commanding that I should take part in this movement, so that I would be following his wishes were I to push on to the summit. I gave the necessary orders to the Third Brigade, and, passing on to the right, was in the act of communicating them to Colonel Van Derveer of the Second, when firing from Orchard Knob began."

General Baird was even more explicit in communicating these orders to General Van Derveer. Looking up at the ridge, he said: "Van Derveer, it is evidently too steep for riding. You had better order your regimental officers to leave their horses." And the field officers of that command led the charge across the plain and up the ridge on foot. It is unnecessary to discuss before this audience whether such orders, given in advance of starting, and especially this leaving the regimental horses, contemplated going to the top. At any rate, they served that purpose well. Likewise, on the other flank of General Thomas' line, the understanding was clear before starting that the crest was the objective. Mr. George Marsh, now of the Quartermaster's Department in Washington, then a first sergeant in Carlin's brigade, which had rejoined Johnson's line from Hooker's column, and formed the right of the storming line, has furnished a copy of his daily diary, and written in it at the time is this: "We then descended [Lookout] and prepared to assault Missionary Ridge, which is four or five miles long and four or five hundred feet high. We formed an immense line of battle in some woods at 3.15 P. M., where our brigadier, General W. P. Carlin of Illinois, said to us, 'Boys, I don't want you to stop until we reach the top of that hill. Forward!' General Carlin rode his horse to the foot of the ridge, and then turned him loose and scrambled up with the rest of us."

General Carlin, commanding the right brigade of the assaulting line, says in his report "he received instructions

from General Johnson to prepare to advance against the enemy on Missionary Ridge." Lieutenant-Colonel Hapeman, commanding one of General Carlin's regiments, reports: "At about three o'clock the line moved forward . . . to assault the enemy's works on Missionary Ridge." Colonel Anson G. McCook, commanding the right regiment of the line, after describing his position, says in his report that at about 4 P. M. he "moved to the assault of Missionary Ridge." As to the understanding in the remaining brigade of Johnson's division, Captain Crofton, commanding the 16th and 19th Regulars, says in his report, "having covered our front with a line of skirmishers [we] were ordered to storm Missionary Ridge."

There was some momentary conflict of orders at two points in the centre divisions as to advancing beyond the rifle-pits, but even there the men rushed on and carried the adjacent lines with them. But the reports, when analyzed, show clearly that whatever others may have had in mind, Thomas' intention, from the first, was to start his flanks for the top of the ridge.

It is but fair to say that my friend General Fullerton, who has done me the honor to come to Boston for this meeting, and who was adjutant-general and chief-of-staff of the Fourth Corps in this battle, does not agree with me in this view, but holds that none of the orders for the movement went further than to include an assault on the rifle-pits at the foot of the ridge.

General Hooker's operations at the south end of Missionary Ridge near Rossville were also of a brilliant character. He succeeded in bridging Chattanooga Creek, and the head of his column, Osterhaus' division, drove back the Confederate infantry and artillery, strongly posted in the gap, gained the rear of Missionary Ridge, and turned northward along its eastern base. Cruft's division of Hooker's force ascended the ridge from the gap and moved at once on the flank of

Bragg's troops which extended beyond Thomas' right. Geary moved rapidly along the western base of the ridge, and coming in sight of the right of Thomas' line just crossing the crest, a half mile to the northward, faced his forces toward the ridge and scaled it. The troops attempting to escape from Thomas, joined to those in position on his right, gave each of Hooker's three divisions some short, sharp fighting, but nothing could resist these heroes of Lookout, and here also the victory was complete and many prisoners were captured.

On the left of Thomas fighting continued until dark. Baird, on reaching the summit, wheeled to the left, or rather his officers and men precipitated themselves in mass upon Hardee's forces, which were attempting to flank them from that direction, and which by dusk were successfully beaten back. Sheridan, upon gaining the crest, immediately pushed down the eastern slope in pursuit. Bragg's entire army, except the force to the left of Thomas and in front of Sherman, retreated in disordered flight, saving but few guns.

Cleburne, before Sherman, had been able even with his small force to hold the bridges over the Chickamauga on his right, and when night fell he withdrew in order, saving all his guns and material.

Thus ended the grandest spectacular battle of the war,—perhaps of any war. The Confederacy had been again as seriously divided as when the Mississippi was opened. Her most thoughtful officers saw that its doom was sealed. Nineteen Northern States fought in the battle. The flags of Massachusetts, side by side with those of Iowa, led the veterans under them to victory. The cheering of the banners on Lookout by those gathered armies was the voice of all the North proclaiming that there was no stronghold in the land from which secession could be successfully defended.

Stated in round numbers the forces actually engaged on the Union side at the various stages of the battle were 58,000, those on the Confederate side 37,000.

General Hooker's assaulting columns on Lookout numbered 10,000 men. The force in action against him was three brigades.

The total force with General Sherman before the north end of Missionary Ridge was 28,000, and Cleburne's available strength against him was 8000 men — and less than 5000 of these were heavily engaged.

General Thomas' force assaulting Missionary Ridge was 20,000. Bragg's lines in Thomas' front were about 18,000 strong, but extended considerably beyond Thomas' flanks.

Hardee used four brigades, numbering 5000, on Cleburne's right at the bridges over the Chickamauga; and between Thomas and Sherman on the ridge were four brigades of about 6000 men.

General Hooker's losses at Lookout aggregated 395; General Sherman's, 1492; and General Thomas', in his assault on the ridge, 3270 for one hour's work, of which 2381 were in Sheridan's and Wood's divisions of Granger's corps.

The total Confederate loss aggregated 6446, and the Union losses 5824.

A brief comparison of the armies of McClellan and Lee at the time of the Seven Days' battles with those which fought at Chickamauga and about Chattanooga may give Eastern soldiers a clearer idea of the magnitude of these Western operations.

In the number of infantry regiments the armies of McClellan during the Seven Days' and Rosecrans at Chickamauga differed only by two regiments; and those of Lee and Bragg by only three, — a total difference of only five regiments of infantry for the combined armies. The total losses of McClellan during the seven days were 330 less than those of Rosecrans. The losses of Lee for the seven days were only 1653 more than Bragg. McClellan's missing were 6053 against only 4774 for Rosecrans. McClellan's killed and wounded were 9796, and Rosecrans' 11,405. One was for battles of seven days, and the other for two days. It should also be remembered that the

regiments of July, 1862, were considerably stronger than those of the autumn of 1863. Here are the figures in detail:

		Regt's. Inf.	Cav.	Artillery
McClellan,	Seven Days'	143	8	55
Rosecrans,	Chickamauga	141	18	36
Grant,	Chattanooga	225	8	52
Lee,	Seven Days'	187	14	79
Bragg,	Chickamauga	184	28	50
Bragg, (Including Longstreet)	Chattanooga	190	17	43

	LOSSES			
	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.	Total.
McClellan,	1734	8062	6053	15,849
Rosecrans,	1656	9749	4744	16,179
Lee,	2823	13,703	3233	19,749
Bragg,	1790	11,158	1380	18,096

It may interest this company to hear a word about the national project by which the history of these great fields is to be preserved.

Congress has authorized the establishment of the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park. The field of Chickamauga is to be purchased. Nearly 6000 acres have been already acquired. The state of Georgia has ceded to the Government jurisdiction over 10,000 acres and all the roads through the field and those of military interest near it. Tennessee has ceded the roads over Lookout Mountain, through Hooker's battle-field to Wauhatchie, his road across to Missionary Ridge at Rossville, and the roads thence along the crest of that ridge to Sherman's earthworks on the isolated hills beyond. These earthworks are still intact and will be preserved. All the lines of battle of both armies are to be marked by historical tablets in metal of the size and character of those before you. There will be 2500 of them in the park and along its approaches. The 40 miles of ceded roads and the 20 miles of roads within the Chickamauga field are all to be put in first-

class order. There will then be a continuous drive of 21 miles from Sherman's position to Glass' Mill, the left of the Confederate lines at Chickamauga, and every foot of that drive will be over hot fighting ground. The underbrush is to be cut from the field, and the whole is to be restored to its condition at the time of the battles. The work is being energetically pushed by a Government Commission.

It will be seen that, in the language of the Act establishing the park, there will be preserved "for historical and professional military study the fields of some of the most remarkable manœuvres and most brilliant fighting of the War of the Rebellion."

XI

THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN SEPTEMBER, 1863

BY

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Read before the Society December 1, 1903

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THE EAST TENNESSEE CAMPAIGN
SEPTEMBER, 1863

On September 19 and 20, 1863, the battle of Chickamauga was fought. It was in many respects the wildest, fiercest conflict of the war.

It was to the West what Gettysburg was to the East. It extinguished the last hope of the Confederates of overthrowing and destroying the Union army which was being driven into the heart of the Confederacy, even as Gettysburg dispelled the rebel dream of Northern conquest and plunder, when with a mighty effort the Army of the Potomac hurled back to the line of the Rappahannock the Army of Northern Virginia.

Chattanooga, the objective point of the campaign, was, in strategic importance, of more value to the Confederates than any other point that had surrendered to our victorious arms, with the possible exception of Vicksburg, for it was the key to the interior of the Confederacy, the converging point of the two greatest lines of railway that bore the Confederate supply-trains to the armies in the East. It was the citadel of Georgia, the gateway to the South thrown open by the prowess of the Army of the Cumberland, and held open by the courage and brawn of its soldiers until the leisurely march of reënforcements enabled them to beat back the envious spectators of their occupancy of the stronghold from the heights of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge.

But it is not with the battle of Chickamauga that this paper has to deal.

General Rosecrans, moving forward from Middle Tennessee

whence he had expelled the Confederates in July, under imperative orders from the War Department, to the capture of Chattanooga, found at the outset of the campaign that it could succeed only by threatening the enemy's communications southward. To accomplish this purpose so thoroughly as to compel the evacuation of Chattanooga, it would be necessary for him to cross the Tennessee River below the city with his entire army and supply-trains and construct roads over two mountain ranges, thus virtually cutting loose from his base of supplies at Nashville and Murfreesboro. In this state of things it is not surprising that he felt apprehensive as to the support afforded to his flanks, as well as to his rear in case the enemy, declining battle, should move via Gunter's Landing or Whitesburg on Nashville. He therefore called upon the War Department to direct General Burnside to close down upon his left and General Grant to protect his right and rear. As time passed and information reached him that Bragg's army was being heavily reënforced, General Halleck appears to have used every effort to secure coöperation from the armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee, with what success it is the object of this paper to show.

The battle was fought south of Chattanooga. If, in spite of the valor of the Union army, it had been defeated by the overwhelming odds that were arrayed against it, its regiments disorganized and captured or driven into the mountains, Chattanooga re-taken, and the Army of the Cumberland eliminated from the arena of war, the fault would not have justly lain at the door of its heroic commander; but the candid historian, studying, with no political bias, the records of that campaign, would have attributed the disaster to the absence of a common commander of all the forces in the field in Tennessee and the Northern Mississippi, from the field of conflict. There is no doubt that had General Halleck's headquarters been at Chattanooga instead of at Washington, Hurlbut's corps from the Army of the Tennessee and Hart-

suff's corps from the Army of the Ohio would have been on the field of Chickamauga.

General Boynton, in his masterly description of the Chattanooga campaign and its attendant battles, says: "There had been time enough, after General Rosecrans' explanation of his proposed plan of campaign, to force General Burnside with twenty thousand men down from East Tennessee, and to have brought all needed strength for the other flank from the Army of the Tennessee on the Mississippi."[1] I leave to the survivors of the latter army, who have usually been found equal to any emergency, to explain why, in disobedience of orders from General Halleck, one hundred thousand men were permitted to lie idle on the banks of the Mississippi while the Army of the Cumberland was engaged in a death-grapple on Chickamauga Creek, with not only its old antagonist, but with Confederate troops withdrawn from the front of Meade in Virginia and others paroled by Grant at Vicksburg, and when the appearance of even one army corps at Rome, Georgia, would have held back reënforcements to Bragg's army from the South and East via Atlanta. The failure of General Burnside to reënforce General Rosecrans is a theme that may interest the student of the joint campaign which resulted in the permanent occupation of Cumberland Gap, Knoxville, and Chattanooga.

The East Tennessee campaign of August and September, 1863, under the light of the record, embraces not only the movements of General Rosecrans, but to an equal extent those of General Burnside. The Army of the Ohio on duty in Kentucky consisted of the Ninth Corps, commanded by Major-General J. G. Parke, and the Twenty-third Corps, under command of Major-General George L. Hartsuff. The first of these corps numbered on August 30, "present for duty, equipped": infantry, 5965; artillery, 208; total, 6173. The Twenty-third Corps, composed of three divisions, num-

[1] Chattanooga and Chickamauga, p. 21.

bered: infantry, 14,279; cavalry, 6073; artillery, 1462; total, 21,814. The first division of this corps, under command of General Boyle, 6357 men of all arms, was required for duty in guarding various military posts in Kentucky, leaving the remainder, 15,457, for offensive operations. The total effective strength of both corps was 21,630. The advance into East Tennessee commenced August 20. General Hascall's division moved from Crab Orchard, crossing the Cumberland at Smith's Ford; General White's division crossed at Jamestown; the cavalry and mounted infantry, Generals Carter and Shackelford and Colonels Foster and Woolford, moving in advance of each column. The two columns were ordered to concentrate after crossing the Cumberland Mountains near Huntsville, and move upon Montgomery in East Tennessee. From there the movements, as Burnside telegraphed Halleck, would be "according to circumstances, but probably upon Kingston and Loudon, as these seem to be the places to which General Rosecrans desires us to go in order to coöperate fully with him. At all events, our final destination will be Knoxville. We have had very serious difficulty to contend with in bad roads and short forage; in fact the country is about destitute. We shall have still greater difficulties in that way to overcome, but if Rosecrans occupies the enemy fully and no troops are allowed to come down the road from Richmond, from the Eastern army, I think we will be successful." The army arrived at Montgomery on the first of September, having encountered no opposition. There was nothing there to oppose it. General Carter's cavalry division moved thence in three columns, one under General Shackelford on Loudon Bridge, one under Colonel Byrd on Kingston, and one under Colonel Foster on Knoxville.

Major-General Simon Bolivar Buckner, in command of the Department of East Tennessee, had, in obedience to orders from the Confederate War Department, gathered up

all his available force, with the exception of 2000 men under command of Brigadier-General John B. Frazer, who was left in defence of Cumberland Gap, and a few isolated detachments at Knoxville and other places under command of Brigadier-General Jackson, and formed a junction with Bragg's army at Chattanooga. Previous to leaving Knoxville, General Buckner wrote Major-General Samuel Jones, in command of the Department of Western Virginia, requesting him to look after his department during his absence. Jones' headquarters were at Dublin, Virginia. He had his hands full taking care of Generals Averill and Scammon, who had on several occasions pushed their commands across the mountains from the north and Kanawha Valley, and he was unable with troops at his command to do much besides look after his own department. In compliance with Buckner's request, however, he came down the road as far as Abingdon, whence on the 6th of September he wrote General Frazer, directing him to hold Cumberland Gap as long as possible, as reënforcements were then on the way from the East. The long line extending from Staunton, Virginia, to the Salt Works, over two hundred miles, comprised in the Department of West Virginia, rendered it out of the power of General Jones to reënforce him with his own troops. In compliance with the request of General Jones, General Lee returned to him one of his own brigades, commanded by Brigadier-General Wharton, which had been for several months on duty in the Army of Northern Virginia, and later another under command of Brigadier-General Corse. General Jones' messenger reached General Frazer too late to prevent his surrender, and 2000 men were thus subtracted from the little force left to oppose the occupation of East Tennessee by the troops under General Burnside.

The following extracts from the returns of the Army of Western Virginia and East Tennessee will show the troops actually on duty in East Tennessee from the 16th of September, at which date the brigade last mentioned arrived:

Organization of the Command of Major-General Samuel Jones in East Tennessee and Western Virginia in September, 1863.

Infantry Brigades.

Brigadier-General Corse (sent by General Lee), 15th, 29th, and 30th Virginia.

Brigadier-General Jackson (Buckner's Corps), Thomas' legion, Walker's battalion.

Brigadier-General Wharton (at Salt Works), 51st Virginia, 30th Virginia battalion, 45th Virginia.

Cavalry Brigades.

Brigadier-General W. E. Jones (made up from fragmentary commands), 21st Virginia cavalry; 27th, 34th, 36th, and 37th Virginia cavalry battalions.

Brigadier-General John S. Williams (one half of them mounted), 64th Virginia detached cavalry; 1st Tennessee cavalry, 4th Kentucky cavalry, May's Kentucky cavalry battalion, 10th Kentucky cavalry battalion, 16th Georgia battalion.

Artillery.

J. Floyd King: Otey's battery, Lowry's battery, Ringgold's battery, Davidson's battery.

The effective total of the above command was, up to the 16th of September, about 4000. Corse's brigade increased it to 5180, and Wharton's brigade, 1852 strong, was stationed at the Salt Works.

The force with which General Burnside confronted that of General Jones, above mentioned, was as follows:

Organization of the Army of the Ohio in Tennessee, September 10, 1863, under Major-General Burnside.

Twenty-third Army Corps, Major-General Hartsuff.

Second Division, General White: infantry, 1st brigade, Colonel O. H. Moore, 4 regiments; 2d brigade, Colonel M. W. Chapin, 4 regiments; artillery, 2 batteries.

Third Division, General Hascall: infantry, 1st brigade, Colonel S. A.

Gilbert, 4 regiments; 2d brigade, Colonel D. Cameron, 4 regiments; artillery, 2 batteries.

Fourth Division, General S. P. Carter; cavalry and mounted infantry; 1st brigade, Colonel R. K. Byrd, 4 regiments; 2d brigade, General Shackelford, 5 regiments; 3d brigade, Colonel J. P. Carter, 4 regiments; independent brigade, Colonel Frank Woolford, 3 regiments; artillery, 5 batteries.

Present for duty (equipped).

Twenty-third Army Corps.

Infantry	6559
Mounted Infantry	3123
Cavalry	3436
Artillery	1341
	14,459

Ninth Army Corps.

Infantry	6222
Artillery	111
Total U. S. Troops in East Tennessee	20,792

The cavalry expeditions from Montgomery were all successful. Kingston and Knoxville were taken without opposition, but at Loudon Bridge Buckner's rear guard was strongly posted. After a brisk skirmish they were driven back by Shackelford's command. The railroad bridge over the Holston, a fine structure, had been saturated with turpentine, and the guard no sooner retreated across it than it was committed to the flames. Colonel Byrd captured at Kingston a steamboat in process of construction, and communicated with Colonel Minty's pickets, who formed the extreme left of General Rosecrans' army.

Leaving Byrd's brigade, 3000 strong, at Loudon and Athens, General Burnside pushed the remainder of the Twenty-third Corps on to Knoxville. Buckner had left Knoxville the day before Colonel Foster's arrival, leaving behind him a small force to guard a considerable quantity of quarter-

master's stores, the government workshops, and a large quantity of salt, which fell into Foster's hands. General Burnside reached the city on the 3d. The East Tennessee troops, separated for many weary months from their families, were greeted with expressions of the tenderest affection by the people all along the line of march. National flags were brought out from their hiding-places and flung to the breeze from nearly every house. There was little use for army rations; a feast awaited the troops at every village. Women stood by the roadside with buckets of water, fruit, and cakes, which they gave freely, refusing all offers of pay. As they drew near Knoxville the city was radiant with flags. Sixty young ladies took their places by the roadside, waving flags and shouting "Hurrah for the Union!" Ladies came out of their houses to greet Generals Burnside and Carter. Seizing their hands, they wept for joy, crying "Welcome to East Tennessee!" Hundreds of people of both sexes and all ages collected in a few minutes, and both General Burnside and General Carter addressed them, promising that they should not again be deserted to their enemies. The demonstrations were not boisterous, but the intense joy imparted by these tidings were exhibited in quiet rejoicing. Men who for months had been hidden in caves in the hills and in mountain fastnesses came in and were overjoyed at their deliverance. The halt at Knoxville was very brief. On the 5th General Shackelford with his brigade, 1434 strong, was sent in the direction of Cumberland Gap to cut off escape by the force in occupation of that stronghold, and on the 7th General Burnside left Knoxville with two regiments of cavalry, two of mounted infantry, and Konkle's battery, and joined Shackelford on the 9th. Colonel De Courcey, who had advanced with his brigade of the Ninth Corps, two infantry regiments, two of cavalry, and a battery of artillery, via Loudon, Kentucky, 1834 strong, had by this time taken position on the north, and summoned the garrison to surrender, which demand was refused. The garrison was

composed of four regiments of infantry from North Carolina, one from Virginia, and one from Georgia, one regiment of East Tennessee cavalry, two field batteries, and three guns in position. General Buckner stopped long enough on his way to Chattanooga to telegraph General Frazer from Loudon, on the 30th of August, to evacuate the Gap with all speed, to burn and destroy everything that could not be transported, and to report to General Samuel Jones at Abingdon, Virginia, 125 miles distant. As General Frazer had been led to believe that East Tennessee was to be held by the Confederates, and knowing the importance of the Gap in this event, he at once construed the telegram of the 30th to be a trick of the Yankees, and replied to it in cipher, stating his condition for defence. He had over 2000 men and forty days' rations, and believed he could hold the position, but asked to be informed if he should still evacuate. The response to this dispatch came on the following day, ordering him to hold his position. This order was countermanded by General Bragg at Chattanooga, but as telegraphic communication with Frazer had been cut off in the mean time, no order to evacuate the Gap reached him before the investment of the place on the 6th of September. The defences, about two miles in extent, required a reliable force of about 6000 men and appropriate artillery to properly man. Batteries of light guns were placed in position to command the three roads converging at the Gap, but owing to the tortuous course of the roads they had range of not over four hundred yards, except on the south, where they had full sweep to the extent of their range. The guns were 6-pounder smooth-bores and 12-pounder howitzers. The First Tennessee Confederate Cavalry, under command of Colonel J. B. Carter, an active and efficient regiment about 600 strong, was sent out to reconnoitre in the direction of Knoxville, where it encountered General Shackelford's advance and was driven into Powell's Valley, when by Frazer's order it continued up the valley on the Virginia Road and reported to General

Williams. The 62d and 64th North Carolina were conscripts, and were thoroughly imbued with Union sentiments. The colonel of the 62d was absent. He soon after resigned and became an open advocate of the Union. His men were accustomed to declare that they had never fired a gun at a Union man and they never would. Three hundred of the 64th North Carolina had already deserted in a body, and the regiment was small, but under better discipline than the 62d. The 54th Georgia had about five hundred men for duty. It had been on provost-marshal duty at Knoxville, and was regarded as tolerably good, although their men *rode their colonel on a rail*, and allowed him to resume command only on promise of better behavior.

He and his lieutenant-colonel were both absent, and Major Printup was in command. Colonel Slemp's Virginia regiment and Burnes' battalion joined Frazer from Marshall's command on the last of August. For insubordination and inefficiency this regiment had no equal in either army. To add, if possible, to the difficulties with which General Frazer had to contend, his predecessor in command had allowed the roof of the powder magazine to go to decay, and on examination most of it was found to be saturated with rain-water. A requisition had been made for an additional supply, which the ordnance officer at Knoxville had duly pigeon-holed and failed to fill. The only drinking-water upon which the garrison had to rely was obtained at a spring in the valley on the south side of the Gap near a mill, which later, when run to its full capacity, ground wheat about as fast as the men could eat the flour. News of the capture of Loudon and the burning of the railroad bridge was followed by the intelligence of the capture of Knoxville, and rightly surmising that the next move would be upon Cumberland Gap, the commander at once made arrangements for defence. A device for conveying water to the top of the hill by means of telegraph wires was designed, but failed in construction for lack of material. Oxen

were put to hauling it up in barrels, but broke down on the second trip. It was then determined that the spring and mill must be guarded, and 150 men of the 62d North Carolina were detailed for this duty, but were put to flight by 100 of Shackelford's cavalry, who dashed down upon the mill and burned it on the night of their arrival. The condition of the beleaguered garrison was now critical in the extreme, and it was only necessary for the two brigades, one on the north and the other on the south, to put on a bold front, concealing their real strength, to ensure the surrender of the stronghold. On the 6th Colonel Carter had reported that the force advancing from Knoxville had steadily driven him, and that he had reason to believe it to be very strong.

On the 7th General Shackelford sent the following communication to General Frazer:

Headquarters, U. S. Forces in Front of Cumberland Gap,
September 7, 1863.

To General Frazer, commanding Confederate Forces, Cumberland Gap:

You are surrounded by my forces. In order to save the effusion of blood and the unnecessary loss of life, I demand the unconditional surrender of yourself and command by 3 o'clock, inst.

I am, General,
Very respectfully,
J. M. SHACKELFORD,
Brigadier-General commanding.[1]

To which General Frazer made answer as follows:

Headquarters, Cumberland Gap,
September 7, 1863.

To Brigadier-General Shackelford,
commanding U. S. Forces:

I have just received your note of to-day demanding the

[1] 51 W. R. 617.

unconditional surrender of myself and forces. In reply, I have simply to state that I must decline acceding thereto.

I am, General,

Very respectfully,

J. W. FRAZER, Brigadier-General.[1]

Similar proposals were made on the following day, both by Shackelford on the south and De Courcey on the north, which were met by a polite refusal to comply. General Burnside arrived at General Shackelford's headquarters on the night of the 8th, and on the morning of the 9th sent the following note to General Frazer:

Headquarters, Army of the Ohio,
September 9, 1863.

Brigadier-General Frazer, commanding Confederate Forces, Cumberland Gap:

General: As ample time has been given for negotiation, you will be kind enough to dismiss at once from your lines our flags of truce, from both sides of the Gap, and cease communication with any of the United States forces, excepting through myself, as none other will be considered valid. At the same time, with the view of avoiding the effusion of blood, I beg to state that I have a force present with me sufficient, in all human probability, to carry your position, and should your reply not be satisfactory, shall commence operations, with the view of assaulting your position at such points and with such forces as I may deem proper, immediately on the return of the officer carrying this note, who has permission to remain one hour at your pickets.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE, Major-General.

Major Van Buren, aide-de-camp on my staff, will be the bearer hereof.[2]

[1] 51 W. R. 617. [2] 51 W. R. 621.

On receipt of this peremptory demand from the major-general commanding the department, whose presence at that remote point indicated that he had nothing to fear from the Confederate forces in East Tennessee, General Frazer wisely concluded that all hope of succor was cut off. To General Burnside's demand for immediate surrender he returned the following note:

Headq'rs, Cumberland Gap,
September 9, 1863.

To General A. E. Burnside, commanding U. S. Forces:

General: As my communications with General Shackelford and Colonel De Courcey will show, I intended contending the position, but will surrender on condition that the officers and men of my command be released on parole.

I am, General, very respectfully,
J. W. Frazer, Brigadier-General.[1]

This proposal was refused by General Burnside, and the result was the unconditional surrender of the Gap with all its garrison and munitions.

Thus was Cumberland Gap, one of the strongest positions on the continent, the natural gateway to the Confederacy, capable of being made impregnable against any force that could be sent against it, twice abandoned and once surrendered without firing a gun in its defence.

Major-General Samuel Jones was directed by the Confederate War Department to extend a protectorate over the district of East Tennessee. Arriving upon the scene of operations too late to prevent the surrender of Frazer at Cumberland Gap, he turned his attention to the formation of a command which should prevent the advance of Burnside's troops eastward, while by a show of force he should be able to hold his antagonist from participating in the struggle then impending near Chattanooga.

[1] 51 W. R. 621, 622.

The value of the salt works at Saltville, fourteen miles east of Abingdon, was inestimable to the Southern army. Their destruction would inflict an irreparable loss upon the Confederacy. Although the capture and destruction of these works seemed never to have entered into the calculations of General Burnside or the War Department, the head of General Burnside's column had no sooner turned in that direction from Cumberland Gap than General Jones at once conjectured the objective point to be the precious salt works, which it had been his special duty to guard.

On the 14th the Union troops were reported to be moving from Cumberland Gap on the salt works. General Wharton was placed in command of the defences, and Otey's battery ordered to report to him. Majors Chenoweth and Prentice were ordered to send scouts out and ascertain the truth of the report. Colonel J. E. Carter, in command of the First Tennessee cavalry brigade, was directed to move via Reedy Creek and Moccasin Gap, and "if the enemy moves toward Saltville, get in his rear and harass him."

Inquiries were next ordered to be made to what extent he could rely upon the home guards to protect the salt works, with the intention of removing Wharton to the front. It will be observed that the mind of General Jones had become impressed with two ideas, both of which were erroneous. One, that Burnside had but a portion of his force in East Tennessee, having sent the greater portion of his troops to coöperate with Rosecrans below Chattanooga; the other, that General Burnside had designs upon the salt works. Both ideas were precisely those which would naturally occur to the mind of an intelligent antagonist, conversant with the importance of both movements, and that he was wrong in his surmise reflects less credit upon his antagonist than upon himself. General Lee, whose mind embraced in its comprehensive grasp the operations of the Confederate army throughout the whole arena of war, had already responded to the call of General

Bragg for reënforcements by detaching one of his strongest corps, under Longstreet, for service at Chattanooga, and now finding the salt works, upon which his army depended, threatened, he had promptly supplied to General Jones an additional brigade under command of Brigadier-General Corse. Wharton's brigade was encamped at Glade Springs, within supporting distance of the artillery in defence of the salt works. Corse was brought to the front and preparations made to defend the line of road leading into the valley of the Upper Tennessee, and if possible, prevent Burnside from advancing upon the salt works and also from detaching any considerable portion of his force to reënforce Rosecrans. In response to a telegram from President Davis asking the strength and position of his forces, General Jones replied as follows:

Jonesboro, September 15, 1863.

His Excellency, Jefferson Davis,
Richmond, Va.

Your telegram of yesterday received last night. I shall withdraw the troops from this to the Watauga and Hollston to await the reënforcements and be in better position to meet an advance on Saltville. No reliable information of the movements of the enemy from Cumberland Gap. Picket skirmishing in front every day. Our pickets behaving well.

SAM JONES, Major-General.[1]

General Jones says in his report: "Under all the circumstances of the case I thought the best service I could render with the small force under my command would be to check and detain the superior force in my front until the battle which I supposed was impending near Chattanooga should be decided."[2]

On the 9th of September General Burnside reported the capture of Cumberland Gap and 2000 prisoners and the occu-

[1] 53 W. R. 652, 653. [2] 51 W. R. 604.

pation of East Tennessee from Jonesboro on the northeast to Athens in the southeast. To this report Halleck responded on the 11th congratulating him upon his success, directing him to hold the gaps in the North Carolina mountains and to connect with General Rosecrans, at least with his cavalry, notifying him that the latter would occupy Dalton or some point on the railroad, to close all access from Atlanta. On the 13th Halleck telegraphed as follows: "It is important that all the available force of your command be pushed forward into East Tennessee. All your scattered forces should be concentrated there. So long as we hold Tennessee, Kentucky is perfectly safe. Move down your infantry as rapidly as possible towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans. Bragg may merely hold the passes in the mountains to cover Atlanta, and move his main army through Northern Alabama to reach the Tennessee River, and turn Rosecrans' right and cut off his supplies. In this case he will turn Chattanooga over to you, and move to intercept Bragg." [1]

Here is a positive order, as explicit as any given to Rosecrans, for Burnside to move his infantry down towards Chattanooga to connect with Rosecrans. The same order had been given on the 5th of August, and had formed a part of the plan of the expedition. It was reiterated on the 5th of September, when he was directed to keep Rosecrans informed of his movements and arrange with him for coöperation; on September 11, when he was notified of Rosecrans' position and need of reënforcements, and again on the 13th, as seen in the above dispatch. He had in Tennessee a division of cavalry and mounted infantry whose effective strength, as shown by the field returns of September 20, was: "Present for duty, equipped, 6700, with thirty-four pieces of artillery." His infantry and artillery under Hartsuff numbered: "Present for duty, equipped, 6586, with thirty-two pieces of artillery." One has but to imagine the grand results of the Chattanooga

[1] 52 W. R. 617.

campaign if these orders had been obeyed. Burnside entered Knoxville with an army of 10,000 men on the 6th of September, leaving a division of infantry and a brigade of cavalry and mounted infantry at Loudon and Athens. He found supplies abundant, besides which he had crossed the mountains with 2000 beef cattle. His advance, under Foster, captured at Knoxville five locomotives, over twenty cars, and a large quantity of provisions. After capturing the force and subsistence stores at Cumberland Gap and opening the route to and from Kentucky, and arming the loyal East Tennesseeans with 5000 stand of arms brought with him for that purpose, he had ample time and opportunity in which to have dispatched at least 10,000 infantry to coöperate with Rosecrans. On the 18th he acknowledged the receipt of Halleck's dispatch of the 13th, above quoted, and also of one dated on the 14th, which reads as follows: "There are reasons why you should reënforce General Rosecrans with all possible dispatch. It is believed that the enemy will concentrate to give him battle. You must be there to help him." [1] To this urgent appeal he replied on the 18th from Knoxville: "Orders to go below will be obeyed as soon as possible. I go to Greenville to-night [in the opposite direction]. Dispositions for attacking the enemy at Jonesboro made. I will lose no time in doing as you order. No direct telegraphic communication as yet. Hope to get it to-morrow." [2] The next day while Rosecrans, after the brilliant flank movement which compelled the evacuation of Chattanooga, found his army on the eve of a terrible battle, Burnside telegraphed from Greenville: "Will obey your instructions in reference to Rosecrans. Our troops occupy Jonesboro. Enemy retiring to Abingdon. Our cavalry in pursuit. Am now sending every man that can be spared to aid Rosecrans. I shall go on to Jonesboro. As soon as I learn the result of our movements to the east, will go down by railroad and direct the movements of reënforcements for Rosecrans.

[1] 52 W. R. 638. [2] 52 W. R. 718.

I have directed every available man in Kentucky to be sent down."[1] On the 20th he received a dispatch from Halleck stating that General Meade did not believe that any of Ewell's troops had gone west, as Burnside had feared; that Longstreet, Johnston, and Bragg had concentrated against Rosecrans, who was on the Chickamauga River, twenty miles south of Chattanooga, closing thus: "He is expecting a battle and wants you to sustain his left. Every possible effort must be made to assist him."[2] To this Burnside replied from Knoxville on the 20th: "You may be sure I will do all I can for Rosecrans. Arrived here last night, and am hurrying troops in his direction. I go up the road to-night for a day."[3]

The following dispatch received by Rosecrans on the battlefield on the 19th, and that which follows on the 20th, show that Halleck fully expected a junction of the two armies: "I have no direct communication with Burnside or Hurlbut. On the 15th Hurlbut says he is moving towards Decatur. I hear nothing of Sherman's troops ordered from Vicksburg. A telegram from Burnside on the 17th, just received, says my orders to move down to reënforce you will be obeyed as soon as possible. Burnside's cavalry ought to be near you by this time."[4] That on the 20th is as follows: "General Burnside's instructions before he left Kentucky were to connect with your left. These instructions have been repeated five or six times, and he has answered that he was moving with that object. I think his advance cannot be far from you."[5] On the 21st: "Nothing heard from Burnside since the 19th. He was then sending to your aid all his available force. It is hoped that you will hold out until he reaches you. He was directed to connect with you ten days ago. I can get no reply from Hurlbut or Sherman."[6]

So the correspondence went on from day to day, and not a man was sent to Rosecrans. The battle of Chickamauga was

[1] 50 W. R. 131, 132. [2] 50 W. R. 131. [3] 52 W. R. 755.
[4] 50 W. R. 130. [5] 50 W. R. 142. [6] 50 W. R. 154.

fought on the 19th and 20th. The noble Army of the Cumberland, struggling against terrible odds, held its position even after the fatal blunder which opened its lines and admitted Longstreet's victorious legions upon its flanks. Obedience to the positive orders of General Halleck would have brought the infantry of the Twenty-third Corps upon the field in ample time to retrieve the disaster if not to have prevented it. The force that required only a small portion of Burnside's troops to drive back from Knoxville to Jonesboro, and which virtually prevented the coöperation of Burnside with Rosecrans, has been already stated. This is how Burnside states it in his dispatch to Halleck of the 21st of September: "Before I knew the necessity of sending immediate assistance to General Rosecrans I had sent a considerable portion of my force to capture and drive out a large force of the enemy under General Sam. Jones, stationed on the road from Bristol to Jonesboro, which amounts to at least 6000 men." [1]

The student of these campaigns cannot fail to be impressed with the folly of the War Department in attempting to direct the management of two separate armies operating upon parallel lines, eastward from their respective bases, by telegraph from a point a thousand miles distant, without giving to one commander extraordinary powers in case of emergency. The misfortunes that attended the Army of the Cumberland could have been arrested if Burnside had remained in Cincinnati, sending Hartsuff into East Tennessee. Burnside's commission ante-dated that of Rosecrans, as Major-General, three days, and for this reason the latter could not order the Army of the Ohio to his assistance. General Burnside told Hartsuff that he could not go to Chattanooga, as he ranked Rosecrans, and confusion might arise; to which Hartsuff responded, "Let me go, I don't rank him."

General Burnside, however, explains his action in the same report, as follows: "It should be remembered that up to the

[1] 52 W. R. 770.

night of the 16th, I was acting under instructions to occupy the upper country of East Tennessee, and all of my available forces were well up the valley, above Knoxville. All that could be turned back were started at once, and as soon as possible the remainder were withdrawn from the presence of the enemy and turned back for the purpose of proceeding to the relief of General Rosecrans. The point where the troops were turned back on the 17th was 140 miles from Chickamauga, where General Rosecrans was fighting on the 19th, and the advance of our forces was over 200 miles distant from him.

"It will be readily seen that under no circumstances could we have reached even the neighborhood of General Rosecrans' forces during that battle. The troops were moved in that direction as rapidly as possible; many dispatches passed between General Halleck and myself after this, in reference to going to Rosecrans' assistance after he had established himself in Chattanooga, and some misunderstandings occurred in regard to the purport of these dispatches. I was averse to doing what would in any way weaken our hold in East Tennessee, and he was anxious lest Rosecrans should not be able to hold Chattanooga. He was not disturbed at Chattanooga, and we held our ground in East Tennessee, so that what occurred in no way affected the result." [1]

Regarding the two campaigns as one in their objects and the two armies as but the right and left wings of a grand army of invasion of Confederate territory moving on parallel lines, under a common commander, it is reasonable to suppose that reënforcements would have been made as occasion demanded. The Confederates regarded the destruction of the Army of the Cumberland as of paramount importance, and boldly massed an army in its front of sufficient magnitude, in their opinion, to accomplish that object. The temporary evacuation of Chattanooga southward was rendered necessary by the strategical movement of a large portion of General Rosecrans' army upon

[1] 51 W. R. 550, 551.

Bragg's communications, but the feeling in the Confederate army was an unwavering faith in their success. This feeling was shared by the people at large. Hundreds of families who had left their homes in Middle Tennessee and Kentucky, and kept in the rear of the Confederate army in its retrograde movement, were congregated at Rome, Georgia. They had led a nomadic life, moving from Murfreesboro to Winchester, thence to Chattanooga and Rome, and, inspired with the hope of returning to their homes as the result of the defeat and pursuit of the Army of the Cumberland, they had their goods and baggage packed in wagons ready to follow the victorious flag of the Confederacy northward to the Cumberland. The fancy of many took a wilder flight. Knowing that Rosecrans' army alone stood between the powerful host of veteran troops concentrating at Lafayette and the Ohio River, it was not too much to hope that a vigorous pursuit of a disorganized army, demoralized by defeat, would carry the war into the Northern States.

The arrival of Longstreet's advance gave promise of an easy victory. Whatever may have been the overweening confidence of General Rosecrans in the strength of his army, and however much he may have underestimated that of his antagonist as indicated by the speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, he no sooner became satisfied of the approach of reënforcements to Bragg from the Army of the Potomac than he saw the necessity of a corresponding increase of his own strength. A commanding general, controlling the movements of both Rosecrans and Burnside, should, at this supreme moment, have had his headquarters at Chattanooga. The simultaneous capture of that city and Cumberland Gap took place on the 9th of September, and within three days thereafter two facts were well known to Burnside and Rosecrans. The former knew that no considerable force confronted him from the eastward, and that none was likely to advance from that direction, as Buckner had, in obedience to orders, evacuated the Valley of the Ten-

nessee — a thing which would not be likely to occur if the Confederate War Department designed to attempt holding that territory. General Rosecrans had ample evidence that a large army was being concentrated to give him battle. Both these facts would have been at once communicated to the commanding general. General White's division of infantry, 3000 strong, and Byrd's division of cavalry and mounted infantry, 2000 strong, remained in the vicinity of Loudon and Athens, within three days' march of Chattanooga, until the 15th of September, four days before the battle of Chickamauga, when White was ordered to Knoxville. The Ninth Army Corps was moving by easy marches from Crab Orchard, Kentucky, via Cumberland Gap to Knoxville. There was no reason why all Burnside's infantry could not have been sent to reënforce Rosecrans, leaving the cavalry and artillery to defend Knoxville. Cumberland Gap was amply defended by De Courcey's brigade, and the advance of the Ninth Army Corps reached its vicinity on the 17th, thus providing against any possibility of its recapture.

That a reënforcement of 10,000 effectives would have been ordered by forced marches to Chattanooga from Burnside's army by a commanding general, stationed where he should have been, as early as the 13th, is as probable as any supposition that could be made with regard to the movements of troops at any juncture during the war. That the order was not given is due solely to the absence of a common commander, and his absence was what Talleyrand termed "worse than a crime — a blunder."

XII

THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE NOVEMBER 30, 1864

BY

HENRY STONE,

LIEUT.-COLONEL AND BREVET-COLONEL, 100TH UNITED STATES COLORED TROOPS [1]

Read before the Society November 25, 1883

[1] During the campaign including the battles of Franklin and Nashville, Colonel Stone served as an assistant adjutant-general on General Thomas' staff. — ED.



THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE
NOVEMBER 30, 1864

NINETEEN years ago, at this very season, a contest was going on in Tennessee between the rebel forces under General Hood and the National troops under General George H. Thomas, the result of which, as determined by the battles of Franklin and Nashville, forever put an end to all the dreams of the Confederacy between the Alleghany Mountains and the Mississippi River. By these two battles, closely related to one another, the only existing army — except that of General Lee in Virginia — on which the rebellion could base any hope whatever of success was blotted out of existence. It did not surrender, but it never afterward came together as an active force to vex the Republic. It disappeared from the regard of men as much as if an earthquake had swallowed it up.

In order to a proper understanding of the work done by the two armies which then met in bloody conflict, it is necessary to go back somewhat beyond the time when the battles were fought, and glance at the events leading up to them. In this paper I shall have time to speak only of matters relating to the battle of Franklin.

When, early in September, 1864, General Sherman announced to the War Department, "Atlanta is ours and fairly won," he naturally omitted to refer to the fact that the rebel army, the destruction of which alone made Atlanta tenable, was as strong and defiant as ever. In a few weeks it had possession of his line of communications. The latter part of September and the first half of October were spent in vain efforts to capture or destroy this army. Finally, on the 21st of October, Sherman made his headquarters at Gaylesville, on the boundary between Georgia and Alabama. He had with

him all his army except the Twentieth Corps, which garrisoned Atlanta, and two divisions which had been sent into Tennessee with General Thomas, to aid in expelling Forrest from that state, and which were now on their way to rejoin him.

But when these two divisions were recalled, General Thomas, much against his will, was ordered to remain in Tennessee to take general charge of affairs there. General Sherman then gradually unfolded to him his proposed plan of operations, which was to take 60,000 to 65,000 picked men, and with them march through the South, destroying Macon, Augusta, and Savannah or Charleston, leaving General Thomas behind with the remnants to do whatever remained to be done. His grand army, at the commencement of the Atlanta campaign, May 1, 1864, consisted of 98,797 men. Various reënforcements brought up the numbers before the end of the campaign to 113,000 men. Out of these the losses amounted to 35,000 for the four months. In the same time the losses in the Army of the Potomac — 150,000 men — were 50,000, almost exactly the same percentage.

General Sherman's first proposition was to leave with General Thomas about 17,000 men to be added to the garrison troops then in Tennessee, with which to accomplish the work of whipping or neutralizing Hood's army — a task to which he with the whole 82,000 had proved inadequate. These garrisons numbered, all told, about 27,000 men, of whom 3000 were artillery assigned to permanent posts; 8000 cavalry, mostly dismounted and scattered, and all but 2500 new, undisciplined, and, in the words of General Thomas, "little better than militia"; and 16,000 infantry, of whom 6000 were perfectly fresh regiments just arriving and arming, — "as undisciplined as a herd of cattle," said General Rousseau; "I hope I shall not be compelled to take them; they will run away," — and 4000 colored troops, well drilled and disciplined, but as yet unaccustomed to campaigning and never under fire. The remaining 6000 were trained to garrison or blockhouse duty,

and were employed in guarding 450 miles of railroad and 100 miles of river — covering an area of 12,000 square miles, nearly as large as Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and protecting the immense property needed for an army of 200,000 men, as well as its lines of communication. The most important posts within this area were Nashville, Johnsonville, Murfreesboro, Bridgeport, Decatur, and Chattanooga. At Nashville, Johnsonville, and Chattanooga were enormous quantities of supplies of every kind; Murfreesboro was a fortress; Bridgeport the headquarters of the naval brigade on the upper Tennessee River; and Decatur was the salient which commanded many of the approaches from the south side of the Tennessee River. The troops at these six posts aggregated about 20,000 men. Whatever might happen, two at least — Nashville and Chattanooga — could never be abandoned. Chattanooga was the gateway to the whole Southeast and to East Tennessee; and Nashville, besides its strategic importance, was the storehouse for all the armies operating in Georgia and elsewhere in the South.

General Hood reached Gadsden, about thirty miles southwest of General Sherman's headquarters at Gaylesville, on the 21st of October. After consultation with Jefferson Davis and General Beauregard, he formed his plan of campaign. He proposed to cross the Tennessee River at Guntersville, with Forrest's cavalry on his right flank; destroy the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad; capture Nashville before any reënforcements from Sherman or the North could reach General Thomas, and then go into winter quarters in Eastern Kentucky, where, with his left flank at Richmond Hill and his right at the gaps between Kentucky and Virginia, he would establish camps, receive recruits, and maintain his ground if followed by Sherman; if not, to go to the Ohio River, and capture Louisville and Cincinnati when spring opened, — or move east to reënforce Lee, reaching him before it was possible for Sherman to go to the assistance of Grant. Together

they would overwhelm the Army of the Potomac and dictate terms of peace at Washington. It was a tempting and bold, but not an impossible, scheme.

On reaching Gaylesville, General Sherman was for some little time in doubt whether to follow Hood down the river to Gadsden and compel him to fight, or to leave him alone and go on with his plan of marching to the sea. Hood soon settled the question for him. On the 24th of October Sherman telegraphed to General Halleck, inviting special attention to his position, saying, "You will observe it is a very good one to watch the enemy about Gadsden and Blue Mountain." On the evening of the 25th he was startled by receiving a telegram from General Thomas in Nashville stating that Hood with his army was moving down the Tennessee River by way of Guntersville. The next morning he sent out a reconnoissance, which found that Hood had indeed slipped past his front and was threatening Decatur, while he was "watching" him. The next day Hood deployed his forces in front of that town, and for three days maintained a defiant attitude, but did not seriously assault. General R. S. Granger, who commanded there, had a garrison of only 2200 men when Hood arrived, and was afterwards reënforced by 1800. With this meagre force he made so brave a showing that Hood moved off without attacking. Had he made a bold assault, he could easily have overwhelmed Granger, and nothing could have prevented his marching at once on Nashville and striking it while entirely undefended except by its regular garrison.

The moment General Sherman learned of Hood's presence at Decatur, he ordered General Stanley to proceed to Tennessee with the Fourth Corps. Hood withdrew from Decatur on the 29th, and on the 30th of October the advance division of the Fourth Corps was started by rail from Chattanooga. One division reached Pulaski on the afternoon of December 1. The whole corps numbering 12,000 men, mostly veterans, was concentrated there on the 4th of November.

Hood, meantime, had moved his army to Tuscumbia, and placed a division on the north bank of the Tennessee at Florence. The only force which at the moment General Thomas could send to oppose this movement was Croxton's brigade of cavalry, less than 2500 strong, and of whom only about 1500 were really effective and reliable. Now that it was evident that Hood meant to invade Tennessee, General Sherman decided to send there also the Twenty-third Corps, about 10,000 men, under command of General Schofield, who was ordered on the 31st of October to report to General Thomas. It was not, however, until the 9th of November that this corps reached Tennessee, the whole transportation being absorbed in forwarding supplies for Sherman's march away from the enemy. General Thomas, however, was meantime comforted with Sherman's assuring him that "after the emergency has passed, and the enemy has done us considerable damage, reënforcements will pour in to you, more than can be provided for or taken care of." Fortunately, Hood was not in condition to profit by this delay. He had, a month before, urged the completion of the railroad from Corinth to Tuscumbia; but on his arrival at the latter place it was still untouched, and all his supplies had to be brought by wagon. So, instead of finding an accumulation, as he expected, he was able to live only from day to day.

Just as the advance division of Schofield's corps reached Nashville, Forrest appeared in front of Johnsonville and attacked the gunboats and transports there. Exaggerated rumors of what he was doing reached Nashville, and General Schofield was sent there with the division. It was too late. The naval commmander, after a conflict in which some of his gunboats were disabled, anxious lest Forrest should get possession of them or of the transports and so cross the river, set them on fire. Between that and Forrest's artillery, the immense warehouses were soon in flames, and a vast amount of property destroyed. Forrest, however, did not suc-

ceed in crossing. Schofield was recalled and sent down to Pulaski, where, on the 14th of November, he assumed command of all the forces at the front. General Stanley was the ranking officer, but the War Department decided in Schofield's favor because he was a department commander. The total force at Pulaski consisted of four divisions of infantry — about 17,000 men.

While this was going on, General Edward Hatch, who commanded a division of cavalry formerly belonging to the Army of the Tennessee, but which had been made a part of the newly organized cavalry corps of the Military Division of the Mississippi, had reached Pulaski on his way to join General Sherman. He was here met by General Thomas' order to go to the Tennessee River near Florence and oppose Hood's advance. His division numbered about 4000 men, and was a most welcome and valuable addition to Croxton's little cavalry force. By an order from General Sherman all the troops in his military division, except those in his immediate presence, were placed under General Thomas' command. Thus Hatch was intercepted at just the right moment.

It was now evident that the most serious work of the campaign which had opened in May was to fall on General Thomas' shoulders. General Sherman had telegraphed him on the 19th of October, "Hood's army may be set down at 40,000 men of all arms, fit for duty; he may follow me, or turn against you. If you can defend the line of the Tennessee in my absence of three months is all I ask." This was ten days before Hood's advance to Tuscumbia made it certain that he would turn against Thomas, who could therefore now count on meeting 40,000 of those veterans who had for five months resisted and baffled Sherman's 80,000. As soon as they crossed the Tennessee River they were reënforced by Forrest's cavalry, at least 10,000 strong. General Thomas' most reliable scouts reported Hood's army as 55,000 strong. To oppose these he had in hand the Fourth Corps, 12,000; the Twenty-third Corps,

10,000; Hatch's and Croxton's cavalry, 6500; and the permanent garrisons before mentioned; in all, an available force of a little over 28,000 veterans to meet Hood's 50,000. General Sherman had repeatedly instructed General Thomas that a movable column of 25,000 men was all that was needed. Now, however, that a collision seemed likely, he appeared to realize more sensibly the hazard of the situation, and sent on the 29th of October for the troops under General A. J. Smith, at present operating in Missouri, to reënforce General Thomas. These would add 10,000 good soldiers; and when the dismounted cavalry could be properly equipped, he would have a sufficiently large and well-appointed army.

General Grant had, at first, given a somewhat reluctant consent to Sherman's plans; and, now that Hood had reached Tuscumbia, desired to have him destroyed before the march to the sea was undertaken. It was only when, on the last of November, he received Sherman's dispatch, saying, "Hood's infantry, about 30,000, with Wheeler's and Roddy's cavalry, from 7000 to 10,000, are now in the neighborhood of Tuscumbia and Florence; Forrest seems to be scattered from Eastport to Jackson; General Thomas had near Athens and Pulaski Stanley's corps, 15,000 strong; Schofield's corps, 10,000, en route by rail, and has at least 20,000 to 25,000 men, with new regiments and conscripts arriving all the time also. General Rosecrans promises the two divisions of Smith and Mower. I have retained about 50,000 good troops, and have sent back full 25,000": that he replied, on the second, giving his consent: "With the force you have left with General Thomas, he must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him. I say then go on as you propose." In a letter to General Grant on the 6th of November General Sherman also says: "I have in Tennessee a force numerically greater than Hood's, well commanded and well organized."

These representations of General Sherman, on which General Grant's permission to undertake the march to the sea was

conditioned, and on which was based his belief that General Thomas "must be able to take care of Hood and destroy him," are the source of all the unjust criticism to which the latter was subsequently subjected by General Grant, whose anger was at one time so inflamed that he directed that the command should be turned over to General Schofield and General Thomas be made subordinate. This, however, is anticipating. How unfair these representations were, I have already partly shown. It is enough now to add that the Fourth Corps numbered but 12,000 and not 15,000; that out of the "20,000 to 25,000 men, with new regiments and conscripts arriving all the time," not more than 5000 men could be culled who could be depended upon in battle with Hood's veterans, numbering over 40,000 instead of 30,000 as Sherman reported; and that Sherman himself, instead of retaining about 50,000, actually retained 62,500 men, who, in his own words, were "able-bodied, experienced soldiers, well-armed, well-equipped, and provided, as far as human foresight could, with all the essentials of life, strength, and vigorous action." These he took on a holiday march where no enemy threatened, leaving behind the two weakest corps of his army, and, in his own words again, "all the sick, wounded, and worthless," to confront the very army which *he* had thus far found invincible. But he left also General Thomas.

The reënforcements ordered from Missouri under General Smith were expected to reach Nashville in about ten days,—say the 10th of November. In his "Memoirs" General Sherman perpetuates these misrepresentations when he says: "On the 11th of November General Thomas and I interchanged full dispatches. He had heard of the arrival of General Smith at Paducah, who would surely reach Nashville much sooner than Hood could possibly do from Florence, so that he was perfectly satisfied with his share of the army." There is no ground whatever for these statements. General Thomas sent but one dispatch to General Sherman on the 11th of Novem-

ber, and in it he uses these words: "Have not heard from General A. J. Smith's troops since last report, but daily expecting him."[1] Never in any dispatch to General Sherman did General Thomas speak of hearing of the arrival of A. J. Smith, or express himself as "perfectly satisfied with his share of the army." At the outset he had strongly expressed himself against being left in Tennessee, but when the order came he loyally obeyed it, and never again referred to the matter. Whatever others might say or do, he never complained, and he always declared he would do the best he could. His last word to General Sherman on the 12th of November was: "If Hood does not follow you, I will thoroughly organize my troops, and I believe shall have men enough to ruin him, unless he gets out of the way very rapidly."[2] That day General Sherman disappeared from public view, not to be heard from again until he re-appeared at Savannah, six weeks later. Then Hood had been ruined.

For Hood did not follow Sherman. Bending all his energies to supplying and refitting his army, he was ready to move in force from Florence on the 19th of November. His advance was persistently opposed by Hatch's and Croxton's cavalry, who also kept General Thomas fully informed of every movement. The troops under General Schofield at Pulaski had been hard at work fortifying the place, and it was now deemed impregnable. Hood, however, did not move against Pulaski, but, by roads to the west of it, directly toward Columbia. On the morning of the 22d his advance was at Lawrenceburg, about twenty miles due west from

[1] November 7 Thomas reported (79 W. R. 685): "Maj.-Gen. A. J. Smith reports from Saint Louis that three regiments and one battery would reach Paducah the evening of the 8th. The other regiments would follow as rapidly as possible." — Ed.

[2] His dispatch to Sherman (79 W. R. 756) runs as follows: "I have no fear that Beauregard can do us any harm now, and if he attempts to follow you I will follow him as far as possible. If he does not follow you I will then thoroughly organize my troops," etc., as above. — Ed.

Pulaski. Here he brought up all his forces, and, after skirmishing all day, drove out Hatch at night, and so got fairly on the flank of Schofield's force, and as near to Columbia as he. Indeed, Forrest's cavalry was nearer, and had driven in a brigade under Colonel Capron on the Waynesboro Road, and at night was at Henryville, about thirty miles from Columbia.

On the same day, hearing of Hood's movement, General Schofield ordered General Cox with two divisions to Lynnville, leaving Stanley with the other two at Pulaski. The movement was made as ordered. Stanley, by extraordinary exertions, secured all the public property and moved on the afternoon of the 23d, reaching Lynnville that night. (Three days before, General Thomas had ordered all surplus stores sent back by rail; and, in general, not a movement was made by Schofield without General Thomas' advice and direction.) The roads were horrible. It had rained and frozen, but not hard enough to bear wagons. General Schofield in person joined Cox at Lynnville during the afternoon of the 23d. Here, to his astonishment, he learned from General Hatch that, in spite of the weather, Hood's infantry had reached Lawrenceburg the evening before and that Forrest was striking for the railroad near Columbia. Cox was ordered at once to head off Forrest. The situation was indeed most critical. It was now Wednesday, and the stores which General Thomas had directed on Sunday to be sent to the rear by rail were just coming forward in wagons, while Forrest at the head of his enterprising legion was nearer to Columbia than any of Schofield's troops. There were but 800 soldiers in Columbia, — merely enough to guard the railroad bridge over Duck River. Fortunately, General Cox was an officer of experience, skill, and enterprise. He moved toward Columbia on the afternoon of the 23d, and came within ten miles of it that night. Just before daylight the next morning, hearing sounds of battle in that direction, he started for the scene, and when within

a few miles of the town took a cross-road which led to the Mount Pleasant Pike. He reached there at seven o'clock in the morning, just in time to interpose between Forrest and Capron's weak brigade, which he was galloping down without ceremony. In another half-hour he would have had the town and the crossings of Duck River. This was the first of the wonderful series of perils through which the little army of Schofield escaped unharmed.

It was after dark of the 23d when Stanley reached Lynnville. During the night he heard of Forrest's advance. Rousing his two divisions at one o'clock in the morning he pushed on with such speed that at nine o'clock his advance brigade joined Cox, having tramped twenty-one miles through the darkness and over the horrible roads. These prompt movements alone saved Columbia and all the stores and wagons belonging to the two corps. As the troops came up, they went into position on the south and west of the town and entrenched. The trains arrived toward night. Only Forrest's cavalry at first appeared in our front; but the next day the infantry also came up and skirmished all along the line, but made no assault.

While General Schofield was at Lynnville on the 23d General Wilson, who had been sent down by General Thomas to take command of the cavalry, reported to him, and the next morning assumed command. While under General Hatch the cavalry had valiantly contested every inch of Hood's advance, and only fell back when infantry threatened its flanks. It was now placed on the north side of Duck River, east of Columbia, to watch the fords and crossings and prevent any move of the enemy in the direction of Murfreesboro.

For, up to this time, it seemed altogether likely that Hood would move — as indeed was his first intention — against the Nashville and Chattanooga railroad. It did not seem probable that he would advance directly upon so strong a place as Nashville. Strict watch was therefore kept on all the roads

leading east from Columbia, and General Thomas had made preparation to send A. J. Smith to Murfreesboro in case Hood moved in that direction. The fords and crossing west of Columbia were guarded by Cooper's brigade of the Twenty-third Corps, which had been retained at Johnsonville and marched thence when Hood's movements made it certain that he would attempt a crossing somewhere.

The line at first taken up at Columbia proved too long for Schofield's small force, and an interior line was therefore fortified, with both flanks resting on the river and covering the railroad bridge. The railroad was in full operation to Nashville. A pontoon bridge was also laid, and on the 26th and the morning of the 27th the wagons were all sent to the north side of the river. The new line was occupied that night and the town given up to the enemy. General Cox with two brigades was also moved to the north bank. It was intended that the whole force should cross on the night of the 26th, but a heavy storm came on and the crossing was postponed. Sunday, the 27th, was as cheerless a day as can well be imagined. Hood kept up a continual skirmishing in front, and reports from the river above and below showed that he was trying to cross. The main body of Wilson's cavalry continued to guard the fords east of the town. That night the whole of Schofield's infantry was withdrawn to the north side, and the pontoon and railroad bridges were destroyed, the latter by fire, the former by scuttling the boats. A substantial line of works was built along a ridge which crosses the bend of the river, like the chord of an arc, the trains were sent on to where Rutherford Creek crosses the Franklin Pike, and the whole force held in readiness to repel any attempt Hood might make to cross at or near Columbia.

The railroad bridge is nearly two miles below the town, and Rutherford Creek empties into Duck River about half a mile above it. In rainy weather this creek becomes a formidable stream. About two miles above its mouth it separates into

two branches — the railroad running through the western valley, while the turnpike at Franklin follows the eastern branch. To the east of this, and some miles distant, is the turnpike from Lewisburg to Franklin. Between these two are numerous dirt roads running in every direction, but in winter almost impassable. The country is fertile and well-watered, and supports a very considerable population. At Spring Hill, about halfway between Columbia and Franklin, the turnpike and railroad come very near together, and several roads converge, making the place easy of access from every direction, especially towards the east. On the Lewisburg Pike are also several hamlets — Rally Hill, Hurt's Cross-Roads, Mount Carmel, etc. The latter is due east of Spring Hill, and from each of them are direct roads to that place. The possession of Spring Hill, therefore, is essential to the security of any movement between Columbia and Franklin.

General Hood was quick to see the advantage to be gained by occupying this place, and at once laid his plans for seizing it in advance of Schofield. It was now guarded by only a small cavalry force. If he could place Forrest there, while he held Schofield at Columbia until he could also push in his infantry, he looked upon the campaign as won. To this end he bent all his energies. On the night of the 27th, while our infantry were crossing, he had Forrest at his headquarters, where they held a full and free conversation about the roads, the nature and condition of the country, and all other matters of interest. Forrest knew every inch of the ground and every ford and cross-road. Since early in 1862 he had raided back and forth until he understood all that was to be known. He was now ordered to throw his whole cavalry force across the river early the next morning to cover the construction of a pontoon bridge for the infantry, as near Columbia as possible. He at once made the necessary dispositions. Buford's division was to cross at the Lewisburg Pike; Chalmers' at Holland's Ford, seven miles east of Columbia; Jackson at Hall's Mills,

two miles still further east; while he in person, with his escort and Biffle's brigade, was to cross within two miles of the town. His force numbered not less than nine thousand men; and he was the ablest, most tireless, most indefatigable, most enterprising of the rebel cavalry commanders. He was perfectly fearless personally, large, tough, muscular, and free from small vices, never smoked nor drank, had a fierce temper which he knew how to control, never lost his head, and was never so badly whipped that he was not ready to fight again as soon as he could get his breath.

But he met a pretty good match in Croxton, who had all Forrest's fearlessness, toughness, and coolness, and more shrewdness and skill; and in Hatch, whose activity and courage were fully equal to those of Forrest, more than his match, when to these were added the military genius, energy, resource, and untiring spirit of General Wilson. The cavalry was now in good condition for fighting, what there was of it, and ready to undertake any enterprise. It was outnumbered by Forrest two to one, but this rather increased its daring and vigilance.

At daylight on the 28th Forrest moved for the crossings, but found every one of them disputed. About 11 o'clock, however, Capron was driven in, and the ford taken possession of. Schofield was immediately notified by General Wilson, and also informed that there was a good road from the point where the rebel cavalry crossed to Rally Hill, to which place he himself would move at once to meet the enemy. Divining that Forrest's purpose was to gain Spring Hill, he left a staff officer behind to send word to General Schofield in case Forrest should move so as to cut in between them, and at half-past four in the afternoon dispatched him: "The enemy's cavalry has crossed on the road leading to Spring Hill. You had better look out for that place." By 7 o'clock Wilson had all his cavalry together at Hurt's Cross-Roads. Capron, who a few days before had been so unceremoniously driven in at Columbia, was again stampeded, and with a few followers

retreated in disorder toward Franklin. The greater part of his brigade, however, remained steadfast; and when, toward night, they were ordered to join the main body at Hurt's Cross-Roads, Major Young, of the 5th Iowa cavalry, in command, dismounted two of the regiments and sent them against the flank of the enemy. He then drew up his own regiment in column on the pike, charged with drawn sabres at the centre, drove the enemy in confusion from their barricades, and so brought off nearly the entire brigade, with very small loss. At 8 o'clock General Wilson sent General Schofield another dispatch, stating that Forrest was moving toward his position on the Lewisburg Pike, and that none of the enemy's cavalry had yet gone to the Franklin Pike, so that road was still clear.

The infantry on the north side of Duck River were in two lines. The Fourth Corps occupied a commanding ridge, from the riverbank below the railroad bridge to the river again about a mile above the town. The Twenty-third Corps was on a line nearer the river, and its flanks were protected by the Fourth Corps. There was pretty continuous skirmishing along the entire front across the river during the day of the 28th. General Schofield was in constant communication with General Thomas that day, not less than eleven dispatches passing between them. He was also kept informed of the condition of things in Wilson's front — the latter forwarding to General Thomas duplicates of all his dispatches. At half-past three General Schofield notified General Thomas that the enemy were crossing the river at noon, and that Wilson had gone to drive him back if practicable. As soon as he received this, General Thomas replied: "If Wilson cannot succeed in driving back the enemy, you will necessarily have to make preparation to take up a new position at Franklin, behind Harpeth — immediately, if it becomes necessary to fall back." At six o'clock Schofield again telegraphs: "The enemy's cavalry has crossed, and is now in possession of Rally Hill. Wilson thinks the enemy may swing in and

strike Spring Hill. I think it would be well to send A. J. Smith's force to that place." As General Thomas had notified General Schofield at ten o'clock that morning that Smith could not be expected before three days, he accepted this last dispatch as an intimation that Schofield could hold his position. He accordingly replied at eight o'clock: "If you are confident you can hold your present position, I wish you to do so until I can get General Smith here. After his arrival we can withdraw gradually and invite Hood across Duck River and fall upon him with our whole force, or wait until Wilson can organize his entire cavalry force and then withdraw. Should Hood then cross, we can surely ruin him." Then follow elaborate instructions for obstructing the roads and fords, none of which were acted upon. Stuart's brigade of cavalry, however, which had been at the fords west of Columbia, was sent round by way of Spring Hill to join Wilson, and Hammond's brigade, which had been at Nashville remounting, was sent forward to the front.

During the night things developed. From prisoners brought in General Wilson learned all that was going on in the rebel lines, — that pontoon bridges had been laid a few miles above Columbia, — that the most of Hood's infantry was in motion, — and that the crossing was to commence at eleven o'clock that night, so as to have them all over and ready to start for Spring Hill by daylight. At one o'clock in the morning he sent a courier to General Schofield with all this information, and suggested that the latter had better be at Spring Hill by ten o'clock in the morning. It was a long way round from Hurt's Cross-Roads to Columbia, so that it was two o'clock in the morning when General Schofield received Wilson's eight o'clock dispatch, and toward daylight when the one o'clock dispatch reached him. Besides these warnings from General Wilson, General Thomas, thinking over the situation during the night, concluded that Schofield's present position was untenable; and accordingly, at half-past three on the

morning of the 29th he telegraphed him: "I desire you to fall back from Columbia and take up your position at Franklin, leaving sufficient force at Spring Hill to contest the enemy's progress until you are securely posted at Franklin. General Smith's command has not yet reached Nashville." General Schofield, however, delayed to act either on the advice of General Wilson or the orders of General Thomas. It was eight o'clock before he issued any order for a movement; and then General Stanley was directed to march with two divisions, all the spare artillery, and all the trains and ambulances, for Spring Hill. In ten minutes he had his troops and trains on the road. And indeed it was no time for delay. Probably, had Stanley been free to act, he would have started at two o'clock in the morning, as he had done the week before from Lynnville, and would have had everything beyond Spring Hill by daylight.

At the time that Stanley started, General Schofield seems to have had serious doubts whether the enemy were really crossing as Wilson reported. Two divisions of Lee's corps were retained in the woods at Columbia by General Hood and all the artillery, and these kept up such a continual and noisy demonstration that Schofield believed Hood's whole army was still in his front. To solve his doubts, he ordered Post's brigade to make a reconnoissance up the river and to report, and at 8.20 telegraphed to General Thomas: "The enemy's cavalry has crossed in force on the Lewisburg Pike, and General Wilson reports the infantry crossing above Huey's Mill, about five miles from this place. I have sent an infantry reconnoissance to learn the fact. *If it proves true*, I will act according to your instructions received this morning." Thus, five hours after Thomas' orders, Schofield still hesitated, nor did his hesitation cease here. He sent out his chief engineer, Captain Twining, with Post, to report what he saw. At 10.45 the captain sent in the information that a column of infantry was moving up from Huey's Mill. Still,

he did not act further than to send orders to Stanley to halt one of his divisions at Rutherford Creek, and to move on to Spring Hill with the other and his trains.

Meantime, General Wilson was vigorously opposing Forrest's advance. He collected all his cavalry on the Lewisburg Pike, believing that he could in this way best retard the enemy's movements, and gain time for Schofield to reach Spring Hill by the Franklin Pike, while the enemy's infantry were confined to the dirt roads between. Croxton commanded the cavalry rear guard, and by repeated deployments of his brigade and withdrawing when his flanks were threatened he held Forrest in check until Mount Carmel was reached, about five miles north of Hurt's Cross-Roads. Here a strong barricade had been erected by Hatch, behind which Croxton passed, and against which Forrest made two determined assaults, both repulsed. At Mount Carmel a dirt road crosses to Spring Hill, and, while the rest of Forrest's command was pressing Wilson, Buford's division was detached to take possession of that place. Believing that Schofield must already be there, if not beyond, Wilson's chief endeavor now was to prevent Forrest from reaching Franklin. He accordingly fell slowly back to Ridge Meeting House, whence, at 12 o'clock, he dispatched Schofield that he believed Forrest had gone toward Nashville by way of Nolensville, and asking what time the infantry would be at Franklin, his purpose being to go in pursuit of Forrest. He little dreamed that the whole of our infantry, except one division, was still in the same position on Duck River, that it had been the night before.

As Buford approached Spring Hill from the east the commander of the small cavalry detachment there sent a courier to General Schofield with the news. This courier — badly scared — was met by General Stanley at the head of his one division, about half-past eleven o'clock, some two and a half miles below the little village. The dispatch was opened and read, and then endorsed, "The head of the 2d division is now

here and will soon be in Spring Hill," was forwarded to its destination. Stanley was none too early, although he had made the ten miles in about three hours. He had hardly read the dispatch when firing was heard east of the village, and the division was at once sent forward at a double-quick. The train was halted about a mile and a half below, and two regiments, deployed east of the pike to guard it, drove back a line of the enemy's skirmishers who had advanced to within four hundred yards of the pike. The leading brigade, Colonel Opdycke's, was sent north of the town and deployed, facing to the north and east; the next, Colonel Lane's, parallel to the pike, facing east; and the last, General Bradley's, was ordered forward to a wooded knoll some three fourths of a mile east, which commanded all the approaches from the south and east. Opdycke and Lane were deployed to cover as much space as possible, and then the wagons were all moved up and packed along the pike behind them. It was four o'clock when the last of the wagons came into the town.

Bradley had hardly reached the knoll when he was assaulted by two brigades of Forrest's cavalry, who were easily repulsed with considerable loss. Forrest, however, saw the wagon-train moving with some confusion on the pike and determined to get it if he could. He therefore dismounted such of the force as he had there and ordered it to charge Bradley's flank with all the vigor possible. One of Bradley's regiments was deployed as skirmishers, four were in line, and one in reserve. His skirmishers were soon driven in, and the reserve regiment was moved to protect the right flank, to which point also the skirmishers were moved as soon as they could be re-supplied with ammunition. They had hardly reached their new position before a considerable force of infantry — the advance of Cheatham's corps — was reported as advancing in line of battle against the front and right of Bradley's brigade, and overlapping it. This compelled Bradley to fall back almost to the pike, where the men were

rallied, though not until Bradley had received a severe and dangerous wound while directing the movement. Re-forming, the line was faced southeast and a barricade thrown up.

When Bradley's brigade was forced back to the pike, about five o'clock in the afternoon, Lane, on his left, moved his skirmishers to the right and sent out a regiment to support them, while he gradually withdrew to a position nearer the town and threw up works. Then, changing front forward on his first battalion, he moved out one regiment and one company — all he could spare from the line — to occupy the place which had been abandoned by Bradley. This little force struck the enemy with such vigor as to compel him to withdraw and re-form, and before he could again advance night came on.

Opdycke, meantime, had pressed back Chalmers' cavalry division from the north and east side of the town, and guarded the train from destruction in that quarter. He kept up a vigorous resistance till dark, at which time he was in line from beyond the railroad station on his left across the railroad and turnpike, his right connecting with Lane. When Bradley was driven in he had sent one of his regiments to the right of the division to strengthen the line there, so that he held at least a mile and a half with only six regiments.

It was fortunate that Stanley had taken the artillery with him, for he had now good use for it. Two of the batteries were brought up to check the cavalry advance, and the other four had been placed in position south of the village, near the pike, to cover the rear of the wagon-train. As Bradley was driven in these batteries opened on the enemy's infantry with canister and soon checked the advance and compelled them to fall back.

As soon as the rebel infantry came up, Forrest sent Jackson's division to Thompson's Station, three miles north of Spring Hill, to take possession of the pike at that point.

Thus by nightfall the only avenue of escape for Schofield's little force seemed to be entirely under Hood's control.

It was not until three o'clock in the afternoon of the 29th — after the repulse of Forrest's cavalry and the advance guard of the rebel infantry — that General Schofield appeared to realize that Hood was moving to cut off his retreat. Even then he took no very vigorous action; he merely started Ruger's division of two brigades, which had been stationed near the railroad bridge over Duck River, for Spring Hill, and accompanied it in person, although he says in his report that by that time he was "satisfied the enemy would not attack his position on Duck River," but was pushing two corps direct for Spring Hill. Ruger's leading brigade, just before dark, passed the wagons at Spring Hill and was put in position east of the pike, where it soon became slightly engaged with the enemy's skirmishers. It maintained its place until 9 o'clock at night, when it was moved up to Thompson's Station, where it was again halted and joined by the other brigade which had gone through a somewhat similar experience south of the town, and where, in a skirmish, it had captured an adjutant-general belonging to Cheatham's corps. Indeed, at this time, friends and foes were intermingled on the pike, and the adjutant-general of the Fourth Corps, riding along the road, was accosted by a squad of rebel officers and soldiers, who asked him where they could find Cleburne's division, supposing him to be one of their own men who had just come from the line. He answered by silently pointing in the direction he supposed it was, and was greatly relieved to see them take it.

It was not until Schofield had reached the vicinity of Spring Hill and found the way obstructed by the enemy in force that he issued the order for the withdrawal of the troops to Franklin. Stanley was directed to hold his present position until the whole army and all the trains had passed, and then to act as rear guard. Cox was ordered to withdraw

from Duck River at dark and march direct for Franklin, unless he found himself attacked, in which case he was to check the enemy and resume the movement as soon as he had done so. Wood, whose division was on Cox's left, was to follow; Kimball, who had been started with Stanley in the morning, but halted at Rutherford Creek, was to follow Wood; Ruger was to remain in his present position till everybody but Stanley had passed, and to move with him; the trains to be between his and Wagner's division, which brought up the rear.

The troops moved as directed. It was 7 o'clock when Cox left his works on the riverbank. He had all day been skirmishing with the two divisions of S. D. Lee's corps across the river, who late in the afternoon succeeded in running a pontoon bridge across and securing a lodgment on the north bank. He passed Ruger and Wagner at Spring Hill, and reached Franklin an hour before dawn, about half-past four o'clock in the morning of November 30. Ruger's division was then directed to follow Cox, and was accompanied by General Schofield. At Thompson's Station it was halted a while to allow the wagon-train to move out. Here General Schofield sent forward his chief engineer, Captain Twining, to Franklin, whence at 10 o'clock that night he forwarded a telegram to General Thomas which shows most vividly the condition of things at that hour:

"Major-General Schofield directs me to inform you that the enemy's cavalry crossed Duck River in force at daylight this morning at Huey's Mill, six miles from Columbia, and pushed at once for Spring Hill. Their cavalry reached that point at four P. M.,[1] and their infantry came in before dark and attacked General Stanley, who held the place with one division, very heavily. General Schofield's troops are pushing for Franklin as rapidly as possible. The General says he will not be able to get farther than Thompson's Station to-night,

[1] It was 12 o'clock noon when Stanley met them at Spring Hill.

and possibly not farther than Spring Hill. He regards his situation as extremely perilous, and fears he may be forced into a general battle to-morrow, or lose his wagon-train. General Wilson's cavalry have been pushed off toward the east and do not connect with our infantry nor cover the pike. Thinking that the troops under A. J. Smith's command had reached Franklin, General Schofield directed me to have them pushed down the Franklin Pike to Spring Hill by daylight to-morrow. I left General Schofield two hours ago at Thompson's Station."

This dispatch must be considered as emanating from General Schofield himself; and it shows that, at 8 o'clock on the night of the 29th, he had given up the game in despair, and that he considered his only hope of safety in the presence of A. J. Smith's troops. But the morning before General Thomas had notified him that he could not hope for Smith in less than three days, and that very morning had informed him that Smith had not yet reached Nashville. When Captain Twining left him he was with Ruger's division, which had afterward come upon a division of Forrest's cavalry and had driven it from the pike after a not severe conflict. Everything else, however, was behind, and he was in despair. He rode back to Spring Hill, where about midnight he met the head of Cox's division, and with it returned to Thompson's Station, whence he started Ruger again towards Franklin, while he rode on, reaching that place in advance of Cox's column.

It was four o'clock in the morning of the 30th when General Thomas received Captain Twining's dispatch. At that hour the first of the boats containing Smith's troops were just landing, and General Thomas at once replied: "It is impossible for Smith to reach Franklin to-day. General Schofield must make a strong effort to cover his wagon-train, protecting it against the enemy, as well as to reach Franklin with his command and get into position there."

At half-past five o'clock General Schofield dispatched to General Thomas that he hoped to get his troops and material safely across the Harpeth that morning. At that hour General Stanley was with the troops at Thompson's Station, repelling another assault on the trains, and the rear guard, Opdycke's brigade, was instructed that it was necessary for them to resist every attack, even to the loss of the last man, as the safety of the army depended on their doing their duty.

General Wilson remained at Ridge Meeting House during the night of the 29th, and at half-past five on the morning of the 30th sent a dispatch to General Schofield that he had strong parties out to open communication with him, and that he would remain where he was until he heard. Thus far none of the enemy had shown themselves east of Franklin.

To return to the movements of the infantry. Wood's division of the Fourth Corps followed Ruger, but was halted north of Spring Hill, which point it reached without opposition. Kimball's division followed Wood. It was midnight when it drew out of its lines along Rutherford Creek. As it passed Spring Hill the enemy were in full view, their camp-fires lighting up the scene, and not more than 200 or 300 yards from the pike. Here Kimball joined the other two divisions of the Fourth Corps, and took position on the left of the pike, to cover the trains in that direction. At one o'clock in the morning the trains began to move from Spring Hill. There were over 800 wagons, covering more than five miles in single file. At the very outset they had to pass one by one over a narrow bridge. When the head of the train reached Thompson's Station it was attacked by Johnson's rebel cavalry division, Ruger's division having moved on to Franklin and leaving it entirely unguarded. It was now three o'clock, and the whole train was stopped and thrown into confusion. It was indeed a night of despair. The rebel cavalry were on the road in front, the rebel infantry on the flanks and rear, and

only the Fourth Corps present. General Stanley was strongly advised to burn the wagons in order to save his men, but he determined to make one more effort to save both. Sending Kimball ahead to clear the road, he ordered Wood to advance east of the pike. Fortunately Major Steele of General Stanley's staff happened to be near at hand when the train was attacked. Collecting a squad of stragglers, he drove away the attacking force, with a loss of only ten wagons. The train was again started; and at five o'clock in the morning, after day had dawned, the last wagon crossed the bridge, and the whole force was once more put in motion. From the hilltops all about the rebel cavalry could be seen watching for chances to dash at any unguarded spot; but they dispersed when some shells were sent among them, and after a while were seen no more.

Kimball's division, at the head of the train, reached Franklin about nine o'clock in the morning, and he was ordered to report to General Cox for position on the line. The train was sent across the river as rapidly as possible, and Wood's division accompanied it. Wagner's division formed the rear guard, and its adventures will soon be told. At 9.50 General Schofield telegraphed to General Thomas: "My trains are coming in all right; half the troops are here and the other half are five miles out, coming on in good order. Will have all across the river this morning."

The movements of the rebel infantry during the day and night of the 29th were even more exciting and peculiar than those of Schofield's forces. At daylight, having left two divisions of S. D. Lee's corps and most of his artillery in the works at Columbia, to keep up the delusion that his army was still there, General Hood put himself at the head of the other seven divisions, and started to cut off Schofield's line of retreat at Spring Hill. Cheatham's corps led the way, Cleburne's division in advance followed by Bate's, and that by Brown's. Stewart's corps came next, accompanied by Johnson's division

of Lee's corps. Cleburne crossed soon after daylight on a pontoon bridge at Davis' Ford, some four or five miles east of the town, and the rest followed, crossing at the same place or at Lowell's Mill, not far from it. Bate followed Cleburne by roads leading to Spring Hill, and Brown moved through the fields, some four hundred yards east of the road, so as to be able, if necessary, to form a second line by merely halting and facing. They reached the vicinity of Spring Hill not long after noon. Forrest was already there, having brought the whole of Schofield's wagon-train to a halt.

As General Hood, at the head of his column, approached Spring Hill, he believed that all the fruit which he had so long and so anxiously tried to pluck was now ready to fall into his hands. His own account is almost too dramatic to be true. Riding to a hilltop east of the town he could plainly see Stanley's little force, with all the wagons gathered behind it, on the pike. Calling General Cheatham to him, he said: "General, do you see the enemy there, retreating rapidly to escape us? Go with your corps, take possession of and hold that pike at or near Spring Hill, accept whatever comes, and turn all those wagons over to our side of the house." Then, turning to General Cleburne, who commanded the advance division, he said: "You have heard what I have said. You have one of the best divisions in the army. Go with General Cheatham and carry out my orders." General Cleburne immediately deployed his division under Cheatham's direction, and advanced promptly against Bradley's brigade which had already twice repelled the assaults of Forrest's cavalry. It was probably this very group of officers whom Stanley noticed, and of whom he says in his report: "Up to this time it was thought we had only cavalry to contend with; but a general officer and his staff were seen reconnoitring our position, at whom we sent some complimentary shells, and very soon afterward General Bradley was assaulted by a force which our men said fought too well to be any dismounted cavalry." Cleburne's

division was intended as the centre one of the assaulting line. Brown was to form on his right and Bate on his left. Bate was ordered, as soon as he reached the pike, to swing toward Columbia, cutting off all communication between that place and Spring Hill. The other two divisions were to drive our men across the pike and capture or destroy everything in their way. Cleburne, however, met with unexpected resistance, and soon fell back in considerable confusion, having to re-form his line with a change of front. Bate, who was to prolong his left, after advancing some distance, and coming almost to the pike —so near that his sharpshooters could command it — found that he did not connect with Cleburne as directed. At the same time he received an order from Cheatham to halt and join his right to Cleburne's left. He was already firing upon our troops on the pike and driving them from the road. He then learned that Cleburne's left was retired some distance to the rear of his right, and that, to join him, his right would have to be thrown back, exposing his left to an enfilading fire. He therefore withdrew his left brigade to meet any movement against that flank, and then attempted to find Cleburne. Before he succeeded night came on, and it was too late to undertake any complicated movement. During the night Johnson's division of Lee's corps came up and joined his left, but no advance was ordered or made. They went into bivouac parallel to the pike, and only a few hundred yards from it. Frequently their men would go almost to the pike and discharge their muskets at the passing soldiers, but without any response.

General Brown did not meet with any better success. He was to join Cleburne's right and advance with him; but his men were tired with their march through the fields, and before they could get into position Cleburne had been repulsed. Coming up at last, he found our line longer than he had expected, and so reported to Cheatham and asked for additional force on his right. Cleburne had found Bradley's right flank

as already stated; but he had also come under the fire of the batteries on the pike, which struck him on the left flank, sending him to the rear in disorder. Lane's thin line had also opened on his right flank. This was more than he had bargained for, and, before his lines could re-form, or Stewart come up to their assistance, it was too dark to attempt any further movement.

Stewart's adventures were even more singular and unsatisfactory than Cheatham's. Following Cheatham from Duck River, he was halted at one of the crossings of Rutherford Creek, to cut off all possibility of Schofield's retreat to Murfreesboro after Hood should have taken possession at Spring Hill. When Cleburne was repulsed, he was sent for to aid in the assault on Stanley. A young man was given him as a guide, who told him that at a certain point the road made a sudden turn to the left, and that from near this turn there was an old road which struck the pike at the toll-gate a mile and a half north of Spring Hill. They soon found what the guide said was this old road; and he had almost reached the pike when a staff officer of General Cheatham brought him orders from General Hood to go into position on the right of Brown. After a good deal of hesitation, and satisfying himself that the order really came from Hood, he retraced his steps, returned to the road he had left, and found General Brown, whose line was oblique to the pike — the right farther from it than the left. It would take him all night to get to the desired position. Certain that there was some mistake, he halted his troops where they were and went into bivouac.

Meantime there were queer doings in the rebel lines among some of the leading officers. Nearly two years before the rebel General Van Dorn had been shot to death by the infuriated husband of a fascinating woman who lived in a large mansion near Spring Hill. As the rebel army now approached, he left for Nashville, but she remained behind. There was music and dancing and feasting, and other gods than Mars were wor-

shiped. During the sacrificing at their shrines, the whole of Schofield's little force moved silently and fearfully by. When day dawned, they found themselves, with inexpressible wonder and thankfulness, safely escaped from the net which had been spread for them. If ever an event deserved to be called providential, this was one.

Accompanying General Hood on this campaign, as a volunteer aide, was Mr. Isham G. Harris, Governor of Tennessee at the time of its secession, and now a Senator in the Congress of the United States. He was on his way to resume the interrupted functions of his office at the State Capitol. He occupied the same room with General Hood on the night of the 29th, at the house of Captain Thompson near Spring Hill. He relates that, after they had retired, a private soldier came into their room and reported that, on trying to reach his regiment, he found himself in the Federal lines; that the troops were in great confusion, some marching toward Franklin and some toward Columbia; that the road was blocked with wagons, making it almost impossible to move in either direction. Hood immediately ordered his adjutant-general to direct Cheatham to move at once to the pike and attack. After daylight they learned that Schofield's whole army had passed Spring Hill and was concentrating at Franklin; and it subsequently turned out that Colonel Mason, the adjutant-general, had neglected to send Hood's order to Cheatham.

General Cheatham declares that, in his last interview with Hood that night, the latter said he intended to wait till morning and attack at daylight. Bate says that he was present, late at night, at an interview between Hood and Forrest, when the latter declared that he held the turnpike north of Spring Hill, and would stop the enemy's movements there. Hood turned to Bate with a smile and said: "In the morning we will have a surrender without a fight. We can sleep quiet to-night."

But in the morning there was much swearing and no sur-

render. Cheatham and Forrest and the others who had given themselves up to the charms of society the night before were more chagrined at the disappearance of the enemy than at their own lapse from duty. Hood was naturally very furious. His cherished scheme was ruined. What he said and did can only be judged by the conduct of his officers that afternoon, when, with reckless bravery, so many of them threw away their lives. Certainly high words passed between him and Cleburne as well as Cheatham. The whole army felt that something was in the air. What Hood said to Cleburne is buried with him; but the latter's conversation with Brown, as they rode to the battle-field the next morning, showed that he was chafing under what he deemed unjust censure. Hood, on the contrary, declares that Cleburne came to him full of expressions of confidence, saying that he was now convinced he was not the hare-brained man he had been represented; and, as they parted, Cleburne said: "General, I have more confidence in the success of our cause than I have had since the first gun was fired."

On reaching Franklin, in the early morning of the 30th, General Schofield hastened to the riverbank to see if the pontoons for which he had sent on the 28th had arrived, and was greatly disturbed to find they had not. Turning over the command of his corps to General Cox, he devoted his energies to superintending the repair of the bridges and the improvement of the fords. The tired and footsore and hungry infantry kept dropping in all the morning. From an hour before dawn, when Cox came up, until noon the weary column dragged along. As they came within the works which Cox's division had commenced, they halted at the best places they could find to make coffee and snatch a wink of sleep. Most of them had not rested since they crossed Duck River, the night of the 27th.

The line established by General Cox ran from the river above the town to the river below, and he immediately set about fortifying it. In this work the men of the Fourth and

Twenty-third Corps were adepts. They had become expert during the long campaign from Chattanooga to Atlanta when they built hundreds of miles. It was wonderful with what quickness and skill the men protected themselves. The shovel and pick and axe were as essential a part of their fighting tools as the musket. Half an hour would suffice to give them a line behind which they could rest in peace. Cox's division of three brigades was assigned to the left of the Columbia Pike, its left resting on the riverbank above the town. Ruger's two brigades occupied the space between the Columbia and the Carter's Creek pikes; and Kimball's three brigades of the Fourth Corps extended from Carter's Creek Pike to the riverbank below the town. The total number of troops in the line was about 13,000 men. By 12 o'clock the works were in pretty good condition. The whole line was about two miles long.

The extreme left was occupied by Stiles' brigade of four regiments, three in the front line and one in reserve. Its left rested on the railroad cut near the riverbank, and two batteries were in position on higher ground at its rear, where they commanded the cut. In its front was a thick hedge of Osage orange, which was thinned out so as to make a formidable obstacle. The spare branches were placed as abatis on Casement's front, on Stiles' immediate right.

Casement's brigade, also of four regiments, three in the front line and one in reserve, crossed the Lewisburg Pike. The works on this part of the line were very strong, and the slope in front admirably adapted it for a defensive position.

Reilly's brigade of five regiments filled the space between Casement's and the Columbia Pike. It was formed in two lines, with a shorter front than that of either of the other brigades of the division, having but two regiments in the front line. Four guns were in the works manned by the left regiment, and four more near the pike. Embrasures were cut for these guns, and the men displaced by them were posted

in their rear, where light barricades were thrown up for their protection. The regiments which formed the second line had been on picket duty and did not come into position till the works were nearly completed. They threw up slight defences, making a sort of a second line. The pike was left open for the passage of trains, and a strong barricade was erected immediately behind the opening.

On the immediate right of the Columbia Pike was Strickland's brigade of four regiments, two in the front line and two in reserve. A battery was in the works near the pike, and two more guns on the right of the brigade. A thick locust grove in front proved a good additional protection for part of the brigade. On Strickland's right Moore's brigade of six regiments, five in the front line and one in reserve, completed the alignment as far as Carter's Creek Turnpike, which was as far as the Twenty-third Corps extended. Traverses were built along the centre of the works of this brigade and a battery stationed at its extreme right.

From there to the river the line was occupied by Kimball's division of the Fourth Corps, Grose's brigade of six regiments, four in front and two in reserve on the left; then Kirby's of six regiments, four in front and two in reserve; then Whitaker's of seven regiments, four in front and three in reserve. The right of the latter rested on the riverbank and commanded roads approaching the town from the west.

Wagner's division had formed the rear guard, Opdycke's brigade covering the whole movement from Spring Hill. It was the hardest kind of a march. Besides continual skirmishing the rear brigade had enough to do to prevent stragglers, footsore men, and new recruits from dropping behind into the enemy's hands. The knapsacks of many of the recruits were cut from their shoulders. Several times the brigade was halted to enable the tired men to gain a little headway, and line of battle formed to keep back the advance of the enemy. Indeed, there was constant anticipation of being attacked

by an overwhelming force and entirely cut off from the rest of the army.

On reaching some high ground about three miles south of the town, the entire division was halted and formed in line of battle, but, on the enemy's deployment, it retired, and at last, about two o'clock, halted on a little rise about half a mile in advance of the main line, directly across the Columbia Pike. Here they were ordered by General Wagner to hold their ground against all odds in spite of the protests of his brigade commanders. Opdycke, however, was so persistent in his representations of the bad policy of remaining where they were that Wagner gave him permission to go where he pleased, and he moved his brigade within the works and formed it in column of regiments on the right of the Columbia Pike, just behind the Carter house. In his front was a battery and another on the opposite side of the pike.

It will be seen that the concentration of troops about the Columbia Pike was very formidable. Along a front of four regiments there were ten, in two or three lines, with seven more in reserve immediately in rear of the centre. There were also twelve guns in the works and eight more in reserve. But there were neither too many guns nor men as the result speedily showed.

As soon as he found that the National troops had slipped away from him, Hood ordered his whole army to pursue as rapidly as possible. He overtook the rear guard as it made a stand about four miles south of Franklin, and moved to outflank it on the left, but our troops retired without waiting for an attack. This movement caused a delay of some hours, and it was half-past three in the afternoon when the rebel army of seven veteran divisions — twenty-four brigades — was seen emerging from the woods in line of battle, stretching with an unbroken front from the river across the Columbia Pike, and marching briskly forward with trailed arms straight at our works. Stewart's corps formed the right,

reaching to the river. Cheatham's corps was on Stewart's left, and extended across the Columbia Pike. Johnson's division of Lee's corps was in reserve. From a high knoll known as Winstead's Hill, about three miles from our lines, where Hood had established his headquarters, his whole line could be plainly seen. General Cheatham's headquarters were near by, and his corps was deployed under his eye. The day was one of surpassing beauty. The gentle haze of Indian summer filled the warm afternoon with an atmosphere of dreamy loveliness. "It was the grandest sight I ever saw," said General Cheatham years afterward as he recalled the scene. "As they wheeled into line of battle in full view of the enemy, their precision and military bearing were as beautiful a sight as was ever witnessed in war."

The order of the rebel line by divisions was — Loring on the extreme right, then Walthall, then French, constituting Stewart's corps; on French's left, Cleburne, then Brown, then Bate, constituting Cheatham's corps. The line of battle was by brigades — two in front and two in rear in each division. The course of the river, which guided the movements of Stewart's corps, soon threw his left as far as the Columbia Pike, so that Cleburne's and French's divisions came together, and at the moment of the assault formed a line of unusual strength.

General Cheatham had arranged with his division commanders to give the order to advance by dropping a flag. When the lines were swung into position, they corrected the alignment and then turned toward him for the signal. A moment of delay, to be sure that all was ready, then the flag dropped, and the line moved forward, steady as a clock. It was two miles and a quarter from the rebel starting-point to Cox's main line, and the advancing line was everywhere in full view. About an hour before the movement, General Schofield, who throughout the morning had given his entire attention to getting the trains over the river, had retired to

the fort on the north bank, where he could overlook the whole region, and had taken General Stanley with him. As the rebel line marched forward to the attack, a battery from Wagner's advance position sent some shells into the ranks and then fell back into the main line. But the two infantry brigades remained steadfast. It is not intended here to discuss the question who was to blame for the faulty location of these brigades. It is enough to say that at half-past two o'clock General Wagner's adjutant-general reported to General Stanley, in the presence and hearing of General Schofield, for orders, and that no orders were given. From that time until the assault fell upon them, neither he nor General Cox, who commanded the lines, gave or enforced any order requiring them to fall back.

Cleburne's and Brown's divisions struck these two hapless brigades at almost the same instant, and rolled them back in haste and confusion. The troops in the works near the pike —Reilly's and Strickland's brigades and the batteries—dare not fire lest they should shoot down their own comrades. As friend and foe came running in as fast as their legs could carry them, almost mingled in one mass, the suspense and excitement in the ranks was terrible. "Let us go into the works with them," shouted Brown to his men, and the cry was taken up all along the line. Cleburne was no less active and enthusiastic. His courage that day was more ardent even than usual, in consequence of his failure of yesterday. He swept down on Conrad's brigade, overwhelming and beating it back.

As General Cox's troops in the lines near the Columbia Pike saw the confusing retreat of these brigades, and heard the wild yell from the exultant rebels, the two regiments on each side the pike turned and fled to the rear, the artillerymen abandoned their guns, and for a considerable space the works were deserted. One of the retreating regiments was a new one and was the first to break, many of its officers being

killed or captured in their efforts to hold the men to their place. In another moment the rebels were swarming over the works, the abandoned guns were turned against the flying mob, and everything gave signs of an irreparable disaster.

At this instant Colonel Opdycke, who as already stated had brought his brigade within the lines, seeing the rout and realizing the danger, by his prompt and brave conduct saved the army from the threatened destruction. As his movement within the lines was one which showed military prescience, so now his action redeemed Wagner's fault. Turning to give the necessary orders to his well-disciplined brigade, he found he was already anticipated by his veterans, who, without orders, had fixed bayonets and were ready for work. The only command needed was "Forward." Deploying as they advanced between the Carter house and the works, they struck the triumphant rebels before they had had time to come into order on our side of the trenches and when they were least able to withstand an unexpected and determined attack with fixed bayonets. The contest was short but sharp enough. The rebels fought like heroes to hold what they had gained, but in vain. In a moment the tide was turned. Now that a nucleus was formed, the other troops — some from Lane's and Conrad's brigades, others from the broken lines at the works, and some regiments sent to the weak points from Cox's and Kimball's divisions — came up and took an active part. In a few minutes those rebels who had gained the works were either forced back or killed or became prisoners in our hands. The abandoned guns were recaptured and worked by Opdycke's men till their own people came back. Among the trophies were thirty-two battle-flags captured from the enemy.

From the moment of Opdycke's repossession of the works, though repeated assaults were made, our whole line was held firmly until after nightfall. About the Carter house and the Columbia Pike, the lines were four or five deep, and the musketry was continuous. Those in rear loaded for those in front,

and so there was no cessation in the fire. The locust grove in front was cut down almost to the ground. Two regiments, the 72d Illinois and the 44th Missouri — an advance guard from A. J. Smith's troops — had been temporarily assigned to Strickland's brigade and were on its right. When the regiments on their left ran away, they changed front and maintained their ground, though with terrible loss; the 44th Missouri having 34 killed, 37 wounded, and 92 missing while the 72d Illinois lost 10 killed, 62 wounded, and 86 missing — a total loss in these two regiments of 321. All the field officers and the color-guard of the latter regiment were shot down. Colonel Opdycke's horse was shot under him and he fought on foot at the head of his men, emptying his revolver, then breaking it as he laid about him, and then, seizing a musket, he used that as a club. Innumerable instances could be given of individual gallantry.

As the battle went on, the smoke settled down over the field and lay motionless along the whole line. At sunset it was lighted up to redness, and in a few minutes added to the sombre darkness.

Bravely as our men fought, it was on the part of the rebels that the fighting was most ardent and the losses most severe. They went into battle determined to win. To them victory was everything, and they resolved that nothing should keep them from it. The men were made to believe that our troops were retreating in confusion and could be easily overthrown, and that then the way was clear to the Ohio River, and to peace. Some of the officers realized the hazard, and among them General Cheatham, who told Hood he did not like the looks of the Federal position. "I prefer to fight them here where they have had only eighteen hours to fortify, rather than at Nashville where they have been strengthening themselves two years and more," was Hood's reply. To this no answer could be made, though the result justified Cheatham's fears.

The men of Walthall's division, the centre of Stewart's corps, were perhaps the first to strike our works. They advanced in echelon, and General Quarles was fatally wounded at the head of his brigade. But the supports were a moment too late, and the attack, though again and again renewed, never succeeded. It fell chiefly on Casement's brigade, which was extremely well protected, and which lost but 3 killed, 17 wounded, and 3 missing, while Walthall's loss was 131 killed, 363 wounded, 133 missing — a total of 627 out of about 2000 taken into action. Walthall himself had two horses shot under him and was severely bruised. His division expended 44,932 rounds of ammunition. Loring's division advanced against our left, the part of the line protected by the Osage orange hedge, and near the railroad cut. It was subjected to a withering fire from two batteries stationed on the rising ground which commanded the cut. In the charge General Adams was killed, his horse also being killed astride the parapet where he had tried to leap the works, and he himself, dead, was pitched headlong into our lines. General Scott was paralyzed by a wound. Stiles, upon whom this assault fell, lost but 10 killed, 47 wounded, and 21 missing, while Loring's loss was little less than 800. French's division reached almost to the Columbia Pike, and its left was mingled with the right of Cleburne's. The reports of our officers on this part of the line state that from six to thirteen distinct charges were made from first to last on the works in their front. It is certain that no fiercer fighting was done on any field during the whole war. Pickett's charge at Gettysburg did not surpass French's and Cleburne's at Franklin in courage and energy, nor in relative losses. French's effective force, according to his report, was less than 2000 men, and he lost 128 killed, of whom 24 were officers, 371 wounded, and 126 missing — a total of 625 in the few minutes of that short afternoon. General Cockerill, one of his brigade commanders, was severely wounded. He reports that he took into action 696 men, and lost 419 — 60 per cent

of his force. Of these, 98 were killed, 229 wounded, and 92 missing.

General Cleburne was the most dauntless, brave, and energetic division commander in Hood's army. He had made himself felt and respected in every engagement from Chattanooga to Atlanta. Smarting under the sense of his imagined shortcoming of the day before, he to-day showed unprecedented activity and zeal. At the head of his division, on a white horse, he rode straight toward our lines, taking Conrad's brigade by the way. He saw our men at the works break, as Conrad's came up, and, spurring on to enter with them, he had reached within six paces of the lines when he fell, pierced with thirty-two bullets, say his men. It was the first discharge our men could make after Conrad had entered the works. No braver man than General Cleburne ever drew a sword, and he was as humane to our prisoners who fell into his hands as he was brave. The losses in his division have never been reported, but General Granberry, one of his brigadiers, was killed by his side. In Conrad's brigade, on which his assault first fell, the losses were 7 killed, 125 wounded, 265 missing — a total of 397; while in Reilly's brigade, in the main line, the loss was 26 killed, 126 wounded, and 73 missing — a total of 225 — or 622 in the two brigades on which the assaults of French and Cleburne fell.

Brown's division on the west of the Columbia Pike met as serious a disaster as Cleburne's. After striking Lane's brigade and endeavoring to come into the works with it, it succeeded for a moment in placing some of its men inside the lines held by Strickland; but it was only to be swept out, with terrible loss, by the heroic charge of Opdycke's brigade. As Lane's men came in most of them also turned at the works and opened upon the enemy the fire which they had reserved while in the advance line. All about the Carter house the storm was terrible. The house itself was riddled with shot and shell, the marks of which are still to be seen. The terror-

stricken family took refuge in the cellar, whence after dark they came forth, and the aged father and his daughter searched the battle-field by the light of a lantern. Here within a stone's throw of his own door, they found the son and brother wounded to death, and brought him home to die in his own house. General Brown was also severely wounded, Gist and Strahl, his brigade commanders, were killed, and Gordon, his other brigade commander, a prisoner. At night the division was commanded by a colonel.

General Bate, who commanded the other division of Cheatham's corps, was ordered, some time before the movements of Cleburne and Brown, to march his division toward the right of Cox's line, with the purpose of turning that flank. He moved in the general direction ordered; but, instead of reaching any flank of his enemy, his own flank came under an enfilading fire from Kimball's veterans and the guns at Carter's Creek Pike. He added little or nothing to the general result except to swell the rebel casualty list. His losses were 43 killed, 253 wounded, 29 missing — a total of 325; while Kimball's whole loss was 63, of whom 6 were killed and 10 missing. Just before dark, Johnson's division of Lee's corps was put into the fight, but with no better success than its fellows. It simply added nearly 600 to the casualty list, among whom was General Manigault, who commanded a brigade.

At the same time that the rebel infantry were marching forward to the assault, Forrest's cavalry attempted to overwhelm Wilson, who the night before had withdrawn to the north bank of the Harpeth River, east of Franklin, and once more come into communication with the infantry. In the morning Croxton's brigade had been sent down to Douglas Church, four miles south of Franklin, to watch the enemy. At ten o'clock Forrest attacked him and was handsomely repulsed. He again attacked at two o'clock, when Croxton, seeing infantry advancing, retired to the north side of the river. Here Wilson concentrated all his cavalry, and toward

evening moved against Forrest. The whole rebel cavalry was driven back to the south side. No further attempt was made to molest Wilson, who went into bivouac and remained there until morning, while Schofield marched during the night back to Nashville. Then, covering the infantry flank and rear, Wilson also withdrew and brought off everything in safety and without interference.

Even darkness did not put an end to Hood's endeavors to gain some advantage, but far into the night, along some portions of the line, desultory attacks were made to find, if possible, some weak point. But every effort failed. At midnight, all firing having ceased, Schofield withdrew the troops, and in the morning they were well on their way to Nashville.

It was not until after the recapture of Franklin, a fortnight later, that the awful losses of the rebel army were made known. Then it was found that six general officers were killed, five wounded, and one captured. 1750 men were buried on the field, 3800 were found wounded in the hospitals, and 702 were prisoners — a total loss of 6252 men, from seven divisions, between four o'clock and dark of that short November afternoon, when the sun set at forty minutes past four. The National loss was 2236, of which more than one half, 1241, were from Wagner's division, and more than one half of these, 671, were captured. Leaving out these unfortunates, the losses in the eight brigades which held the works against the assaults of the seven divisions were 1085, of whom 137 were killed, 514 wounded, and 434 missing; 44, or one third of the 137 killed, were from the two regiments before mentioned.

Perhaps no battle-field of the war can show such relative results. Our troops killed ten times as many as their own dead, and wounded four times as many as their own wounded.

There is little to be said about the generalship on either side in this short fight. Hood merely sent in his men, with tremendous vigor and persistency, without the slightest effort at any strategy or tactics. General Schofield had no more to

do with the battle than if he had been with General Thomas at Nashville. He saw it, or a part of it, from his fortress a mile and a half or two miles away; but after turning over his command to General Cox in the morning, he went in considerable haste, about half-past two in the afternoon, across the river, and there remained until toward morning, when he joined the retiring columns on their way to Nashville. General Cox, on whom the command devolved, made no serious exertion, by his own confession, to rectify Wagner's palpable blunder. He saw Wagner at the Carter house about two o'clock, and after that Wagner ordered his brigade commanders to hold their ground as long as they could, and to have the sergeants fix their bayonets and hold the men to it. The rebel troops could be seen advancing in line of battle for fully an hour, in clear view from General Cox's position, but he seems to have taken no decisive steps to enforce the directions which he says were given Wagner in the morning, or about noon, to retire within the works. Aside from this neglect, General Cox acted wisely and gallantly.

General Stanley, the only major-general present except General Schofield and the commander of the Fourth Corps, had, early in the morning, one of his divisions (Kimball's) taken away from him and ordered to report to General Cox. Later, according to the assertions of both Generals Schofield and Cox, Wagner's division was also detailed. Wood's, the only remaining division, was sent across the river to guard the wagons. This left Stanley, the senior officer of them all and a brave and accomplished soldier, with no command whatever, and when General Schofield retired across the river he accompanied him. Neither of them then expected a battle. But when the first gun was fired, Stanley, with the quick instinct of the soldier, galloped to the field. He had just reached Opdycke's brigade when its charge began, and he saw no need of giving orders. He accompanied it, and soon had his horse shot under him, and was wounded in the neck.

Obtaining a remount, he continued on the field till night, and even after dark labored to put out a fire which too plainly told the story of our movements.

To Colonel Opdycke, since made a brigadier and brevet major-general for his gallantry, more than to any other one man, is due the salvation of our little army on the 30th of November, 1864. His action it was which put a check to Hood's ambitious but vain scheme of conquest and glory.

NOTE BY EDITOR. — For General Cox's view of the part taken by himself and Generals Schofield and Stanley in the battle of Franklin, see The March to the Sea, pp. 81–98.

XIII

THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE DECEMBER 15 AND 16, 1864

BY

HENRY STONE,[1]

LIEUT.-COLONEL AND BREVET-COLONEL, 100TH UNITED STATES COLORED TROOPS

Read before the Society January 14, 1884

[1] The writer served as assistant adjutant-general on the staff of General Thomas in the battle of Nashville. — ED.



THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE, TENNESSEE DECEMBER 15 AND 16, 1864

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon of November 30, 1864, while the rebel army under General Hood was deploying into line of battle, preparatory to its desperate charge on the works held by the Nashville forces at Franklin, Tennessee, General Schofield, who was in command of the latter, telegraphed to General Thomas at Nashville: "I have just received your dispatch, asking if I can hold Hood here three days. I do not believe I can. I can doubtless hold him one day; but will hazard something in doing that. He now has a large force, probably two corps, in my front, and seems prepared to cross the river above and below. . . . It appears to me that I ought to take position at Brentwood at once. If A. J. Smith's division and the Murfreesboro garrison join me there, I ought to be able to hold Hood in check for some time. I have just learned that the enemy's cavalry is already crossing three miles below. I will have lively times with my trains again." [1]

In reply to this, General Thomas immediately answered: "Send back your trains to this place at once, and hold your troops in readiness to march to Brentwood and thence to this place as soon as your trains are fairly on the way." [2]

This dispatch must have reached General Schofield at about the moment of Hood's assault. Without leaving the fort, in which he had taken position about an hour before, on the north bank of the river, some two miles from the battle-field, he at once issued his orders for retiring to Nashville. The movement was to begin at midnight. The strictest silence was to be observed, and fires were prohibited. The orders were

[1] 93 W. R. 1170. [2] 93 W. R. 1171.

successfully carried out, and by noon of the next day, December 1, the two infantry corps were in position in front of Nashville, without having encountered any opposition from the enemy. The report that the rebel cavalry were crossing the river below proved a false alarm.

The cavalry corps was ordered by General Wilson to move at daylight of the 1st toward Brentwood, about eight miles south of Nashville. It had been originally intended to make a stand at Brentwood, where the hills offer admirable opportunities for defence; but, before reaching there, it was thought best to occupy the inner circlet of hills enclosing Nashville on the south. Accordingly, the entire command was directed to push on to that place. The cavalry had more or less skirmishing all the way; and at 3.20 P. M. General Wilson, who had just reached the Brentwood Hills, dispatched to General Thomas that he occupied an excellent position, and, if his right flank could be protected by the infantry, he could whip Forrest's whole force. The infantry, however, was too far withdrawn to get into proper position before dark, and the suggestion was not carried into effect. The cavalry was, therefore, placed within the works, extending from the left of the 23d Corps to the riverbank above the town.

By the night of the 1st of December the works about Nashville were fully occupied. The three divisions from Missouri, under command of General A. J. Smith, which had been sent for by General Sherman on the 29th of October and had received their orders for Nashville on the 30th, and which, according to the promises of General Rawlins, General Grant's chief of staff, who had gone from City Point to St. Louis solely to hasten the movement, should have embarked on the 10th of November so as to be in Nashville on the 14th, — a week before Hood's advance from Florence, — arrived only as General Schofield was falling back from Franklin. These troops — less than 12,000 in all — were the only reënforcements General Thomas received from the 29th of September,

the day he was sent by General Sherman to take charge of affairs in Tennessee, to the day of the battle of Nashville, except Hatch's small cavalry division, intercepted at Pulaski on the 31st of October. The ominous warning of General Sherman — "reënforcements will pour in to you, more than can be provided for or taken care of" — had this fulfilment — no more. A lot of new regiments, not enough in number to make good the veterans just mustered out, had come into the department, chiefly from Ohio; but they were all undisciplined and utterly unfit to cope with Hood's trained soldiers.

General Thomas' force, present for duty on the 31st of October when Hood reached the Tennessee River on his intended raid to the Ohio, amounted to 53,416 of all arms, of whom only 28,546, being the 4th and 23d Corps of infantry, and Hatch's and Croxton's cavalry, had had any such training as would fit them for active operations of any kind. These were all speedily concentrated to oppose Hood, leaving for 10 important permanent posts and 150 blockhouses 24,869 men, averaging about 150 men to each post, mostly raw recruits. These were scattered along 450 miles of railroad and river, covering an area as large as Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, and guarding priceless stores and lines of communication, the loss of any of which might mean a month's delay. By the 10th of December the whole force present for duty had been increased to 70,272, a gain in forty days of 16,857 men. Of these, 11,926 were A. J. Smith's veterans, and of the remaining 4931, 2648 were cavalry and 2293 infantry. The cavalry alone were veterans, returning from Louisville, where they had been sent for remount, so difficult was it to procure horses at the front. As may be imagined, it did not prove a very serious task "to provide for and take care of" this inpour of reënforcements.

Few places are better situated for defence against attack from any quarter, especially the south, than the city of Nash-

ville. The older part of the town occupies a rocky bluff on the left bank of the Cumberland River. The crest of this bluff, which at about an eighth of a mile from the river rises steeply to the height of one hundred or one hundred and twenty-five feet, is crowned by the State Capitol, a spacious building of white limestone, visible for miles in every direction. The river sweeps around the place in a half-circle, running nearly north along the city front, then west, then south, and again about two miles below the town turning toward the north. The place was strongly fortified, a very considerable part of the works having been built in 1862 under General Buell's orders, at first for a small garrison of about 5000 men, and twice afterward enlarged. Beginning at a steep bluff on the riverbank above the town, a mile and a quarter from the capitol, they ran southwesterly over a series of hills, on the summits of which were forts, then westerly, then northerly, to the river, about three miles from the capitol. The two principal forts on this line of works were Fort Negley, on a hill 260 feet high, and Fort Casino, 250 feet. This line was built in the autumn of 1862, and intended for a garrison of about 20,000 men, such as General Buell left there when he took the main army into Kentucky in pursuit of the rebel forces under General Bragg. Of this line Fort Casino was the salient.

From the city, on the south side of the river, excellent turnpike roads run in every direction, spreading like the sticks of a fan. The eight principal pikes are: (1) The Lebanon, running due east through the considerable town of Lebanon, thirty miles from Nashville, to the upper Cumberland region and the eastern slopes of the mountains; (2) the Murfreesboro, running southeast through the town of the same name, on to Chattanooga, — the highway to East Tennessee and Georgia before railroads were built; (3) the Nolensville, running into the fertile region watered by the Harpeth River, east of Franklin; (4) the Franklin, running almost due south through Franklin, Columbia, and so on to Decatur, Alabama,

— the former highway to Montgomery and Mobile; (5) the Middle Franklin, or Granny White, which joins the Franklin some eight or ten miles south of the town; (6) the Hillsboro, running southwesterly into the country watered by Duck River, west of Columbia; (7) the Hardin, running also southwesterly, but only of local importance; (8) the Charlotte, running almost due west to the Tennessee River, and reaching the important iron region of Middle and West Tennessee.

In 1860 the population of Nashville was only 17,000, and of Davidson County, of which this is the county seat, only 55,000, giving an average population of 125 to the square mile. During the last two years of the war, however, Nashville contained a population of at least 100,000, and was a busy and exciting town. The greater part of this population, of course, were in the employ of the United States, or were camp-followers, traders, and speculators. Such was its condition in December, 1864.

While Hood was threatening Columbia, and it was still uncertain whether he would not move to Murfreesboro, General Thomas planned what he thought might possibly prove a counter-stroke to his raid. General Steedman, the commander at Chattanooga, was an officer of extraordinary energy and gallantry, and was always ready for any enterprise. He it was who, at Chickamauga at the critical moment of the battle, brought his division to the aid of General Thomas' threatened force, when all but that had been driven or had fled from the field. By heroic courage and effort he prevented the turning of the left flank of the imperilled troops. General Thomas now consulted him as to the feasibility of taking a force to the south side of the Tennessee and doing whatever damage he could, with a view of compelling Hood's retreat. Steedman was only too ready for the undertaking. The necessary troops to the number of 5000 were collected at Chattanooga and brought by rail as far as Stevenson, the point of junction of the Memphis and Charles-

ton with the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. When they arrived there, Hood's movements and A. J. Smith's delay made it advisable to bring them to Nashville. They were accordingly ordered there, and arrived on the 2d of December, just as Hood was bringing up his troops from Franklin.

Soon after the 4th Corps reached Nashville, General Stanley, who found himself seriously troubled by the wound he had received at Franklin, went North on leave of absence, and the command of the corps devolved on Brigadier-General T. J. Wood, its senior division commander, an officer of zeal, experience, and energy. He had commanded a division since January, 1862, and had taken an active part in all the campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland. (An unfortunate dispute with General Rosecrans in regard to his conduct at the battle of Chickamauga had, perhaps, prevented his promotion; but he led his division, two months afterward, up the steep slope of Missionary Ridge, and throughout the Atlanta campaign he was one of the most enterprising officers in the army.) General Beatty, senior brigade commander, succeeded to Wood's old division.

A plethora of major-generals seriously embarrassed General Thomas at this time. Two of them, Rousseau and Milroy, the latter not unknown to campaigners in Virginia, were at the post of Murfreesboro, and were left there. To have brought them to Nashville would have compelled the displacement of some deserving officer already identified with the troops, to the detriment of both. Major-General Couch, who had been among the early corps commanders in the Army of the Potomac, had been sent from Washington to Nashville. He was assigned to the division of the 23d Corps, which had been under Brigadier-General Ruger, now disabled by sickness. Major-General Schofield was relegated to the command of his corps, and Major-General Steedman retained in command of the division he had brought from Chattanooga.

Wagner's division was reorganized by being placed under

command of Brigadier-General Elliott, who had been chief of cavalry on the Atlanta campaign. Brigadier-General Garrard, one of the few officers of Southern birth in General Thomas' old regiment who remained loyal, an officer whose merit was only equalled by his modesty, and who had led a cavalry division under General Sherman with less acceptance to the latter than the demonstrative and immodest Kilpatrick, was assigned to the command of a division in A. J. Smith's corps. Two new division commanders were also assigned to the cavalry corps, — Brigadier-General R. W. Johnson, who had commanded the post of Pulaski, and Brigadier-General J. F. Knipe, a brigade commander in Hooker's corps on the Atlanta campaign. It was a work of no little perplexity so to arrange all these details as to prevent jealousies and heartburnings, but the tact and good sense of General Thomas accomplished it.

The interior line of works about Nashville, built in 1862, was not large enough for the army now gathered there. Accordingly a new position was selected on a range of hills about a mile in advance of the right or western half of the inner circle. This line left the original line at Fort Casino, which had been the salient, and passing over Laurens Hill, 270 feet high, Acklen's Hill, 300, and a series of unnamed hills, varying from 150 to 360 feet in height, ended at the riverbank, a mile and a half below the old line. The salient of this line was at Acklen's Hill, and was within 600 yards of Hood's advance post on Montgomery Hill. The works were thrown up by the troops as they came into position on the 1st and 2d days of December.

The force from Chattanooga, under General Steedman, was placed on the extreme left, and the cavalry was sent to the north side of the river to recruit, rest, and be refitted. Here Steedman was reënforced by the troops from the Nashville and Northwestern Railroad, and his division, 7500 men, extended from the riverbank to the Nolensville Pike. The

23d Corps, General Schofield, 10,000 men, occupied the line from the Nolensville Pike to Fort Casino; the 4th Corps, General Wood, 15,000 men, from Fort Casino to midway between the Hillsboro and Hardin Pikes; and the detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, General A. J. Smith, 12,000 men, from the 4th Corps right to the river. This made a force of infantry of about 44,000 men, occupying a little more than eight miles of works, or an average of about 5000 men to the mile. The interior line, from Fort Casino to the river, was held by the post garrison, about 5000 men, and a detachment of quartermaster's employees, mostly discharged soldiers, organized for the occasion, to the number of about 5000 more. The post troops were under command of Brigadier-General John F. Miller, at present United States Senator from California, who had also commanded the post in the summer of 1862, and subsequently had distinguished himself at the battles of Stone's River and Liberty Gap, in which latter engagement he received a bullet in the eye, the bullet remaining in his head about ten years, and at last being removed by a surgical operation. The quartermaster's employees were under command of Brigadier-General Donaldson, chief quartermaster, and made a brave show in their new uniforms, as we moved out to the battle-ground on the morning of December 15.

By this distribution of the troops one half were concentrated on the three miles from the river above the town to Fort Casino, the other half occupying the remaining five miles. This brought the heavier force within the works which commanded the approaches from the south and southeast, the Nolensville, Franklin, and Granny White Pikes. As further protection for the left flank, General Steedman dammed the waters of Brown's Creek in his front, so as to render the ground there impassable.

General Hood followed General Schofield to Nashville as soon as he could. The morning of December 1 was spent in

burying the dead, bringing up the remainder of Lee's corps from Columbia, collecting the small arms scattered over the field; and in the afternoon the advance, Lee's corps, crossed the river and moved out several miles. The rest of the army came on the next day; but it was not until the afternoon of the 3d of December that the rebel troops were in the positions they continued to occupy till the day of battle. Cheatham's corps formed the rebel right — his right extending beyond the Nolensville Pike and his left near the Franklin Pike. Lee was in the centre, his right joining Cheatham and his left near the Granny White Pike. Stewart was on the left, his left extending some distance along the Hillsboro Pike. Chalmers' division and Biffle's brigade of cavalry kept up connection with the river below Nashville, and the rest of Forrest's cavalry occupied the ground to the rear and right of Cheatham.

I have given the number present for duty with General Hood as 37,485, of whom 12,000 were in Lee's corps in the centre, 9000 in Stewart's corps on the left, 13,000 in Cheatham's corps on the right, 3000 in Chalmers' cavalry division and Biffle's brigade, and 485 in the engineer battalion. Hood claims that he had but 22,000 men present in battle at Nashville, but such claim cannot be sustained. He had there in his army 188 regiments of infantry, 27 batteries of artillery, and at least 15 regiments of cavalry. The number of his artillery and cavalry are known to aggregate 6000. This would leave but 16,000 infantry to be divided among 188 regiments — an average of only 85 officers and men to a regiment. But his infantry officers amounted to 2100 — an average of nearly 12 to a regiment, or one officer for every six men. Of course any such proportion as that is absurd. In General Thomas' army the infantry regiments averaged 307 men, and they had been in service as long as Hood's men and had received quite as few recruits, not exceeding 35 men to a regiment. His officers present did not exceed 2300, being one officer for 20 men. Hood's latest morning report before the battle is dated Decem-

ber 10, 1864. It gives an aggregate present of 36,440, of whom 2252 are sick and 108 in arrest; making these deductions, there remain 34,080 men for duty on that date.[1] But four brigades of infantry were not included in these returns, of which two, at least, rejoined the army before the 15th.[2] They would bring up the number to the aggregate I have given.

I have also placed the number of General Thomas' force actually engaged at 43,260. This conclusion was reached after a most careful study of the returns and reports. The number present in the fortifications, excluding the cavalry and post troops, aggregated by the returns of December 14, 1864, was 44,569. General Steedman left in the fortifications 2000 men; General Schofield 1450; General Wood 1750; and General Smith 2700; in all 7900 men to hold some eight miles of works — say 1000 men to the mile. There were also on the interior line the post troops and the quartermaster's employees. But the force with which General Thomas went into action consisted of 36,660 infantry and artillery and 6600 cavalry. With that force he attacked the 34,485 infantry, artillery, and engineers and the 8000 cavalry in their entrenched position.

The line taken up by Hood was on a range of hills nearly parallel to that occupied by General Thomas' troops, and, in most places, equally high. A branch of Brown's Creek, which rises in the Brentwood hills and empties into the river above the town, runs through the valley in front of the hills occupied by Lee and Cheatham, and a branch of Richland Creek, rising in the same neighborhood and emptying into the river below the town, is in the valley between A. J. Smith's troops and Stewart's corps. Hood lost no time in fortifying his position

[1] 24,074 present for duty, according to field return, excluding Jackson's cavalry division, which was absent with Forrest, to which should be added about 1200 for Chalmers' cavalry division, which was present. 93 W. R. 679, 755, 756, 765. — Ed.

[2] Only Sears' brigade of French's division, about 240. See N. & L. 133, notes 1 and 2. — Ed.

and using every coign of vantage. He pushed an advance line to the crest of Montgomery Hill, directly opposite Wood's salient, and fortified there. He also soon projected and began to build a series of detached, self-supporting works, on the flanks of his line, — two or three, connected by a curtain, on Cheatham's right, and five on Stewart's front and left, along the Hillsboro Pike. These were intended to be manned by four to six guns each, and from 100 to 150 infantry, and were meant to be impregnable to assault. The sites for these works were admirably selected, being, in most cases, commanded or supported by other works and batteries in the main line. Indeed, it would be difficult to find anywhere a stronger natural position than that taken up by General Hood. He also had the advantage of some very skilful, ingenious, and energetic engineers, capable of planning and building works of the most formidable character.

As General Thomas had at first considered it more likely that Hood would move against Murfreesboro than Nashville, he thought it best to retain a considerable garrison there, and accordingly had sent to that point five of the new regiments which had come to take the place of the troops mustered out. He also ordered there the troops which, under General R. S. Granger, had defended Decatur when Hood threatened it on the 27th and 28th of October. This made a total garrison for the post, which was strongly fortified, of about 8000 men, of whom over 5000 were new to the service. It was not until Hood had shown, by his demonstration at Spring Hill and his assault at Franklin on the 30th of November, that he intended going to Nashville, that it was certain he would not go to Murfreesboro. By that time the arrival of A. J. Smith and the approach of General Steedman rendered it unnecessary to make any larger concentration at Nashville.

General Hood, as he was leaving Franklin, ordered General Bate, then a division commander in Cheatham's corps,

and now Governor of Tennessee, to move to Murfreesboro and destroy the railroad between that place and Nashville. He probably thought when he gave the order that Murfreesboro had been evacuated, as it was not until the next day that he warned Bate, by a special courier, that he would find a force of some 5000 Yankees there. Bate reached the vicinity of Murfreesboro on the 4th of December. On the 5th he was joined by Forrest with two divisions of cavalry, and with orders to take command of the combined forces. They tore up a few lengths of railroad, captured the garrisons of two or three blockhouses, and then turned against Murfreesboro itself. On the 7th Forrest ordered Bate to attack from the north, while he with the cavalry moved against it from the west. Bate made only a feeble demonstration, and General Milroy came out, with eight regiments of infantry, a battery, and a small squad of cavalry, assaulted Bate and drove him off with a loss of two guns, over 200 prisoners, and an equal number killed and wounded. Forrest met with not much better luck in his attempt to take the town. His charge was repulsed, and he was driven out in great haste by the regular garrison. These results were rather discouraging. Bate was sent back to Nashville with a request from General Forrest to send a division that would fight. There are strong indications that Hood intended sending an entire corps to capture Murfreesboro, when the battle of Nashville gave more pressing business. Forrest remained in the vicinity, making predatory excursions, but without accomplishing anything of importance. He attacked several blockhouses, and the report of the defence of one of them is so unique that it deserves to be perpetuated.

Block House, No. 7, December 18, 1864.

Major-General Milroy:

Sir: I am informed by your scout (Mr. Lee) that the rebs have retreated. He tells me that, if there is anything

I want, to send a note to you and say what it is. General, I want nothing but liberty. I have been hemmed in for 13 days, not daring to put my head outside the blockhouse. The rebel sharpshooters have left and I feel better. The health of myself and men is good, and ready for any emergency. Gen'l Forrest sent in a flag of truce four times, demanding the surrender of this house, promising to treat me well, and threatening to burn me with Greek fire if I refused. I resolved to believe nothing but such thing as I could see, and, as I could not see the Greek fire, I thought I would wait till I did.

I am, Genl., very respectfully,
Your obt. servt,
H. H. GLOSSER,
1st Lieut. Co. E. 115th Regt. Ohio Vol. Infy.
Comdg. Blockhouse No. 7.[1]

No sooner had Hood arrived before Nashville than General Grant, who up to that time had not given any special attention to General Thomas since the departure of General Sherman, began to show great anxiety about the safety of the place, and especially lest Hood should move to the Ohio River. On the 2d of December he telegraphed General Halleck: "Is it not possible to send reënforcements to Thomas from Hooker's Department [comprising the states of Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan]? If there are new troops, organized state militia, or anything that can go, now is the time to annihilate Hood's army. Governor Bramlette [of Kentucky] might put 5000 or 10,000 horsemen in the field to serve only to the end of the campaign. I believe, if he were asked, he would do so."[2] In view of the fact that there had already been sixteen regiments of new troops sent to Nashville which nobody dared to take into the field, and that there were about 7000 trained cavalrymen there unmounted and unable to

[1] 93 W. R. 633. [2] 94 W. R. 16.

procure horses, this telegram shows an extraordinary degree of excitement at City Point. Any more new troops would, for the present, be a nuisance at Nashville, and Governor Bramlette's horsemen would do more harm there than the enemy's.

As this was the first battle since his overwhelming victory at Mill Spring on the 19th of January, 1862, for the planning and conduct of which General Thomas alone was responsible, he naturally felt the full weight of his responsibility. He knew that he was not liked by General Grant as General Sherman was, though he knew no reason why he should not be equally trusted. When he was sent back from Atlanta to Tennessee, he declared that the one thing he did not want — unless General Sherman and the authorities at Washington deemed it absolutely necessary — was to be left in command there. Andrew Johnson was at Nashville with the military rank of a brigadier-general and holding a politico-military appointment as Military Governor of the State. His counsels had great weight at Washington, and General Thomas had seen the reputation of more than one able, zealous, and brave soldier undermined by means which such a man knew how to employ. Besides, he naturally wanted to be with his own army, with which he had grown up from the beginning, and which was as faithfully devoted to him as was ever lover to his mistress. In the 14th Corps, which General Sherman had carried off with him, were the very regiments which for three years he had trained to service, in his various grades as brigade, division, corps, and army commander. They had often fought under him — never, except to win. Their confidence in him was unbounded. He never passed a column of his troops on the march that they did not instinctively gain courage and strength from seeing him; and in battle they felt that he was invincible. They could not associate him with defeat. Mill Spring, and Stone's River, and Chickamauga, and the marvelous triumphs of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge,

and all the battles of the Atlanta campaign had so inspired his soldiers with faith in him that they were glad to join any enterprise in which he was the leader. When, therefore, that part of his old army, which was included in the 4th Corps and Steedman's division and Miller's post garrison, realized that a great battle was to be planned and fought at Nashville under his direction, their satisfaction and ardor were unbounded. Schofield's troops had also served by the side of the Army of the Cumberland, and shared some portion of its spirit. And when A. J. Smith's lost tribes, — whose corps badge, he said, was a comet, — who had taken part in Sherman's Mississippi raid, and in Banks' Louisiana fiasco, and in Rosecrans' pursuit of Price in Missouri, returned at last to their proper command, they could not help contrasting their present leader with some of the luckless generals under whom they had been serving, and gladly shared in the feeling of confidence which animated all the rest. Whatever others might think, General Thomas' soldiers knew their man. It was his fight, and they meant to win it for him.

As to General Thomas' loyalty and fidelity to the service they had been proved in every possible manner and under every circumstance. A Virginian by birth, he had all the feeling of pride in the history and reputation of its great men which were natural and proper; but before all and above all, to him, was the nation as founded by Washington and his companions. In its service he was trained; to it his life was devoted. In the old army he had been selected in 1855 to be junior major of the new cavalry regiment, of which Albert Sidney Johnston was colonel, Robert E. Lee, a Virginian like himself, was lieutenant-colonel, and William J. Hardee, senior major, and he had served with it for over five years. But, when the rebellion threatened the nation's life, he gave up the enjoyment of the first and only leave of absence that had ever been granted him; and his first service in the field in 1861 was to cross the Potomac on the 2d of July, sword in hand,

at the head of a column of Pennsylvania troops, and on his native soil disperse the rebel battalions which, under command of Stonewall Jackson, had been brought to the borders of the state to dispute the entrance of soldiers bearing the United States flag. From that day onward he was continuously in the field. He had served in subordinate positions under Sherman, and Buell, and Rosecrans, and Grant; and he had also commanded Grant's army in Western Tennessee, when in April, 1862, that general had fallen under Halleck's displeasure and was practically relieved. If, therefore, General Grant underrated, or misunderstood, General Thomas' character or abilities, it was not for lack of opportunity for knowing them.

Smith's and Steedman's troops had reached Nashville destitute of transportation, and the wagons and mules of the 4th and 23d Corps and the cavalry were badly used up by the hard march from Pulaski to Nashville. Nearly one half the cavalry also was dismounted, and the horses of the rest worn out. There were no pontoons nor pontoniers, General Sherman having appropriated General Thomas' well-trained and well-equipped pontoon train and brigade, and General Schofield's having been destroyed at Columbia. In short, everything requisite for a victorious and pursuing army was lacking but men, arms, ammunition, and rations. As soon as horses and mules and wagons and pontoons and tents, and all the thousand other wants requisite to make an army ready for battle and pursuit, could be supplied, that moment General Thomas was ready. He realized too keenly the importance of victory to allow anything that might help secure it to be neglected. Compared with the destruction of Hood's army, nothing else was of any account. What mattered a few days if at last the work was thoroughly done? To that end, therefore, he bent every energy, and the vigor of the whole body of men there assembled was never surpassed. I doubt if a busier workshop than Nashville during the two weeks

preceding the battle was ever seen anywhere. Day and night everything that could be done was done. The chief want, however, was horses, and these could not be manufactured. The country was scoured for every quadruped that could carry a man or haul a team. Even the storm-bound circus was seized, and the trick mule and calico horse were returned after trial to their congenial sawdust ring, rather because they were useless for army work than because of the copious tears of their claimants.

While straining every nerve to make ready for battle, General Thomas was subjected to a course of treatment by General Grant which has not its equal, to my knowledge, in any military experience during the civil war, nor in any other war with which I am acquainted. It is so essential a part of the history of the battle of Nashville that it cannot be passed by in silence. There is not time to read all the correspondence, but I do not see how any one reading it can resist the feeling that General Grant was vicariously visiting on General Thomas the wrath which should properly have been expended on General Sherman for leaving him in so exposed a situation. But General Sherman was out of reach, and General Thomas was at the other end of a convenient telegraph wire.

On the 1st of December General Thomas sent an elaborate dispatch to General Halleck, showing the exact condition of things after the battle of Franklin, and adding: "I think it best to remain here until Wilson can equip all his cavalry. If Hood attacks me here, he will be more seriously damaged than he was yesterday; if he remains until Wilson gets equipped, I can whip him, and will move against him at once."[1] On the 2d General Grant opened his battery of telegrams and orders. At 11 o'clock in the morning he said: "If Hood is permitted to remain quietly about Nashville, we will lose all the roads back to Chattanooga and possibly have

[1] 94 W. R. 3.

to abandon the line of the Tennessee. Should he attack you it is all well; but if he does not you should attack him before he fortifies. Arm and put in the trenches your quartermaster's employees, citizens, etc." [1] At half-past one in the afternoon he returned to the charge: "After the repulse of Hood at Franklin, it looks to me that instead of falling back to Nashville, we should have taken the offensive" — as it looked to everybody but General Schofield — . . . "You will suffer incalculable injury upon your railroads, if Hood is not speedily disposed of." [2] To these urgent suggestions General Thomas replied that evening: "At the time Hood was whipped at Franklin, I had at this place but about 5000 men of General Smith's command, which, added to the force under General Schofield, would not have given me more than 25,000 men; besides, General Schofield felt convinced that he could not hold Franklin till the 5000 men would reach him. As General Wilson's cavalry force also numbered only about one fourth that of Forrest's . . . I now have infantry enough to assume the offensive, if I had more cavalry, which I hope to have in two or three days. . . . We can get neither reënforcements nor equipments at this great distance from the North very easily; . . . and the task of reorganizing and equipping has met with many delays, which have enabled Hood to take advantage of my crippled condition. I earnestly hope, however, that in a few more days I shall be able to give him a fight." [3]

It will be seen that, even at this time, General Thomas' only request was for time to get his cavalry reorganized and equipped. He neither asked for, nor wanted, the reënforcements which General Grant was casting about to find. This telegram seems to have silenced, if it did not satisfy, General Grant for two or three days. But on the 5th he again returned to the assault. "Is there not danger," he asks, "of Forrest moving down the Tennessee [evidently meaning the

[1] 94 W. R. 17. [2] 94 W. R. 17. [3] 94 W. R. 17.

Cumberland] River where he can cross it? It seems to me whilst you should be getting up your cavalry as rapidly as possible to look after Forrest, Hood should be attacked where he is. Time strengthens him, in all probability, as much as it does you." [1]

This telegram shows both a lack of knowledge of the situation at Nashville, and of General Thomas' intended plan of attack. Hitherto, certainly in the Western armies, and I judge in the Army of the Potomac also, the cavalry was hardly considered an integral part of an attacking force. It was used as videttes, or as train-guards, or to protect the communications, or to cover the flanks of the infantry, or as scouts — almost anything except to fight in immediate connection with the infantry. General Thomas had other views than these concerning the uses of cavalry. He determined to combine all three arms of the service, the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, into one attacking force, and with them all to lay waste his enemy. He had had personal training and service in each of these branches, and knew the value and uses of each. He was, undoubtedly, the best artillerist in the Army of the Cumberland. He did, at Nashville, exactly what General Grant did more than three months afterward, when he moved against Lee's right flank below Petersburg, using Sheridan's cavalry as an integral part of the assaulting force. And all he ever asked was time enough to enable him to prepare for such action. He therefore replied to General Grant: "As soon as I get up a respectable force of cavalry, I will march against Hood. I hope to have some 6000 or 8000 cavalry mounted in three days from this time. I do not think it prudent to attack Hood with less than 6000 cavalry to cover my flanks, because he has, under Forrest, at least 12,000." [2]

This explanation did not satisfy General Grant, who, at four o'clock on the next day, the 6th, sent this peremptory telegram: "Attack Hood at once, and wait no longer for a

[1] 94 W. R. 55. [2] 94 W. R. 70.

remount for your cavalry. There is great danger in delay resulting in a campaign back to the Ohio River." [1] At nine o'clock that evening General Thomas answered: "I will make the necessary dispositions and attack Hood at once, agreeably to your order, though I believe it will be hazardous with the small force of cavalry now at my service." [2]

In accordance with this order, General Thomas assembled his corps commanders for the purpose of giving them minute instructions for the impending battle. After full consultation, however, it was found that the earliest possible moment at which things could be made fully ready for such battle as the urgency of the situation demanded would be the morning of the 10th, and even then the means for a vigorous pursuit would be inadequate. The pontoons were not finished, owing to the neglect and dissipation of the engineer officer in charge, who subsequently brought disgrace to the service, and himself to an untimely death; and there were at least five formidable streams to cross in the pursuit, besides five or six more for which pontoons might be needed; the mules for the wagons were insufficient in number and most of them unbroken; and the cavalry still in a very backward condition, both as to men and horses, a large number of the men being still at Louisville, remounting. This making preparation at arm's length for a campaign in mid-winter is no child's play. If General Grant's army had been at Weldon, North Carolina, one hundred miles south of Richmond, and dependent for all its supplies on a single line of railroad, it would be in a position somewhat similar to General Thomas' at Nashville. The Army of the Potomac, fortunately, was always near tide-water, and never more than one hundred miles from Washington, and so lacked the experience of long lines of communication such as our Western armies became accustomed to.

The morning of the 7th wore away without bringing news of battle to General Grant. Unable any longer to restrain his

[1] 94 W. R. 70. [2] 94 W. R. 70.

impatience, at half-past one that afternoon he sent the following telegram:

Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War:

You probably saw my order to General Thomas to attack. If he does not do it immediately, I would recommend superseding him by General Schofield, leaving General Thomas subordinate.

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.[1]

I doubt if, in the whole history of armies, another such recommendation from a general-in-chief can be found concerning an officer whose record of service, of loyalty, of military ability, of unbroken success in battle is so clear and noble as that of General Thomas. Neither the ill-success of Burnside, nor the fiascoes of Butler, nor the failures of Banks — to mention no more — were thought to render them worthy of such punishment. It was reserved for Thomas, the most successful fighter of all Grant's lieutenants, except perhaps Sheridan, to be subjected to this unprecedented and most unmerited indignity. Fortunately for the country and for General Grant's own character and reputation, this scheme of supersedure miscarried. Had General Grant been at Nashville, he would undoubtedly have done exactly as General Thomas did, wait till he was ready to give battle with the prospect of success; exactly what he himself had done at Chattanooga a little more than a year before, when he waited a month; exactly what he was then doing in front of Petersburg. Such an order as he recommended the Secretary of War to issue is not merely unprecedented during the war of the rebellion, — its like can hardly be found since civilized warfare began. Plenty of generals have been relieved of their commands, some of great ability and merit; but where is there another instance of a general, — left with an inferior army to

[1] 94 W. R. 84.

do the work which a much greater one, under another general, failed or was unable to do; stripped of his own soldiers, and a lot of odds and ends assigned to him out of which to create an army; ordered to a position against his own seeking, only after the implied assurance that he would be fully supported by the authorities at Washington, — just on the eve of a decisive engagement for which he had made every preparation, and the principal difficulties in the way of which he was just surmounting, directed to turn over his command to a subordinate who had never planned or fought a battle, and then to report to such subordinate for duty?

But General Grant did not content himself with merely recommending such supersedure of General Thomas. On the morning of the 8th, the next day, he telegraphed to General Halleck, directing him to have all the troops that could be spared anywhere sent, for General Thomas, to Louisville! for he feared Hood would go to the Ohio River, and submitting to him whether it would not be well to call on Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois for 60,000 men for thirty days![1] It is difficult to account for the panic into which General Grant seems to have been thrown by Hood's presence before Nashville. Everybody there was serene and confident, while he was tortured with anxiety, a thousand miles away. A day or two before he had suggested 10,000 horsemen from Kentucky, and now 60,000 men for thirty days, to prevent the seizure of Louisville. There was nothing to indicate any possibility of Hood's slipping past Nashville; the time when such a movement might have been undertaken had gone by. Lee could move on Washington as easily as Hood on Louisville. Indeed, General Grant's anxiety seemed to increase as the prospect of Hood's further aggression decreased. He kept the telegraph wire busy with all sorts of suggestions for General Thomas' benefit. At ten o'clock that night he advised General Halleck: "I want General Thomas reminded of the importance of immediate action. I

[1] 94 W. R. 96.

sent him a dispatch this morning which will probably urge him on. I would not say relieve him until I hear further from him." [1]

The dispatch here referred to by General Grant was followed by another at 7.30 in the evening, in which General Thomas was conjured, by all means, to avoid the contingency of a foot-race to see whether he or Hood could beat to the Ohio, — and directing him to call on the governors of states to send a force to Louisville to meet the enemy, if he should cross the Cumberland River.[2] General Thomas' reply to this was a model of brevity, conciseness, and confidence. It was dated 11.30 P. M.: "Your dispatch of 7.30 is just received. I can only say, in further extenuation why I have not attacked Hood, that I could not concentrate my troops and get their transportation in order in shorter time than it has been done, and I am satisfied I have made every effort that was possible to complete the task." [3]

No man was ever more conscious of the importance of small things, as going to make up great ones, than General Thomas. "The fate of a battle may depend on a buckle," he once said, at a review, to an artillery officer whose harness gave way. He was not willing to risk the tremendous hazard of battle with the sole remaining rebel army in the Southwest with all its possible contingencies, until everything that his experience could suggest was done to make his preparation thorough. He might be relieved, but he would be prepared. Besides, the delay was none of his making. It was not due to him that General Schofield's troops had been detained, at the very outset of the campaign, eight or nine days at Chattanooga, while General Sherman was using all the rolling-stock of the railroad to gather supplies for his raid; that A. J. Smith's troops had been delayed in Missouri for two weeks after their promised time; that his only pontoon bridge was destroyed without his knowledge and a new one had to be rebuilt by a dissolute

[1] 94 W. R. 96. [2] 94 W. R. 97. [3] 94 W. R. 115.

and neglectful engineer, the only one available, and who concealed the true condition of things; that, out of 22,000 cavalry horses reported as having been sent to Louisville for him, he could not find enough to mount 10,000 men. These things are not referred to as apologies for General Thomas — he needs none. But they are facts beyond his control, and needing to be stated in order that his real condition may be known. This one thing is sure, — that, from the beginning to the end of the war, in his own proper command, whether it were a brigade, a division, a corps, or an army, no superior officer ever before found occasion to censure him for delay. He was always ready when the time came; never in a hurry, he was never behind-hand. When the appointed hour struck, he was ready and in earnest.

The telegram, which General Halleck, under General Grant's admonition, sent to General Thomas, did not exactly tally with that of the General-in-Chief. The latter laid great stress on having additional forces sent to Louisville; but General Halleck's anxiety was how to take care of the horses which his imagination had already supplied. "If you wait," he said, "till General Wilson mounts his cavalry, you will wait till doomsday, for the waste equals the supply" — as indeed it had thus far. "Moreover, you will be in the same condition that Rosecrans was last year — with so many animals that you cannot feed them. Reports already come in of scarcity of forage." [1]

Nothing could more clearly show the entire misunderstanding on the part of General Halleck of General Thomas' position at Nashville than this allusion to General Rosecrans. Evidently, both General Grant and himself considered General Thomas' present situation as similar to that of the National forces at Chattanooga in October and November, 1863, after the battle of Chickamauga. Nothing could be more absurd than such a suggestion. But, even if the circumstances

[1] 94 W. R. 114.

were similar, General Grant might have remembered that he himself was in chief command at Chattanooga from the 23d of October, and that he did not give battle until the 24th of November, for substantially the same reasons as those now controlling General Thomas: he could not get his troops ready. As it was, he was in no condition for pursuit after the battle, owing to lack of cavalry and transportation. Nor is it to be forgotten that Grant's delay at Chattanooga was caused not by Thomas', but by Sherman's unreadiness.

The telegram of General Grant to the Secretary of War, already quoted, though sent on the 7th, was not acted on in Washington until the 9th, and even then it required the interference of the General-in-Chief, who dispatched to General Halleck: "No attack yet by General Thomas. Please telegraph order relieving him and placing Schofield in command." [1] In accordance with this dispatch, an order was made out by Colonel John C. Kelton, Assistant Adjutant-General to General Halleck, as follows: —

Head Quarters of the Army,
General Orders. War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,
No. Washington, D. C., December 9, 1864.

In accordance with the following dispatch from Lieutenant-General Grant, viz.: Please telegraph orders relieving General Thomas at once and placing Schofield in command. Thomas should be directed to turn over all dispatches received since the battle of Franklin to Schofield,

U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

The President orders:

First. That Major-General J. M. Schofield assume command of all troops in the Departments of the Cumberland, the Ohio, and the Tennessee.

Second. That Major-General George H. Thomas report to

[1] 94 W. R. 115, 116.

General Schofield for duty, and turn over to him all orders and dispatches received by him, as specified above.

By order of the Secretary of War,

(Signed) J. C. KELTON,

Assistant Adjutant-General.[1]

The existence of such an order has been strenuously denied by General Grant's nearest friends, and all evidence concerning it studiously suppressed by his admiring biographer, Badeau. I saw and copied it last winter, in the War Records Office in Washington, together with the telegram on which it is based. It is in Colonel Kelton's handwriting, wanting nothing but the number to make it complete.

The very day that this order was made out at Washington a terrible storm of snow, sleet, rain, and hail came on at Nashville, freezing as it fell, and covering all the hills and valleys with a glare of ice which made it next to impossible to move on foot, and out of the question with the smooth-shod horses. No such storm had ever been known in that region; it is of rare occurrence in New England. The people there accused the Yankees of bringing their weather, as well as their armies, with them. The storm and its consequences lasted until the night of the 13th. General Thomas notified General Grant and General Halleck of the impossibility of present movement, and waited with almost sleepless anxiety for the weather to change. General Halleck advised, on the 8th, against relieving General Thomas, telling General Grant "the responsibility would be his, as no one in Washington, so far as he was informed, wished General Thomas removed,"[2] and on the 9th, after the order was made out, delayed sending it in consequence of General Thomas' telegram explaining the situation. In reply to his suggestions, General Grant said: "I am very unwilling to do injustice to an officer who has done so much good service as General Thomas has, and will therefore

[1] 94 W. R. 114.

[2] 94 W. R. 96.

suspend the order relieving him until it is seen whether he will do anything."[1] So, with an admonition to General Thomas, and the expression of the hope that "the facts will show that you have been right all the time,"[2] the obnoxious order was suspended. General Grant, however, continued to prod him, and at 4 P. M. on the 11th telegraphed: "Delay no longer for weather or reënforcements."[3] General Thomas on the 12th tried the experiment of moving; he made a reconnoissance in force with some of the troops on his left, and brought the cavalry across the river. It took the entire day to get the cavalry into position to the right and rear of Smith, and many men and horses were injured by falling. The mounted officers of the infantry reconnoissance were compelled to leave their horses behind, and, in numerous cases, the men had to crawl on their hands and knees to make any headway up the steep hillsides. It was impossible to keep a moving column in anything like order. Every man had to look out for himself. Of course, under such conditions it would be madness to give battle.

I do not know what caused a change to come over General Grant's mind in regard to relieving General Thomas by General Schofield. But on the 13th of December it happened that General John A. Logan, now United States Senator from Illinois, was at City Point. He had come there from taking an active part in the political campaign just closed. He was too late to join General Sherman at Atlanta, and was now on his way to resume command of his corps when it should reach Savannah. General Logan had served as corps commander under General Grant in the Army of the Tennessee. He had made a good record as a gallant and energetic soldier, and after McPherson's death on the 22d of July had, as senior officer, assumed command of that army and fought it successfully through that trying and difficult day, when Hood so fiercely assaulted it on all sides. When, therefore, General

[1] 94 W. R. 116. [2] 94 W. R. 115. [3] 94 W. R. 143.

Thomas seemed to General Grant disinclined to fight, General Logan was directed to "proceed immediately to Nashville, Tennessee, reporting by telegraph to the Lieutenant-General his arrival at Louisville, Kentucky, and also his arrival at Nashville, Tennessee." This was all of the order to General Logan which has ever been made public. His private instructions were to take command of the Army of the Cumberland in place of General Thomas. As he was senior to General Schofield, this would naturally put him in chief command of all the forces.

General Logan immediately started for Nashville. His first report to General Grant tells the rest of the story. It is dated Louisville, Kentucky, 10 A. M., December 17, 1864, after the battle was all over. "Have just arrived, weather bad, raining since yesterday morning. People here jubilant over Thomas' success. Confidence seems to be restored. I will remain here to hear from you. All things going right. It would seem best that I return to join my command with Sherman" [1] — a conclusion in which General Grant concurred, and he sent orders to that effect. General Grant himself had by this time become so absorbed in the condition of things at Nashville that he left City Point on the 14th, intending to go there and direct matters. When he reached Washington on the evening of the 15th, he heard the news, and sent General Thomas a congratulatory and admonitory telegram, instead of continuing his journey. In view of all these facts, on which perhaps too much time has been spent, but which seem essential to the proper presentation of the case, any interested person could hardly help suggesting the question, why, with an army at his back relatively to the enemy much larger and better equipped than that which General Thomas commanded, was General Grant so impatient with things at Nashville and so patient with things at City Point?

The storm with all its consequences continued unabated

[1] 94 W. R. 230.

until the afternoon of the 13th of December. On the morning of the 14th the thaw was fairly under way, with every prospect of good footing for the next day. In the afternoon, therefore, the corps commanders were again assembled at General Thomas' headquarters, the order of battle given, all details carefully discussed, and every contingency that could be anticipated provided for. The order in full is as follows:

Special Field Orders. Head Quarters, Army of the Cumberland,
No. 342. Nashville, Tennessee, December 14, 1864.

As soon as the weather will admit of offensive operations, the troops will move against the enemy's position in the following order:

1. Major-General A. J. Smith, commanding Detachment of the Army of the Tennessee, after forming his troops on and near the Hardin Pike, in front of his present position, will make a vigorous assault on the enemy's left.

Brevet Major-General Wilson, commanding the Cavalry Corps, Military Division of the Mississippi, with three (3) divisions will move on and support General Smith's right, assisting as far as possible in carrying the left of the enemy's position, and be in readiness to throw his force upon the enemy the moment a favorable opportunity occurs. General Wilson will also send one division on the Charlotte Pike to clear that road of the enemy, and observe in the direction of Bell's Landing, to protect our right rear until the enemy's position is fairly turned, when it will rejoin the main force.

3. Brigadier-General T. J. Wood, commanding 4th Army Corps, after leaving a strong skirmish line in his works from Laurens Hill to his extreme right, will form the remainder of the 4th Corps on the Hillsboro Pike to support General Smith's left, and operate on the left and rear of the enemy's advanced position on Montgomery Hill.

4. Major-General Schofield, commanding 23d Army Corps, will replace Brigadier-General Kimball's division of the 4th

Corps with his troops, and occupy the trenches from Fort Negley to Laurens Hill with a strong skirmish line. He will move with the remainder of his force in front of the works and coöperate with General Wood, protecting the latter's left flank against an attack by the enemy.

5. Major-General Steedman, commanding District of the Etowah, will occupy the interior line in rear of his present position, stretching from the reservoir on the Cumberland River to Fort Negley, with a strong skirmish line, and mass the remainder of his force in its present position, to act according to the exigencies which may arise during these operations.

6. Brigadier-General Miller, with the troops forming the garrison of Nashville, will occupy the interior line from the battery on Hill 210 to the extreme right, including the enclosed works on the Hyde's Ferry Road.

7. The quartermaster's troops, under the command of Brevet Brigadier-General J. C. Donaldson, will, if necessary, be posted on the interior line from Fort Morton to the battery on Hill 210.

The troops occupying the interior line will be under the direction of Major-General Steedman, who is charged with the immediate defence of Nashville during the operations around the city.

Should the weather permit, the troops will be formed to commence operations at 6 A. M. on the 15th, or as soon thereafter as practicable.

By command of Major-General George H. Thomas.

(Signed) WM. D. WHIPPLE,
A. A. G. and Chief-of-Staff.[1]

On the morning of the 15th the weather proved all that could be desired. It was not daylight when the movement of the army began. In most of the camps reveille had been

[1] 94 W. R. 184.

ordered at four o'clock, then breakfast, so that by six o'clock everything was ready. A dense fog, caused by the melting snow, overhung the whole region, and was especially thick in the valleys of Brown's and Richland Creeks, on opposite banks of which lay the two armies so soon to be engaged in deadly combat. The morning was fairly warm, and the men everywhere in excellent spirits. They were literally eager for the fight.

The first movement was made by General Steedman against the extreme right of the rebel forces, at the works held by Cheatham's corps on the Murfreesboro and Nolensville Pikes. It was not intended to be a serious attack, but only a feint to cover the real point of assault on the extreme left of the rebel position. As General Thomas moved away from his headquarters, the gaslights in the streets were still burning, and the guns from Fort Negley could be heard as they sent an occasional random shot in the direction of the enemy's lines. One of these shots fell among a group of rebel officers near the Murfreesboro Pike, killing a horse belonging to one of them. The force which Steedman took into action consisted of two brigades, nearly all colored troops. The rest of his troops remained to hold the works. One of these brigades, consisting of three regiments, about 2000 men, was under command of Colonel Charles R. Thompson of the 12th U. S. Colored Troops, a young officer of great energy and gallantry, who had distinguished himself at Stone's River and other battles while serving on the staff of General Rosecrans; the other, of five regiments and a detachment of white troops, numbering about 3200, was under command of Colonel T. J. Morgan of the 14th U. S. Colored Troops, who had made a gallant sortie at Decatur when Hood threatened the town on the 26th of October. This force soon met the enemy's skirmishers and drove them back upon the main line. Morgan's brigade advanced to the north front of the enemy's detached work, at the extreme right, between the Nashville and Chat-

tanooga Railroad and the Murfreesboro Pike, and pressed against it with such vigor that the rebel line there was strengthened. A movement simulating an assault was also undertaken by Morgan; but the fire to which it exposed him was so severe that he fell back under orders and withdrew from close range, though holding a threatening attitude and maintaining a steady and effective fire of artillery and musketry throughout the rest of the day.

Thompson's brigade crossed Brown's Creek between the Nolensville and Murfreesboro Pikes and moved against the western flank of the enemy's works. By means of good ground in his front, he succeeded in gaining and maintaining a position very near the lines, fortifying, and constantly threatening an assault. Two divisions of Cheatham's corps — Smith's, formerly Cleburne's, and Bate's — occupied the works against which Steedman demonstrated with these two brigades. Cheatham's other division — Lowry's, formerly Brown's — was in line to the left of Bate and Smith, somewhat retired, but in support. It was eight o'clock in the morning when Steedman's first attack on the works was made. Afterward, about eleven o'clock, when Morgan had withdrawn his brigade, as mentioned, another movement by the same troops was made, which resulted in their getting possession of a group of brick buildings near the enemy's lines. These were loopholed and held throughout the day. At the same time Thompson's brigade carried and held the left of the front line of the enemy's works near the Nolensville Pike. These troops remained in the positions which they had finally gained until the next morning. Their losses for the day are not reported, but they were not very heavy, as no formidable assault was made. It was the first time that most of the colored troops had been under fire, and they behaved with great steadiness and courage.

While this was going on on the extreme National left, the main business of the day was transacted at or near the extreme right. General Wilson's cavalry had been brought

from the north side of the river on the 12th, and placed in rear of A. J. Smith's right, between the river and the Charlotte Pike. It had been arranged that the cavalry was to move early in the morning to Smith's right and front, by the Charlotte Pike and some cross-roads, before the infantry began its movement; but when at the appointed hour Wilson brought forward his cavalry, he found all the roads occupied by the infantry. This caused some delay and confusion, but fortunately the fog hid all movements, and before it lifted Wilson had succeeded in getting his troopers into their desired position. Hatch's division was selected to do the principal work and joined Smith's right. Johnson's division was sent to Bell's Landing on the river, eight miles below the town, where Chalmers' rebel cavalry had built some works and had planted a battery which commanded the bend of the river in each direction. Croxton's brigade was to occupy the ground between Johnson and Hatch, keeping up communication between the two. The other two brigades of McCook's division, to which Croxton belonged, had been sent several days before into Kentucky to dispose of a cavalry force under the rebel General Lyon, which had crossed the rivers near the Kentucky line and was threatening to tear up the railroad. Knipe's division was held as a reserve, and, moving out over the Hardin Pike, was held in readiness for service wherever required. Thus, instead of four cavalry divisions, as the plan of battle proposed, there were only three divisions and a brigade available when the day came, and of these two brigades were unmounted.

Smith's three divisions of infantry moved promptly at six o'clock and were soon advancing steadily and briskly over the open space between the Charlotte and Hardin Pikes, swinging the right forward as they moved. A regiment from each brigade was left behind to hold the works. McArthur's division formed Smith's right. Its advance began by brigades, moving mostly by the flank, until they had crossed to the east

side of the Hardin Pike, when they came into line of battle west of, and almost parallel to, the Hillsboro Pike. Its left connected with the right of Garrard's division, which, having a much shorter distance to move, had swung forward by a left half-wheel, until it too was parallel to the Hillsboro Pike, and its left connected with Elliott's division of the 4th Corps. A small division under command of Colonel J. B. Moore was held in reserve, moving forward in rear of McArthur's left, and ready to reënforce any part of the line where needed. Soon after Smith began to advance east of the Hardin Pike, he met the enemy's skirmishers, steadily pressing them back. It was after ten o'clock when all the brigades had reached the position where a continuous line of battle was formed.

The 4th Corps, ready as soon as the rest, moved out of the works at six o'clock — Elliott's division on the right, Kimball's in the centre, and Beatty's (formerly Wood's) on the left. Beatty's division had occupied the salient in the 4th Corps line, in front of Montgomery Hill, Hood's advanced position, held by a portion of Stewart's corps. The hills are of nearly equal height with a considerable valley between. Beatty's division moved down into the valley, its right reaching somewhat beyond the western slope of Montgomery Hill. Kimball connected with Beatty's right, and swung forward by a left wheel, forming an angle with Beatty's line. Elliott moved out to Kimball's right, filling the space between Kimball and Garrard. Each of these two divisions had two brigades in their front lines, the third in reserve.

Schofield's 23d Corps was also early withdrawn from the works, and its place was filled with that part of Steedman's command which was not taken into action. The movements of the enemy consequent on Steedman's demonstration against their right made it possible to modify the original order of battle to this extent. Couch's division was moved to the right and held as a general reserve to the whole of the force advancing against the Hillsboro Pike. It occupied the slope of a hill east

of the Hardin Pike, in the rear of the junction of Smith's and the 4th Corps. Cox's division was massed near the Hillsboro Pike in the rear of Wood's left, ready to move to that flank in case of an assault by the enemy.

By the time these dispositions were completed the fog had burned away and the day had become a warm and sunny mid-winter one, such as is never known in this climate. The whole array of troops could be seen from the hilltops by both armies. It was the first open battle-field of the war which most of them had ever seen. General Thomas had established his head-quarters on a round-topped hill midway between the Hardin and Hillsboro Pikes. It was 290 feet above the level of the river, and, looking across the valley in front, the lines of rebel works and the detached forts could be plainly seen stretching along the Hillsboro Pike toward the right, and near at hand on the very next eminence the advance works on Montgomery Hill. The fields on the hillsides and in the valleys were many of them covered with stacks of dried corn-stalks, others had just been ploughed and were black with mud. The sun shone bright and warm as soon as the fog lifted. Groups of cattle were seen here and there in the fields; the long blue line of slowly advancing troops, their gun-barrels glistening in the morning light, gave new life to the scene. Away to the left the sounds of Steedman's advance and the guns from Fort Negley could be plainly heard. To the right and front the pattering skirmish fire told of the beginning of resistance to the movements of Smith and Wilson. The artillery firing on both sides also grew brisker and more effective.

The cavalry, in order to reach its intended point of attack on the enemy's extreme left, had to move about six miles over a country filled with hills and valleys, streams and ravines, stone walls, and an occasional wooden fence, with here and there clumps of trees. Smith's right had also to move nearly the same distance, so that, by the time their movements were completed, the enemy's skirmishers driven in, and the

line of battle fully established within easy musket range of the enemy's works, it was almost noon. For about two hours there had been a series of affairs between skirmishers, in some cases amounting almost, at least in sound, to an engagement, as the pressure from our troops or the resistance of the enemy grew more pronounced.

Johnson's cavalry division of two brigades, only one mounted, had been sent out to the Charlotte Pike. About eight miles below the city it came upon Chalmers' rebel cavalry behind some works on the farther side of a steep-banked creek. These works commanded the crossings and were quite formidable. A hasty charge was made by Harrison's brigade as it came up, but it was easily repulsed, and it withdrew to wait for the unmounted brigade and the artillery to come up. A series of movements was then made, lasting through the day, which resulted in Chalmers' retreat to the Granny White Pike with the loss of his headquarters train. His books and papers were brought to General Thomas early in the afternoon.

As the right of Beatty's division of the 4th Corps came into position a little to the west of the crest of Montgomery Hill, Colonel Sidney Post, commanding first brigade, made a personal reconnoissance of that slope of the hill, and, as the result of his observations, reported to General Wood that he thought he could carry the works by assault from that side. It looked desperate, but the very audacity of such a movement might, as indeed it did, prove an element of success. General Wood immediately gave his consent, and in a few minutes, as soon as the line was made ready, the charge was sounded. The whole brigade sprang forward at once, swarming up the steep hillside, Post on horseback in advance. The colors of the several regiments made an almost even line as the men charged up the hill, but at the crest, where the works were, only the strongest had kept pace with the colors. But there was not a moment's wavering. Most of the enemy's bullets had passed over the heads of the charging column, and as the men in

advance, who had not stopped for anything, reached the works, they leaped upon the parapet and opened fire. Post himself was first inside the enemy's lines. The color-bearers from the top of the works waved their colors to encourage those behind, and in a twinkling the line was swept clear of rebel troops. Such of them as were not captured made the best of their way to a stone wall four hundred yards at their rear, followed by squads and companies from Post's brigade. For a moment, as the hilltop was gained, it looked from General Thomas' position as though the enterprise had failed. The situation was so critical that success appeared impossible, and, to add to the anxiety, a long line of men in gray was seen coming toward our lines. But in another instant a wild outburst of cheers told the whole story. "That is the voice of the American people," said General Thomas, as renewed cheers, three times three, sounded through the clear winter air. Then it was seen that the men in gray were prisoners under guard marching to the nearest Provost Marshal. It was indeed an inspiring beginning of the good day's work, and immediately after the redoubled musketry to the right, along Smith's and Wilson's fronts, told that they were stimulated to renewed effort by this first great success. Meantime, Opdycke's brigade, a considerable distance beyond Post's, had crept forward halfway up a hill on its front, which commanded the rear of the enemy's advanced position, and occupied a stone wall there so as to threaten them from that direction. The other brigades of Beatty's division, as soon as Post had gained the works, came upon his left and cleared the whole of the enemy's advance line. They then moved forward toward Hood's main works and so threatened his centre that it was impossible for him to detach any of the force there to aid operations elsewhere.

It was now about 1.30 o'clock in the afternoon. The whole of General Thomas' line was in such position that any forward movement meant immediate fight. McArthur's division on

Smith's right and Hatch's cavalry division were at the foot of the entrenched hills along the Hillsboro Pike, and were exposed to artillery fire from the detached works. They could not wait where they were without suffering almost as great losses as a successful assault would cost. The news of Post's triumph and the inspiring cheers which came from Montgomery Hill were just the stimulus needed. The two divisions, Hatch's dismounted and fighting as infantry, started together as the charge was sounded. The hills were steep and rocky, and considerable growths of underbrush made the way difficult. The rebel infantry from behind the stone walls along the Hillsboro Pike, as well as the artillery in the detached works, opened a hellish fire as soon as the advance began. Horses and men fell at every step, but without a halt or a break the whole line swept forward. In a moment skirmishers, main line, and reserves were dashing ahead as fast as possible, while the enemy's fire seemed to be redoubled as they approached the hilltops. But never was resistance more useless. Simultaneously Hatch's cavalry and McArthur's infantry dashed into the works which had been intended to be self-supporting and impregnable, capturing guns, prisoners, colors, and small arms, and scattering in thorough confusion the routed brigades which had attempted to hold them. The gallant Colonel Hill, commanding the advance brigade of McArthur's division, fell dead with a bullet in his forehead at the very instant of entering the fort at the head of his men. But another range of hills strongly entrenched, to the rear of those just carried, was occupied by the enemy. This was also speedily carried, and all the guns, with numerous prisoners, fell into our hands. Of the hill carried by Hatch's division Wilson says in his report it had very steep sides and on the top an irregular enclosed work in which a four-gun battery was placed. "To men less brave and determined than the dismounted horsemen of Hatch's division it would have seemed like madness to attack such a position. I have seen columns

of infantry hesitate to attack positions not half as strong." [1] But the redoubt was carried; indeed, the whole line everywhere in front of Wilson and Smith was carried, and our troops advanced to the Hillsboro Pike. Those of the enemy who had fled from the redoubts did not stop at the works along the Hillsboro Pike, but ran in panic away toward the Granny White Pike and the wooded hills there.

McArthur and Hatch did not wait a moment in the captured entrenchments. As soon as the men could be re-formed under their colors, regiment by regiment they took up the pursuit, giving the enemy no rest, until Hatch was recalled for other work.

When the first of the positions held by the enemy on the west of the Hillsboro Pike had been carried by McArthur and Hatch, General Thomas, who had thus far held the 23d Corps, General Schofield's, in reserve, finding that Smith's right did not, as he had hoped, reach the enemy's left, and that the cavalry was therefore unable to turn Hood's flank if it kept up its connection with the infantry, ordered Schofield to move his two divisions to Smith's right so as to relieve the cavalry for an independent movement. Couch's division was accordingly moved at once to the new position, and Cox was ordered from near Wood's centre to join Couch. It was about four o'clock when they got into position, just in time to take part in the final work of the day.

At two o'clock, after the charge of Smith and Wilson already described had been made, General Thomas ordered General Wilson to assemble his cavalry and strike the Hillsboro Pike some six or seven miles from the city, which would enable him to turn the enemy's left completely, and then to push as far as he could. At that time every position of the enemy, against which any determined movement had been made, was in our possession — Montgomery Hill, the detached forts, the stone wall along part of the Hillsboro Pike,

[1] 93 W. R. 563.

— with numerous prisoners and all the guns which had been in the works.

When the forts on the west of the Hillsboro Pike had been carried, Hood for the first time seemed to realise his real peril. Indeed, up to the moment of their capture, he had considered it impossible that these works could be taken. He looked upon Steedman's movement against his right as the main attack, and so had held firmly to that position. Now, however, when he discovered that his left was the place of danger, he sent orders to Cheatham to push a division at once to the left of his line to aid Stewart in his extremity. Lee, in the centre, had at about noon, just before Post's assault on Montgomery Hill, sent two brigades — Manigault's and Deas' — to prolong Stewart's left, but these had already been swept away by the resistless charges of Hatch and McArthur. Indeed, they were with difficulty rallied even in the hills where they found refuge. Cheatham, accordingly, started Bate's division, which had only recently returned from its unlucky experience near Murfreesboro, over to the rebel left at the Hillsboro Pike.

Meantime the two divisions of the 23d Corps had come up on Smith's right, and the cavalry at once began to feel its way to Hood's flank. At the same time Elliott's and Kimball's divisions of the 4th Corps, which were within charging distance of the enemy's lines on the hills near the Hillsboro Pike, where the works form an angle, were made ready to assault. The right of Elliott's division had in its movements come into line in front of Garrard's left. There was no time to spend in a readjustment of the lines. Accordingly Garrard withdrew the brigade, which was in rear of Elliott, by its right flank and placed it in reserve, while the other two brigades of his division were also made ready for the assault, which was to include the whole army.

It was about four o'clock when these final dispositions were completed. As soon as he found that the lines were in position, General Thomas ordered a simultaneous assault along

the entire front. The works in front of the 4th Corps, near the Hillsboro Pike, were the strongest now held by the enemy and were the key to the rebel position. To reach them it was necessary that Grose's brigade, on the right of Kimball's division, should move down the slope on which he had taken position, across a ravine, over stone walls which bordered the pike, and cross the pike itself; while Kirby's brigade, at the left of the angle, had to march over muddy corn-fields, brush, and fallen timber, and gain the works from the north. Indeed, so formidable did the place of intended assault appear, that, when one of General Thomas' staff officers who carried the order for the assault to General Wood, told one of his brigade commanders what was intended, the latter — though an officer of exceptional reputation for personal gallantry — expressed himself very decidedly against it, and declared it would be suicide to make the attempt.

All the while that the lines were being adjusted for the assault the skirmishers had been creeping forward at every possible point, until by the time the word was given they were within two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's main line. The moment the charge sounded, the whole line, as far as the eye could see, moved forward with one impulse. The enemy opened a terrific fire, especially at the angle on the Hillsboro Pike. But without a break or a halt, the troops everywhere ran over the works in their front. It seemed hardly a moment from the time when the charge was ordered before the colors of a dozen regiments, at various points of the line, were waving from the captured works, and the wildest cheers from 20,000 throats resounded above all the noise of musketry and artillery. Everywhere the rout was complete. Guns, colors, prisoners — everything that was in the works — were taken possession of. Half the regiments, without stopping to gather in the spoils or to re-form, flushed with excitement and eager for the chase, pushed on in pursuit. Night alone, which came too soon, put an end to the wild

tumult and saved the rebel army from utter overthrow in this first day's fight.

In this final charge everybody participated. The cavalry on our extreme right reached beyond the enemy's left, and came across the Hillsboro Pike near the six-mile post, about which they bivouacked for the night. Schofield's two divisions had come up just in time to join Smith's triumphant movement, and, Cooper's brigade having gallantly carried the works in his front, pushed across the Hillsboro Pike and took possession of a series of high hills just to the east of it, where they fortified and spent the night. Schofield's right was protected by the cavalry. Smith was everywhere victorious, and his brigades went into bivouac east of the Hillsboro Pike beyond Schofield's left, just where night happened to find them, without much order or regularity. The 4th Corps, swinging to the right after its successful assault, moved to the east of the Granny White Pike, and there went into bivouac in line nearly parallel to the pike, and without any immediate connection with any other troops. General Wood had hoped to reach the Franklin Pike before dark, but the day was too short.

At dark Hood's army, which at twelve o'clock held an unbroken line from the Murfreesboro to the Hillsboro Pike, with a strongly fortified advance position on Montgomery Hill and five strong forts along the Hillsboro Pike, barely maintained its hold from the Murfreesboro to the Granny White Pike. His entire left had been driven to take refuge on two formidable hills just west of the Granny White Pike, two miles and a half in rear of the advance works on Montgomery Hill, and along a line running eastwardly from the base of those hills. Hither Bate's division, from Hood's extreme right, which had started before the final assault, now hastily made its way. "When I passed the Franklin Pike," says Bate in his report, "streams of stragglers and artillerists, and horses without guns and caissons — the sure indications of

defeat — came hurriedly from the left."[1] Hood at once set himself at work to prepare new lines of defence against the next day's assault, which he felt was sure to come. It was an unprecedented thing for him, who before had always been so ready to take the initiative and to assault without much regard to chances, to find himself outdone at his favorite game, — to find that his men gave way before a determined assault sooner than he had ever succeeded in making his enemy do. Cheatham's entire corps was started as soon as it was dark from the right to the extreme left, Stewart's was placed in the centre, and Lee's on the right. The new line extended from the hills near the Granny White Pike, along the base of a range of high hills, which in some of our reports are spoken of as mountains, to a series of considerable hills just east of the Franklin Pike, known as the Overton Hills. It was about two miles to the rear of the main line occupied during the day, and was about three and a quarter miles long — a little more than half as long as that out of which they had just been driven. The night was spent in fortifying and strengthening the new position, already strong by nature.

It will be seen that during this day's operations General Thomas made no attempt to attack Hood's lines, except by moving with great strength and concentration against his left. From Steedman, on Thomas' extreme left, to the right of Wilson, the distance was at least six miles. Yet from Steedman's position to the left of the 4th Corps, nearly three miles, General Thomas brought no troops at all into action. Everything, except Steedman's 5000, was in front of the line from Montgomery Hill to Hood's extreme left along the Hillsboro Pike. By this means, though operating on exterior lines, he had by eleven o'clock in the morning put his troops in such position that they had every advantage which operating on interior lines could give. As he afterwards proved, he could send reënforcements to any part of his line as soon as, or

[1] 93 W. R. 747.

sooner than, Hood could to his. At the same time, so long as Steedman threatened his right, it was impossible for Hood to make any considerable detachment from that quarter to aid his imperilled left. The garrison troops rendered the lines about the city from the river to the Granny White Pike secure against assault from that direction. Cox's division of the 23d Corps was so massed that it could be thrown against Lee's lines, if any considerable detachment was made there. All the rest of Thomas' forces — cavalry, infantry, and artillery — were hurled with resistless momentum against Stewart's corps, aided only by the two brigades sent early in the morning to its left. Except by the two divisions of Cheatham's corps on the right where Steedman attacked, and the three divisions of Stewart's corps aided by the two brigades on the left, and Chalmers' cavalry down by the riverbank, not a shot was fired by the rebel army that day. One division of Cheatham's and almost the whole of Lee's corps were rendered by Thomas' tactics as useless in the fight as though they had been at Franklin or Murfreesboro. The distribution of the National troops held them as in a vise, unable to move or to fight. No wonder that with so simple and masterly a plan of battle, executed with such precision and energy, and with the hearty coöperation of his commanders and the unbounded confidence and enthusiasm of the men, the enemy were driven from position after position by the superior numbers which General Thomas' skill had enabled him to bring to bear at any given point. So delighted was General Steedman with the success that he afterward declared that the best report which could be made of the battle would be to change the future into the past tense in the Special Field Order for the day, which I have read.

As soon as General Thomas returned to his headquarters, he issued orders to his corps commanders to continue in the morning the movements against the enemy in the same order as before — *i. e.* by attacking and if possible turning his left,

if he awaited attack; if not, to pursue as rapidly as possible by the Franklin and Granny White Pikes. During the night General Schofield became alarmed for the safety of his line, and a small division from A. J. Smith's corps was sent to strengthen him. With this exception there were no changes in our lines till morning.

With the earliest dawn of the 16th General Wood moved the divisions of the 4th Corps to the Franklin Pike, and then, by a right wheel, southerly along the pike. Beatty's division was east of the pike, Elliott's across it, Kimball's on Elliott's right. In a short time after the southerly movement began, the troops came upon an advance work held by a strong skirmish line. This was carried without much difficulty, and the rebel skirmishers fell back to the main line, rapidly followed by the 4th Corps in line of battle. Meantime, Smith had placed Garrard's division in junction with Kimball's right, and McArthur, by a left wheel, swung his left forward to connect with Garrard's right. Schofield joined Smith's right, Couch's division on his left being at right angles with Cox, whose right connected with the cavalry. As the 4th Corps advanced, the men entered upon the work so eagerly that the movement soon quickened into a run and almost into a charge, which was only checked by positive orders. With loud cheers they took up and held a position at one point within two hundred and fifty yards of the enemy's fortified line near the Franklin Pike. Steedman, also, after taking a brigade from the interior line and placing it on the Nolensville Pike to guard against a flank movement from that direction, moved his division forward east of the Franklin Pike, and, about noon, joined his right to the left of the 4th Corps, thus completing the alignment.

General Thomas left his headquarters in the town just after daylight. As he heard the cannonading and musketry caused by the advance of the 4th Corps, he started his horse into a brisk trot, an almost unprecedented thing for him who

always walked his horse, direct toward the sound of conflict. He reached the lines at the Franklin Pike just as Wood had established himself there and had begun to fortify. It was a cloudy but not cold morning, with occasional gleams of sunlight, followed later in the day by intermittent showers. The troops were in great spirits, cheering as the General came up. The enemy also appeared to have recovered their spirits, for their yells could be plainly heard in reply to the cheers of our men. Their position at Overton Hill was very strong, and well manned with infantry and artillery, the latter of which kept up a steady and accurate fire at our lines.

The ground between the two armies, for the greater part of the way between the Franklin and Granny White Pikes, was low, open, crossed by frequent little streams running in every direction, and in many places muddy — either newly ploughed or old corn-fields. Overton Hill, Hood's right, is a well-rounded slope, the top of which was fully fortified. The hills near Granny White Pike, on his left, are so steep that it is difficult to climb them at any time, and now the summits were crowned with formidable earthworks, while fallen trees and branches made a further obstacle. Between these two extremities the rebel line was well chosen and fortified. In many cases strong stone walls were covered with earth and had logs on the top. The woods behind also protected any movement. Artillery was posted at the most available points.

The morning was mostly consumed in the movements described, which were also somewhat delayed by the rains which frequently fell during the day. The cavalry, by a considerable detour, had passed beyond the extreme rebel left, and secured a lodgment on the Granny White Pike, but for some time, owing to the difficult nature of the country, could make no head against the enemy. General Wilson at one time became almost discouraged at his slow progress and advised General Thomas to move the cavalry over to the other flank, as that seemed to promise a better opportunity. But General Thomas

preferred to adhere to his original plan which had thus far worked so well, especially as much time would be consumed in making the change. With the Granny White Pike under Wilson's control, but one avenue of escape — the Franklin — now remained open for Hood, and a vigorous assault by Schofield on the extreme rebel left would roll up the line and so relieve the cavalry, which would then be free to gallop down the Granny White Pike to its junction with the Franklin, six or eight miles below, and to plant itself squarely across Hood's only line of retreat. If this plan were promptly executed, nothing but capture or surrender awaited the entire rebel army.

Soon after noon General Thomas, who had been along the entire line, who had seen how full everybody was of ardor and spirit, how admirably the artillery was being served, and who had frequent reports from Wilson showing what steps he was taking and how energetically Hatch was at work, came to General Schofield's position. He found here a surprising degree of apathy, and of concern lest the enemy should make an assault on him, instead of the ready eagerness for offensive action which animated all the rest. General Schofield's first words were a request for additional aid to enable him to hold his ground. Anxious that there should be no further excuse for delay, as the afternoon was short, and believing that General Schofield would not needlessly call for assistance at such a time, without stopping to inquire into his reasons, General Thomas at once ordered General Smith to send him a division in addition to that which had been furnished him during the night. When General Smith received this order, he was preparing his own troops to take part in the expected assault from the troops on his right; and, as General Schofield was not already engaged and no movement of the enemy was apparent, he so represented to General Thomas, and the order was withdrawn. General Schofield, however, remained motionless, although the enemy's force in his immediate front had

been weakened by sending Smith's, formerly Cleburne's, division over to Hood's right at Overton Hill. General Couch, one of his division commanders, had a short time before told General Schofield that he thought he could carry the hill on his front, but doubted if he could hold it without assistance; but even then General Schofield made no sign. The ground in front of General Cox, his other division commander, was as inviting for assault as any along the entire line and was not very strongly manned. The cavalry on his immediate right had already made its way over some wooded hills directly in Bate's rear and within cannon-shot range. But none of these things spurred Schofield to action.

Meantime, while there was such apathy where action had been expected,[1] important movements were making in Wood's front, at our left. Colonel Post, who had so gallantly carried Montgomery Hill the day before, had made a careful reconnoissance of Overton Hill and had reported to General Wood that an assault there would cost dear, but he thought would succeed. At any rate he was ready to try. "Well, Post, we'll try it," was Wood's answer. The brigade was immediately made ready. It was to be supported by the brigades on either side, which were held so as to rush for the works the moment Post should gain them. Steedman, too, promised his coöperation by a demonstration further to the left. Post's brigade was formed in perfect silence, with orders to halt for nothing, but to carry the works at a run. The moment the bugle sounded the rush began. It was a race for life. A few of the skirmishers gained the ditch, one or two the parapet, the main brigade line was within twenty steps of the works, when, by a concentrating fire of musketry and artillery from a front of two divisions, the advance was checked. Post himself was brought down by a grape-shot with a wound, at first supposed to be mortal, and then, its leader and animating spirit gone,

[1] For another view of General Schofield's conduct in this battle see his Memoirs and Cox's The March to the Sea. — Ed.

the line slowly drifted back to the works it had left, having lost in the few minutes some 300 men. Streight's brigade, which was to support Post's left, lost 250. Thompson's brigade of colored troops, with which Steedman was to coöperate, advanced at the same time with Post. There had been no reconnoissance in front of Steedman's position, or it is probable the way might have been found to reach and turn the enemy's right flank. As the brigade advanced, the men became excited, and what had been intended as merely a demonstration was without premeditation turned into an actual charge. Colonel Thompson, seeing the men breaking into a run, led them gallantly to the very slope of the entrenchments. But, in rushing across the open field up the hillside, a huge fallen tree broke the continuity of the line, and, as the men separated to pass it, the enemy opened on the flanks thus created with terrible effect. Thus at the very moment when a compact order was most required they came up ragged and broken. Meantime Post had been repulsed, and a part of the fire which had been expended on him was turned upon the colored troops. Nothing remained, therefore, but that they should get back to their original line as soon as possible. This was done without panic or confusion. The three regiments of the brigade lost 467 men killed and wounded. These were the only instances of repulse to any portion of General Thomas' forces during the whole of the two days' fighting.

Finding that General Schofield delayed to make any movement against the enemy, General Smith on his immediate left suggested to General Thomas, who had started toward the left at the sound of Post's assault and was now returning, that he would charge the hill in his front. General Thomas, however, was so anxious that the rebel line should be broken nearer its left flank so as to increase the chance of entirely cutting off Hood's retreat, that he told General Smith that he preferred adhering to his original plan, and having General Schofield take the initiative. He did not, however, prohibit

Smith from making the attempt, and, with the view of bringing about an immediate assault, rode on to General Schofield's line. Here he met General Wilson who had just come up and who told him, in Schofield's presence, of the progress he had been making during the last hour. But General McArthur of Smith's corps, whose division joined Schofield's left, grew so impatient and was so averse to spending the night on the rocky hill which he occupied, that he told General Smith that he believed he could carry the high hill in front of Schofield's left division and would undertake it unless forbidden. General Smith did not forbid, and accordingly McArthur withdrew McMillen's brigade from the trenches and marched it by the flank to a position directly in front of Couch's line. McMillen was ordered to fix bayonets and to charge up the hill without a halt or a cheer until the works were gained. At the signal the gallant brigade moved swiftly down the slope, across the narrow valley, and began scrambling up the side of a hill so steep that one had almost to creep to gain any headway. The bravest of the lookers-on held his breath as the men steadily mounted the hillside. But in almost the time it takes to tell the story the enemy's works were gained, the flags waved from the parapets, and the wild cheer told the exultant story. Among the fruits of this wonderful charge was the capture of one general officer, 84 field, staff, and line officers, and 1533 enlisted men, with 4 flags, 8 guns, 8 caissons, and numerous small arms.

While McMillen's brigade was preparing for this charge, Hatch's cavalry was doing equally effective work. It had pushed its way through the woods and gained the tops of two hills which commanded the enemy's rear. Here with incredible labor some of the battery-men had dragged up two pieces of artillery, and, just as McMillen's charge began, opened on the hill up the opposite side of which the infantry were struggling. At the same moment Coon's brigade of dismounted cavalry charged with loud cheers down the hill from the top

of which the two cannon were playing, and blazed upon the enemy in such volleys of musketry from their repeating rifles as were never before heard in any battle at which I was present. Thus beset in front and rear, the rebels broke out of the works at a bound and ran down the steep hill toward their right and rear as fast as their legs could carry them. It was more like a scene in a spectacular drama than anything in real life. The steep hill, its top crowned with trees through which the enemy's works and movements could be dimly seen, and its sides still green with patches of moist grass;—the waving flags;—the smoke slowly rising through the leafless branches;—the wonderful outburst of musketry;—the still more wonderful ecstatic cheers;—the multitude racing for life;—the eager and rapid pursuit;—so exciting was it all that the lookers-on involuntarily clapped their hands as at a splendid and successful transformation scene; as indeed it was, for in those few minutes the whole elaborate structure of the rebellion in the Southwest was utterly overthrown by one crash, and even its very foundations destroyed.

As soon as Garrard's division of Smith's corps, and the troops of the 4th Corps, still further to the left, saw and heard the doings on their right, they did not wait for orders. Everywhere by a common impulse they charged the enemy in their front. Garrard captured General Ed. Johnson, with the greater part of his division and all his guns — 20 in number — and colors. Johnson, strongly entrenched behind a stone wall, seeing Garrard's advance, ordered his men to hold their fire until he had come within ten paces of their position. As the smoke rose after delivering the volley, Johnson looked to see his enemy getting back to the rear as fast as possible; instead of that he found himself and most of his men prisoners.

The 4th Corps men were not behind Smith's in their ardor. Over the very ground from which Post's assault had been repulsed with such heavy loss two hours before, the same troops now charged with such vigor that nothing could withstand

them. Fourteen pieces of artillery and 980 prisoners were brought in by Wood's divisions. Steedman's colored brigades also rallied to the charge and brought in their share of prisoners.

In this glorious work the 23d Corps alone took no conspicuous part. After the hill in its front was carried by McMillen's brigade from a neighboring corps, and the extreme rebel left was broken and scattered by Hatch's cavalry, it slowly advanced from its works, and, on reaching the Granny White Pike, halted and went into bivouac for the night. The afternoon before a single brigade of Couch's division under the command of General Cooper took an active and gallant part in the assault on the rebel works near the Hillsboro Pike, losing 89 in killed and wounded. The losses in the other five brigades amounted to 4 killed and 71 wounded in the whole of the two days' engagements, of whom 17 wounded belonged to Cox's division; and this, when on the second day the corps, and Cox's division of the corps, were expected to take the initiative, and by an early and successful assault on the enemy's left flank leave the cavalry free to cut off the inevitable retreat. Of course the fault was not in the men, — they were of the same stuff as the rest of the army.

The losses in the 4th Corps were 969, of whom 135 were killed; in A. J. Smith's corps 857, of whom 79 were killed; Steedman lost 606, of whom 98 were killed; Schofield, 164, of whom 9 were killed; and the cavalry corps, 306, of whom 36 were killed; 234 out of the 306 casualties in the cavalry were in the two brigades of Hatch's division. The total National loss in the two days was 2902, of whom 357 were killed and 2545 wounded. The number missing is not reported, but it was surprisingly small, not exceeding 100 in all. The comparatively slight loss on General Thomas' part, considering the magnitude of the results, was due — aside from the skilful plan of battle — to the energy with which every assault was made, and the fact that in the charges up the hills a very

large part of the enemy's bullets went over the heads of our men.

Hood's losses were never reported. Fifty-three pieces of artillery, 4462 prisoners, 3079 muskets, at least 28 colors, and innumerable other pieces of property were captured, in addition to the losses by death and desertion. A single brigade of Smith's corps, numbering 1421 muskets, captured 2000 prisoners, 9 guns, and 7 colors, and lost but 315 men all told.

The story of misfortune told by the enemy is sorry enough. Bate, whose division was the first to break, declares that our batteries were so placed as to throw shells directly across the lines composing the angle on the hill held by him, so as to take both his right and left brigades in the rear. The lines on his left, he says, were formed on three sides of a square, our troops shooting across the two parallel lines. The men on his left gave way, while his division "stood firm and received fire from three directions with coolness and courage." When McMillen's assault was made "the gallant and obstinate Colonel Shy" — for whom the hill is now named — "and nearly half his brave men had fallen. Only sixty-five of the command escaped, not as a command but as individuals. The command was nearly annihilated. . . . The breach once made, the lines lifted from either side almost instantly and fled in confusion. . . . The men, then, one by one, climbed over the rugged hills in their rear and passed down a short valley which debouched into the Franklin Pike. The whole army on this thoroughfare seemed to be one heterogeneous mass, moving back without organization or government. . . . The disorganized mass swept in confusion down the pike amidst the approaching darkness and drenching rain until beyond Brentwood, where the fragments were in some measure united and bivouacked in groups for the night."[1]

Such was the condition on Hood's extreme left, as told in the words of the commander of his left division. Everywhere

[1] 93 W. R. 749–50.

else a similar story is told. Clayton, who was on the extreme right where Post's and Thompson's assaults were repulsed, says that Thompson's charge was driven back with great slaughter, and it was with difficulty that his troops were restrained from following them as they fell back. At four o'clock, while all were in the highest state of enthusiasm, he received a message from his corps commander, General Lee, that he was expected to bring off his division in good order. To his inquiries — when? and what was going on? — he received no answer. Turning to give the command, he saw the troops on his left flying in disorder, the whole army in complete rout, except his own and Stevenson's divisions, which, he says, halted and checked the advance of the enemy's skirmishers. They soon retreated also, and spent the night at Hollow Tree Gap, seven miles from Franklin. Holtzclaw, who commanded one of Clayton's brigades, says that he has seen most battle-fields of the West, but never saw dead men thicker than in front of his brigade where Thompson's charge was repulsed. But about four o'clock he saw the line to his left, three or four brigades off, suddenly give way. "The line crumbled away till it reached me," he *naïvely* adds, "and my command showed symptoms of taking care of itself;"[1] which it did with such effect that it was not until eleven o'clock at night that it halted within four miles of Hollow Tree Gap. Stevenson, also of Lee's corps, tells a similar story. General Stewart was in conversation with Hood, who was sitting in a chair on the hillside in rear of his centre, when a staff officer rode up and announced that the line had given way. Hood at once mounted his horse and vainly strove to stay the tide of disaster. It was too late. "Once broken," says Stewart, "the line gave way everywhere, and the whole army made for the Franklin Pike."[2]

The service of the artillery in General Thomas' army throughout these two days was as effective as that of the

[1] 93 W. R. 711. [2] 31 W. R. 706.

infantry or cavalry. The rebel reports all speak of the accuracy and continuousness of its fire. There were eleven field batteries in action, and altogether they expended over one thousand rounds each. At several points during the progress of the fight they were most efficient in their work, as on the first day at Montgomery Hill and near the angle at the Hillsboro Pike, and on the second day on Shy's Hill. It was a common sight to see our shells burst directly in the rebel lines, scattering things in all directions, and frequently a caisson was exploded or a gun knocked over. At such times the enemy would take to their heels with astonishing quickness. One of our batteries had a way of firing five shots one after the other as quickly as possible, reserving the sixth for a little while, until it was thought the enemy did not expect any more, and then giving it to them. Several times batteries ventured out to the skirmish-line, and then opened rapid and accurate fire at short range.

When it was found that Hood was approaching Nashville, a division of the naval force under command of Admiral S. P. Lee was sent to the Cumberland River, and coöperated most usefully with the army. Indeed, if the Admiral had been under General Thomas' orders he could not have been more zealous in carrying out every wish expressed to him. For a hundred miles above and below Nashville the river was patrolled so as to render the crossing of any body of rebel troops impossible. And in the first day's fight the gunboats aided Johnson's division in driving out Chalmers from his works on the riverbank.

Pursuit was taken up at daylight the next morning, and the enemy driven beyond the Harpeth, as far as Spring Hill, by night. The cavalry were moved to the Franklin Pike, and had repeated brushes with the rear guard, consisting of part of Chalmers' cavalry and Walthall's infantry divisions. The 4th Corps followed close at the heels of the cavalry, Steedman after the 4th Corps. Smith and Schofield moved down the Granny

White Pike. The pontoon train was not up when the advance reached Harpeth River, and a bridge of floating timber and driftwood was improvised, and the cavalry and 4th Corps crossed before night, the cavalry pursuing almost to Spring Hill and having a sharp skirmish just before dark. The next morning, the 18th, the pursuit was continued, but the enemy could not be brought to a stand. Steedman now received orders to march with his division across country to Murfreesboro, where he would be joined by the rest of his troops who were guarding Nashville, and together they were to be sent by rail to Decatur, there crossing the river and marching to Tuscumbia, or wherever Hood might attempt to cross, destroy his bridge, and hold him until the pursuing troops could come up. Steedman moved at once, but through the negligence and inefficiency of the railroad people he was detained at Murfreesboro forty-two hours, and only got to the south side of the river at Decatur at the same time that Hood's last division had crossed at Bainbridge. But for this inexcusable, if not criminal, detention he would have succeeded in placing himself across Hood's line of retreat.

The cavalry and the 4th Corps kept up their pursuit with unabated vigor. Forrest's command, from Murfreesboro, came up on the 19th, and the rear guard was put under his command. The weather had now become icy cold, and Rutherford Creek could not be crossed without pontoons. The colored regiment, which had been detailed and trained as pontoniers, became demoralized by the cold, and it was almost impossible to make any headway. The ropes froze and the planks were covered with ice the moment they touched the water. It was not until the morning of the 20th that Rutherford Creek could be crossed. This delay gave Hood a breathing spell, and he reorganized somewhat on the south side of Duck River, selecting a rear guard of about 5000 of the best men remaining in his army. These continued undaunted and firm until the Tennessee was crossed. Duck River presented

twice as great difficulties as Rutherford's Creek, and it was not until the 22d that our troops got on to the south side of the river. The 4th Corps led the way, followed immediately by the cavalry, and the next day pursuit was renewed. Together they kept close upon the heels of the retreating army until the Tennessee River was reached on the morning of the 28th. Here it was found that Hood's rear guard had made good its escape the evening before. It had rained or snowed or frozen, or all three together, every day but two since leaving Nashville. The country through which the cavalry and 4th Corps had been marching for the last four days was utterly destitute, the forage and rations were exhausted, the roads next to impassable, so that it took twelve hours to haul a wagon six miles, and it was impossible to live there twenty-four hours. They were accordingly withdrawn to the line of the railroad, and the cavalry entered upon preparations for its new campaign, which, after the reduction of Selma and Montgomery and Macon, ended with the less important but more dramatic capture of Jefferson Davis.

The captures in the battles of the 15th and 16th of December and in the pursuit which followed amounted to a small army both in men and *matériel*. They consisted of 1 major-general, 7 brigadier-generals, 14 colonels, 10 lieutenant-colonels, 18 majors, 173 captains, 487 lieutenants, 1612 non-commissioned officers, and 6336 privates — in all, 8658 fighting men, with 77 surgeons and chaplains. Besides these, 3112 prisoners were taken in the various operations immediately preceding the battle of Nashville — making a total of 11,857 prisoners from the time Hood crossed the Tennessee River on his northward way till he reassembled his army in Mississippi. In the same time there were received 1521 deserters of all grades — making an aggregate of 15,378 men who fell into General Thomas' hands, besides the vast number of deserters who were never accounted for. There were also captured 72 field guns, over 60 colors, more than 300 wagons, 78 pontoon

boats, 1000 mules, and caissons, limbers, small arms, accoutrements, and ambulances to correspond.

So thoroughly was the destruction of Hood's army accomplished that it was deemed unnecessary longer to retain a large force in Tennessee, or indeed anywhere in that section. The scattered troops, which had been gathered together at Nashville and had there rendered such heroic service to their country under General Thomas' leadership, were soon even more widely scattered than before. The general order issued on the 29th of December announcing the close of the campaign, was hardly distributed when the work of disintegration began; and the various corps, which by the battle-fire of Nashville had been fused into one army, were separated never to meet again. The 23d Corps, accompanied by more than one half the division which Steedman had brought with him from Chattanooga, was forwarded by rail to the seaboard, and afterward joined Sherman in North Carolina; Smith's corps and Knipe's cavalry division were sent to Mobile, and helped to capture that stronghold; the 4th Corps, after a short expedition into East Tennessee, was moved to Texas to help keep the peace on the Mexican frontier; the cavalry corps, reorganized, swept like destruction through Alabama and Georgia. By the time of Lee's surrender at Appomattox there remained in Tennessee only the post garrisons and railroad guards needed to protect the property of the United States.

From Nashville to Bainbridge, where Hood crossed the Tennessee River, is about one hundred and forty miles. The pursuit was made in eleven days. It was midwinter, the greater part of the time the weather was cold and rainy, there was but a single road, so that there was no possibility of getting upon the flank of the retreating army, and there were five considerable streams to cross by pontoons, besides numberless smaller ones to be forded. General Grant complained that the pursuit was slow. From Petersburg to Appomattox Court House the distance is about one hundred

miles — Grant's pursuit of Lee to that point was made in nine days. It was early spring; the greater part of the time the weather was bright and warm; there were several roads running in the same general direction, so that it was possible to gain the enemy's flank, and there were no streams of any magnitude to cross. In the one case the rate of pursuit was thirteen miles a day — in the other, eleven.

In a letter to General Grant, written on the 27th of December, 1864, General Schofield says: "By uniting my troops and Stanley's we were able to hold Hood in check at Columbia and Franklin, until General Thomas could concentrate at Nashville, and also to give Hood his death-blow at Franklin. Subsequent operations have shown how little fight was then left in his army, and have taken that little out of him." As the "subsequent operations" here referred to must mean the battle of Nashville, it is evident that General Schofield intends to convey to General Grant the idea that Hood showed but little fight at that battle. Passing by the singular fact of a commander, who has dealt a "death-blow" to his enemy, running away from him immediately afterward in the night with secrecy and silence, this statement may be challenged on its merits and by comparison. All of Hood's commanders, and himself, insist that they fought bravely and well at Nashville. All of Thomas' commanders, except Schofield, insist that they met with good fighting. If General Schofield declares the contrary, he has only the soldiers of his own corps, to whom he gave so small chance for distinction, to speak for and settle with. Of the 2902 killed and wounded in those two glorious days his own corps, numbering one fifth the numbers engaged, suffered only about one twentieth of the total losses, though it was placed at a critical part of the line on the second day and was intended to accomplish great results. Omitting the single brigade which for an hour or two on the afternoon of the 15th fought bravely, because bravely led, his loss was but 75 out of the remaining 7500 men. It is evident that there

was very little fight left in somebody in the 23d Corps, whatever might be the case with Hood.

But those who fought at Nashville need not fear comparison. History will never cease to extol the heroic bravery of Lee's Army of Northern Virginia during the nine days preceding the surrender at Appomattox Court House, nor the tenacity and courage with which Grant's army followed and fought him. The losses in Grant's army during those nine days were 8216 killed and wounded, being 7.4 per cent of the numbers engaged. The total loss in Thomas' army in the two days at Nashville — including Schofield's corps — was 7 per cent of the total engaged; or, omitting the 23d Corps from all calculations, 8.4 per cent. Surely, if Hood had but little fight in him, still less, by the same token, had Lee in the supreme moments after his evacuation of Petersburg and Richmond. The losses of Grant's army in the Wilderness, on the 5th and 6th days of May, 1864, amounted to a little more than 11 per cent of the total; and during the 8th, 9th, and 10th of the same month, to a little over 7 per cent. Or, if a comparison with General Schofield's own record in battle is preferred, the losses by killed and wounded in General Thomas' army during the two days at Nashville were equal in percentage to Schofield's losses for the whole month of May, 1864, including the battle of Resaca, the only battle in which he was seriously engaged; and were greater, in point of numbers, than in Schofield's whole corps from the beginning of the Atlanta campaign, May 1, 1864, down to and including the battle of Nashville, December 15 and 16, 1864 — seven and a half months of active service in almost daily presence of the enemy. It is humiliating to have to make such comparisons; but when a major-general of the United States Army endeavors to belittle the very actions which are his chief title to distinction, in the vain effort to rob others of their true glory, it is necessary to confront his assertions by such odious methods.

Hood collected the shattered remnants of his demoralized corps at Tupelo, Mississippi, on the Mobile and Ohio Railroad; and on the 13th of January, 1865, a few days less than six months from the time he received the Army of Tennessee, 65,000 strong, from General Joseph E. Johnston, he retired from a command which numbered present for duty less than 15,000 men. The rest were dead, or deserters, or prisoners in our hands. When he left Gadsden on the 24th of October, he had 45,000 men. He was joined by Forrest on the 15th of November with 9000 more, making 54,000 in all. His losses, therefore, from the 27th day of November, the day he reached Duck River on his way to Nashville, to the 27th of December, the day he re-crossed the Tennessee on his disastrous retreat, were nearly 40,000 out of a total of 54,000, about 75 per cent. Some months after, a considerable portion of Forrest's command was collected together, but only to be completely scattered again by Wilson. The figures here given are from official sources, but private correspondence tells the tale more graphically, if not more truly. Captain Freeman, inspector-general of French's division, in a letter to that general, who was on leave of absence, dated at Tupelo, January 10, 1865, says: "Walthall has lost every piece of artillery, and Loring most of his. . . . The second day's fight at Nashville was a perfect rout. . . . The whole army cannot now number 5000 effectives. Great numbers are going home every day, — many never to return, I fear" — and so on.

Yet some life still remained. Nearly four months afterward, on the 1st and 2d days of May, 1865, a little more than 13,000 men, remnants of two of the corps which had constituted a part of the gallant Confederate Army of Tennessee, — an army which had borne a brave and conspicuous part in every action in the Southwest, — in 1862, at Mill Spring, Fort Donelson, Shiloh, Perryville, and Stone's River (or Murfreesboro,) — in 1863, at Chickamauga, Lookout Mountain, and Missionary Ridge, — in 1864, at Resaca, New Hope Church,

Kenesaw, Peach Tree Creek, Atlanta, Jonesboro, Franklin, and Nashville, — often defeated, but never, till Nashville, disheartened, — laid down their arms at Greensboro, North Carolina, and gave their paroles as prisoners of war. They had drifted east little by little, by squads or regiments or brigades, and were now all that could be mustered from the grand aggregate of over 130,000 whose names had been borne on the rolls of that army less than a year before.

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

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
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Erratum.

Page 194, line 24, for
"reliable" read "unreliable."